控股股东社会资本、创新意愿与技术创新的关系——兼议股权资本和产权性质的情境效应
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摘要
从控股股东这一资源提供者的角度出发,放宽控股权等于控制权的假设前提,深入探究控股股东社会资本对企业技术创新的作用路径与内在机理。研究发现:控股股东的社会资本增强了其谋取控制权私有收益的动机和能力,会抑制企业的技术创新水平,但其创新意愿会削弱这一负向影响;此外,上述传导关系在低股权资本和非国有样本中更加显著。研究揭示控股股东社会资本这一隐性权力与企业技术创新不足间的内在关系,并在此基础上理清不同情境下的差异性影响,以期丰富技术创新微观层面的影响因素,并为政府和监管部门对相关信息披露政策的补充和完善提供参考。
From the perspective of controlling shareholder as a resource provider, this paper loosens the premise that controlling right is equal to control right, and probes into the function path and internal mechanism of controlling shareholder's social capital to enterprise's technological innovation. It is found that the controlling shareholders' social capital enhances their motivation and ability to obtain the private income of control rights, and will restrain the level of technological innovation of enterprises, but their willingness to innovate will weaken this negative influence; in addition, the above-mentioned conduction relationship is more significant in low-equity capital and non-stateowned samples. In this paper, the internal relation between the hidden power of the controlling shareholder's social capital and the deficiency of the technological innovation of the enterprise is revealed, and the influence of the difference in different situations is clarified on the basis of the research, with a view to enriching the influencing factors of the micro-level of technological innovation, and provide reference for the government and the regulatory authorities to supplement and finish the relevant information disclosure policy.
From the perspective of controlling shareholder as a resource provider, this paper loosens the premise that controlling right is equal to control right, and probes into the function path and internal mechanism of controlling shareholder's social capital to enterprise's technological innovation. It is found that the controlling shareholders' social capital enhances their motivation and ability to obtain the private income of control rights, and will restrain the level of technological innovation of enterprises, but their willingness to innovate will weaken this negative influence; in addition, the above-mentioned conduction relationship is more significant in low-equity capital and non-stateowned samples. In this paper, the internal relation between the hidden power of the controlling shareholder's social capital and the deficiency of the technological innovation of the enterprise is revealed, and the influence of the difference in different situations is clarified on the basis of the research, with a view to enriching the influencing factors of the micro-level of technological innovation, and provide reference for the government and the regulatory authorities to supplement and finish the relevant information disclosure policy.
引文
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[22]杨慧军,杨建君.股权集中度、经理人激励与技术创新选择[J].科研管理,2015,36(4):48-55.
[23]田银华,李华金.股权结构、社会资本控制与控股股东利益侵占:来自中国家族上市公司的经验证据[J].当代经济科学,2015,37(:5):89-95,127.
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[25]贺京同,高林.企业所有权、创新激励政策及其效果研究[J].财经研究, 2012,38(3):15-25.
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[29]陈朝月,许治.企业外部技术获取模式与企业创新绩效之间的关系探究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2018,39(1):143-153.
[30]HE J, TIAN X.The dark side of analyst coverage:the case ofinnovation[J].SocialScienceElectronicPublishing,2013,109(3):856-878.
[31]TIAN X, WANG T Y.Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation[J].Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(1):211-255.
[32]刘华,杨汉明.风险承担与创新绩效:基于股权激励调节作用的考察[J].现代财经,2018,38(1):98-113.
[33]孙刚.“科技认定”、代理成本与创新绩效:基于上市公司专利申请的初步证据[J].科学学研究,2018,36(2):249-263.
[34]王运通,姜付秀.多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本[J].世界经济, 2017,40(10):119-143.
[2]张伟华,王斌,宋春霞.股东资源、实际控制与公司控制权争夺:基于雷士照明的案例研究[J].中国软科学,2016(10):109-122.
[3]崔思凝.惯习、资本与场域:布迪厄实践理论及其对中国公共政策过程研究的启示[J].湖北社会科学,2017(9):22-27.
[4]宋春霞.股东资源-资源基础理论的研究新视角[J].技术经济与管理研究,2015(3):70-74.
[5]唐婧清,刘树海,张俊民.大股东治理体制对现金持有价值的影响:基于“掏空”与“支持”双重动机视角[J].管理评论,2016,28(7):53-65.
[6]周雪峰,左静静.社会资本对企业创新投资的影响研究:综述及展望[J].华东经济管理,2017,31(12):153-161.
[7]NAHAPIET J,GHOSHAL S.Social capital,intellectual capital,and the organizational advantage[J].Knowledge&Social Capital,2000,23(2):119-157.
[8]程敏英,魏明海.关系股东的权力超额配置[J].中国工业经济,2013(10):108-120.
[9]杨松令,王昱茜,刘亭立.大股东关系对关联交易的影响:基于社会资本视角[J].现代财经,2014,34(11):60-70.
[10]刘亭立,杨理嘉,王志华.大股东“关系治理”对真实盈余管理影响的实证分析[J].统计与决策,2016(14):167-170.
[11]周晓珺,陈清华.社会资本能影响上市公司财务治理效率吗?:基于核心利益相关者的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2014,29(:3):68-76.
[12]杨菲,安立仁,史贝贝.知识积累与创新关系研究脉络及未来展望[J].科技管理研究,2017,37(11):136-140.
[13]WU J F, XU D A, PHAN P H.The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 2011,28(1):95-114.
[14]朱德胜,周晓珮.股权制衡、高管持股与企业创新效率[J].南开管理评论,2016,19(3):136-144.
[15]CHENVZ,LIJ,SHAPIRODM.AreOECD-prescribed"goodcorporategovernancepractices"reallygoodinan emerging economy?[J].Asia Pacific Journal of Management,2011,28(1):115-138.
[16]杨建君,王婷,孙丰文.大股东控制与技术创新间关系的研究综述[J].科技管理研究, 2014,34(4):204-210.
[17]洪峰,徐永乐.股东能否容忍创新背景下的回报下降?:基于高管薪酬回报非对称敏感性的解释[J].云南财经大学学报,2016,32(1):141-151.
[18]CLAESSENS S, FAN J P H, LANG L H P. The benefits and costs of group affiliation:evidence from East Asia[J].Emerging Markets Review, 2002,7(1):1-26.
[19]俞红海,徐龙炳,陈百助.终极控股股东控制权与自由现金流过度投资[J].经济研究,2010,45(8):103-114.
[20]顾群,李敏,郑杨.控制权私有收益对企业双元创新平衡影响研究:公司治理的调节作用[J].贵州财经大学学报,2018(2):78-85.
[21]杨建君,梅晓芳,石立江.股权集中度、创新承诺与创新方式选择关系研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2010,31(1):48-54.
[22]杨慧军,杨建君.股权集中度、经理人激励与技术创新选择[J].科研管理,2015,36(4):48-55.
[23]田银华,李华金.股权结构、社会资本控制与控股股东利益侵占:来自中国家族上市公司的经验证据[J].当代经济科学,2015,37(:5):89-95,127.
[24]苏坤.终极股东超额控制对公司研发投资的影响:产权性质的调节作用[J].科技进步与对策, 2017,34(:6):91-96.
[25]贺京同,高林.企业所有权、创新激励政策及其效果研究[J].财经研究, 2012,38(3):15-25.
[26]CHOI S B, LEE S H, WILLIAMS C.Ownership and firm innovation in a transition economy:evidence from China[J].Research Policy,2011,40(3):441-452.
[27]廖冠民,沈红波.国有企业的政策性负担:动因、后果及治理[J].中国工业经济,2014(6):96-108.
[28]彭松林,周超.企业国际化能够提升企业创新能力吗?:基于中国上市公司面板数据检验[J].科技管理研究,2017,37(14):6-13.
[29]陈朝月,许治.企业外部技术获取模式与企业创新绩效之间的关系探究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,2018,39(1):143-153.
[30]HE J, TIAN X.The dark side of analyst coverage:the case ofinnovation[J].SocialScienceElectronicPublishing,2013,109(3):856-878.
[31]TIAN X, WANG T Y.Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation[J].Review of Financial Studies,2014,27(1):211-255.
[32]刘华,杨汉明.风险承担与创新绩效:基于股权激励调节作用的考察[J].现代财经,2018,38(1):98-113.
[33]孙刚.“科技认定”、代理成本与创新绩效:基于上市公司专利申请的初步证据[J].科学学研究,2018,36(2):249-263.
[34]王运通,姜付秀.多个大股东能否降低公司债务融资成本[J].世界经济, 2017,40(10):119-143.