企业家出身造成了产能过剩吗——来自中国企业—劳动力匹配调查(CEES)的经验证据
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摘要
多年来,产能过剩一直是制约我国经济迈向高质量发展的重要障碍。与现有文献多从宏观产业政策层面研究上述问题有所不同,本文选取企业家公共部门出身这一微观视角,运用政治关联理论,就企业家出身造成我国企业产能过剩的微观机理进行了创新性的实证解释。运用"中国企业—劳动力匹配调查"(CEES)数据,本文的基准回归表明,为获取政治关联所带来的非市场回报,在其他因素既定的前提下,对于出身公共部门的企业家而言,其所在企业的产能过剩程度平均偏高13.9%,出现产能过剩问题的边际概率则平均偏高5.3%。内生性检验、中介效应模型的估计结果发现,与宏观产业政策相比,企业家公共部门出身对于产能过剩的影响效应具有更高的经济显著性,而过度投资则是其中的重要影响途径。运用上市公司的微观面板数据,同源性误差检验进一步支持了本文的主要实证发现。为此,本文的政策建议是:政府应该将政策重心从产业政策转向竞争性政策,通过构建公平竞争的市场环境,厘清政府与市场二者的边界,避免企业家依靠政治关联对政府资源的"俘获"。只有构建公平竞争的市场经济秩序,企业家的创新潜能才能得到充分释放,并从微观机理上解决我国的产能过剩问题。
Over the years,excess capacity has always been an important obstacle which restricts the economy of China developing towards high quality.Different from the existing literature which explains excess capacity from structural perspective,this paper selects the microscopic perspective which is about CEO coming from the public sector.Using the theory of political relevance,this paper empirically explains the influence of CEO coming from the public sector on excess capacity.Under the control of other factors,the basic regression,with the data from China Employer-employee Survey(CEES),empirically considers that the enterprises whose CEO coming from the public sector have higher degree and marginal probability of excess capacity,which are about 13.9% and 5.3%respectively.That is because the enterprises themselves are willing to obtain non-market returns through political connections.In addition,endogenous test and the mediating effect model find that compared with the macroscopic structural factors,the influence of CEO coming from the public sector on excess capacity has higher economic significance and overinvestment is one of the important ways of influence during this process.Finally,using the micro-panel data of listed companies,the common variance tests further support the main empirical findings of this paper.Therefore,the policy recommendations are as follows:The government should shift the focus of policy from industrial policy to competitive policy and clarify the boundary between the government and the market by constructing a fair competition market environment,which can prevent CEO to [WWZ]"capture"[WWH]government resources relying on political connections.Only in this way,can the innovative potential of CEO be fully released and the problem of excess capacity in China be solved from microscopic mechanism.
Over the years,excess capacity has always been an important obstacle which restricts the economy of China developing towards high quality.Different from the existing literature which explains excess capacity from structural perspective,this paper selects the microscopic perspective which is about CEO coming from the public sector.Using the theory of political relevance,this paper empirically explains the influence of CEO coming from the public sector on excess capacity.Under the control of other factors,the basic regression,with the data from China Employer-employee Survey(CEES),empirically considers that the enterprises whose CEO coming from the public sector have higher degree and marginal probability of excess capacity,which are about 13.9% and 5.3%respectively.That is because the enterprises themselves are willing to obtain non-market returns through political connections.In addition,endogenous test and the mediating effect model find that compared with the macroscopic structural factors,the influence of CEO coming from the public sector on excess capacity has higher economic significance and overinvestment is one of the important ways of influence during this process.Finally,using the micro-panel data of listed companies,the common variance tests further support the main empirical findings of this paper.Therefore,the policy recommendations are as follows:The government should shift the focus of policy from industrial policy to competitive policy and clarify the boundary between the government and the market by constructing a fair competition market environment,which can prevent CEO to [WWZ]"capture"[WWH]government resources relying on political connections.Only in this way,can the innovative potential of CEO be fully released and the problem of excess capacity in China be solved from microscopic mechanism.
引文
[1] R.J.Gilbert, M.Lieberman.Investment and Coordination in Oligopolistic Industries[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1987,18(1).
[2]B.A.Blonigen,W.W.Wilson.Foreign Subsidization and Excess Capacity[J].Journal of International Economics,2010,80(2).
[3]王克敏,刘静,李晓溪.产业政策、政府支持与公司投资效率研究[J].管理世界,2017,(3).
[4]刘锦,张三保.企业腐败、劳动收入份额与工资差距——基于中国营商环境调查的证据[J].宏观质量研究,2016,(4).
[5]陆瑶,施新政.企业治理改革、产品市场竞争与公司价值[J].宏观质量研究,2016,(4).
[6]李旭超,罗德明,金祥荣.资源错置与中国企业规模分布特征[J].中国社会科学,2017,(2).
[7]R.J.Caballero,T.Hoshi,A.K.Kashyap.Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan[J].China Economic Review,2008,98(5).
[8]J.Lu,Z.Tao,Z.Yang.The Costs and Benefits of Government Control:Evidence from China’s Collectively-owned Enterprises[J].China Economic Review,2010,21(2).
[9]H.Li,L.Meng,Q.Wang,L.A.Zhou.Political Connections,Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J].Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(2).
[10]L.Chernykh.Profit or Politics?Understanding Renationalizations in Russia[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(5).
[11]J.Fan,T.J.Wong,T.Zhang.Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China Newly Partially Privatized Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economies,2007,84(2).
[12]高勇强,何晓斌,李路路.民营企业家社会身份、经济条件与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2011,(12).
[13]中国人民银行营业管理部课题组.预算软约束、融资溢价与杠杆率——供给侧结构性改革的微观机理与经济效应研究[J].经济研究,2017,(10).
[14]陈圻,陈佳.成本外部化陷阱:创新与经济转型最大的制度性障碍——“去外部化”的政策选择[J].中国软科学,2016,(2).
[15]S.Claessens,E.Feijen,L.Laeven.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3).
[16]周劲,付保宗.产能过剩的内涵、评价体系及在我国工业领域的表现特征[J].经济学动态,2011,(10).
[17]修宗峰,黄健柏.市场化改革、过度投资与企业产能过剩——基于我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2013,(7).
[18]E.R.Berndt,C.J.Morrison.Capacity Utilization Measures:Underlying Economic Theory and an Alternative Approach[J].American Economic Review,1981,71(2).
[19]S.Richardson.Over-investment of Free Cash Flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3).
[20]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发,苏国灿.财政压力、产能过剩与供给侧改革[J].经济研究,2017,(9).
[21]A.Banerjee.A Simple Model of Herd Behavior[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1992,107(3).
[22]B.Schmidt.Costs and Benefits of Friendly Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,117(2).
[23]D.Chen,S.Khan,X.Yu,Z.Zhang.Government Intervention and Investment Comovement:Chinese Evidence[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2013,40(3-4).
[24]梅建华.把经济社会发展推向质量时代——学习领会习近平同志的质量观[J].宏观质量研究,2016,(1).
[25]程虹.管理提升了企业劳动生产率吗?——来自中国企业—劳动力匹配调查的经验证据[J].管理世界,2018,(2).
(1)销售收入增长率,采用企业当前销售收入的自然对数值(lnyijd,t)与滞后一期销售收入自然对数值(lnyijd,t-1)的差分作为代理变量。
(2)现金比率采用企业年度经营活动产生的现金流量净额与资产总额的比值作为代理变量。
(3)企业规模采用企业年底雇用的劳动力人数作为代理变量。
(1)所有制根据控股类型具体划分为国有(SOE)、民营(Private)、港澳台(HTM)和外资(Foreign)等4个虚拟变量。
(1)第三次经济普查公报数据显示:截止到2013年,广东省共有各类制造业企业30万家,制造业企业数量占全国的13.4%;制造业从业人数为930万人,占全国制造业人数总额的19.4%;进出口总额则占全国的25.9%。与之对应,湖北省的工业总产值约为4.6万亿元,制造业从业人数约为340万人,制造业规模增速在中部地区排名第一。
(1)本文所用的上市公司面板数据,根据国泰安数据库进行统计整理。考虑到企业家的工作经历数据是从2008年以后才存在记录,本文所构建的上市公司面板数据时间跨度为2008-2017年,并均为A股上市公司样本。为与“中国企业-劳动力匹配调查”(CEES)的受访企业类型相对应,剔除了非制造业的A股上市企业,并将ST企业进行了剔除。综上,本文所用的全部上市公司有效样本数量为8 427个。由于篇幅限制,本文未报告基于上市公司面板数据的描述性统计结果,有兴趣的读者可向笔者索取。
[2]B.A.Blonigen,W.W.Wilson.Foreign Subsidization and Excess Capacity[J].Journal of International Economics,2010,80(2).
[3]王克敏,刘静,李晓溪.产业政策、政府支持与公司投资效率研究[J].管理世界,2017,(3).
[4]刘锦,张三保.企业腐败、劳动收入份额与工资差距——基于中国营商环境调查的证据[J].宏观质量研究,2016,(4).
[5]陆瑶,施新政.企业治理改革、产品市场竞争与公司价值[J].宏观质量研究,2016,(4).
[6]李旭超,罗德明,金祥荣.资源错置与中国企业规模分布特征[J].中国社会科学,2017,(2).
[7]R.J.Caballero,T.Hoshi,A.K.Kashyap.Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan[J].China Economic Review,2008,98(5).
[8]J.Lu,Z.Tao,Z.Yang.The Costs and Benefits of Government Control:Evidence from China’s Collectively-owned Enterprises[J].China Economic Review,2010,21(2).
[9]H.Li,L.Meng,Q.Wang,L.A.Zhou.Political Connections,Financing and Firm Performance:Evidence from Chinese Private Firms[J].Journal of Development Economics,2008,87(2).
[10]L.Chernykh.Profit or Politics?Understanding Renationalizations in Russia[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(5).
[11]J.Fan,T.J.Wong,T.Zhang.Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China Newly Partially Privatized Firms[J].Journal of Financial Economies,2007,84(2).
[12]高勇强,何晓斌,李路路.民营企业家社会身份、经济条件与企业慈善捐赠[J].经济研究,2011,(12).
[13]中国人民银行营业管理部课题组.预算软约束、融资溢价与杠杆率——供给侧结构性改革的微观机理与经济效应研究[J].经济研究,2017,(10).
[14]陈圻,陈佳.成本外部化陷阱:创新与经济转型最大的制度性障碍——“去外部化”的政策选择[J].中国软科学,2016,(2).
[15]S.Claessens,E.Feijen,L.Laeven.Political Connections and Preferential Access to Finance:The Role of Campaign Contributions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,88(3).
[16]周劲,付保宗.产能过剩的内涵、评价体系及在我国工业领域的表现特征[J].经济学动态,2011,(10).
[17]修宗峰,黄健柏.市场化改革、过度投资与企业产能过剩——基于我国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2013,(7).
[18]E.R.Berndt,C.J.Morrison.Capacity Utilization Measures:Underlying Economic Theory and an Alternative Approach[J].American Economic Review,1981,71(2).
[19]S.Richardson.Over-investment of Free Cash Flow[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2006,11(2-3).
[20]席鹏辉,梁若冰,谢贞发,苏国灿.财政压力、产能过剩与供给侧改革[J].经济研究,2017,(9).
[21]A.Banerjee.A Simple Model of Herd Behavior[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1992,107(3).
[22]B.Schmidt.Costs and Benefits of Friendly Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2015,117(2).
[23]D.Chen,S.Khan,X.Yu,Z.Zhang.Government Intervention and Investment Comovement:Chinese Evidence[J].Journal of Business Finance&Accounting,2013,40(3-4).
[24]梅建华.把经济社会发展推向质量时代——学习领会习近平同志的质量观[J].宏观质量研究,2016,(1).
[25]程虹.管理提升了企业劳动生产率吗?——来自中国企业—劳动力匹配调查的经验证据[J].管理世界,2018,(2).
(1)销售收入增长率,采用企业当前销售收入的自然对数值(lnyijd,t)与滞后一期销售收入自然对数值(lnyijd,t-1)的差分作为代理变量。
(2)现金比率采用企业年度经营活动产生的现金流量净额与资产总额的比值作为代理变量。
(3)企业规模采用企业年底雇用的劳动力人数作为代理变量。
(1)所有制根据控股类型具体划分为国有(SOE)、民营(Private)、港澳台(HTM)和外资(Foreign)等4个虚拟变量。
(1)第三次经济普查公报数据显示:截止到2013年,广东省共有各类制造业企业30万家,制造业企业数量占全国的13.4%;制造业从业人数为930万人,占全国制造业人数总额的19.4%;进出口总额则占全国的25.9%。与之对应,湖北省的工业总产值约为4.6万亿元,制造业从业人数约为340万人,制造业规模增速在中部地区排名第一。
(1)本文所用的上市公司面板数据,根据国泰安数据库进行统计整理。考虑到企业家的工作经历数据是从2008年以后才存在记录,本文所构建的上市公司面板数据时间跨度为2008-2017年,并均为A股上市公司样本。为与“中国企业-劳动力匹配调查”(CEES)的受访企业类型相对应,剔除了非制造业的A股上市企业,并将ST企业进行了剔除。综上,本文所用的全部上市公司有效样本数量为8 427个。由于篇幅限制,本文未报告基于上市公司面板数据的描述性统计结果,有兴趣的读者可向笔者索取。