政府约束机制下环境质量监管三方演化博弈分析及仿真研究
|
摘要
本文研究环境检测领域政府监管部门、第三方环境检测机构、排污企业3个主体在信息不对称与有限理性情况下的行为选择问题,为政府加强环境质量管理提供重要的指导意义。本文基于演化博弈理论,构建第三方与排污企业之间的协调均衡博弈模型和第三方与排污企业合谋构成的利益集团与政府监管部门之间的非对称演化博弈模型,研究行为主体的策略选择问题并利用Matlab仿真不同参数变化时模型的演化均衡策略。结果表明:惩罚额度、监管力度、监管成本是分别影响监管部门、排污企业、第三方检测机构演化稳定策略的关键因素,最后从资格审查、竞争机制、信息系统、奖惩机制方面给出政府加强环境质量监管的建议,从而更加有效地抑制环境检测领域数据造假行为。
The paper studies on the behavior choice of three subjects of government regulatory authorities,third-party environmental organization institutions and pollutant enterprises in the case of information asymmetry and limited rationality in the field of environmental testing,provides important guiding significance for the government to strengthen environmental quality management.Based on the theory of evolutionary game,this paper constructs a coordination and equilibrium game model between the third party and pollutant enterprises,and asymmetric evolutionary game model between interest groups formed by the third party and pollutant enterprises and government regulatory authorities.This paper studies the strategy selection of the subjects and uses Matlab to simulate the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model when different parameters change.The results show that the change of the three parameters of the amount of punishment,regulatory strength and the regulatory cost of the regulatory authorities will affect the evolution and stability strategy of the regulatory authorities,pollutant enterprises and the third-party respectively.Finally,the paper gives some suggestions to strengthen the environmental quality regulatory from the aspects of qualification,competition mechanism,information system,reward and punishment mechanism,so as to suppress the illegal data falsification in the field of environmental inspection more effectively.
The paper studies on the behavior choice of three subjects of government regulatory authorities,third-party environmental organization institutions and pollutant enterprises in the case of information asymmetry and limited rationality in the field of environmental testing,provides important guiding significance for the government to strengthen environmental quality management.Based on the theory of evolutionary game,this paper constructs a coordination and equilibrium game model between the third party and pollutant enterprises,and asymmetric evolutionary game model between interest groups formed by the third party and pollutant enterprises and government regulatory authorities.This paper studies the strategy selection of the subjects and uses Matlab to simulate the evolutionary equilibrium strategy of the model when different parameters change.The results show that the change of the three parameters of the amount of punishment,regulatory strength and the regulatory cost of the regulatory authorities will affect the evolution and stability strategy of the regulatory authorities,pollutant enterprises and the third-party respectively.Finally,the paper gives some suggestions to strengthen the environmental quality regulatory from the aspects of qualification,competition mechanism,information system,reward and punishment mechanism,so as to suppress the illegal data falsification in the field of environmental inspection more effectively.
引文
[1]Frisvold G B,Caswell M F.Trans Boundary Water Management Game-theoretic Lessons for Projects on the US-Mexico Border[J].Agricultural Economics,2000,24(10):101～111.
[2]王涛,马小平.质量技监部门与企业在产品质量监管中的博弈分析[J].中国质量技术监督,2007,(10):38.
[3]吴瑞明,胡代平,沈惠樟.流域污染治理中的演化博弈稳定性分析[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(6):797～801.
[4]朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.政府-企业间质量监管博弈分析[J].软科学,2013,27(1):47～49.
[5]刘长玉,于涛.绿色产品质量监管的三方博弈关系研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(10):170～176.
[6]张雁林,杜建国,金帅.企业环境污染治理中的三方博弈[J].生态经济,2015,31(4):29～33.
[7]刘长玉.政府、第三方检测机构和企业质量监管中博弈关系研究[J].东岳论丛,2015,36(10):128～132.
[8]赵荧梅,郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):111～120.
[9]朱立龙,郭鹏菲.政府约束机制下农产品质量安全监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析[J].系统工程,2017,35(12):75～80.
[10]潘峰,王琳.两人进化博弈策略的决定机制与应用研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,32(5):24～29.
[2]王涛,马小平.质量技监部门与企业在产品质量监管中的博弈分析[J].中国质量技术监督,2007,(10):38.
[3]吴瑞明,胡代平,沈惠樟.流域污染治理中的演化博弈稳定性分析[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(6):797～801.
[4]朱立龙,于涛,夏同水.政府-企业间质量监管博弈分析[J].软科学,2013,27(1):47～49.
[5]刘长玉,于涛.绿色产品质量监管的三方博弈关系研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015,25(10):170～176.
[6]张雁林,杜建国,金帅.企业环境污染治理中的三方博弈[J].生态经济,2015,31(4):29～33.
[7]刘长玉.政府、第三方检测机构和企业质量监管中博弈关系研究[J].东岳论丛,2015,36(10):128～132.
[8]赵荧梅,郭本海,刘思峰.不完全信息下产品质量监管多方博弈模型[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(2):111～120.
[9]朱立龙,郭鹏菲.政府约束机制下农产品质量安全监管三方演化博弈及仿真分析[J].系统工程,2017,35(12):75～80.
[10]潘峰,王琳.两人进化博弈策略的决定机制与应用研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,32(5):24～29.