银行管制放松、地区结构性竞争与企业风险承担
|
摘要
本文使用省级层面的银行分支机构数据构造银行地区结构性竞争程度指标,探究银行竞争加剧对企业风险承担的影响及其作用机理。检验结果发现,整体上银行业竞争加剧显著提高企业风险承担水平。按照产权性质分组检验发现,银行业竞争对企业风险承担水平的促进作用在国有企业组与非国有企业组中均显著,且两者无显著差异,通过一系列稳健性检验后,上述研究结论依然成立。作用机制检验发现,银行业竞争对国有企业主要通过融资成本机制、而非国有企业主要通过融资约束机制促进其提高风险承担水平。经济后果检验发现,银行业竞争加剧均显著提高国有企业与非国有企业价值,且相对国有企业,其对非国有企业促进作用更显著。以上研究结论表明,深化银行体系改革以促进银行间竞争程度的提高,对构建实体经济与虚拟经济的良性互动关系具有重要意义。
This paper aims to utilize the data of bank branches at the provincial level to construct the regional structural competition degree index of bank, especially to explore the impacts and action mechanism of increasing fierce bank competition on enterprise risk taking. The results show that in general the increasing fierce bank competition significantly prompts the level of enterprise risk taking. By group test on the nature of property right, it can be concluded that the promotion on the state-owned enterprises group is the same significant as on the non-state-owned enterprises. A series of stabile test also proves this conclusion. Action mechanism test proves that the state-owned enterprises mainly improve the risk-taking level via the financing cost mechanism while the non-state-owned enterprises via the financing constraint mechanism. The economic consequences test finds that the increasing fierce competition significantly enhances the value of state-owned enterprises as well as the non-state-owned enterprises. Compared with the state-owned enterprises, the value enhancement among the non-state-owned enterprises is more significant. In addition, to relieve endogenous, some other methodologies suchas exogenous shock and instrument variables are also applied in the paper. At the same time, the research results are approved to be stable by conducting a series of stabile tests. In brief, the above research results indicate that the increasing fierce competition is conducive to the shareholder value maximization and it is of great significance to establish the good interactive relationship between real economy and virtual economy by deepening the bank system reform to increase the competition degree in the future.
This paper aims to utilize the data of bank branches at the provincial level to construct the regional structural competition degree index of bank, especially to explore the impacts and action mechanism of increasing fierce bank competition on enterprise risk taking. The results show that in general the increasing fierce bank competition significantly prompts the level of enterprise risk taking. By group test on the nature of property right, it can be concluded that the promotion on the state-owned enterprises group is the same significant as on the non-state-owned enterprises. A series of stabile test also proves this conclusion. Action mechanism test proves that the state-owned enterprises mainly improve the risk-taking level via the financing cost mechanism while the non-state-owned enterprises via the financing constraint mechanism. The economic consequences test finds that the increasing fierce competition significantly enhances the value of state-owned enterprises as well as the non-state-owned enterprises. Compared with the state-owned enterprises, the value enhancement among the non-state-owned enterprises is more significant. In addition, to relieve endogenous, some other methodologies suchas exogenous shock and instrument variables are also applied in the paper. At the same time, the research results are approved to be stable by conducting a series of stabile tests. In brief, the above research results indicate that the increasing fierce competition is conducive to the shareholder value maximization and it is of great significance to establish the good interactive relationship between real economy and virtual economy by deepening the bank system reform to increase the competition degree in the future.
引文
[1]Acemoglu,D.,Zilibotti,F..Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance?Risk,Diversification,and Growth.Journal of Political Economy,1997,105(4):709-751.
[2]Baumol,W.J.,Strom,R.J..Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth.Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal,2007,1(3-4):233-237.
[3]John,K.,Litov,L.,Yeung,B..Corporate Governance and Risk-taking.The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1679-1728.
[4]Fama,E.F.,Miller,M.H..The Theory of Finance,Holt Rinehart&Winston,1972.
[5]Jensen,M.C.,Meckling,W.H..Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure.Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[6]张健华,王鹏,冯根福.银行业结构与中国全要素生产率——基于商业银行分省数据和双向距离函数的再检验.经济研究,2016,(11):110-124.
[7]Scott,J.A.,Dunkelberg,W.C..Competition and Credit Market Outcomes:A Small Firm Perspective.SSRN Working Paper Series,2001.
[8]Degryse,H.,Ongena,S..The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation.Journal of Financial Intermediation,2007,16(3):399-424.
[9]方芳,蔡卫星.银行业竞争与企业成长:来自工业企业的经验证据.管理世界,2016,(7):63-75.
[10]张杰,郑文平,新夫.中国的银行管制放松、结构性竞争和企业创新.中国工业经济,2017,(10):118-136.
[11]蔡竞,董艳.银行业竞争与企业创新——来自中国工业企业的经验证据.金融研究,2016,(11):96-111.
[12]Guariglia,A.,Poncet,S..Could Financial Distortions Be no Impediment to Economic Growth after All?Evidence from China.Journal of Comparative Economics,2008,36(4):633-657.
[13]郭立宏,季琳,董建卫.银行业竞争与风险承担.金融论坛,2011,(10):50-55.
[14]王红建,李茫茫,汤泰劼.实体企业跨行业套利的驱动因素及其对创新的影响.中国工业经济,2016,(11):73-89.
[15]王红建,曹瑜强,杨庆,杨筝.实体企业金融化促进还是抑制了企业创新——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究.南开管理评论,2017,20(1):155-166.
[16]Faccio,M.,Marchica,M.T.,Mura,R..CEO Gender,Corporate Risk-taking,and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation.Journal of Corporate Finance,2012,(39):193-209.
[17]Boubakri,N.,Cosset,J.C.,Saffar,W..The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-taking:Evidence From Privatization.Journal of Financial Economics,2013,108(3):641-658.
[18]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担.经济研究,2013,(9):112-124.
[19]Coles,J.L.,Daniel,N.D.,Naveen,L..Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking.Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(2):431-468.
[20]Acharya,V.V.,Amihud,Y.,Litov,L..Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-taking.Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(1):150-166.
[21]Li,K.,Griffin,D.,Yue,H.,Zhao,L..How Does Culture Influence Corporate Risk-taking?Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,23(1):1-22
[22]Qian,Y..Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China.Economic Development Institute of the World Bank,1994.
[23]Allen,F.,Qian,J.,Qian,M..Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China.Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[24]饶品贵,姜国华.货币政策对银行信贷与商业信用互动关系影响研究.经济研究,2013,(1):68-82.
[25]林毅夫,姜烨.经济结构、银行业结构与经济发展——基于分省面板数据的实证分析.金融研究,2006,(1):7-22.
[26]林毅夫,孙希芳.银行业结构与经济增长.经济研究,2008,(9):110-124.
[27]王菁华,茅宁.企业风险承担研究述评及展望.外国经济与管理,2015,(12):44-58.
[28]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担.金融研究,2013,(1):149-163.
[29]Faccio,M.,Marchica,M.T.,Mura,R..Large Shareholder Diversification and Corporate Risk-taking.Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(11):3601-3641.
[30]李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担.中国工业经济,2012,(12):115-127.
[31]Hilary,G.,Hui,K.W..Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America?Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):455-473.
[32]Song,Z.,Storesletten K.,Zilibotti F..Growing Like China.American Economic Review,2011,101(1):196-233.
[33]陆正飞,祝继高,樊铮.银根紧缩、信贷歧视与民营上市公司投资者利益损失.金融研究,2009,(8):124-136.
[34]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据,管理世界,2006,(10):100-107.
[35]张维迎.从现代企业理论看国有企业改革.价格与市场,1995,(2):30-33.
[36]李广子,刘力.债务融资成本与民营信贷歧视.金融研究,2009,(12):137-150.
[37]连玉君,苏治,丁志国.现金-现金流敏感性能检验融资约束假说吗?统计研究,2008,(10):92-99.
[38]靳庆鲁,孔祥,侯青川.货币政策、民营企业投资效率与公司期权价值.经济研究,2012,(5):96-106.
[39]方军雄.所有制、制度环境与信贷资金配置.经济研究,2007,(10):82-92.
[40]季琳,赵延丽.银行业竞争与风险承担——中国银行业的实证分析.金融监管研究,2012,(3):64-73.
[41]辛清泉,林斌,杨德明.中国资本投资回报率的估算和影响因素分析——1999-2004年上市公司的经验.经济学(季刊),2007,6(4):1143-1164.
[42]潘越,潘健平,戴亦一.公司诉讼风险、司法地方保护主义与企业创新.经济研究,2015,(3):131-145.
[43]权小锋,尹洪英.中国式卖空机制与公司创新——基于融资融券分步扩容的自然实验.管理世界,2017,(1):128-144.
[44]杨兴全,申艳艳,尹兴强.外资银行进入与公司投资效率:缓解融资约束抑或抑制代理冲突?财经研究,2017,43(2):97-108.
(1)Faccio的结果显示,1999-2007年,世界主要国家的平均风险承担水平(未乘以100)为0.048,中位数为0.037。
(2)由于银行竞争指标是省级层面数据,如果按照全样本分组,可能会导致在银行竞争程度整体较低的年份,将早些年银行竞争程度较大、较高的样本落划入银行竞争程度低组,同时在之后也可能导致在银行竞争程度整体较高组年份中将银行竞争程度较低的样本划入银行竞争程度高组,因此我们按照中位数逐年进行分组,其中每年阈值分别为:0.446(2005年)、0.49(52006年)、0.502(2007年)、0.54(12008年)、0.573(2009年)、0.576(2010年)、0.599(2011年)。
[2]Baumol,W.J.,Strom,R.J..Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth.Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal,2007,1(3-4):233-237.
[3]John,K.,Litov,L.,Yeung,B..Corporate Governance and Risk-taking.The Journal of Finance,2008,63(4):1679-1728.
[4]Fama,E.F.,Miller,M.H..The Theory of Finance,Holt Rinehart&Winston,1972.
[5]Jensen,M.C.,Meckling,W.H..Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Capital Structure.Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
[6]张健华,王鹏,冯根福.银行业结构与中国全要素生产率——基于商业银行分省数据和双向距离函数的再检验.经济研究,2016,(11):110-124.
[7]Scott,J.A.,Dunkelberg,W.C..Competition and Credit Market Outcomes:A Small Firm Perspective.SSRN Working Paper Series,2001.
[8]Degryse,H.,Ongena,S..The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation.Journal of Financial Intermediation,2007,16(3):399-424.
[9]方芳,蔡卫星.银行业竞争与企业成长:来自工业企业的经验证据.管理世界,2016,(7):63-75.
[10]张杰,郑文平,新夫.中国的银行管制放松、结构性竞争和企业创新.中国工业经济,2017,(10):118-136.
[11]蔡竞,董艳.银行业竞争与企业创新——来自中国工业企业的经验证据.金融研究,2016,(11):96-111.
[12]Guariglia,A.,Poncet,S..Could Financial Distortions Be no Impediment to Economic Growth after All?Evidence from China.Journal of Comparative Economics,2008,36(4):633-657.
[13]郭立宏,季琳,董建卫.银行业竞争与风险承担.金融论坛,2011,(10):50-55.
[14]王红建,李茫茫,汤泰劼.实体企业跨行业套利的驱动因素及其对创新的影响.中国工业经济,2016,(11):73-89.
[15]王红建,曹瑜强,杨庆,杨筝.实体企业金融化促进还是抑制了企业创新——基于中国制造业上市公司的经验研究.南开管理评论,2017,20(1):155-166.
[16]Faccio,M.,Marchica,M.T.,Mura,R..CEO Gender,Corporate Risk-taking,and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation.Journal of Corporate Finance,2012,(39):193-209.
[17]Boubakri,N.,Cosset,J.C.,Saffar,W..The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-taking:Evidence From Privatization.Journal of Financial Economics,2013,108(3):641-658.
[18]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担.经济研究,2013,(9):112-124.
[19]Coles,J.L.,Daniel,N.D.,Naveen,L..Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking.Journal of Financial Economics,2006,79(2):431-468.
[20]Acharya,V.V.,Amihud,Y.,Litov,L..Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-taking.Journal of Financial Economics,2011,102(1):150-166.
[21]Li,K.,Griffin,D.,Yue,H.,Zhao,L..How Does Culture Influence Corporate Risk-taking?Journal of Corporate Finance,2013,23(1):1-22
[22]Qian,Y..Reforming Corporate Governance and Finance in China.Economic Development Institute of the World Bank,1994.
[23]Allen,F.,Qian,J.,Qian,M..Law,Finance,and Economic Growth in China.Journal of Financial Economics,2005,77(1):57-116.
[24]饶品贵,姜国华.货币政策对银行信贷与商业信用互动关系影响研究.经济研究,2013,(1):68-82.
[25]林毅夫,姜烨.经济结构、银行业结构与经济发展——基于分省面板数据的实证分析.金融研究,2006,(1):7-22.
[26]林毅夫,孙希芳.银行业结构与经济增长.经济研究,2008,(9):110-124.
[27]王菁华,茅宁.企业风险承担研究述评及展望.外国经济与管理,2015,(12):44-58.
[28]余明桂,李文贵,潘红波.管理者过度自信与企业风险承担.金融研究,2013,(1):149-163.
[29]Faccio,M.,Marchica,M.T.,Mura,R..Large Shareholder Diversification and Corporate Risk-taking.Review of Financial Studies,2011,24(11):3601-3641.
[30]李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担.中国工业经济,2012,(12):115-127.
[31]Hilary,G.,Hui,K.W..Does Religion Matter in Corporate Decision Making in America?Journal of Financial Economics,2009,93(3):455-473.
[32]Song,Z.,Storesletten K.,Zilibotti F..Growing Like China.American Economic Review,2011,101(1):196-233.
[33]陆正飞,祝继高,樊铮.银根紧缩、信贷歧视与民营上市公司投资者利益损失.金融研究,2009,(8):124-136.
[34]孙铮,李增泉,王景斌.所有权性质、会计信息与债务契约——来自我国上市公司的经验证据,管理世界,2006,(10):100-107.
[35]张维迎.从现代企业理论看国有企业改革.价格与市场,1995,(2):30-33.
[36]李广子,刘力.债务融资成本与民营信贷歧视.金融研究,2009,(12):137-150.
[37]连玉君,苏治,丁志国.现金-现金流敏感性能检验融资约束假说吗?统计研究,2008,(10):92-99.
[38]靳庆鲁,孔祥,侯青川.货币政策、民营企业投资效率与公司期权价值.经济研究,2012,(5):96-106.
[39]方军雄.所有制、制度环境与信贷资金配置.经济研究,2007,(10):82-92.
[40]季琳,赵延丽.银行业竞争与风险承担——中国银行业的实证分析.金融监管研究,2012,(3):64-73.
[41]辛清泉,林斌,杨德明.中国资本投资回报率的估算和影响因素分析——1999-2004年上市公司的经验.经济学(季刊),2007,6(4):1143-1164.
[42]潘越,潘健平,戴亦一.公司诉讼风险、司法地方保护主义与企业创新.经济研究,2015,(3):131-145.
[43]权小锋,尹洪英.中国式卖空机制与公司创新——基于融资融券分步扩容的自然实验.管理世界,2017,(1):128-144.
[44]杨兴全,申艳艳,尹兴强.外资银行进入与公司投资效率:缓解融资约束抑或抑制代理冲突?财经研究,2017,43(2):97-108.
(1)Faccio的结果显示,1999-2007年,世界主要国家的平均风险承担水平(未乘以100)为0.048,中位数为0.037。
(2)由于银行竞争指标是省级层面数据,如果按照全样本分组,可能会导致在银行竞争程度整体较低的年份,将早些年银行竞争程度较大、较高的样本落划入银行竞争程度低组,同时在之后也可能导致在银行竞争程度整体较高组年份中将银行竞争程度较低的样本划入银行竞争程度高组,因此我们按照中位数逐年进行分组,其中每年阈值分别为:0.446(2005年)、0.49(52006年)、0.502(2007年)、0.54(12008年)、0.573(2009年)、0.576(2010年)、0.599(2011年)。