董事会资本、分层董事会条款与公司风险承担研究
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摘要
聚焦中国资本市场上保护管理者控制权的重要手段——分层董事会条款设立,基于资源观和代理观,从该条款设立的影响因素和后果两个方面展开研究分析。首先,指出董事会资本是影响分层董事会条款设立的重要因素;其次,在公司风险承担的研究情境下,探讨了分层董事会条款设立之后的作用机理;然后,利用手工搜集的上市公司分层董事会条款数据,实证检验了分层董事会条款设立影响因素和后果的研究假设。研究结果发现:董事会资本越丰裕,上市公司越可能设立分层董事会条款;分层董事会条款的设立会阻碍董事将其资本应用于公司风险承担。
This paper focuses on one important way to protect managers' controlling rights in China'scapital market,that is,the establishment of staggered board clause. We analyze what affects the establishmentof this clause and what are the consequences. Firstly,based on resource perspective,this study proposes thatboard capital has an important impact on the establishment of staggered board clause. Secondly,taking corpo-rate risk-taking as the research situation,this study explores two different mechanisms through which thestaggered board clause works. One is from resource perspective,and the other is from agency perspective. U-sing data about staggered board clause collected from articles of association,this study empirically tests whataffects the establishment of this clause and its consequences. We find that,board capital positively affects theestablishment of staggered board clause,while its establishment negatively moderates the positive relationshipbetween board capital and corporate risk-taking.
This paper focuses on one important way to protect managers' controlling rights in China'scapital market,that is,the establishment of staggered board clause. We analyze what affects the establishmentof this clause and what are the consequences. Firstly,based on resource perspective,this study proposes thatboard capital has an important impact on the establishment of staggered board clause. Secondly,taking corpo-rate risk-taking as the research situation,this study explores two different mechanisms through which thestaggered board clause works. One is from resource perspective,and the other is from agency perspective. U-sing data about staggered board clause collected from articles of association,this study empirically tests whataffects the establishment of this clause and its consequences. We find that,board capital positively affects theestablishment of staggered board clause,while its establishment negatively moderates the positive relationshipbetween board capital and corporate risk-taking.
引文
[1]瞿旭,杨丹,瞿彦卿,等.创始人保护、替罪羊与连坐效应---基于会计违规背景下的高管变更研究[J].管理世界,2012(5):137-151,156.
[2]李四海,周泳彤.中国创始人与控制权:王朝思维还是契约精神?[J].清华管理评论,2016(10):22-28.
[3]ATANASSOV J.Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation?Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting[J].Journal of Finance,2013,68(3):1 097-1 131.
[4]STRASKA M,WALLER H G.Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth:A Survey of the Literature[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2014,49(4):933-956.
[5]JOHNSON S,SCHNATTERLY K,HILL A D.Board Composition beyond Independence:Social Capital,Human Capital,and Demographics[J].Journal of Management,2013,39(1):232-262.
[6]KROLL M,WALTERS B A,LE S A.The Impact of Board Composition and Top Management Team OwnerShip Structure on Post-IPO Performance in Young Entrepreneurial Firms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2007,50(5):1 198-1 216.
[7]ROSENSTEIN J,BRUNO A V,BYGRAVE W D,et al.The CEO,Venture Capitalists,and the Board[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1993,8(1):99-113.
[8]MIZRUCHI M S,STEARNS L B.A LongitudinalStudy of Borrowing by Large American Corporations[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1994,39(1):118-140.
[9]STUART T E,YIM S.Board Interlocks and the Propensity to Be Targeted in Private Equity Transactions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,97(1):174-189.
[10]王凯,武立东,薛坤坤.独立董事政治关联的“好”与“坏”---基于上市公司政府补贴的实证研究[J].预测,2017,36(1):54-60.
[11]BRICKLEY J A,LEASE R C,SMITH C W.Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-3):267-291.
[12]DAVIS G F.Agents without Principles?The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1991,36(4):583-613.
[13]BARRY J M,HATFIELD J W.Pills and Partisans:Understanding Takeover Defenses[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2012,160(3):633-713.
[14]DEANGELO H,RICE E M.Antitakeover Charter A-mendments and Stockholder Wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1-4):329-360.
[15]FALEYE O.Classified Boards,Firm Value,and Managerial Entrenchment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(2):501-529.
[16]CHEN Y,LI W,LIN K J.Cumulative Voting:Investor Protection or Antitakeover?Evidence from Family Firms in China[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2015,23(3):234-248.
[17]BEBCHUK L A,COATES I J C,SUBRAMANIAN G.The Powerful Antitakeover force of Staggered Boards:Theory,Evidence and Policy[J].Stanford Law Review,2002,54(5):887-951.
[18]李善民,许金花,张东.分层董事会制度与公司价值---基于公司章程的视角[J].厦门大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2016(2):111-121.
[19]中国企业家调查系统.企业经营者对企业家精神的认识与评价---2009年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告[J].管理世界,2009(6):91-101.
[20]NGUYEN P.Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking:Evidence from Japanese Firms[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2011,19(3):278-297.
[21]李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担[J].中国工业经济,2012,32(12):115-127.
[22]周建,任尚华,金媛媛,等.董事会资本对企业R&D支出的影响研究---基于中国沪深两市高科技上市公司的经验证据[J].研究与发展管理,2012,24(1):67-77.
[23]BENNEDSEN M,FAN J P H,JIAN M,et al.The Family Business Map:Framework,Selective Survey,and Evidence from Chinese Firm Succession[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,62(4):212-226.
[24]武立东,丁昊杰,王凯.民营企业创始人特质与公司治理机制完善程度对职业经理人引入影响研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(4):505-515.
[25]易阳,宋顺林,谢新敏,等.创始人专用性资产、堑壕效应与公司控制权配置---基于雷士照明的案例分析[J].会计研究,2016(1):63-70,96.
[26]HOSKISSON R E,CHIRICO F,ZYUNG J D,et al.Managerial Risk Taking:A Multitheoretical Review an Future Research Agenda[J].Journal of Management,2017,43(1):137-169.
[27]HILLMAN A,DALZIEL T.Boards of Directors and Firm Performance:Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives[J].Academy of Management Review,2003,28(3):383-396.
[28]严若森,钱晶晶.董事会资本、CEO股权激励与企业R&D投入---基于中国A股高科技电子行业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2016,38(7):60-70.
[29]ADAMS R B,ALMEIDA H,FERREIRA D.Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance[J].Review of Financial Studies,2005,18(4):1 403-1432.
(1)本研究假设2中的因变量——风险承担采用了下一期的数据,即2009~2016年。受金融危机的影响,上市公司在2009年之后的风险承担行为与2009年之前存在系统性差异。由此,本研究所选择的样本期间可以规避这种系统性差异带来的影响。
[2]李四海,周泳彤.中国创始人与控制权:王朝思维还是契约精神?[J].清华管理评论,2016(10):22-28.
[3]ATANASSOV J.Do Hostile Takeovers Stifle Innovation?Evidence from Antitakeover Legislation and Corporate Patenting[J].Journal of Finance,2013,68(3):1 097-1 131.
[4]STRASKA M,WALLER H G.Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth:A Survey of the Literature[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2014,49(4):933-956.
[5]JOHNSON S,SCHNATTERLY K,HILL A D.Board Composition beyond Independence:Social Capital,Human Capital,and Demographics[J].Journal of Management,2013,39(1):232-262.
[6]KROLL M,WALTERS B A,LE S A.The Impact of Board Composition and Top Management Team OwnerShip Structure on Post-IPO Performance in Young Entrepreneurial Firms[J].Academy of Management Journal,2007,50(5):1 198-1 216.
[7]ROSENSTEIN J,BRUNO A V,BYGRAVE W D,et al.The CEO,Venture Capitalists,and the Board[J].Journal of Business Venturing,1993,8(1):99-113.
[8]MIZRUCHI M S,STEARNS L B.A LongitudinalStudy of Borrowing by Large American Corporations[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1994,39(1):118-140.
[9]STUART T E,YIM S.Board Interlocks and the Propensity to Be Targeted in Private Equity Transactions[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2008,97(1):174-189.
[10]王凯,武立东,薛坤坤.独立董事政治关联的“好”与“坏”---基于上市公司政府补贴的实证研究[J].预测,2017,36(1):54-60.
[11]BRICKLEY J A,LEASE R C,SMITH C W.Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1-3):267-291.
[12]DAVIS G F.Agents without Principles?The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network[J].Administrative Science Quarterly,1991,36(4):583-613.
[13]BARRY J M,HATFIELD J W.Pills and Partisans:Understanding Takeover Defenses[J].University of Pennsylvania Law Review,2012,160(3):633-713.
[14]DEANGELO H,RICE E M.Antitakeover Charter A-mendments and Stockholder Wealth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(1-4):329-360.
[15]FALEYE O.Classified Boards,Firm Value,and Managerial Entrenchment[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,83(2):501-529.
[16]CHEN Y,LI W,LIN K J.Cumulative Voting:Investor Protection or Antitakeover?Evidence from Family Firms in China[J].Corporate Governance:An International Review,2015,23(3):234-248.
[17]BEBCHUK L A,COATES I J C,SUBRAMANIAN G.The Powerful Antitakeover force of Staggered Boards:Theory,Evidence and Policy[J].Stanford Law Review,2002,54(5):887-951.
[18]李善民,许金花,张东.分层董事会制度与公司价值---基于公司章程的视角[J].厦门大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2016(2):111-121.
[19]中国企业家调查系统.企业经营者对企业家精神的认识与评价---2009年中国企业经营者成长与发展专题调查报告[J].管理世界,2009(6):91-101.
[20]NGUYEN P.Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking:Evidence from Japanese Firms[J].Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2011,19(3):278-297.
[21]李文贵,余明桂.所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担[J].中国工业经济,2012,32(12):115-127.
[22]周建,任尚华,金媛媛,等.董事会资本对企业R&D支出的影响研究---基于中国沪深两市高科技上市公司的经验证据[J].研究与发展管理,2012,24(1):67-77.
[23]BENNEDSEN M,FAN J P H,JIAN M,et al.The Family Business Map:Framework,Selective Survey,and Evidence from Chinese Firm Succession[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2015,62(4):212-226.
[24]武立东,丁昊杰,王凯.民营企业创始人特质与公司治理机制完善程度对职业经理人引入影响研究[J].管理学报,2016,13(4):505-515.
[25]易阳,宋顺林,谢新敏,等.创始人专用性资产、堑壕效应与公司控制权配置---基于雷士照明的案例分析[J].会计研究,2016(1):63-70,96.
[26]HOSKISSON R E,CHIRICO F,ZYUNG J D,et al.Managerial Risk Taking:A Multitheoretical Review an Future Research Agenda[J].Journal of Management,2017,43(1):137-169.
[27]HILLMAN A,DALZIEL T.Boards of Directors and Firm Performance:Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives[J].Academy of Management Review,2003,28(3):383-396.
[28]严若森,钱晶晶.董事会资本、CEO股权激励与企业R&D投入---基于中国A股高科技电子行业上市公司的经验证据[J].经济管理,2016,38(7):60-70.
[29]ADAMS R B,ALMEIDA H,FERREIRA D.Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance[J].Review of Financial Studies,2005,18(4):1 403-1432.
(1)本研究假设2中的因变量——风险承担采用了下一期的数据,即2009~2016年。受金融危机的影响,上市公司在2009年之后的风险承担行为与2009年之前存在系统性差异。由此,本研究所选择的样本期间可以规避这种系统性差异带来的影响。