现代权利视域中利益理论的更新与发展
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摘要
利益理论若仅提出权利是法律保护的利益,而不指明利益的判断程序、利益与权利的关系、权利人的确定标准等,其权利概念可能就是一个"毫无必要甚或令人迷惑的术语"。为回应这些质疑,利益理论者也作出了克服利益理论自身缺陷的诸多尝试。探求权利的本质更重要的或许不在于揭示权利本质本身为何,而在于依照权利的本质要求创设与实现权利。由此,应该从权利人的视角即从内部由权利人自身创设权利,而非从外部赋予权利人权利。循此,则必须保证并确立权利人参与权利创设与适用的法律程序。现代权利的程序理论主要包括权利的生成程序与适用程序,其能够涵盖并容纳两种传统权利理论的核心内容,应该是研究现代权利理论的正途。
引文
[1]See Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.107.
[2]See Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,note 27 at p.240.
[3]See Philipp Heck,The Jurisprudence of Interests:An Outline,in The Jurisprudence of Interests:Selected Writings of Various Authors,trans.and ed.by M.Magdalena Schoch,Harvard University Press,1948,p.35.
[4]笔者有关耶林利益理论的介绍主要参照了吴从周:《概念法学、利益法学与价值法学:探索一部民法方法论的演变史》,中国法制出版社2011年版;以及朱庆育:《耶林权利理论述略》,载第四届罗马法、中国法与民法法典化国际研讨会论文集,2009年10月编。
[5]Jhering,Zweck II,S.170f.转引自前引[4],吴从周书,第200—201页。
[6]前引[4],吴从周书,第200页。
[7]Helmut Coing,Benthams Bedeutung für die Interessenjurisprudenz,in:ARSP 1968 S.86.转引自前引[4],吴从周书,第204页。
[8]See Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,pp.240—241.
[9]Jeremy Bentham,An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,eds.by J.H.Burns and H.L.A.Hart,The Athlone Press,University of London,Chap.XVI,para.25,n.e2,in p.206;see also Jeremy Bentham,Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence,ed.by Philip Schofield,Oxford:Clarendon Press,2010,§11 and§13.
[10]H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.174.
[11]H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.169.
[12]D.N.Mac Cormick,“Rights in Legislation,”in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by P.M.S.Hacker and Joseph Raz,Oxford University Press,1977,p.192.
[13]Rudolf von Jhering,Geist des r觟mischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung,dritter Theil,erste Abteilung,sechste und siebente Auflage,Leipzig:Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf&H觟rtel,1924,S.327ff,S.339,S.350,S.351,S.351ff.此处引文参照了朱庆育的翻译,参见前引[4],朱庆育文,第784—786页。
[14]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.237.
[15]Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,p.33;Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.248.
[16]D.N.Mac Cormick,“Rights in Legislation,”in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by P.M.S.Hacker and Joseph Raz,Oxford University Press,1977,pp.204—205.
[17]工具性价值表现在,“某物是工具性价值在某种程度上来自其后果价值,或来自其希望的后果价值,或来自其能够产生的后果价值”。Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,p.177.
[18]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,note 1 at p.177。
[19]Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,pp.32—33.See also Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights,Ethics”,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[20]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.305.
[21]Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[22]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.176—177.
[23]此处需明确的是,克雷默是在法理学领域而非在伦理学或政治学领域讨论权利问题。正如他本人指出的,在“利益理论”标题下通常“既可用来解释道德权利,也可用来解释法律权利”。但是,也有许多利益理论的学说(包括克雷默本人)“主要是在法律哲学领域而非政治哲学领域。它们合乎法理学的特点,因为它们部分地构成了对于法律权利本质的一般解说”。See Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,p.32.他的这一立场在“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,pp.245—246一文中又再次重申。
[24]Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[25]可比较其早先观点,“法律权利之利益理论的核心原则要点是,任何法律权利都保护权利人有益于人类、集体或非人生物境况中的某一方面”。See Matthew H.Kramer,“Rights without Trimmings”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.60—101.“X拥有法律权利必要但不充分的条件是,当对X某方面处境经全面考虑予以实际、规范性地保护时,跟权利相对应的义务通常是为了人类、集体或非人类生物的利益。”Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,p.32.可以发现,克雷默当前观点并没有实质性变化。
[26]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.298.
[27]Neil Mac Cormick,“Taking the‘Rights Thesis’Seriously”,in his Legal Right and Social Democracy:Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.143,144.
[28]Neil Mac Cormick,“Children's Rights:A Test-Case for Theories of Right”,in his Legal Right and Social Democracy:Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press 1982,pp.163—164.
[29]Joseph Raz,“Rights and Individual Well-Being”,Ratio Juris.Vol.5 No.2,1992,p.130.
[30]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,p.180.
[31]正是这种从“施加义务以服务于权利人利益”来界定权利的策略,其利益理论被西蒙斯看成是现代利益理论的代表。See N.E.Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.202—203.
[32]Eric Mack,“In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights”,4 The Journal of Ethics,2000,p.84.
[33]Arthur Kaufmann,Winfried Hassemer,Einführung in Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart,6.neubearbeitete und erweiterte Aufl.6,Heidelberg 1994,S.145.
[34]参见前引[4],吴从周书,第416—418页。
[35]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,pp.262—264.
[36]Juliana Tutt,“Theories of Rights:Problems and Solutions”,Eudaimonia:Georgetown Philosophical Review,Vol.IV,Issue1,2007,p.169.
[37]H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.187.
[38]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.243.
[39]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,pp.241—242;Leif Wenar,“The Analysis of Rights”,in The Legacy of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by Matthew H.Kramer,Claire Grant,Ben Colbum,and Antony Hatzistavrou,Oxford University Press,2008,p.255.
[40]施启扬:《民法总则》,中国法制出版社2010年版,第25页。
[41]相关论述还可参见:See Rowan Cruft,“Rights:Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?”,Law&Philosophy,2004,23(4),pp.372—375;George W.Rainbolt,Rights Theory,Philosophy Compass,Vol 1,No.1,2006,p.14;Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.241。
[42]D.N.Mac Cormick,“Rights in Legislation,”in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by P.M.S.Hacker and Joseph Raz,Oxford University Press,1977,p.202.
[43]George W.Rainbolt,“Rights Theory”,Philosophy Compass,Vol 1,No.1,2006,p.14.
[44]John Chipman Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,2nd ed.,ed.by David Campbell and Philip Thomas,Ashgate/Dartmouth,1997,p.13.
[45]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.120.
[46]Eric Mack,“In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights”,4 The Journal of Ethics,2000,pp.95—96.
[47]See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Harvard University Press,1978,p.240;F.M.Kamm,Morality,Mortality Volume II:Rights,Duties,and Status,Oxford University Press,1996,pp.259—289;Horacio Spector,Autonomy and Rights:The Moral Foundations of Liberalism,Clarendon:Oxford University Press,1992,pp.163—178;Judith Jarvis Thomson,The Realm of Rights,Harvard University Press,1990,pp.123—148;Alan Gewirth,“Are There Any Absolute Rights?”,in Theories of Rights,Jeremy Waldron ed.,Oxford University Press,1984,pp.91—92;Amartya Sen,Rights and Agency,Philosophy&Public Affairs,Vol.11,No.1,1982,pp.3—7;Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,San Diego Law Review,Vol.46,p.827.
[48]See Judith Jarvis Thomson,The Realm of Rights,Harvard University Press,1990,p.151.
[49]See Robert Nozick,Anarchy,State,and Utopia,Basic Books,1974,pp.29—33;Horacio Spector,Autonomy and Rights:The Moral Foundations of Liberalism,Clarendon:Oxford University Press,1992,pp.163—178.
[50]Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,San Diego Law Review,Vol.46,p.828.
[51]See Robert Nozick,Anarchy,State,and Utopia,Basic Books,1974,p.29;Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,San Diego Law Review,Vol.46,p.828.括号内C实际上是“constraints”(限制)的缩写。
[52]Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,in Perspectives in Moral Science,eds.by M.Baurmann&B.Lahno,2009,p.359.
[53]Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,in46 San Diego Law Review,2009,p.826.
[54]See Hamish Ross,“Children's Rights and Theories of Rights”,International Journal of Children's Rights,Vol 21,2013,pp.701—702.
[55]原话是,“如果说一个人拥有权利仅仅意味着他是一项义务的意在受益人,那么此种意义上的‘权利’可能就是一个描述法律中毫无必要甚或令人迷惑的术语;既然所有能用权利这一术语表达的也能甚至最适宜用义务这一必不可少的术语表达”。H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.181—182.
[56]Brian H.Bix,A Dictionary of Legal Theory,Oxford University Press,2004,p.101.
[57]N.E.Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.197—198.
[58]在克雷默、斯坦纳的论文中用的是英镑符号“￡”,而在斯尼瓦森的论文中用的则是美元符号“$”。为方便与对应,这里统一使用美元。
[59]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.302.
[60]Matthew H.Kramer,“Rights without Trimmings”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.80—81.
[61]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.263.
[62]See H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.177—179.
[63][64]Matthew H.Kramer,“Rights without Trimmings”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.81—82;p81.
[65]Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.263.
[66]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.264.
[67]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,pp.304—305.克雷默在文章中用“R”指代“权利人(即Rights holder)”。
[68]Ibid.,p.305.
[69]See Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010;Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights,Ethics”,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[70]利益理论是否一定跟实证主义有必然联系,这个问题本身还需要进一步考证与讨论。
[71]N.E.Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,p.198.
[72]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,ch.7.
[73][74]Joseph Raz,Ethics in the Public Domain,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994,pp.149—153;p.274.
[75]特定职位之人的权利之所以是利益理论面临的难题,是因为并非所有的职位权利或特权都能给其持有人带来利益。
[76]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.290,291.
[77]Cécile Fabre,“Posthumous Rights”,in The Legacy of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by Matthew H.Kramer,Claire Grant,Ben Colbum,&Antony Hatzistavrou,Oxford University Press,2008,p.227.
[78]斯尼瓦森和克雷默围绕此点发生过激烈争论。See Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007;Gopal Sreenivasan,“Duties and Their Direction”,120 Ethics,2010;Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013.
[79][法]雅克·盖斯旦、吉勒·古博等:《法国民法总论》,陈鹏等译,法律出版社2004年版,第135页。
[80]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,Philosophy and Public Affairs 33,2005,pp.241—242.
[81]See Hamish Ross,“Children's Rights and Theories of Rights”,International Journal of Children's Rights,Vol 21,2013,p.703.
[82]See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.184.
[83]L.W.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of Rights,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1987,p.99.
[84][85]L.W.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of Rights,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1987,p.47,96.
[86]Alon Harel,“Theories of Rights”,in Martin P.Golding and William A.Edmundson eds.,The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,Blackwell Publishing,2005,p.195.笔者赞同萨姆纳、哈雷尔利益理论可包含选择理论的理解,但不同意其认为选择理论不能包含利益理论的观点。下文即会指出选择理论同样可包含利益理论。
[87]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.121.
[88]Willam A.Edmundson,An Introduction to Rights,Cambridge University Press,2004,p.127.
[89]John Oberdiek,“Towards a Right against Risking”,Law and Philosophy,Vol.28,No.4,2009,note 4 at p.371.
[90]See Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.109.
[91]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.108.
[92]H.J.Mc Closkey,“Rights”,Philosophical Quarterly 15,1965,p.126.
[93]Matthew H.Kramer,“On the Nature of Legal Rights”,Cambridge Law Journal,2000,59(3),p.478.
[94]See Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.186—192.
[95]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.190—191.
[96]John Chipman Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,2nd ed.,ed.by David Campbell and Philip Thomas,Ashgate/Dartmouth,1997,p.13.
[97]前引[79],盖斯旦、古博等书,第135页。
[98]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.112.
[99]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.262.
[100]Brian H.Bix,A Dictionary of Legal Theory,Oxford University Press,2004,p.101.
[101]此处(1)—(4)点的相关观点还均可参见Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.241.
[102]Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.262.
[103]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.112.
[104]参见彭诚信:《私权的层次划分与体系建构》,《法制与社会发展》2009年第1期;彭诚信:《现代权利理论研究》,法律出版社2017年版,第334—366页。
[105]相关论述,参见前引[104],彭诚信书,第185—206页。
[106]Frank Michelman,“Law's Republic”,The Yale Law Journal,1988,Vol.97,No.8,p.1518.
[107][奥]凯尔森:《纯粹法理论》,张书友译,中国法制出版社2008年版,第73页。
[108]如贝林博士所言:“如同法律本身,权利永远不应是固定的、僵化的,新的危险和需求将出现,而为了回应这些危险和需求,权利必须被重新具体化以保护个人的人格健全与固有尊严。”Bernard Bailyn,The Living Past-Commitments for the Future,Remarks at the First Millennium Evening at the White House,Accessed Feb 11,1998.http://clinton4.nara.gov/Initiatives/Millennium/bbailyn.html,visited on 2015-02-26.
[109]韦尔曼曾指出,意志理论与利益理论解决的是完全不同的问题,因而把两者结合起来也不会存在逻辑上的矛盾。意志理论解决的是权利本质的问题,即我们应该如何构想权利;利益理论解决的是拥有权利的主体资格问题,即成为权利人的主体条件是什么。因此,一个人可在权利性质方面采纳意志理论,同时在权利基础方面采纳利益理论。See Carl Wellman,Real Rights,Oxford University Press,1995,pp.118—119,p.124.
[110][英]尼尔·麦考密克:《法律推理与法律理论》,姜峰译,法律出版社2005年版,第245页。
[2]See Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,note 27 at p.240.
[3]See Philipp Heck,The Jurisprudence of Interests:An Outline,in The Jurisprudence of Interests:Selected Writings of Various Authors,trans.and ed.by M.Magdalena Schoch,Harvard University Press,1948,p.35.
[4]笔者有关耶林利益理论的介绍主要参照了吴从周:《概念法学、利益法学与价值法学:探索一部民法方法论的演变史》,中国法制出版社2011年版;以及朱庆育:《耶林权利理论述略》,载第四届罗马法、中国法与民法法典化国际研讨会论文集,2009年10月编。
[5]Jhering,Zweck II,S.170f.转引自前引[4],吴从周书,第200—201页。
[6]前引[4],吴从周书,第200页。
[7]Helmut Coing,Benthams Bedeutung für die Interessenjurisprudenz,in:ARSP 1968 S.86.转引自前引[4],吴从周书,第204页。
[8]See Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,pp.240—241.
[9]Jeremy Bentham,An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,eds.by J.H.Burns and H.L.A.Hart,The Athlone Press,University of London,Chap.XVI,para.25,n.e2,in p.206;see also Jeremy Bentham,Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence,ed.by Philip Schofield,Oxford:Clarendon Press,2010,§11 and§13.
[10]H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.174.
[11]H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.169.
[12]D.N.Mac Cormick,“Rights in Legislation,”in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by P.M.S.Hacker and Joseph Raz,Oxford University Press,1977,p.192.
[13]Rudolf von Jhering,Geist des r觟mischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung,dritter Theil,erste Abteilung,sechste und siebente Auflage,Leipzig:Druck und Verlag von Breitkopf&H觟rtel,1924,S.327ff,S.339,S.350,S.351,S.351ff.此处引文参照了朱庆育的翻译,参见前引[4],朱庆育文,第784—786页。
[14]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.237.
[15]Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,p.33;Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.248.
[16]D.N.Mac Cormick,“Rights in Legislation,”in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by P.M.S.Hacker and Joseph Raz,Oxford University Press,1977,pp.204—205.
[17]工具性价值表现在,“某物是工具性价值在某种程度上来自其后果价值,或来自其希望的后果价值,或来自其能够产生的后果价值”。Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,p.177.
[18]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,note 1 at p.177。
[19]Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,pp.32—33.See also Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights,Ethics”,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[20]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.305.
[21]Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[22]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.176—177.
[23]此处需明确的是,克雷默是在法理学领域而非在伦理学或政治学领域讨论权利问题。正如他本人指出的,在“利益理论”标题下通常“既可用来解释道德权利,也可用来解释法律权利”。但是,也有许多利益理论的学说(包括克雷默本人)“主要是在法律哲学领域而非政治哲学领域。它们合乎法理学的特点,因为它们部分地构成了对于法律权利本质的一般解说”。See Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,p.32.他的这一立场在“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,pp.245—246一文中又再次重申。
[24]Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[25]可比较其早先观点,“法律权利之利益理论的核心原则要点是,任何法律权利都保护权利人有益于人类、集体或非人生物境况中的某一方面”。See Matthew H.Kramer,“Rights without Trimmings”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.60—101.“X拥有法律权利必要但不充分的条件是,当对X某方面处境经全面考虑予以实际、规范性地保护时,跟权利相对应的义务通常是为了人类、集体或非人类生物的利益。”Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010,p.32.可以发现,克雷默当前观点并没有实质性变化。
[26]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.298.
[27]Neil Mac Cormick,“Taking the‘Rights Thesis’Seriously”,in his Legal Right and Social Democracy:Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.143,144.
[28]Neil Mac Cormick,“Children's Rights:A Test-Case for Theories of Right”,in his Legal Right and Social Democracy:Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press 1982,pp.163—164.
[29]Joseph Raz,“Rights and Individual Well-Being”,Ratio Juris.Vol.5 No.2,1992,p.130.
[30]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,p.180.
[31]正是这种从“施加义务以服务于权利人利益”来界定权利的策略,其利益理论被西蒙斯看成是现代利益理论的代表。See N.E.Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.202—203.
[32]Eric Mack,“In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights”,4 The Journal of Ethics,2000,p.84.
[33]Arthur Kaufmann,Winfried Hassemer,Einführung in Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie der Gegenwart,6.neubearbeitete und erweiterte Aufl.6,Heidelberg 1994,S.145.
[34]参见前引[4],吴从周书,第416—418页。
[35]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,pp.262—264.
[36]Juliana Tutt,“Theories of Rights:Problems and Solutions”,Eudaimonia:Georgetown Philosophical Review,Vol.IV,Issue1,2007,p.169.
[37]H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.187.
[38]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.243.
[39]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,pp.241—242;Leif Wenar,“The Analysis of Rights”,in The Legacy of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by Matthew H.Kramer,Claire Grant,Ben Colbum,and Antony Hatzistavrou,Oxford University Press,2008,p.255.
[40]施启扬:《民法总则》,中国法制出版社2010年版,第25页。
[41]相关论述还可参见:See Rowan Cruft,“Rights:Beyond Interest Theory and Will Theory?”,Law&Philosophy,2004,23(4),pp.372—375;George W.Rainbolt,Rights Theory,Philosophy Compass,Vol 1,No.1,2006,p.14;Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.241。
[42]D.N.Mac Cormick,“Rights in Legislation,”in Law,Morality and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by P.M.S.Hacker and Joseph Raz,Oxford University Press,1977,p.202.
[43]George W.Rainbolt,“Rights Theory”,Philosophy Compass,Vol 1,No.1,2006,p.14.
[44]John Chipman Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,2nd ed.,ed.by David Campbell and Philip Thomas,Ashgate/Dartmouth,1997,p.13.
[45]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.120.
[46]Eric Mack,“In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights”,4 The Journal of Ethics,2000,pp.95—96.
[47]See Ronald Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously,Harvard University Press,1978,p.240;F.M.Kamm,Morality,Mortality Volume II:Rights,Duties,and Status,Oxford University Press,1996,pp.259—289;Horacio Spector,Autonomy and Rights:The Moral Foundations of Liberalism,Clarendon:Oxford University Press,1992,pp.163—178;Judith Jarvis Thomson,The Realm of Rights,Harvard University Press,1990,pp.123—148;Alan Gewirth,“Are There Any Absolute Rights?”,in Theories of Rights,Jeremy Waldron ed.,Oxford University Press,1984,pp.91—92;Amartya Sen,Rights and Agency,Philosophy&Public Affairs,Vol.11,No.1,1982,pp.3—7;Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,San Diego Law Review,Vol.46,p.827.
[48]See Judith Jarvis Thomson,The Realm of Rights,Harvard University Press,1990,p.151.
[49]See Robert Nozick,Anarchy,State,and Utopia,Basic Books,1974,pp.29—33;Horacio Spector,Autonomy and Rights:The Moral Foundations of Liberalism,Clarendon:Oxford University Press,1992,pp.163—178.
[50]Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,San Diego Law Review,Vol.46,p.828.
[51]See Robert Nozick,Anarchy,State,and Utopia,Basic Books,1974,p.29;Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,San Diego Law Review,Vol.46,p.828.括号内C实际上是“constraints”(限制)的缩写。
[52]Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,in Perspectives in Moral Science,eds.by M.Baurmann&B.Lahno,2009,p.359.
[53]Horacio Spector,“Value Pluralism and the Two Concepts of Rights”,in46 San Diego Law Review,2009,p.826.
[54]See Hamish Ross,“Children's Rights and Theories of Rights”,International Journal of Children's Rights,Vol 21,2013,pp.701—702.
[55]原话是,“如果说一个人拥有权利仅仅意味着他是一项义务的意在受益人,那么此种意义上的‘权利’可能就是一个描述法律中毫无必要甚或令人迷惑的术语;既然所有能用权利这一术语表达的也能甚至最适宜用义务这一必不可少的术语表达”。H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.181—182.
[56]Brian H.Bix,A Dictionary of Legal Theory,Oxford University Press,2004,p.101.
[57]N.E.Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.197—198.
[58]在克雷默、斯坦纳的论文中用的是英镑符号“￡”,而在斯尼瓦森的论文中用的则是美元符号“$”。为方便与对应,这里统一使用美元。
[59]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.302.
[60]Matthew H.Kramer,“Rights without Trimmings”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.80—81.
[61]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.263.
[62]See H.L.A.Hart,“Legal Rights”,in Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,pp.177—179.
[63][64]Matthew H.Kramer,“Rights without Trimmings”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,pp.81—82;p81.
[65]Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.263.
[66]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.264.
[67]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,pp.304—305.克雷默在文章中用“R”指代“权利人(即Rights holder)”。
[68]Ibid.,p.305.
[69]See Matthew H.Kramer,“Refining the Interest Theory of Rights”,55 The American Journal of Jurisprudence,2010;Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights,Ethics”,Vol.123,No.2,2013,p.246.
[70]利益理论是否一定跟实证主义有必然联系,这个问题本身还需要进一步考证与讨论。
[71]N.E.Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”,in Matthew H.Kramer,N.E.Simmonds,Hillel Steiner,A Debate over Rights:Philosophical Enquiries,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1998,p.198.
[72]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,ch.7.
[73][74]Joseph Raz,Ethics in the Public Domain,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994,pp.149—153;p.274.
[75]特定职位之人的权利之所以是利益理论面临的难题,是因为并非所有的职位权利或特权都能给其持有人带来利益。
[76]Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007,p.290,291.
[77]Cécile Fabre,“Posthumous Rights”,in The Legacy of H.L.A.Hart,eds.by Matthew H.Kramer,Claire Grant,Ben Colbum,&Antony Hatzistavrou,Oxford University Press,2008,p.227.
[78]斯尼瓦森和克雷默围绕此点发生过激烈争论。See Matthew H.Kramer,Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way”,27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007;Gopal Sreenivasan,“Duties and Their Direction”,120 Ethics,2010;Matthew H.Kramer,“Some Doubts about Alternatives to the Interest Theory of Rights”,Ethics,Vol.123,No.2,2013.
[79][法]雅克·盖斯旦、吉勒·古博等:《法国民法总论》,陈鹏等译,法律出版社2004年版,第135页。
[80]Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,Philosophy and Public Affairs 33,2005,pp.241—242.
[81]See Hamish Ross,“Children's Rights and Theories of Rights”,International Journal of Children's Rights,Vol 21,2013,p.703.
[82]See H.L.A.Hart,Essays on Bentham:Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1982,p.184.
[83]L.W.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of Rights,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1987,p.99.
[84][85]L.W.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of Rights,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1987,p.47,96.
[86]Alon Harel,“Theories of Rights”,in Martin P.Golding and William A.Edmundson eds.,The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory,Blackwell Publishing,2005,p.195.笔者赞同萨姆纳、哈雷尔利益理论可包含选择理论的理解,但不同意其认为选择理论不能包含利益理论的观点。下文即会指出选择理论同样可包含利益理论。
[87]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.121.
[88]Willam A.Edmundson,An Introduction to Rights,Cambridge University Press,2004,p.127.
[89]John Oberdiek,“Towards a Right against Risking”,Law and Philosophy,Vol.28,No.4,2009,note 4 at p.371.
[90]See Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.109.
[91]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.108.
[92]H.J.Mc Closkey,“Rights”,Philosophical Quarterly 15,1965,p.126.
[93]Matthew H.Kramer,“On the Nature of Legal Rights”,Cambridge Law Journal,2000,59(3),p.478.
[94]See Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.186—192.
[95]Joseph Raz,The Morality of Freedom,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1986,pp.190—191.
[96]John Chipman Gray,The Nature and Sources of the Law,2nd ed.,ed.by David Campbell and Philip Thomas,Ashgate/Dartmouth,1997,p.13.
[97]前引[79],盖斯旦、古博等书,第135页。
[98]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.112.
[99]See Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.262.
[100]Brian H.Bix,A Dictionary of Legal Theory,Oxford University Press,2004,p.101.
[101]此处(1)—(4)点的相关观点还均可参见Leif Wenar,“The Nature of Rights”,33 Philosophy and Public Affairs,2005,p.241.
[102]Gopal Sreenivasan,“A Hybrid Theory of Claim-Rights”,25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2005,p.262.
[103]Markus Englerth,“Responsible Trimmings:The Political Case for the Interest Theory of Rights”,UCL Jurisprudence Review,2004,11,p.112.
[104]参见彭诚信:《私权的层次划分与体系建构》,《法制与社会发展》2009年第1期;彭诚信:《现代权利理论研究》,法律出版社2017年版,第334—366页。
[105]相关论述,参见前引[104],彭诚信书,第185—206页。
[106]Frank Michelman,“Law's Republic”,The Yale Law Journal,1988,Vol.97,No.8,p.1518.
[107][奥]凯尔森:《纯粹法理论》,张书友译,中国法制出版社2008年版,第73页。
[108]如贝林博士所言:“如同法律本身,权利永远不应是固定的、僵化的,新的危险和需求将出现,而为了回应这些危险和需求,权利必须被重新具体化以保护个人的人格健全与固有尊严。”Bernard Bailyn,The Living Past-Commitments for the Future,Remarks at the First Millennium Evening at the White House,Accessed Feb 11,1998.http://clinton4.nara.gov/Initiatives/Millennium/bbailyn.html,visited on 2015-02-26.
[109]韦尔曼曾指出,意志理论与利益理论解决的是完全不同的问题,因而把两者结合起来也不会存在逻辑上的矛盾。意志理论解决的是权利本质的问题,即我们应该如何构想权利;利益理论解决的是拥有权利的主体资格问题,即成为权利人的主体条件是什么。因此,一个人可在权利性质方面采纳意志理论,同时在权利基础方面采纳利益理论。See Carl Wellman,Real Rights,Oxford University Press,1995,pp.118—119,p.124.
[110][英]尼尔·麦考密克:《法律推理与法律理论》,姜峰译,法律出版社2005年版,第245页。