管理者权力与企业风险承担——来自中国上市公司的经验证据
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摘要
通过理论分析和实证检验,本文研究了公司管理者综合权力以及管理者权力的不同维度对企业风险承担的影响,以此深入解析管理者权力对企业风险承担行为的作用机制。研究结果表明,管理者综合权力对企业风险承担存在显著的抑制作用,管理者权力越大越会抑制企业风险承担行为;不同于管理者权力其他维度的权力,管理者组织权力显著提升企业风险承担水平,管理者两职兼任的企业风险承担行为更多;管理者所有权权力,专家权力,声誉权力与管理者综合权力对于企业风险承担水平存在显著的抑制作用。这意味着,为了促进积极的企业风险承担水平,加快企业资本的积累,要对管理者权力不同纬度的权力进行合理的配置,可以考虑提升管理者组织权力的同时降低管理者其他维度的权力,从而提升企业风险承担水平。
The paper studied the influence of the company's managerial power and the different dimensions of managerial power on the company's corporate risk-taking through theoretical analysis and empirical test These deeply analyzed the action mechanism of the managerial power on the corporate risk-taking behavior.It is pointed that:Comprehensive managerial power exerts a significant inhibitory effect on the corporate risk-taking.The greater managerial power,the more inhibition of corporate risk-taking.The organization power is different from other dimensions power of managerial power.The duality of manager significantly promotes the increase of the corporate risk-taking level.Ownership power,expert power,reputation power of managers and managerial power all play a significant inhibitory role in the level of corporate risk-taking.The results indicate that in order to promote the improvement of corporate risk-taking level and accelerate the accumulation of enterprise capital,it is necessary to reasonably allocate the managerial power at different latitude.The owners can consider to improve organizational power and reduce the Power in other dimensions which can be achieved to improve the level of corporate risk-taking.
The paper studied the influence of the company's managerial power and the different dimensions of managerial power on the company's corporate risk-taking through theoretical analysis and empirical test These deeply analyzed the action mechanism of the managerial power on the corporate risk-taking behavior.It is pointed that:Comprehensive managerial power exerts a significant inhibitory effect on the corporate risk-taking.The greater managerial power,the more inhibition of corporate risk-taking.The organization power is different from other dimensions power of managerial power.The duality of manager significantly promotes the increase of the corporate risk-taking level.Ownership power,expert power,reputation power of managers and managerial power all play a significant inhibitory role in the level of corporate risk-taking.The results indicate that in order to promote the improvement of corporate risk-taking level and accelerate the accumulation of enterprise capital,it is necessary to reasonably allocate the managerial power at different latitude.The owners can consider to improve organizational power and reduce the Power in other dimensions which can be achieved to improve the level of corporate risk-taking.
引文
[1] 吕长江,赵宇恒.国有企业管理者激励效应研究——基于管理者权力的解释[J].管理世界,2008(11):99-109+188.
[2] 夏芸.管理者权力、股权激励与研发投资——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].研究与发展管理,2014,26(04):12-22.
[3] 张丽平,杨兴全.管理者权力、管理层激励与过度投资[J].软科学,2012,26(10):107-112.
[4] 刘锦,王学军,张三保,等.CEO非正式权力、正式权力与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的证据[J].管理评论,2015,27(11):161-169.
[5] 代彬,彭程.高管控制权、资本扩张与企业财务风险——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2012(05):20-30.
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[9] 赵纯祥,张敦力.市场竞争视角下的管理者权力和企业投资关系研究[J].会计研究,2013(10):67-74+97.
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[11] 王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(07):111-119.
[12] 吕文栋,刘巍,何威风.管理者异质性与企业风险承担[J].中国软科学,2015(12):120-133.
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[21] 余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J]. 金融研究,2013(01):149-163.
[22] 李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担[J].中国工业经济,2012(12):115-127.
[23] Amihud Y and Lev B.Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(02):605-617.
[24] Bargeron,L L,Lehn K,Zutter C.Sarbane-oxley and corporate risk-taking[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49(01):34-52.
[25] John K,Litov L,Yeung B.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,3(04):1679-1728.
[26] 徐明东,陈学彬.货币环境、资本充足率与商业银行风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(07):50-62+489.
[27] 江曙霞,陈玉婵.货币政策、银行资本与风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(04):1-16.
[28] Faccio M,Marchica M,Mura R.Large shareholder diversification and corporate risk-Taking[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011(11):3601-3641.
[29] Kim E H,Lu Y.CEO ownership,external governance,and risk-taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(02):272-292.
[30] Anderson R C,Reeb D M.Founding-family ownership,ownership,corporate diversification,and firm leverage [J].Journal of Law and Economics,2003,46(02):653-684.
[31] Drucker P F.Innovation and entrepreneurship:practice and principles[J].Public Productivity Review,1986,10(01):105-109.
[32] 况学文,陈俊.董事会性别多元化、管理者权力与审计需求[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(06):48-56.
[33] 卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效[J].南方经济,2007(02):60-70.
[34] 赵纯祥,罗飞.市场竞争、管理者权力与薪酬粘性[J].当代财经,2013(10):76-85.
[35] 刘星,徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012,34(01):86-102.
[36] 代彬,刘星,郝颖.高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2011(04):90-98+127.
[37] Allen M P.Managerial power and tenure in the large corporation[J].Social Forces,1981,60(02):482-494.
[38] Miller D,Shamsie J.Learning across the life cycle:experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads[J].Strategic Management Journal,2001,22(08):725-745.
[39] 初春虹,叶陈刚,申斐.高管权力与企业并购绩效研究——基于产权性质视角[J].软科学,2016,30(12):95-99.
[2] 夏芸.管理者权力、股权激励与研发投资——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].研究与发展管理,2014,26(04):12-22.
[3] 张丽平,杨兴全.管理者权力、管理层激励与过度投资[J].软科学,2012,26(10):107-112.
[4] 刘锦,王学军,张三保,等.CEO非正式权力、正式权力与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的证据[J].管理评论,2015,27(11):161-169.
[5] 代彬,彭程.高管控制权、资本扩张与企业财务风险——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].经济与管理研究,2012(05):20-30.
[6] 权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010,45(11):73-87.
[7] 张丽平,杨兴全.管理者权力、外部薪酬差距与公司业绩[J].财经科学,2013(04):66-75.
[8] 熊婷,程博,潘飞.CEO权力、产品市场竞争与公司研发投入[J].山西财经大学学报,2016,38(05):56-68.
[9] 赵纯祥,张敦力.市场竞争视角下的管理者权力和企业投资关系研究[J].会计研究,2013(10):67-74+97.
[10] 左晶晶,钟迪.CEO管理者权力与公司创新投资——基于中国制造业上市公司与交互效应模型的研究[J].中国人力资源开发,2016(15):28-35+56.
[11] 王克敏,王志超.高管控制权、报酬与盈余管理——基于中国上市公司的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007(07):111-119.
[12] 吕文栋,刘巍,何威风.管理者异质性与企业风险承担[J].中国软科学,2015(12):120-133.
[13] Acemoglu D,Zilibotti F.Was prometheus unbound by chance? Risk,diversification and growth[J].Journal of Political Economy,1997,106(04):709-761.
[14] John K,et al.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,63(04):1679-1728.
[15] Rabe W F.Managerial power[J].California Management Review,1962(03):31-39.
[16] Finkelstein S.Power in top management teams:dimensions,measurement,and validation[J].Academy of Management Journal,1992,35:505-538.
[17] Adams R B,Almeida H,Ferreira D.Powerful CEOs and their impact on corporate performance[J].Review Of Financial Studies,2005,18(04),1403-1432.
[18] Kini O,Williams R.Tournament incentives,firm risk,and corporate policies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2012,103(02):350-376.
[19] Lewellyn K B,Muller K M I.CEO power and risktaking:evidence from the subprime lending industry [J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2012,20(03):289-307.
[20] 李海霞,王振山.CEO 权力与公司风险承担:基于投资者保护的调节效应研究[J]. 经济管理,2015(08):12-27.
[21] 余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担[J]. 金融研究,2013(01):149-163.
[22] 李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担[J].中国工业经济,2012(12):115-127.
[23] Amihud Y and Lev B.Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers[J].Bell Journal of Economics,1981,12(02):605-617.
[24] Bargeron,L L,Lehn K,Zutter C.Sarbane-oxley and corporate risk-taking[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,49(01):34-52.
[25] John K,Litov L,Yeung B.Corporate governance and risk-taking[J].The Journal of Finance,2008,3(04):1679-1728.
[26] 徐明东,陈学彬.货币环境、资本充足率与商业银行风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(07):50-62+489.
[27] 江曙霞,陈玉婵.货币政策、银行资本与风险承担[J].金融研究,2012(04):1-16.
[28] Faccio M,Marchica M,Mura R.Large shareholder diversification and corporate risk-Taking[J].Review of Financial Studies,2011(11):3601-3641.
[29] Kim E H,Lu Y.CEO ownership,external governance,and risk-taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(02):272-292.
[30] Anderson R C,Reeb D M.Founding-family ownership,ownership,corporate diversification,and firm leverage [J].Journal of Law and Economics,2003,46(02):653-684.
[31] Drucker P F.Innovation and entrepreneurship:practice and principles[J].Public Productivity Review,1986,10(01):105-109.
[32] 况学文,陈俊.董事会性别多元化、管理者权力与审计需求[J].南开管理评论,2011,14(06):48-56.
[33] 卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效[J].南方经济,2007(02):60-70.
[34] 赵纯祥,罗飞.市场竞争、管理者权力与薪酬粘性[J].当代财经,2013(10):76-85.
[35] 刘星,徐光伟.政府管制、管理层权力与国企高管薪酬刚性[J].经济科学,2012,34(01):86-102.
[36] 代彬,刘星,郝颖.高管权力、薪酬契约与国企改革——来自国有上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2011(04):90-98+127.
[37] Allen M P.Managerial power and tenure in the large corporation[J].Social Forces,1981,60(02):482-494.
[38] Miller D,Shamsie J.Learning across the life cycle:experimentation and performance among the hollywood studio heads[J].Strategic Management Journal,2001,22(08):725-745.
[39] 初春虹,叶陈刚,申斐.高管权力与企业并购绩效研究——基于产权性质视角[J].软科学,2016,30(12):95-99.