管理者过度自信、盈余管理与企业绩效——基于企业产权异质性视角
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摘要
依据行为金融学和心理学的相关理论,选取2012-2016年间沪深股市2385家企业的面板数据为样本,以企业产权异质为研究视角,将管理者过度自信、盈余管理程度及企业绩效放在同一个理论框架下,运用实证方法分析了三者之间内在的逻辑关系,结果发现:企业的盈余管理行为越多,其绩效水平则会越差,而且这种关系在盈余程度较强的企业中表现的更加明显;进一步研究发现,管理者过度自信行为,能够增强盈余管理对企业绩效的负向影响,而且国有企业较非国有企业,这种关系表现的更明显。
In the enterprise, the manager's mentality and emotions will affect their psychological judgment and behavioral decision once they exceed the general confidence level. In this regard, based on the relevant theories of behavioral finance and psychology, this paper selects the panel data of 2,385 companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2016 as a sample, taking the heterogeneity of corporate property as a research perspective, and over-confidence and earnings management. Enterprise performance is placed under the same theoretical framework, using empirical methods to analyze the inherent logical relationship between the three. The results show that the more the company's earnings management behavior, the worse its performance level, and this relationship will be more obvious in enterprises with a higher surplus. Later, the extended research found that managers' overconfidence behavior can enhance the negative impact of earnings management on corporate performance, and the relationship between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises will be more obvious.
In the enterprise, the manager's mentality and emotions will affect their psychological judgment and behavioral decision once they exceed the general confidence level. In this regard, based on the relevant theories of behavioral finance and psychology, this paper selects the panel data of 2,385 companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2012 to 2016 as a sample, taking the heterogeneity of corporate property as a research perspective, and over-confidence and earnings management. Enterprise performance is placed under the same theoretical framework, using empirical methods to analyze the inherent logical relationship between the three. The results show that the more the company's earnings management behavior, the worse its performance level, and this relationship will be more obvious in enterprises with a higher surplus. Later, the extended research found that managers' overconfidence behavior can enhance the negative impact of earnings management on corporate performance, and the relationship between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises will be more obvious.
引文
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[22]王克敏, 王志超. 高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 管理世界, 2007(7):111-119.
[23]谢盛纹,刘杨晖.高管权力、产权性质与盈余持续性[J].华东经济管理,2015(12):112-116.
[24]王素莲,柴顺天.企业家风险偏好、产权性质与公司盈余质量—以制造业上市公司为例[J].会计之友,2016(12):53-58.
[25]刘凤委,汪辉,孙铮.股权性质与公司业绩—基于盈余管理基础上的经验分析[J].财经研究,2005(6):97-105.
[26]陈红,胡耀丹,余怒涛.盈余管理、高管薪酬—业绩敏感性与内部控制治理效应[J].贵州财经大学学报,2016(4):45-56.
[2]李心合. 财务理论范式革命与财务学的制度主义思考[J]. 会计研究, 2002(7):3-10.
[3]Hall, B.J., Murphy, K,J. Stock options for undiversified emerging[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2002(1):3-42.
[4]Heaton, J.B. Managerial optimism and corporate finance[J]. Financial Management, 2002(2):33-45.
[5]史永东,朱广印.管理者过度自信与企业并购行为的实证研究[J].金融评论,2010(2):73-82.
[6]何威风,刘启亮,刘永丽.管理者过度自信与企业盈余管理行为研究[J].投资研究,2011(11):73-90.
[7]Davidson, W.N., Dan L.W., Lee, C.I. Stock market reactions to announced corporate illegalities[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 1994(12):979-987.
[8]李增福,郑友环,连玉君.股权再融资、盈余管理与上市公司业绩滑坡——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控方式下的研究[J].中国管理科学,2011(12): 49-56.
[9]杨萍,董军.企业社会责任担当的经济伦理分析[J].现代管理科学,2009(8):88-90.
[10]王福胜,吉姗姗,程富.盈余管理对上市公司未来经营业绩的影响研究——基于应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理比较视角[J].南开管理评论,2014(17):95-98.
[11]杨彩虹.企业生命周期、盈余管理与公司绩效[J].会计之友,2018(11):42-50.
[12]靳珊.风险投资资本介入、IPO盈余管理与企业绩效[J].财会通讯,2018(6):51-55.
[13]张荣武,刘文秀.管理者过度自信与盈余管理的实证研究[J].财经理论与实践,2008(1):72-77.
[14]罗进, 李延喜. 管理者过度自信、业绩滑坡与盈余管理[J]. 财会月刊, 2012(36):6-9.
[15]吴江玲. 管理者过度自信、企业盈余管理与企业财务困境关系研究[J]. 新会计, 2015(12):19-23.
[16]刘文秀. 管理者过度自信与盈余管理的实证研究[D]. 长沙:湖南大学硕士学位论文, 2008.
[17]Dechow, P.M., Sloan, R.G., Sweeney, A.P. Detecting earnings management[J]. Accounting Review, 1995(2):193-225.
[18]冯丽艳,肖翔,张靖. 企业社会责任与盈余管理治理——基于盈余管理方式和动机的综合分析[J]. 重庆大学学报(社会科学版),2016(6):79-87.
[19]Hayward, M.L.A., Hambrick, D.C. Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris.[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997(1):103-127.
[20]Brown, R., Sarma, N. CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions[J]. Journal of Economics & Business, 2007(5):358-379.
[21]姜付秀,张敏,陆正飞.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究, 2009(1):131-143.
[22]王克敏, 王志超. 高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J]. 管理世界, 2007(7):111-119.
[23]谢盛纹,刘杨晖.高管权力、产权性质与盈余持续性[J].华东经济管理,2015(12):112-116.
[24]王素莲,柴顺天.企业家风险偏好、产权性质与公司盈余质量—以制造业上市公司为例[J].会计之友,2016(12):53-58.
[25]刘凤委,汪辉,孙铮.股权性质与公司业绩—基于盈余管理基础上的经验分析[J].财经研究,2005(6):97-105.
[26]陈红,胡耀丹,余怒涛.盈余管理、高管薪酬—业绩敏感性与内部控制治理效应[J].贵州财经大学学报,2016(4):45-56.