国际投资条约下知识产权保护的困境及其应对
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摘要
近年来,知识产权的国际保护正日益呈现从"与贸易有关"向"与投资有关"延伸的新趋势。国际投资条约将知识产权纳入"投资"范畴,并通过投资待遇条款和投资者与国家间争端解决机制为知识产权增添了新一层保护。"莫里斯案"与"礼来诉加拿大案"等案件的出现,表明知识产权人正试图更加积极地利用国际投资条约及其仲裁机制来挑战东道国的知识产权政策(措施),在某种程度上导致了国际投资条约与知识产权条约的竞合保护困境,打破了知识产权条约在私权保护与社会福祉之间既已建立的平衡。基于此,调整和改革国际投资条约及其仲裁机制,明确投资条约对知识产权的保护边界,维护东道国知识产权政策(措施)的自主空间成为必要。对投资条约而言,在保护知识产权的同时维持知识产权规则内嵌的弹性机制和限制条款是其今后发展的应有之义。
引文
[1]参见刘笋:《知识产权保护立法的不足及TRIPS协议与国际投资法的关系》,《政法论坛》2001年第2期。
[2]本文所称的国际投资条约,包括双边投资条约(BIT)及含有投资章节的自由贸易协定(FTA)。
[3] See Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant:Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements,Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, p. 871.
[4]本文仅统计可公开获取并已作出裁决的案件。除这些案件外,还有部分涉及东道国知识产权政策的投资仲裁案件未予公开或已经撤案,包括“Erbil Serter诉法国案”(涉及船型设计版权)、“Gilead Science诉乌克兰案”(涉及丙型肝炎药品专利)、“Shell Brands诉尼加拉瓜案”(涉及壳牌石油公司商标权)等案件。此外,也有一些投资仲裁案件虽部分涉及知识产权,但并不直接与东道国的知识产权政策相关,这包括“Joseph Charles Lemire诉乌克兰案”“Generation Ukraine诉乌克兰案”“AHS诉尼日尔案”“MHS诉马来西亚案”“Grand River Enterprises Six Nations诉美国案”等案件。
[5]参见梁志文:《药品专利链接制度的移植与创制》,《政治与法律》2017年第8期。
[6]See Apotex Inc. v. The Government of the United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 14June 2013.
[7]See Philip Morris Brands Sàrl,Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, 19 February 2010.
[8]Supra note[7], Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 July 2013.
[9]Ibid, Award, 8 July 2016.
[10] See Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration,21 November 2011.
[11]Ibid, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 17 December 2015.
[12]See Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration, 12September 2013.
[13]Supra note[12],Final Award, 16 March 2017.
[14]See Gabriele Gagliani, International Economic Disputes, Investment Arbitration and Intellectual Property:Common Descent and Technical Problems, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 51,2017, p. 346.
[15]参见田晓萍:《国际投资协定中知识产权保护的路径及法律效果——以“礼来药企案”为视角》,《政法论丛》2016年第1期。
[16]需要注意的是,根据《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(CPTPP)第2条及其附件的规定,TPP中有关扩大可专利性客体的规定被“暂停适用”,除非缔约国协议终止暂停适用。
[17]同前注[3],Bryan Mercurio文,第876~877页。
[18]See Dany Khayat&William Ahern, Reliance on Investment Treaty Standards to Claim for Failures to Recognize or Protect Intellectual Property Rights, BCDR International Arbitration Review, Vol. 3,2016, pp. 406-409.
[19]See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber, Application No. 73049/01, Judgment,11 January 2007.
[20] See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 161.
[21]同前注[6],第206~225段。
[22] See Carlos Correa&Jorge E. Vinuales, Intellectual Property Rights as Protected Investments:How Open are the Gates?, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19,2016, pp. 91-120.
[23]See Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 51-52.
[24]See Sigfrid Fina&Gabriel M. Lentner, The European Union's New Generation of International Investment Agreements and Its Implications for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Journal ofWorld Investment&Trade, Vol. 18,2017, pp. 284-285.
[25]See Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 35,2014, pp. 1126-1127.
[26]Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention:A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 128.
[27]参见张建邦:《国际投资条约知识产权保护制度的现代转型研究》,《中国法学》2013年第4期。
[28]See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment:A Sequel, United Nations Publication, 2012, p. 10.
[29] See Kathleen Liddell&Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Judicial Patent Decisions, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19,2016, pp. 145-174.
[30]See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration:The Case of Indirect Expropriation,American University International Law Review, Vol. 25,2010, pp. 419-422.
[31]See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Challenging Compliance with International Intellectual Property Norms in Investor-state Dispute Settlement, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19, 2016, pp. 267-270.
[32]See Anthony Sinclair, Umbrella Clause, in Marc Bungenberg et al.(eds.), International Investment Law, Beck/Hart/Nomos,2015, pp. 944-947.
[33]参见何艳:《美国投资协定中的知识产权保护问题研究》,《知识产权》2013年第9期。
[34]参见韩静雅:《技术转让要求规制新趋势下的中国因应》,《广东社会科学》2017年第3期。
[35] See James Gathii&Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Law Making and Enforcement From the WTO to the International Investment Regime, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology, Vol. 18,2017, p. 474.
[36]参见何艳:《涉公共利益知识产权投资争端解决机制的反思与重构》,《环球法律评论》2018年第4期。
[37] See United States-US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1, Request for Consultations by Brazil, 7 February 2001; WT/DS224/2, Request to Joint Consultations-Communication from India, 19 February 2001.
[38]See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,Investment Law and Intellectual Property Rights,同前注[32],Marc Bungenberg等编书,第1693页。
[39]《TRIPS协定》规定的灵活性得到了国际社会的普遍认可。世界知识产权组织在其《多边法律框架中与专利有关的灵活性及其在国家和地区立法中的落实》报告中,对《TRIPS协定》中关于专利的灵活性进行了详尽的列举。See WIPO, Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels, CDIP/5/4 Rev.,http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=153559, last visit on 30 October 2018.
[40]See Rochelle Dreyfuss&Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset:How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 36,2015, p. 566.
[41] Supra note[7], Award, 8 July 2016, para. 583.
[42]同前注[35],James Gathii、Cynthia Ho文,第436页。
[43]See Gilead Sciences Inc. v. Ukraine, Settlement Agreement(not public), 25 January 2017.
[44]See Luke Eric Peterson&Zoe Williams, Pharma Corp Withdraws Investment Arbitration After Ukraine Government Agrees to Settlement of Dispute over Monopoly Rights to Market Anti-viral Drug, Investment Arbitration Reporter, 16 March 2017.
[45]事实上,国家为了避免诉累而调整或放弃投资管制措施的事例并不鲜见。例如,肯尼亚等国由于受到外国烟草商的诉讼及仲裁威胁而对控烟立法犹像不决。See Cynthia M. Ho, A Collision Between TRIPS Flexibilities and Investor-State Proceedings, UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 6,2016, p. 411.
[46]参见黄世席:《国际投资仲裁中的挑选条约问题》,《法学》2014年第1期。
[47] See Simon Klopschinski, The WTOs DSU Article 23 as Guiding Principle for the Systemic Interpretation of International Investment Agreements in the Light of TRIPS, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19,2016, pp. 211-239.
[48] See United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, paras. 362-362.
[49]同前注[31],Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan文,第250页。
[50] See Australia-Tobacco Plain Packaging, WT/DS435, WT/DS441, WT/DS458, WT/DS467, Panel Reports, 19 July 2018.
[51]欧盟与新加坡投资保护协定的附件三“征收与知识产权”中亦有类似之规定。TPP虽未明确将征收条款与知识产权条约“脱钩”,但其附件9-B对征收的认定进行了排除性规定:除极少数情况外,一缔约方旨在并用于保护公共健康、安全、环境等合法公共福利目标的非歧视性管制措施不构成间接征收。TPP在其注释中对公共健康的管制措施进行了详细列举,包括但不限于与药物、诊断方法、疫苗、医疗设备、基因疗法和技术、健康援助和器械以及血液和血液制品的监管、定价、供应和报销有关的措施。
[52]参见欧盟与新加坡投资保护协定的第2.4条第7款、欧盟与越南自由贸易协定的投资章第2节第14.6条、TPP第9.6条第3款中亦有类似之规定。
[53]See Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare? Intellectual Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment Agreements, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 6,2015, pp. 262-263.
[54]See Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, American University Law Review, Vol. 66,2017, p.829.
[55]参见徐树:《国际投资仲裁中滥诉防范机制的构建》,《法学》2017年第5期。
[56]同前注[35],James Gathii、Cynthia Ho文,第482页。
[57]投资仲裁的“正当性危机”表现在多个方面,包括仲裁裁决之间的不一致性、对公共利益的忽视、对投资者利益的偏私等。See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, 2005, pp.1521-1625; Michael Waibel et al.(eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and Reality, Kluwer Law International, 2010.
[58]截至目前,已有加拿大、澳大利亚、日本、墨西哥、新西兰及新加坡等6国批准了该协定。
[59]See Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, American Journal of International Law, Vol.112,2018, p.410.
[60]参见王燕:《国际投资仲裁机制改革的美欧制度之争》,《环球法律评论》2017年第2期。
[61]近年来,由于美国单方面阻挠WTO上诉机构成员的遴选,使上诉机构面临“瘫痪”的风险。为了恢复WTO争端解决机制的正常运转,WTO成员正在积极谈判推进WTO改革。在此背景下,有必要思考是否存在WTO机制之外的其他替代性机制。有学者指出,现行的投资仲裁机制与WTO争端解决机制均非解决知识产权投资争端的理想途径,并建议设立专门的争端解决机构。在具体制度设计方面,其主张国家间机制相比投资者与国家间机制更有优势和可取性,应借鉴WTO机制建构知识产权投资争端的国家间解决机制。还有学者建议整合贸易规则与投资规则,将WTO争端解决机制升级为世界贸易与投资争端解决机制。应予说明的是,WTO争端解决机制的改革以国际社会的政治共识为前提,其改革前景尚不明朗,在达成最终改革方案之前,WTO争端解决机构仍将是解释和适用《TRIPS协定》的首要机构。同前注[36],何艳文;杨国华:《论世界贸易与投资组织的构建》,《武大国际法评论》2018年第1期。
[62]See Brooks E. Allen&Tommaso Soave, Jurisdictional Overlap in WTO Dispute Settlement and Investment Arbitration,Arbitration International, Vol.30,2014, pp.7-8.
[63]参见马尔蒂·科斯肯涅米:《国际法不成体系问题:国际法多样化和扩展引起的困难》,国际法委员会研究组报告,A/CN.4/L.682,第44~45段。
[64]同前注[47],Simon Klopschinski文,第238~239页。
[65]See Lawrence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 29,2004, p. 1.
[66]同前注[54],PeterK. Yu文,第910页。
[67]同前注[24],Sigfrid Fina、Gabriel M. Lentner文,第289~300页。
[68]同前注[53],Bryan Mercurio文,第273~274页。
[2]本文所称的国际投资条约,包括双边投资条约(BIT)及含有投资章节的自由贸易协定(FTA)。
[3] See Bryan Mercurio, Awakening the Sleeping Giant:Intellectual Property Rights in International Investment Agreements,Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2012, p. 871.
[4]本文仅统计可公开获取并已作出裁决的案件。除这些案件外,还有部分涉及东道国知识产权政策的投资仲裁案件未予公开或已经撤案,包括“Erbil Serter诉法国案”(涉及船型设计版权)、“Gilead Science诉乌克兰案”(涉及丙型肝炎药品专利)、“Shell Brands诉尼加拉瓜案”(涉及壳牌石油公司商标权)等案件。此外,也有一些投资仲裁案件虽部分涉及知识产权,但并不直接与东道国的知识产权政策相关,这包括“Joseph Charles Lemire诉乌克兰案”“Generation Ukraine诉乌克兰案”“AHS诉尼日尔案”“MHS诉马来西亚案”“Grand River Enterprises Six Nations诉美国案”等案件。
[5]参见梁志文:《药品专利链接制度的移植与创制》,《政治与法律》2017年第8期。
[6]See Apotex Inc. v. The Government of the United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 14June 2013.
[7]See Philip Morris Brands Sàrl,Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, 19 February 2010.
[8]Supra note[7], Decision on Jurisdiction, 2 July 2013.
[9]Ibid, Award, 8 July 2016.
[10] See Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-12, Notice of Arbitration,21 November 2011.
[11]Ibid, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 17 December 2015.
[12]See Eli Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration, 12September 2013.
[13]Supra note[12],Final Award, 16 March 2017.
[14]See Gabriele Gagliani, International Economic Disputes, Investment Arbitration and Intellectual Property:Common Descent and Technical Problems, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 51,2017, p. 346.
[15]参见田晓萍:《国际投资协定中知识产权保护的路径及法律效果——以“礼来药企案”为视角》,《政法论丛》2016年第1期。
[16]需要注意的是,根据《全面与进步跨太平洋伙伴关系协定》(CPTPP)第2条及其附件的规定,TPP中有关扩大可专利性客体的规定被“暂停适用”,除非缔约国协议终止暂停适用。
[17]同前注[3],Bryan Mercurio文,第876~877页。
[18]See Dany Khayat&William Ahern, Reliance on Investment Treaty Standards to Claim for Failures to Recognize or Protect Intellectual Property Rights, BCDR International Arbitration Review, Vol. 3,2016, pp. 406-409.
[19]See Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber, Application No. 73049/01, Judgment,11 January 2007.
[20] See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property in International Law, Oxford University Press, p. 161.
[21]同前注[6],第206~225段。
[22] See Carlos Correa&Jorge E. Vinuales, Intellectual Property Rights as Protected Investments:How Open are the Gates?, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19,2016, pp. 91-120.
[23]See Salini v. Morocco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, paras. 51-52.
[24]See Sigfrid Fina&Gabriel M. Lentner, The European Union's New Generation of International Investment Agreements and Its Implications for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Journal ofWorld Investment&Trade, Vol. 18,2017, pp. 284-285.
[25]See Ruth L. Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the International Intellectual Property System, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 35,2014, pp. 1126-1127.
[26]Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention:A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 128.
[27]参见张建邦:《国际投资条约知识产权保护制度的现代转型研究》,《中国法学》2013年第4期。
[28]See UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment:A Sequel, United Nations Publication, 2012, p. 10.
[29] See Kathleen Liddell&Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable Treatment and Judicial Patent Decisions, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19,2016, pp. 145-174.
[30]See Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration:The Case of Indirect Expropriation,American University International Law Review, Vol. 25,2010, pp. 419-422.
[31]See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Challenging Compliance with International Intellectual Property Norms in Investor-state Dispute Settlement, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19, 2016, pp. 267-270.
[32]See Anthony Sinclair, Umbrella Clause, in Marc Bungenberg et al.(eds.), International Investment Law, Beck/Hart/Nomos,2015, pp. 944-947.
[33]参见何艳:《美国投资协定中的知识产权保护问题研究》,《知识产权》2013年第9期。
[34]参见韩静雅:《技术转让要求规制新趋势下的中国因应》,《广东社会科学》2017年第3期。
[35] See James Gathii&Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Law Making and Enforcement From the WTO to the International Investment Regime, Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology, Vol. 18,2017, p. 474.
[36]参见何艳:《涉公共利益知识产权投资争端解决机制的反思与重构》,《环球法律评论》2018年第4期。
[37] See United States-US Patents Code, WT/DS224/1, Request for Consultations by Brazil, 7 February 2001; WT/DS224/2, Request to Joint Consultations-Communication from India, 19 February 2001.
[38]See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan,Investment Law and Intellectual Property Rights,同前注[32],Marc Bungenberg等编书,第1693页。
[39]《TRIPS协定》规定的灵活性得到了国际社会的普遍认可。世界知识产权组织在其《多边法律框架中与专利有关的灵活性及其在国家和地区立法中的落实》报告中,对《TRIPS协定》中关于专利的灵活性进行了详尽的列举。See WIPO, Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels, CDIP/5/4 Rev.,http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=153559, last visit on 30 October 2018.
[40]See Rochelle Dreyfuss&Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset:How International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 36,2015, p. 566.
[41] Supra note[7], Award, 8 July 2016, para. 583.
[42]同前注[35],James Gathii、Cynthia Ho文,第436页。
[43]See Gilead Sciences Inc. v. Ukraine, Settlement Agreement(not public), 25 January 2017.
[44]See Luke Eric Peterson&Zoe Williams, Pharma Corp Withdraws Investment Arbitration After Ukraine Government Agrees to Settlement of Dispute over Monopoly Rights to Market Anti-viral Drug, Investment Arbitration Reporter, 16 March 2017.
[45]事实上,国家为了避免诉累而调整或放弃投资管制措施的事例并不鲜见。例如,肯尼亚等国由于受到外国烟草商的诉讼及仲裁威胁而对控烟立法犹像不决。See Cynthia M. Ho, A Collision Between TRIPS Flexibilities and Investor-State Proceedings, UC Irvine Law Review, Vol. 6,2016, p. 411.
[46]参见黄世席:《国际投资仲裁中的挑选条约问题》,《法学》2014年第1期。
[47] See Simon Klopschinski, The WTOs DSU Article 23 as Guiding Principle for the Systemic Interpretation of International Investment Agreements in the Light of TRIPS, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 19,2016, pp. 211-239.
[48] See United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R, paras. 362-362.
[49]同前注[31],Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan文,第250页。
[50] See Australia-Tobacco Plain Packaging, WT/DS435, WT/DS441, WT/DS458, WT/DS467, Panel Reports, 19 July 2018.
[51]欧盟与新加坡投资保护协定的附件三“征收与知识产权”中亦有类似之规定。TPP虽未明确将征收条款与知识产权条约“脱钩”,但其附件9-B对征收的认定进行了排除性规定:除极少数情况外,一缔约方旨在并用于保护公共健康、安全、环境等合法公共福利目标的非歧视性管制措施不构成间接征收。TPP在其注释中对公共健康的管制措施进行了详细列举,包括但不限于与药物、诊断方法、疫苗、医疗设备、基因疗法和技术、健康援助和器械以及血液和血液制品的监管、定价、供应和报销有关的措施。
[52]参见欧盟与新加坡投资保护协定的第2.4条第7款、欧盟与越南自由贸易协定的投资章第2节第14.6条、TPP第9.6条第3款中亦有类似之规定。
[53]See Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare? Intellectual Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment Agreements, Journal of International Dispute Settlement, Vol. 6,2015, pp. 262-263.
[54]See Peter K. Yu, The Investment-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, American University Law Review, Vol. 66,2017, p.829.
[55]参见徐树:《国际投资仲裁中滥诉防范机制的构建》,《法学》2017年第5期。
[56]同前注[35],James Gathii、Cynthia Ho文,第482页。
[57]投资仲裁的“正当性危机”表现在多个方面,包括仲裁裁决之间的不一致性、对公共利益的忽视、对投资者利益的偏私等。See Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, 2005, pp.1521-1625; Michael Waibel et al.(eds.), The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration:Perceptions and Reality, Kluwer Law International, 2010.
[58]截至目前,已有加拿大、澳大利亚、日本、墨西哥、新西兰及新加坡等6国批准了该协定。
[59]See Anthea Roberts, Incremental, Systemic and Paradigmatic Reform of Investor-State Arbitration, American Journal of International Law, Vol.112,2018, p.410.
[60]参见王燕:《国际投资仲裁机制改革的美欧制度之争》,《环球法律评论》2017年第2期。
[61]近年来,由于美国单方面阻挠WTO上诉机构成员的遴选,使上诉机构面临“瘫痪”的风险。为了恢复WTO争端解决机制的正常运转,WTO成员正在积极谈判推进WTO改革。在此背景下,有必要思考是否存在WTO机制之外的其他替代性机制。有学者指出,现行的投资仲裁机制与WTO争端解决机制均非解决知识产权投资争端的理想途径,并建议设立专门的争端解决机构。在具体制度设计方面,其主张国家间机制相比投资者与国家间机制更有优势和可取性,应借鉴WTO机制建构知识产权投资争端的国家间解决机制。还有学者建议整合贸易规则与投资规则,将WTO争端解决机制升级为世界贸易与投资争端解决机制。应予说明的是,WTO争端解决机制的改革以国际社会的政治共识为前提,其改革前景尚不明朗,在达成最终改革方案之前,WTO争端解决机构仍将是解释和适用《TRIPS协定》的首要机构。同前注[36],何艳文;杨国华:《论世界贸易与投资组织的构建》,《武大国际法评论》2018年第1期。
[62]See Brooks E. Allen&Tommaso Soave, Jurisdictional Overlap in WTO Dispute Settlement and Investment Arbitration,Arbitration International, Vol.30,2014, pp.7-8.
[63]参见马尔蒂·科斯肯涅米:《国际法不成体系问题:国际法多样化和扩展引起的困难》,国际法委员会研究组报告,A/CN.4/L.682,第44~45段。
[64]同前注[47],Simon Klopschinski文,第238~239页。
[65]See Lawrence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 29,2004, p. 1.
[66]同前注[54],PeterK. Yu文,第910页。
[67]同前注[24],Sigfrid Fina、Gabriel M. Lentner文,第289~300页。
[68]同前注[53],Bryan Mercurio文,第273~274页。