基于资金约束的风险厌恶制造商融资策略和渠道选择研究
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摘要
针对风险厌恶制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑制造商因开通直销渠道面临资金约束、直销渠道需求不确定性和零售渠道增值服务,基于Stackelberg博弈理论构建了零售商提前支付模型和银行借贷模型,给出了制造商的最优融资策略和渠道选择策略。研究发现,提前支付对资金约束制造商总是最优的,但是只有当自有资金较少时零售商才愿意提前支付。对制造商来说,只有自有资金很少且风险厌恶程度较高时,才不开通直销渠道;零售商应该提高增值服务效率,并在一定条件下,中等的提前支付利率水平对零售商是最优的。最后,数值算例验证了结论的正确性。
With the rapid development of e-commerce,many manufacturers have opened their direct channels besides traditional retail channels.When a direct channel is established,opportunities and threats coexist.From the manufacturer's perspectives,running a direct channel cannot only directly improve the profitability,but also enhance the bargaining power with retailers.However,as an emerging sale channel,the demand in the direct channel may be instability and unreliability.Thus,the manufacturer needs to consider the risk arising from the uncertainty of running a direct channel.Moreover,capital constraint is a common phenomenon in the manufacturer's operation due to a direct channel developed.In addition,the presence of the direct channel may intensify the competition between manufactures and retailers,sometimes deteriorating retailers.This may result in retailers' counterattack,including the improvement of service level etc..Based on the practical background,our research issues are examined:First,how does a risk-averse manufacturer choose the proper financing ways under the advance payment financing with price discount and bank loan financing;Second,whether or under what conditions should a manufacturer choose to run a direct channel;Third,how the manufacturer's financing strategy and channel selection is affected by the manufacturer's risk aversion and the retailer's add-value service.To answer the above questions,a supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and one retailer is considered.The manufacturer is capital constrained.Under a manufacturer-Stackelberg game,by formulating the problem as a mean-variance optimization problem and based on the uncertainty of developing a direct channel and add-value services of a retail channel,the advance payment model and the bank loan model are constructed to dispose the manufacturer's optimal financing strategies and channel choice strategies.Through the analysis of the model,the advance payment is optimal for the capital constrained manufacturer.The retailer is willing to pat in advance when the initial capital is very small.The manufacturer runs the direct channel only when the initial capital is very small and the risk aversion coefficient is large.The retailer should improve the efficiency of the add-value services,and should choose the medium rate of the advance payment to prevent running the direct channel.A numerical example is provided to illustrate the analytical results.
With the rapid development of e-commerce,many manufacturers have opened their direct channels besides traditional retail channels.When a direct channel is established,opportunities and threats coexist.From the manufacturer's perspectives,running a direct channel cannot only directly improve the profitability,but also enhance the bargaining power with retailers.However,as an emerging sale channel,the demand in the direct channel may be instability and unreliability.Thus,the manufacturer needs to consider the risk arising from the uncertainty of running a direct channel.Moreover,capital constraint is a common phenomenon in the manufacturer's operation due to a direct channel developed.In addition,the presence of the direct channel may intensify the competition between manufactures and retailers,sometimes deteriorating retailers.This may result in retailers' counterattack,including the improvement of service level etc..Based on the practical background,our research issues are examined:First,how does a risk-averse manufacturer choose the proper financing ways under the advance payment financing with price discount and bank loan financing;Second,whether or under what conditions should a manufacturer choose to run a direct channel;Third,how the manufacturer's financing strategy and channel selection is affected by the manufacturer's risk aversion and the retailer's add-value service.To answer the above questions,a supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and one retailer is considered.The manufacturer is capital constrained.Under a manufacturer-Stackelberg game,by formulating the problem as a mean-variance optimization problem and based on the uncertainty of developing a direct channel and add-value services of a retail channel,the advance payment model and the bank loan model are constructed to dispose the manufacturer's optimal financing strategies and channel choice strategies.Through the analysis of the model,the advance payment is optimal for the capital constrained manufacturer.The retailer is willing to pat in advance when the initial capital is very small.The manufacturer runs the direct channel only when the initial capital is very small and the risk aversion coefficient is large.The retailer should improve the efficiency of the add-value services,and should choose the medium rate of the advance payment to prevent running the direct channel.A numerical example is provided to illustrate the analytical results.
引文
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[18]Eeckhoudt L,Gollier C,Schlesinger H.The risk-averse(and prudent)newsboy[J].Management Science,1995,41(5):786-794.
[19]Xiao Tiaojun,Yang Danqin.Price and service competition of supply chains with risk-averse retailers under demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,114(1):187-200.
[20]Xu Guangye,Dan Bin,Zhang Xumei,et al.Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,147(1):171-179.
[21]张霖霖,姚忠.基于顾客退货风险规避型双渠道供应链最优策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2015,21(3):766-775.
[22]徐广业,张旭梅.风险规避下基于价格折扣的双渠道供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(11):1114-1120.
[23]Li Zhuoxin,Gilbert S M,Lai Guoming.Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information[J].Management Science,2014,60(2):449-462.
[2]王虹,周晶.竞争和风险规避对双渠道供应链决策的影响[J].管理科学,2010,23(1):10-17.
[3]Iyer G,Kuksov D.Competition in consumer shopping experience[J].Marketing Science,2012,31(6):913-93.
[4]Teng J T,Min Jie,Pan Qinhua.Economic order quantity model with trade credit financing for non-decreasing demand[J].Omega,2012,40(3):328-335.
[5]Moussawi-Haidar L,Jaber M Y.A joint model for cash and inventory management for a retailer under delay in payments[J].Computers&Industrial Engineering,2013,66(4):758-767.
[6]Kouvelis P,Zhao Wenhui.Financing the newsvendor:Supplier vs.bank and the structure of optimal trade credit contracts[J].Operations Research,2012,60(3):566-580.
[7]金伟,骆建文.考虑风险规避的资金约束供应链最优信用企业设计[J].中国管理科学,2018,26(1):35-46.
[8]Zhang Qinhong,Zhang Dali,Tsao Yuchung,et al.Optimal ordering policy in a two-stage supply chain with advance payment for stable supply capacity[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,177:34-43.
[9]王文利,骆建文.零售商提前支付与贷款担保下的供应链融资策略[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(1):178-184.
[10]Cai Gangshu,Chen Xiangfeng,Xiao Zhiguo.The roles of bank and trade credits:Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(4):583-598.
[11]Buzacott J A,Zhang R Q.Inventory management with asset-based financing[J].Management Science,2012,50(9):1274-1292.
[12]鲁其辉,姚佳希,周伟华.基于EOQ模型存货质押融资业务模式选择研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):56-66.
[13]Lee C H,Rhee B D.Coordination contracts in the presence of positive inventory financing costs[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2010,124(2):331-339.
[14]Lee C H,Rhee B D.Trade credit for supply chain coordination[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2011,214(1):136-146.
[15]张小娟,王勇.零售商资金约束的双渠道供应链决策[J].控制与决策,2014,29(2):299-306.
[16]郭金森,周永务,钟远光.基于资金约束零售商的双渠道制造商贸易信贷与提前订货折扣契约选择策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(5):1254-1264.
[17]肖肖,骆建文.面向资金约束制造商的双渠道供应链融资策略[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(1):121-128.
[18]Eeckhoudt L,Gollier C,Schlesinger H.The risk-averse(and prudent)newsboy[J].Management Science,1995,41(5):786-794.
[19]Xiao Tiaojun,Yang Danqin.Price and service competition of supply chains with risk-averse retailers under demand uncertainty[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2008,114(1):187-200.
[20]Xu Guangye,Dan Bin,Zhang Xumei,et al.Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2014,147(1):171-179.
[21]张霖霖,姚忠.基于顾客退货风险规避型双渠道供应链最优策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2015,21(3):766-775.
[22]徐广业,张旭梅.风险规避下基于价格折扣的双渠道供应链协调[J].系统管理学报,2016,25(11):1114-1120.
[23]Li Zhuoxin,Gilbert S M,Lai Guoming.Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information[J].Management Science,2014,60(2):449-462.