农村水环境治理的非合作博弈均衡分析
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摘要
农村水环境治理涉及的利益相关者众多、利益冲突复杂,有效协调各方利益和行动是提高治理成效的关键。探讨了政府、企业、村民和村委在水环境治理过程中的责任要求与行为关系,应用博弈论分析了政府—企业之间的不完全信息的动态均衡和政府—企业—公众之间的不完全信息的静态均衡。研究表明,企业积极治理水环境与公众参与、政府能力密切相关;政府切实查处污染的概率与公众维权的概率成反比,公众参与可有效提高企业的治理成效,降低政府的监督成本。
In the vast rural areas,water pollution became an important factor of threatening the normal production and life and the rural sustainable development. Understanding the motivation of governance,promoting stakeholders coordination became one of the most important tasks of the rural water environment governance. To rationalize the action strategies of various stakeholders in the rural water environment governance,this paper analyzed the behavior of major relevant stakeholder( government,township enterprise,village committees and villagers) based on the game theory. Then,based on villagers participation in governance or not to established the following game models: The incomplete information dynamic game model between government and township enterprise,the incomplete information static game model of government,township enterprise and villagers. The results showed that the performance of rural water environment governance was closely related to the public participation and government ability,and the probability of the government accept report was inversely proportional to the probability of the public to report. Comprehensive analysis showed that setting up a three- level rural water environment management,coordination of the interests of relevant stakeholders and enhancement in the environmental awareness of government,township enterprise and villagers could improve the performance of rural water environment governance.
In the vast rural areas,water pollution became an important factor of threatening the normal production and life and the rural sustainable development. Understanding the motivation of governance,promoting stakeholders coordination became one of the most important tasks of the rural water environment governance. To rationalize the action strategies of various stakeholders in the rural water environment governance,this paper analyzed the behavior of major relevant stakeholder( government,township enterprise,village committees and villagers) based on the game theory. Then,based on villagers participation in governance or not to established the following game models: The incomplete information dynamic game model between government and township enterprise,the incomplete information static game model of government,township enterprise and villagers. The results showed that the performance of rural water environment governance was closely related to the public participation and government ability,and the probability of the government accept report was inversely proportional to the probability of the public to report. Comprehensive analysis showed that setting up a three- level rural water environment management,coordination of the interests of relevant stakeholders and enhancement in the environmental awareness of government,township enterprise and villagers could improve the performance of rural water environment governance.
引文
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[11]雷玉桃.流域水环境管理的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2006,16(1)∶122-125.
[12]王艳.公众参与环境保护的博弈分析[J].大连海事大学学报,2006,(11)∶19-22.
[13]黄采金,王浣尘,陈明义.企业环境污染的监控机制[J].系统工程理论方法应用,1998,7(4)∶65-70.
[14]宋国君,冯时,王资峰,等.中国农村水环境管理体制建设[J].环境保护,2009,(9)∶26-29.
[15]SUN Hu,LIU Yansui,XU Keshuai.Hollow Villages and Rural Restructuring in Major Rural Regions of China:A Case Study of Yucheng City,Shandong Province[J].Chinese Geographical Science,2011,21(3)∶354-363.
[2]李颖明,宋建新,黄宝荣,等.农村环境自主治理模式的研究路径分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(1)∶165-170.
[3]郑开元,李雪松.基于公共物品理论的农村水环境治理机制研究[J].生态经济,2012,(3)∶162.
[4]LU Jun,Hou Jun-dong,Liu Yang.Analysis of Rural Ecological Environment Governance in the Two-oriented Society Construction:A Case Study of Xiantao City in Hubei Province[J].Procedia Environmental Sciences,2011,(11)∶1278-1284.
[5]易志斌.地方政府竞争的博弈行为与流域水环境保护[J].经济问题,2011,(1)∶60-64.
[6]陈晓宏,陈栋为,陈伯浩,等.农村水污染治理驱动因素的利益相关者识别[J].生态环境学报,2011,20(8)∶1273-1277.
[7]杜焱强,孙小霞,苏时鹏,等.社会生态视阈下的敏感区养殖污染治理分析-以福建省南平市西芹水厂水源地周边地区为例[J].中国生态农业学报,2014,22(7)∶866-874.
[8]严旭阳,张宏艳,王卓然.农村水环境问题的经济学思考.[J].北京社会科学,2009,(4)∶43-46.
[9]ZHANG Guo-peng,DING En-jie,YANG Kun.A Suboptimal Joint Bandwidth and Power Allocation for Cooperative Relay Networks a Cooperative Game Theoretic Approach[J].Science China Information Sciences,2013,(7)∶60-71.
[10]许佳贤,苏时鹏.科技扶贫过程中利益相关主体的博弈分析[J].中南林业科技大学学报(社会科学版),2011,(8)∶68-70.
[11]雷玉桃.流域水环境管理的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2006,16(1)∶122-125.
[12]王艳.公众参与环境保护的博弈分析[J].大连海事大学学报,2006,(11)∶19-22.
[13]黄采金,王浣尘,陈明义.企业环境污染的监控机制[J].系统工程理论方法应用,1998,7(4)∶65-70.
[14]宋国君,冯时,王资峰,等.中国农村水环境管理体制建设[J].环境保护,2009,(9)∶26-29.
[15]SUN Hu,LIU Yansui,XU Keshuai.Hollow Villages and Rural Restructuring in Major Rural Regions of China:A Case Study of Yucheng City,Shandong Province[J].Chinese Geographical Science,2011,21(3)∶354-363.