CFO薪酬溢价和公司财务违规
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摘要
CFO是企业财务工作的重要执行者,CFO薪酬状况影响企业财务表现。通过采用A股上市公司2008～2016年的数据作为研究样本,文章考察了CFO薪酬溢价与公司财务违规可能性之间的关系及董事长权力对两者关系的影响。结果发现,CFO薪酬溢价越大,公司出现财务违规的可能性越小;董事长权力较大时,CFO薪酬溢价也较大,公司财务违规的可能性上升。进一步研究表明,相比于国有企业,非国有企业中CFO薪酬溢价与公司财务违规的负向关系更为显著;且给予CFO相对的高薪有助于减少其违规倾向,而非被稽查概率;而一旦财务违规行为被监管部门发现,相对高薪的CFO所受的处罚也会更重。本文研究结论表明,薪酬激励正向效应在CFO身上得到体现,但企业领导人员过大的权力反而会削弱这种正向效应。
This paper examines the relationship between CFO compensation premium and the possibility of financial violations, as well as the influence of chairman's power on the relationship. The study finds that the greater the premium of CFO compensation is, the lower the possibility of financial violations is, whereas when the chairman has greater power, the greater the premium of CFO compensation is, the more likely the company's financial violations are. Further research finds that compared with state-owned enterprises, the premium of CFO compensation in non-state-owned enterprises has a more significant impact on reducing corporate financial violations, and that the relatively high salary of CFO helps to reduce its violations tendency, rather than the probability of being inspected. Once the financial violations are found by regulatory authorities, the CFO with relative higher pay will receive even heavier punishment.
This paper examines the relationship between CFO compensation premium and the possibility of financial violations, as well as the influence of chairman's power on the relationship. The study finds that the greater the premium of CFO compensation is, the lower the possibility of financial violations is, whereas when the chairman has greater power, the greater the premium of CFO compensation is, the more likely the company's financial violations are. Further research finds that compared with state-owned enterprises, the premium of CFO compensation in non-state-owned enterprises has a more significant impact on reducing corporate financial violations, and that the relatively high salary of CFO helps to reduce its violations tendency, rather than the probability of being inspected. Once the financial violations are found by regulatory authorities, the CFO with relative higher pay will receive even heavier punishment.
引文
程新生,刘建梅,陈靖涵.2015.才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露[J].金融研究(12):146-161.
戴亦一,余威,宁博,潘越.2017.民营企业董事长的党员身份与公司财务违规[J].会计研究(6):75-81.
方军雄.2012.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界(11):144-155.
贺伟,龙立荣.2011.实际收人水平、收入内部比较与员工薪酬满意度的关系——传统性和部门规模的调节作用[J].管理世界(4):98-110.
黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明.2014.外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗——基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论17(4):24-35.
黎文靖,胡玉明.2012.国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?[J].经济研究47(12):125-136.
李绍龙,龙立荣,贺伟.2012.高管团队薪酬差异与企业绩效关系研究:行业特征的跨层调节作用[J].南开管理评论15(4):55-65.
李晓玲,刘中燕.2016.CFO持股对上市公司盈余管理的影响[J].中南财经政法大学学报(1):82-88.
李延喜,包世泽,高锐,孔宪京.2007.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开管理评论(6):55-61.
林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.2003.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J].经济研究(4):31-40.
刘春,孙亮.2010.薪酬差距与企业绩效:来自国企上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论13(2):30-39.
刘子君,刘智强,廖建桥.2011.上市公司高管团队薪酬差距影响因素与影响效应:基于本土特色的实证研究[J].管理评论23(9):119-127.
陆瑶,李茶.2016.CEO对董事会的影响力与上市公司违规犯罪[J].金融研究(1):176-191.
Akerlof G A, Yellen J L. 1990. The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(2):255-283.
Feng M, Ge W, Luo S. 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1-2):21-36.
Jiang J X, Petroni K R, Wang I Y. 2010. CFOs and CEOs:Who have the most influence on earnings management?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,96(3):513-526.
Lazear E P, Rosen S. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5):841-864.
Rosen S. 1986. Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments[J]. American Economic Review, 76:701-715.
戴亦一,余威,宁博,潘越.2017.民营企业董事长的党员身份与公司财务违规[J].会计研究(6):75-81.
方军雄.2012.高管超额薪酬与公司治理决策[J].管理世界(11):144-155.
贺伟,龙立荣.2011.实际收人水平、收入内部比较与员工薪酬满意度的关系——传统性和部门规模的调节作用[J].管理世界(4):98-110.
黎文靖,岑永嗣,胡玉明.2014.外部薪酬差距激励了高管吗——基于中国上市公司经理人市场与产权性质的经验研究[J].南开管理评论17(4):24-35.
黎文靖,胡玉明.2012.国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?[J].经济研究47(12):125-136.
李绍龙,龙立荣,贺伟.2012.高管团队薪酬差异与企业绩效关系研究:行业特征的跨层调节作用[J].南开管理评论15(4):55-65.
李晓玲,刘中燕.2016.CFO持股对上市公司盈余管理的影响[J].中南财经政法大学学报(1):82-88.
李延喜,包世泽,高锐,孔宪京.2007.薪酬激励、董事会监管与上市公司盈余管理[J].南开管理评论(6):55-61.
林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.2003.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J].经济研究(4):31-40.
刘春,孙亮.2010.薪酬差距与企业绩效:来自国企上市公司的经验证据[J].南开管理评论13(2):30-39.
刘子君,刘智强,廖建桥.2011.上市公司高管团队薪酬差距影响因素与影响效应:基于本土特色的实证研究[J].管理评论23(9):119-127.
陆瑶,李茶.2016.CEO对董事会的影响力与上市公司违规犯罪[J].金融研究(1):176-191.
Akerlof G A, Yellen J L. 1990. The fair wage-effort hypothesis and unemployment[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(2):255-283.
Feng M, Ge W, Luo S. 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(1-2):21-36.
Jiang J X, Petroni K R, Wang I Y. 2010. CFOs and CEOs:Who have the most influence on earnings management?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,96(3):513-526.
Lazear E P, Rosen S. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5):841-864.
Rosen S. 1986. Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments[J]. American Economic Review, 76:701-715.