语言与实践:实用主义解释学的两条进路
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摘要
实用主义解释学是哲学解释学在北美传播的成果之一,它继承了实用主义和解释学传统中的反表象主义认识论要求,对肇始于笛卡尔的近现代认识论传统进行了深入的分析和批判。以罗蒂为代表的实用主义解释学,以表象认识论为线索重构了笛卡尔—洛克—康德式的认识论传统,并以语言行为主义为方法论途径,对这一传统进行了激烈的批判,最终要求将作为知识之可能性条件的先验法则再次置入具体的语言使用规则之中,因而呈现出典型的语言哲学色彩。而以伯恩斯坦为代表的实用主义解释学,虽然同样以笛卡尔认识论为批判性起点,但通过对科学解释学效应、社会科学解释学效应以及哲学解释学效应的考察,将实践理性突显为关键要素,因而最终呈现出浓重的实践哲学色彩。实用主义解释学的这两条进路,一方面源自实用主义哲学本身的多元性,另一方面则是因为伽达默尔解释学本身对语言和实践的双重强调。
Pragmatic hermeneutics, one of positive results achieved by philosophical hermeneutics in North America,inherits the epistemological requirements of anti-representationalism common in pragmatism and hermeneutics, and undertakes profound analysis of and critique at modern epistemological tradition which originated from Descartes.Pragmatic hermeneutics with Rorty as its representative, reconstructs the epistemological tradition of Descartes-Locke-Kant epistemology with representational epistemology, and, by taking language behaviorism as its methodology, launches a severe attack at it, and finally insists that that we should reduce the transcendental norm of condition of our knowledge into our particular usage of language, hence manifesting typical philosophical color of language. Pragmatic hermeneutics represented by Bernstein, however, though starting also with Descartes' epistemology,highlights practical rationality as its key element by examining the influence of hermeneutics on science, social science and philosophical hermeneutics itself, hence exhibiting a strong color of practical philosophy. These two kinds of pragmatic hermeneutics derive on the one hand from the pluralism of pragmatism, and on the other hand from the double emphasis of language and praxis in Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Pragmatic hermeneutics, one of positive results achieved by philosophical hermeneutics in North America,inherits the epistemological requirements of anti-representationalism common in pragmatism and hermeneutics, and undertakes profound analysis of and critique at modern epistemological tradition which originated from Descartes.Pragmatic hermeneutics with Rorty as its representative, reconstructs the epistemological tradition of Descartes-Locke-Kant epistemology with representational epistemology, and, by taking language behaviorism as its methodology, launches a severe attack at it, and finally insists that that we should reduce the transcendental norm of condition of our knowledge into our particular usage of language, hence manifesting typical philosophical color of language. Pragmatic hermeneutics represented by Bernstein, however, though starting also with Descartes' epistemology,highlights practical rationality as its key element by examining the influence of hermeneutics on science, social science and philosophical hermeneutics itself, hence exhibiting a strong color of practical philosophy. These two kinds of pragmatic hermeneutics derive on the one hand from the pluralism of pragmatism, and on the other hand from the double emphasis of language and praxis in Gadamer's hermeneutics.
引文
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[2]WILLIAMB.IsHeideggerarepresentationalist?[J].Philosophical Topics, 1999, 27(2):190-191.
[3]DESCARTES. The philosophical writings of descartes, Vol. 11[M]. New York:Cambridge University Press,1984.
[4]LOCKE. The works of John Locke, in Ten Volumes:Vol. 1[M].New York:Cosimo Classics, 2008.
[5]塞拉斯.逻辑与语言[M].李国山,译.北京:东方出版社,2005.
[6]康德.纯粹理性批判[M].邓晓芒,译.北京:人民出版社,2004.
[7]STRAWSON. The bounds of sense:an essay on Kant’s critique of pure reason[M]. London:Methuen, 1966.
[8]RORTY.Strawson’sobjectivityargument[J].Reviewof Metaphysics 24. 1970(10):207-244.
[9]罗蒂.罗蒂和实用主义:哲学家对批评家的回应[M].张国清,译.北京:商务印书馆, 2003.
[10]RORTY.Objectivity,relativismandtruth[M].NewYork:Cambridge University Press,1991.
[11]HILDEBRAND.Theneopragmatistturn[J].Southwest Philosophy Review, 2003, 19(1):8-22.
[12]BERNSTEIN.Beyondobjectivismandrelativism[M].Philadelphia:University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983.
[13]库恩.必要的张力[M].范岱年,纪树立,译.北京:北京大学出版社, 2004.
[14]库恩.科学革命的结构[M].金吾伦,胡新和,译.北京:北京大学出版社, 2003.
[15]彼得?温奇.社会科学的观念及其与哲学的关系[M].张庆熊,张缨,郁喆隽,等译.上海:上海人民出版社, 2004.
[16]伽达默尔.真理与方法[M].洪汉鼎,译.上海:上海译文出版社, 1999.