合作博弈Shapley值法在国际商务谈判中的应用
|
摘要
在产业链发展优势主导竞争格局的背景下,国际商务谈判不再只是两个买卖双方间的谈判,而是各自所属产业链主体间的谈判,其结果也体现着各自掌控的产业链资源禀赋差异,由此一来,国际商务谈判也从双边谈判转化为了多边谈判,从两人博弈转化为了多人联盟博弈。各主体在联盟中的边际贡献决定了国际商务谈判的地位和能力,合作博弈Shapley值为国际商务谈判联盟博弈提供了较好的理论参考。Shapley值方法下,随着资产专用性投资增加,产业链资源整合趋势明显,联盟谈判将取代双边谈判;谈判的模式将从一对一转为多对一或多对多,从竞争式谈判转为合作式谈判;谈判的核心将从利益分配转为价值创造;谈判的筹码将从低成本战略转为创造新价值战略。
With the development of the industrial chain advantage competition pattern,international business negotiation is no longer the negotiations between the two parties,and it is competition of the industry chain resource endowment differences. As a result,the international business negotiation is changed from the bilateral negotiations to a multilateral negotiations. The marginal contribution to the alliance determines the negotiation status and capability. Shapley Value of cooperative games theory provides a good reference for the alliance of international business negotiation. With the integration of the special asset investment and the increase of industry chain resources,the core of the negotiations would be turned from the distribution of interests to the creation of value,from the low cost strategy of bargaining to that of creating new values.
With the development of the industrial chain advantage competition pattern,international business negotiation is no longer the negotiations between the two parties,and it is competition of the industry chain resource endowment differences. As a result,the international business negotiation is changed from the bilateral negotiations to a multilateral negotiations. The marginal contribution to the alliance determines the negotiation status and capability. Shapley Value of cooperative games theory provides a good reference for the alliance of international business negotiation. With the integration of the special asset investment and the increase of industry chain resources,the core of the negotiations would be turned from the distribution of interests to the creation of value,from the low cost strategy of bargaining to that of creating new values.
引文
[1]曲扬.竞争还是合作?---红黑博弈揭示的商务谈判思维[J].经济问题,2014(2):91-94.
[2]邹琳.基于纳什谈判的供应链环境成本分摊研究[J].商业经济研究,2010(25):25-26.
[3]陈菲,范良聪.基于合作与竞争的战略联盟稳定性分析[J].管理世界,2007(7):102-110.
[4]苏勇,陈骏骏,吴展.合作式谈判研究述评与展望[J].外国经济与管理,2014(3):65-73.
[5]李永飞,苏秦,刘强.合作环境及Shapley讨价还价下的供应链质量双边谈判[J].系统管理学报,2014(3):159-165.
[6]贡文伟,葛翠翠,陈敬贤,潘建国.基于Nash谈判的三级逆向供应链合作利益分配模型[J].工业工程与管理,2011(3):16-21.
[7]Williamson,Oliver E..The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:The Free Press,1985.
[8]迈克尔·波特.竞争战略[M].陈小悦,译.北京:华厦出版社,2003.
[9]Barney JB.Firm Resource and Sustained Competitive Advantage[J].Journal of Management,1991,17(1):99-120.
[10]Chung,S.,Singh,H.and Lee,K..Complementarity,Status Similarity and Social Capital as Drivers of Alliance Formation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2000,21:1-22.
[11]迈克尔·Y.吉野,U.斯里尼瓦萨·朗甘.战略联盟:企业通向全球化的捷径[M].商务印书馆,2007.
[12]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2009.
[2]邹琳.基于纳什谈判的供应链环境成本分摊研究[J].商业经济研究,2010(25):25-26.
[3]陈菲,范良聪.基于合作与竞争的战略联盟稳定性分析[J].管理世界,2007(7):102-110.
[4]苏勇,陈骏骏,吴展.合作式谈判研究述评与展望[J].外国经济与管理,2014(3):65-73.
[5]李永飞,苏秦,刘强.合作环境及Shapley讨价还价下的供应链质量双边谈判[J].系统管理学报,2014(3):159-165.
[6]贡文伟,葛翠翠,陈敬贤,潘建国.基于Nash谈判的三级逆向供应链合作利益分配模型[J].工业工程与管理,2011(3):16-21.
[7]Williamson,Oliver E..The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:The Free Press,1985.
[8]迈克尔·波特.竞争战略[M].陈小悦,译.北京:华厦出版社,2003.
[9]Barney JB.Firm Resource and Sustained Competitive Advantage[J].Journal of Management,1991,17(1):99-120.
[10]Chung,S.,Singh,H.and Lee,K..Complementarity,Status Similarity and Social Capital as Drivers of Alliance Formation[J].Strategic Management Journal,2000,21:1-22.
[11]迈克尔·Y.吉野,U.斯里尼瓦萨·朗甘.战略联盟:企业通向全球化的捷径[M].商务印书馆,2007.
[12]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2009.