我国经营者集中的反垄断审查与执法者的“行为性救济”偏好分析——兼论专利密集领域的执法困境
|
摘要
防止经营者集中活动对市场竞争效率的潜在危害,是各国反垄断立法、执法的主要目标,结构性和行为性救济就是对这类行为的主要干预方式。本文利用手动汇总的经营者集中案件数据库(2008—2016年),对我国商务部反垄断局的救济决定及其行为化偏好进行了初步的计量检验,主要发现有:救济与否的决定与兼并案件关联市场的集中度、参与者市场份额、是否纵向兼并和股权收购的比例显著正相关;一个兼并活动被施加行为性救济的力度则与所在行业的网络特性、参与者的市场占有率和股权收购比例有关联。这表明,商务部的经营者集中救济行为基本上符合我国反垄断法设定的"单边效应"和"协调效应"原则。本文对专利密集型产业执法实践的案例分析,也揭示出在反垄断法执行权力分割配置的背景下,行为性救济低效或无效的事实和成因。基于此,建议统一和集中三个反垄断执法部门的权责范围,并制定公开、透明和可实施的救济机制,强化竞争中性原则的应用。
The anti-monopoly law(AML) of China plays a key role in maintaining fair market competition. In 2015, the central government laid out general requirements for "strengthening market price supervision and anti-monopoly law enforcement and gradually establishing the basic status of competition policy" to reform and adjust the AML's enforcement system, legislative principles, and implementation guidelines. Therefore, empirical research on the effects of the AML's implementation is of significant theoretical and practical value. Following enactment of the AML, the Ministry of Commerce(MOFCOM) received 1,731 merger cases from 2008 to 2016, of which 1702 were approved unconditionally and 27 with conditions; two were prohibited. This paper initially explores three interrelated issues through both quantitative testing and representative case studies:(1) What factors does the MOFCOM consider in regulating mergers?(2) Is there a certain preference in the choice of regulatory approach?(3) Does this tendency influence the effects of the AML's implementation?To answer these questions, we collected micro-data from the centralized review and relief documents of the MOFCOM and formed a database involving 86 merger cases(71 being equity acquisitions) and more than 10 variables, including industrial structure, M&A characteristics, and relief methods. This paper uses probit and negative binomial regression models to analyze the MOFCOM's remedy decisions in the merger database. The findings reveal that(1) the market's concentration and changes in market share dominate the MOFCOM's remedy decisions, and(2) the MOFCOM prefers using behavioral remedies. These preferences are in line with the tendency of antitrust law practices in other countries and have some of the characteristics of industry-specific regulations. Further, case studies examining AML enforcement in patent-intensive industries yield the following findings:(1) Behavioral remedies face high supervision costs and difficulties in implementation and are more likely than structural remedies to be revoked.(2) The generalization of behavioral relief may also have unwanted effects such as inhibiting technological innovation, blurring the boundary between government and the market, and "regulating" antitrust behavior.(3) The fragmented enforcement and implementation of China's AML system not only contributed to the low efficiency of behavioral remedies but also led regulators to prefer such remedies.Using standardized econometric analysis, this paper finds that the "unilateral effects" and "coordinated effects" principles followed in enforcing the AML and the tendency to use behavioral remedies negatively affected the efficiency of market competition. This paper also makes contribution by uncovering invalid enforcement and regulatory characteristics of behavioral remedies in knowledge-and patent-intensive industries, which are inconsistent with the goal of structural reform. Our findings have the following policy implications:(1) There is a need to reduce the loopholes caused by fragmented supervision and law enforcement and allow the competition policy to fulfill its basic role in market resource allocation.(2) The enforcement rules for "concentration of undertakings" reviews should be improved, and clear legislative principles and quantifiable judgment indicators are needed.(3) The information and feedback in merger review and relief decisions should be more transparent. Consistent with our prediction, the central government in 2018 decided to consolidate AML enforcement power with the creation of a State Market Supervisory Authority, and a series of antitrust rules were amended or implemented, including the "Automotive Industry Anti-monopoly Guide", the "Abuse of Intellectual Property Anti-monopoly Guide", and the "Guidelines for General Conditions and Procedures for Monopoly Agreement Exemption".In future research, we will continue to update the database of China's AML enforcement and test the effects of regulatory remedy decisions on market structure, monopoly power, pricing conduct, and welfare.
The anti-monopoly law(AML) of China plays a key role in maintaining fair market competition. In 2015, the central government laid out general requirements for "strengthening market price supervision and anti-monopoly law enforcement and gradually establishing the basic status of competition policy" to reform and adjust the AML's enforcement system, legislative principles, and implementation guidelines. Therefore, empirical research on the effects of the AML's implementation is of significant theoretical and practical value. Following enactment of the AML, the Ministry of Commerce(MOFCOM) received 1,731 merger cases from 2008 to 2016, of which 1702 were approved unconditionally and 27 with conditions; two were prohibited. This paper initially explores three interrelated issues through both quantitative testing and representative case studies:(1) What factors does the MOFCOM consider in regulating mergers?(2) Is there a certain preference in the choice of regulatory approach?(3) Does this tendency influence the effects of the AML's implementation?To answer these questions, we collected micro-data from the centralized review and relief documents of the MOFCOM and formed a database involving 86 merger cases(71 being equity acquisitions) and more than 10 variables, including industrial structure, M&A characteristics, and relief methods. This paper uses probit and negative binomial regression models to analyze the MOFCOM's remedy decisions in the merger database. The findings reveal that(1) the market's concentration and changes in market share dominate the MOFCOM's remedy decisions, and(2) the MOFCOM prefers using behavioral remedies. These preferences are in line with the tendency of antitrust law practices in other countries and have some of the characteristics of industry-specific regulations. Further, case studies examining AML enforcement in patent-intensive industries yield the following findings:(1) Behavioral remedies face high supervision costs and difficulties in implementation and are more likely than structural remedies to be revoked.(2) The generalization of behavioral relief may also have unwanted effects such as inhibiting technological innovation, blurring the boundary between government and the market, and "regulating" antitrust behavior.(3) The fragmented enforcement and implementation of China's AML system not only contributed to the low efficiency of behavioral remedies but also led regulators to prefer such remedies.Using standardized econometric analysis, this paper finds that the "unilateral effects" and "coordinated effects" principles followed in enforcing the AML and the tendency to use behavioral remedies negatively affected the efficiency of market competition. This paper also makes contribution by uncovering invalid enforcement and regulatory characteristics of behavioral remedies in knowledge-and patent-intensive industries, which are inconsistent with the goal of structural reform. Our findings have the following policy implications:(1) There is a need to reduce the loopholes caused by fragmented supervision and law enforcement and allow the competition policy to fulfill its basic role in market resource allocation.(2) The enforcement rules for "concentration of undertakings" reviews should be improved, and clear legislative principles and quantifiable judgment indicators are needed.(3) The information and feedback in merger review and relief decisions should be more transparent. Consistent with our prediction, the central government in 2018 decided to consolidate AML enforcement power with the creation of a State Market Supervisory Authority, and a series of antitrust rules were amended or implemented, including the "Automotive Industry Anti-monopoly Guide", the "Abuse of Intellectual Property Anti-monopoly Guide", and the "Guidelines for General Conditions and Procedures for Monopoly Agreement Exemption".In future research, we will continue to update the database of China's AML enforcement and test the effects of regulatory remedy decisions on market structure, monopoly power, pricing conduct, and welfare.
引文
白让让,2015a:《纵向结构与投入品竞价合谋的悖论分析》,《财经研究》第5期。
白让让,2015b:《合谋行为的反垄断执法》,《经济学动态》第11期。
陈强,2010:《高级计量经济学及STATA应用》,高等教育出版社。
黄坤、张昕竹,2010:《可口可乐并购汇源案的竞争损失分析》,《中国工业经济》第12期。
黄坤、张昕竹,2011:《并购审查中的安全港规则:一种非参数方法》,《中国工业经济》第9期。
江小娟,2017:《高度联通社会中的资源重组与服务业增长》,《经济研究》第3期。
李俊峰,2015:《全球平行审查背景下的中国经营者集中救济》,《当代法学》第2期。
林平,2015:《标准必要专利FRAND许可的经济分析与反垄断启示》,《财经问题研究》第6期。
潘志成,2009:《析商务部禁止可口可乐收购汇源的相关理由》,《法学》第7期。
叶军,2015:《经营者集中法律界定模式研究》,《中国法学》年第5期。
余东华,2012:《横向并购效率抗辩中的最低要求效率研究》,《中国工业经济》第9期。
袁日新,2016:《经营者集中救济类型位阶性的理论反思》,《法律科学》第2期。
Bergman, M. A., M. B.Coate, M.Jakobsson, and S.W.Ulrick, 2010, “Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States”, Review of Industrial Organization, 36 (4), 305—331.
Bergman, M. A.,M.Jakobsson, and C.Razo,2005, “An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions”,International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(9—10),717—737.
Bruce.H. K., and J.D. Wright., 2012,“The Limits of Antitrust and Patent Holdup: a Reply to Cary et al.”, Antitrust Law.Jornal. 74 (1), 720—722.
Clougherty.J.A., T.D.Miyu, and J. Seldeslachts,2016,“Effective European Antitrust: Doses EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?”, Economic Inquiry, 54(4), 1884—1903.
Coate, M. B., 2005, “An Empirical Analysis of Merger Enforcement Under The 1992 Merger Guidelines”, Review of Industrial Organization, 27 (4), 279—301.
Coate, M. B., and S.W. Ulrick, 2006, “Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review Process”, Antitrust Law Journal, 73 (3), 531—570.
Coate, M. B., R.S.Higgins, and F.S.McChesney, 1990, “Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges”, Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (2), 463—482.
Colin,C., and P.K.Trivedi, 2010, Microeconometrics Using Stata, A Stata Press.
Davies.S., and M. Olczak,2010,“Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?”, Review of Industrial Organization, 37(1), 83—99.
Dusan.P., 2009, “Merger Remedies and Regulatory Measures In The EU Electronic Communications Sector: A Critical Assessment”, European Business Organization Law Review,10,575—594.
Farrar.A., L.Gerard, and J. Padilla, 2014, “Patent Licensing in Vertically Disaggregated Industries: The Royalty Allocation Neutrality Principle”, Communications and Strategies,95 (3), 61—84.
Farrell.J.H., C.Shapiro, and S.Theresa, 2007,“Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up”, Antitrust Law Journal, 74 (3), 603—670.
Gilbert.R.J., 2011,“Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations”, Antitrust Law Journal, 77 (3), 855—888.
Han, M., and R.Stephen,2014,“Remedies In Chinese Merger Control Law-Themes, Recent Cases and Developments”, Business Law International, 15(3),201—221.
Katz, M.L., 2002,“Recent Antitrust Enforcement Actions by the U.S.Department of Justice: A Selective Survey of Economic Issues”, Review of Industrial Organization, 21 (4), 373—397.
Kovacic, W.E.,C.M.Petros, and D. J. Neven, 2014,“Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A Comparison of EU and U.S. Practice”, Antitrust Bulletin, 59(1),55—109.
Kwoka, J.E., 2015,“Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes”, Antitrust Law Journal, 78 (4), 619—649.
Kwoka, J.E., 2015,Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies,MIT Press.
Kwoka, J.E., and D.L. Moss, 2012,“Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement”, Antitrust Bulletin, 57 (4), 979—1011.
Lin, P., and J. Zhao,2012,“Merger Control Policy Under China'S Anti-Monopoly Law”, Review of Industrial Organization, 41(1),109—132.
Mark, L., and C.Shapiro, 2005,“Probabilistic Patents”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2), 75—98.
Mehta, A., A.Nevo,O.Richard, and J.Wilder,2014, “The Year In Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2013—2014”, Review of Industrial Organization, 45(4), 379—397.
Mikhail, S. K., 2007,“Measuring the Extent of Structural Remedy in Section 7 Settlements: Was the US DOJ Successful in the 1990s?”, Review of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 1—27.
Miller, B.M.,2015,“Frand-Encumbered SEPs and Injunctions: Why Sections of the FTC Act is an Inappropriate Remedy”, Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, (16),452—493.
Moss,D.L., 2008, “Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of Electricity”, Review of Industrial Organization, 32 (3), 241—261.
Swanson,D.G., and W.Baumol, 2005,“Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (Rand) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power”, Antitrust Law Journal, 73(1), 1—58.
Wang,E., J.Tsai, and S.Chan, 2013, “Merger Remedies with Chinese Characteristics”, Competition Policy International, 8, 1—13.
Wang,W., and R.Matti,2012,“EU Merger Remedies and Competition Concerns: An Empirical Assessment”, European Law Journal, 18(4), 555—576.
Wright, J.D., 2014,“Does the FTC Have a New IP Agenda? Remarks at the 2014 Milton Handler Lecture: Antitrust in the 21st Century”, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/03/.
Yang,Q.G., and P.Michael, 2014,“The Merger Clearance Decision Process in New Zealand: Application of a New Two-stage Probit Model”, Review of Industrial Organization, 44 (4), 299—325.
(1)这是一种专利裁决机制,其核心思想是:每一个参与制定标准的专利持有者必须首先承诺,在标准制定以后有义务向任何一个善意的标准实施者(非故意逃避标准专利许可费的标准实施者)提供一个FRAND出价。同时,专利持有者承诺,如果其不能够与标准实施者就相关专利技术达成许可协议,将会接受一个由仲裁程序决定的最终FRAND出价(林平,2015)。
(2)感谢匿名审稿人对原文理论逻辑缺失的批评和修改建议,为突出本文的主题,这里删减和简化了假说提出的内容。
(3)在商务部网站公布的《经营者集中简易公告》中,相关企业需要公告“交易方式、金额、国别、细分市场”等多项指标,据此就得到用于计量检验的变量,问题在于企业会以商业机密为由不公开这些信息,因此有效样本很少。
(4)感谢匿名审稿人指出了表1中变量股权收购比例存在异常值的问题,股权收购式的案例只有59个,但按照我国商务部的规定,经营者集中还包括企业合并、合营与合资等其他方式,而在后面的三种模式中各自有12家涉及到双方的股权转让行为,因此本文把这12个涉及股权变动的案件与59个股权收购案合并在一起,共得到71个样本量,目的还在于保障足够的样本(文章的原始数据可向作者索取)。
(5)基于stata12的检验表明,变量行为救济力度的方差为0.958,几乎是其均值0.477的两倍多,故应该使用负二项回归;考虑到变量(Conduct)包含大量的“零”值,本文还进行了“零膨胀泊松回归”和“零膨胀负二项回归”得到了相应的Vuong统计量,它们分别是0.37和-1.75,前者远远小于1.96,后者虽然比-1.96稍大,但对应的概率仅为0.04,故使用负二项回归是合适的。
(6)感谢匿名审稿人指出本文缺少稳健性检验的问题。作者试图通过增加2017年新增救济案件样本量、使用工具变量和分析兼并前后相关市场结构变化等方式弥补这一缺陷,由于2017年商务部反垄断局发布的救济决定有一半以上是取消或者放松以往的决定,这反而会使本文的总样本数量减少,而以滞后变量为工具会损失相当数量的样本,为此没有进行稳健分析,只能以案例研究来弥补这一缺陷。
(7)根据Wang et al.(2013)的统计,在美国联邦贸易委员会2009—2011年的兼并审查中,只有13%属于行为救济,78%为结构性,二者混同的也仅有9%;欧盟竞争委员会2007—2009年间,行为救济的比例为12%,结构性占42%,混合的比例则为46%。
(8)参见美国司法部反垄断局发布的《兼并救济指南》第2章B节(https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-enforcement)。
(9)关于反垄断机构是否要针对互联网、电信、制药等技术和专利密集型行业出台特殊的政策指南或原则,在经济学界和执法层面存在较为严重的分歧,美国联邦贸易委员会顾问,知名反垄断学者Wright(2014)认为,包括FTC和我国商务部在内的执法者,听信经济学家关于专利套牢的猜测,违背了传统的资产“平等原则”,将知识产权类兼并人为地与有形、无形资产的兼并区分开来,进而对相关企业施加更多的行为和结构救济,是对反垄断执法权的“滥用”。产业经济学家(Mark & Shapiro,2005;Farrell et al.,2007;Swanson & Baumol,2005;Gilbert,2011)则致力于构建专利池、战略专利、专利封锁等模型,力图证明基于知识资产的纵向或横向封锁会引发更大的福利损失,有必要针对此类资产专门立法。
(10)例如,2015年,国家发展改革委对美国高通公司罚款60亿元的决定,就是依据后者在手机市场滥用专利权力的反垄断行为而做出的。
(11)欧盟对这一案件予以无条件批准,原因是他认为摩托罗拉在手机终端市场的参与率极低且处于不断下滑状态,谷歌通过专利封锁限制苹果、三星公司的发展也难以挽回摩托罗拉的窘境,相反严格遵守已有的FRAND原则,向现有厂商开放安卓系统和其他专利技术,反而会增加收购后的收入。
(12)在国家层面,发改委、商务部和工商管理总局下属的反垄断机关的在编岗位人数只有150多,而仅美国商务部专门负责反垄断事务的竞争局就有300多位正式职员。
白让让,2015b:《合谋行为的反垄断执法》,《经济学动态》第11期。
陈强,2010:《高级计量经济学及STATA应用》,高等教育出版社。
黄坤、张昕竹,2010:《可口可乐并购汇源案的竞争损失分析》,《中国工业经济》第12期。
黄坤、张昕竹,2011:《并购审查中的安全港规则:一种非参数方法》,《中国工业经济》第9期。
江小娟,2017:《高度联通社会中的资源重组与服务业增长》,《经济研究》第3期。
李俊峰,2015:《全球平行审查背景下的中国经营者集中救济》,《当代法学》第2期。
林平,2015:《标准必要专利FRAND许可的经济分析与反垄断启示》,《财经问题研究》第6期。
潘志成,2009:《析商务部禁止可口可乐收购汇源的相关理由》,《法学》第7期。
叶军,2015:《经营者集中法律界定模式研究》,《中国法学》年第5期。
余东华,2012:《横向并购效率抗辩中的最低要求效率研究》,《中国工业经济》第9期。
袁日新,2016:《经营者集中救济类型位阶性的理论反思》,《法律科学》第2期。
Bergman, M. A., M. B.Coate, M.Jakobsson, and S.W.Ulrick, 2010, “Comparing Merger Policies in the European Union and the United States”, Review of Industrial Organization, 36 (4), 305—331.
Bergman, M. A.,M.Jakobsson, and C.Razo,2005, “An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions”,International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23(9—10),717—737.
Bruce.H. K., and J.D. Wright., 2012,“The Limits of Antitrust and Patent Holdup: a Reply to Cary et al.”, Antitrust Law.Jornal. 74 (1), 720—722.
Clougherty.J.A., T.D.Miyu, and J. Seldeslachts,2016,“Effective European Antitrust: Doses EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?”, Economic Inquiry, 54(4), 1884—1903.
Coate, M. B., 2005, “An Empirical Analysis of Merger Enforcement Under The 1992 Merger Guidelines”, Review of Industrial Organization, 27 (4), 279—301.
Coate, M. B., and S.W. Ulrick, 2006, “Transparency at the Federal Trade Commission: The Horizontal Merger Review Process”, Antitrust Law Journal, 73 (3), 531—570.
Coate, M. B., R.S.Higgins, and F.S.McChesney, 1990, “Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges”, Journal of Law and Economics, 33 (2), 463—482.
Colin,C., and P.K.Trivedi, 2010, Microeconometrics Using Stata, A Stata Press.
Davies.S., and M. Olczak,2010,“Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?”, Review of Industrial Organization, 37(1), 83—99.
Dusan.P., 2009, “Merger Remedies and Regulatory Measures In The EU Electronic Communications Sector: A Critical Assessment”, European Business Organization Law Review,10,575—594.
Farrar.A., L.Gerard, and J. Padilla, 2014, “Patent Licensing in Vertically Disaggregated Industries: The Royalty Allocation Neutrality Principle”, Communications and Strategies,95 (3), 61—84.
Farrell.J.H., C.Shapiro, and S.Theresa, 2007,“Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up”, Antitrust Law Journal, 74 (3), 603—670.
Gilbert.R.J., 2011,“Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations in Standard-Setting Organizations”, Antitrust Law Journal, 77 (3), 855—888.
Han, M., and R.Stephen,2014,“Remedies In Chinese Merger Control Law-Themes, Recent Cases and Developments”, Business Law International, 15(3),201—221.
Katz, M.L., 2002,“Recent Antitrust Enforcement Actions by the U.S.Department of Justice: A Selective Survey of Economic Issues”, Review of Industrial Organization, 21 (4), 373—397.
Kovacic, W.E.,C.M.Petros, and D. J. Neven, 2014,“Merger Control Procedures and Institutions: A Comparison of EU and U.S. Practice”, Antitrust Bulletin, 59(1),55—109.
Kwoka, J.E., 2015,“Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions and Merger Outcomes”, Antitrust Law Journal, 78 (4), 619—649.
Kwoka, J.E., 2015,Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies,MIT Press.
Kwoka, J.E., and D.L. Moss, 2012,“Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust Enforcement”, Antitrust Bulletin, 57 (4), 979—1011.
Lin, P., and J. Zhao,2012,“Merger Control Policy Under China'S Anti-Monopoly Law”, Review of Industrial Organization, 41(1),109—132.
Mark, L., and C.Shapiro, 2005,“Probabilistic Patents”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (2), 75—98.
Mehta, A., A.Nevo,O.Richard, and J.Wilder,2014, “The Year In Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2013—2014”, Review of Industrial Organization, 45(4), 379—397.
Mikhail, S. K., 2007,“Measuring the Extent of Structural Remedy in Section 7 Settlements: Was the US DOJ Successful in the 1990s?”, Review of Industrial Organization, 30(1), 1—27.
Miller, B.M.,2015,“Frand-Encumbered SEPs and Injunctions: Why Sections of the FTC Act is an Inappropriate Remedy”, Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, (16),452—493.
Moss,D.L., 2008, “Antitrust Versus Regulatory Merger Review: The Case of Electricity”, Review of Industrial Organization, 32 (3), 241—261.
Swanson,D.G., and W.Baumol, 2005,“Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (Rand) Royalties, Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power”, Antitrust Law Journal, 73(1), 1—58.
Wang,E., J.Tsai, and S.Chan, 2013, “Merger Remedies with Chinese Characteristics”, Competition Policy International, 8, 1—13.
Wang,W., and R.Matti,2012,“EU Merger Remedies and Competition Concerns: An Empirical Assessment”, European Law Journal, 18(4), 555—576.
Wright, J.D., 2014,“Does the FTC Have a New IP Agenda? Remarks at the 2014 Milton Handler Lecture: Antitrust in the 21st Century”, available at: https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/03/.
Yang,Q.G., and P.Michael, 2014,“The Merger Clearance Decision Process in New Zealand: Application of a New Two-stage Probit Model”, Review of Industrial Organization, 44 (4), 299—325.
(1)这是一种专利裁决机制,其核心思想是:每一个参与制定标准的专利持有者必须首先承诺,在标准制定以后有义务向任何一个善意的标准实施者(非故意逃避标准专利许可费的标准实施者)提供一个FRAND出价。同时,专利持有者承诺,如果其不能够与标准实施者就相关专利技术达成许可协议,将会接受一个由仲裁程序决定的最终FRAND出价(林平,2015)。
(2)感谢匿名审稿人对原文理论逻辑缺失的批评和修改建议,为突出本文的主题,这里删减和简化了假说提出的内容。
(3)在商务部网站公布的《经营者集中简易公告》中,相关企业需要公告“交易方式、金额、国别、细分市场”等多项指标,据此就得到用于计量检验的变量,问题在于企业会以商业机密为由不公开这些信息,因此有效样本很少。
(4)感谢匿名审稿人指出了表1中变量股权收购比例存在异常值的问题,股权收购式的案例只有59个,但按照我国商务部的规定,经营者集中还包括企业合并、合营与合资等其他方式,而在后面的三种模式中各自有12家涉及到双方的股权转让行为,因此本文把这12个涉及股权变动的案件与59个股权收购案合并在一起,共得到71个样本量,目的还在于保障足够的样本(文章的原始数据可向作者索取)。
(5)基于stata12的检验表明,变量行为救济力度的方差为0.958,几乎是其均值0.477的两倍多,故应该使用负二项回归;考虑到变量(Conduct)包含大量的“零”值,本文还进行了“零膨胀泊松回归”和“零膨胀负二项回归”得到了相应的Vuong统计量,它们分别是0.37和-1.75,前者远远小于1.96,后者虽然比-1.96稍大,但对应的概率仅为0.04,故使用负二项回归是合适的。
(6)感谢匿名审稿人指出本文缺少稳健性检验的问题。作者试图通过增加2017年新增救济案件样本量、使用工具变量和分析兼并前后相关市场结构变化等方式弥补这一缺陷,由于2017年商务部反垄断局发布的救济决定有一半以上是取消或者放松以往的决定,这反而会使本文的总样本数量减少,而以滞后变量为工具会损失相当数量的样本,为此没有进行稳健分析,只能以案例研究来弥补这一缺陷。
(7)根据Wang et al.(2013)的统计,在美国联邦贸易委员会2009—2011年的兼并审查中,只有13%属于行为救济,78%为结构性,二者混同的也仅有9%;欧盟竞争委员会2007—2009年间,行为救济的比例为12%,结构性占42%,混合的比例则为46%。
(8)参见美国司法部反垄断局发布的《兼并救济指南》第2章B节(https://www.justice.gov/atr/merger-enforcement)。
(9)关于反垄断机构是否要针对互联网、电信、制药等技术和专利密集型行业出台特殊的政策指南或原则,在经济学界和执法层面存在较为严重的分歧,美国联邦贸易委员会顾问,知名反垄断学者Wright(2014)认为,包括FTC和我国商务部在内的执法者,听信经济学家关于专利套牢的猜测,违背了传统的资产“平等原则”,将知识产权类兼并人为地与有形、无形资产的兼并区分开来,进而对相关企业施加更多的行为和结构救济,是对反垄断执法权的“滥用”。产业经济学家(Mark & Shapiro,2005;Farrell et al.,2007;Swanson & Baumol,2005;Gilbert,2011)则致力于构建专利池、战略专利、专利封锁等模型,力图证明基于知识资产的纵向或横向封锁会引发更大的福利损失,有必要针对此类资产专门立法。
(10)例如,2015年,国家发展改革委对美国高通公司罚款60亿元的决定,就是依据后者在手机市场滥用专利权力的反垄断行为而做出的。
(11)欧盟对这一案件予以无条件批准,原因是他认为摩托罗拉在手机终端市场的参与率极低且处于不断下滑状态,谷歌通过专利封锁限制苹果、三星公司的发展也难以挽回摩托罗拉的窘境,相反严格遵守已有的FRAND原则,向现有厂商开放安卓系统和其他专利技术,反而会增加收购后的收入。
(12)在国家层面,发改委、商务部和工商管理总局下属的反垄断机关的在编岗位人数只有150多,而仅美国商务部专门负责反垄断事务的竞争局就有300多位正式职员。