社会保险政策缴费率调整对企业实际缴费率的影响——基于深圳市2006年养老保险政策缴费率调整的双重差分估计
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摘要
中国社会保险企业实际缴费率明显低于政策缴费率,较高的政策缴费率可能是成因之一。本文利用深圳市2006年政策缴费率调整的经验事实和2004—2007年深圳市及广州市工业企业微观数据,使用双重差分方法研究政策缴费率调整对企业实际缴费率的影响效应。研究发现,在一定的幅度之内,政策缴费率的调整对企业实际缴费率具有显著的负向影响。政策缴费率调整对不同人力资本水平的企业的影响差异显著,人力资本水平越低的企业,其实际缴费率水平对政策缴费率调整的反向反应程度越大。调整政策缴费率对企业实际缴费率同时具有反向的政策效应和正向的直接效应,只有在有限的政策缴费率调整幅度条件下,反向影响效应才可能实现。因此,适度降低政策缴费率水平可以提高企业实际缴费率水平,从而进一步提高养老保险基金实际收入规模。
The actual contribution rate of social insurance of enterprise in China is significantly lower than the policy contribution rate,which is the consequence of high policy contribution rate. In this paper,we use the empirical data of policy contribution rate adjustment of Shenzhen in 2006 and the micro-data of industrial enterprises of Shenzhen and Guangzhou from 2004 to 2007 to study the effect of the policy contribution rate adjustment on the actual contribution rate effect by DID method. Our study finds that,within a certain range,the adjustment of the policy contribution rate has a significant negative impact on the actual contribution rate of enterprise. The effect of the policy contribution rate adjustment on enterprises with different human capital levels is significant. The lower the level of human capital,the greater the degree of reverse reaction of the actual contribution rate level to the policy contribution rate adjustment. The adjustment of policy contribution rate to the actual contribution rate of enterprise at the same time has reverse policy effect and directly positive effect. Only under the condition of limited adjustment of policy contribution rate the reverse effect is possible. Therefore,a moderate reduction of policy contribution rate level can improve the actual contribution rate level of enterprise,thereby further increasing the actual income scale of pension fund.
The actual contribution rate of social insurance of enterprise in China is significantly lower than the policy contribution rate,which is the consequence of high policy contribution rate. In this paper,we use the empirical data of policy contribution rate adjustment of Shenzhen in 2006 and the micro-data of industrial enterprises of Shenzhen and Guangzhou from 2004 to 2007 to study the effect of the policy contribution rate adjustment on the actual contribution rate effect by DID method. Our study finds that,within a certain range,the adjustment of the policy contribution rate has a significant negative impact on the actual contribution rate of enterprise. The effect of the policy contribution rate adjustment on enterprises with different human capital levels is significant. The lower the level of human capital,the greater the degree of reverse reaction of the actual contribution rate level to the policy contribution rate adjustment. The adjustment of policy contribution rate to the actual contribution rate of enterprise at the same time has reverse policy effect and directly positive effect. Only under the condition of limited adjustment of policy contribution rate the reverse effect is possible. Therefore,a moderate reduction of policy contribution rate level can improve the actual contribution rate level of enterprise,thereby further increasing the actual income scale of pension fund.
引文
[1]Nyland,C.,R.Smith and C.J.Zhu,"What Determines the Extend to Which Employer will Comply with their Social Security Obligations?Evidence from Chinese Firm-level Data",Social Policy and Administration,40(2):196-214,2006.
[2]Gillion,C.,J.Turner,C.Bailey,and D.Latulippe,"Social Security Pensions:Development and Reform",Geneva,International Labor Office,2000.
[3][4][24]Bailey,C.and J.Turner,"Strategies to Reduce Contribution Evasion in Social Security Financing",World Development:385-393,2001.
[5][25]Feldstain M.,and J.Liebman,"Realizing the Potential of China's Social Security Pension System",China Economic Times,February,24,2006.
[6][31]景鹏、胡秋明:《企业职工基本养老保险统筹账户缴费率潜在下调空间研究》,载《中国人口科学》,2017(1)。
[7][27]郑秉文:《供给侧:降费对社会保险结构性改革的意义》,载《中国人口科学》,2016(3)。
[8][33]封进:《中国城镇职工社会保险制度的参与激励》,载《经济研究》,2013(7)。
[9][34]赵静、毛捷、张磊:《社会保险缴费率、参保概率与缴费水平---对职工和企业逃避费行为的经验研究》,载《经济学(季刊)》,2016(1)。
[10]Harberger,A.C.,"Taxation,Resource Allocation and Welfare",Due J.(Ed.),in The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the Federal Revenue System,Princeton University Press,1964.
[11]Auerbach,A.J.,"The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation",Handbook of Public Economics,1:61-127,1985.
[12]Hausman,J.A.,"Taxes and labor supply",Handbook of Public Economics,1:213-263,1985.
[13]Browning,E.K.,"On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation",American Economic Review,77(1):11-23,1987.
[14]Feldstein,M.,"The Effects of Tax-Based Saving Incentives on National Saving and Government Revenue",NBER Working Paper,No.4021,1992.
[15]Feldstein,M.,"The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income:A Panel Study of The 1986 Tax Reform Act",Journal of Political Economy,103(3):551-572,1995.
[16][17]Feldstein,M.,"Tax Avoidance and The Deadweight Loss of The Income Tax",The Review of Economics and Statistics,81(4):674-680,1999.
[18]Gruber,J.,and E.Saez,"The Elasticity of Taxable Income:Evidence and Implications",Journal of Public Economics,84(1):1-32,2002.
[19]Piketty,T.,and E.Saez,"Income Inequality in the United States,1913-1998",Quarterly Journal of Economics,118(1):1-39,2003.
[20]Giertz,S.H.,"The Elasticity of Taxable Income:Influences on Economic Efficiency and Tax Revenues,and Implications for Tax Policy",Economics Department Faculty Publications,64:101-136,2009.
[21]Fisman,R.,and S.J.Wei,"Tax Rates and Tax Evasion:Evidence from'Missing Imports'in China",Journal of Political Economy,2004,112(2):471-496,2004.
[22]Mishra,P.,A.Subramanian,and P.Topalova,"Tariffs,Enforcement,and Custom Evasion:Evidence from India",Journal of Public Economics,92(10-11):1907-1925,2008.
[23]Cai,H.,and Q.Liu,"Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms",Economic Journal,119(537):764-795,2009.
[26]Nyland C.,S.B.Smyth,and C.J.Zhu,"Employer Attitudes towards Social Insurance Compliance in Shanghai",International Social Security Review,64(4):73-98,2011.
[28]孙祁祥:《“空账”与转轨成本---中国养老保险体制改革的效应分析》,载《经济研究》,2001(5)。
[29]赵耀辉、徐建国:《我国城镇养老保险体制改革中的激励机制问题》,载《经济学(季刊)》,2001(1)。
[30]艾慧、吴延东、李洁明、杨长昱:《我国城镇职工基本养老保险金征缴的不利因素研究---基于统筹账户精算视角》,载《华东经济管理》,2012(3)。
[32]陈曦:《养老保险降费率、基金收入与长期收支平衡》,载《中国人口科学》,2017(3)。
[35]陈强:《高级计量经济学及stata应用》,79~81页,北京,高等教育出版社,2010.
[36]Chetty,R.,and E.Saez,"Teaching the Tax Code:Earning Responses to an Experiment with EITC Claimants",NBERWorking Paper,No.14836,2009.
[37]Saez,E.,J.B.Slemrod,and S.H.Giertz,2012."The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates:ACritical Review",Journal of Economic Literature,50(1):3-50.
(1)数据来源:United States Social Security Administration."Social Security Programs Throughout the World",2016.
(2)数据来源于人力资源和社会保障部社会保险事业管理中心:《中国社会保险发展年度报告2015》,北京,中国劳动社会保障出版社,2016。
(1)与企业职工养老保险一样,深圳市医疗保险对象也分为本市户籍职工和非本市户籍职工。其中,本市户籍的参加综合医疗保险、地方补充医疗保险,非本市户籍的参加住院医疗保险与地方补充医疗保险,同时,经用人单位申请,非本市户籍的在职人员也可以参加综合医疗保险。2008年深圳市住院医疗保险下调至0.6%,由于只有0.2个百分点的降幅,且住院医疗保险仅针对部分非深圳户籍参保对象,因此本文忽略住院医疗保险费率的极小幅度调整。
(2)我们假设深圳市本地户籍与外地户籍职工各占50%,在此条件下,深圳市基期的企业职工养老保险统筹缴费比例为8.5%,基本医疗保险政策缴费率为6%×0.5+0.8%×0.5+(0.5%+0.2%)×0.5=12.25%,养老保险与医疗保险企业总缴费比例为12.15%;实验期深圳市养老保险与医疗保险企业总缴费比例为14.15%。
(3)由于深圳市政策缴费率调整是在2006年8月实施的,按照双重差分对处理期的定义,干预应该发生在基期最后一期结束时和实验期第一期之前。为了避免年中调整政策缴费率对处理期和实验期确定造成的影响,我们仅使用2004年、2005年、2007年数据。
(1)准确估计α1的取值需要有不同政策缴费率调整幅度的样本,利用连续DID方法进行估计。
(1)目前除广东、浙江和福建部分地区之外,多数省份养老保险企业政策缴费率在19%~20%,医疗保险企业政策缴费率为8%,因此,本文按28%的政策缴费率水平进行估算。
[2]Gillion,C.,J.Turner,C.Bailey,and D.Latulippe,"Social Security Pensions:Development and Reform",Geneva,International Labor Office,2000.
[3][4][24]Bailey,C.and J.Turner,"Strategies to Reduce Contribution Evasion in Social Security Financing",World Development:385-393,2001.
[5][25]Feldstain M.,and J.Liebman,"Realizing the Potential of China's Social Security Pension System",China Economic Times,February,24,2006.
[6][31]景鹏、胡秋明:《企业职工基本养老保险统筹账户缴费率潜在下调空间研究》,载《中国人口科学》,2017(1)。
[7][27]郑秉文:《供给侧:降费对社会保险结构性改革的意义》,载《中国人口科学》,2016(3)。
[8][33]封进:《中国城镇职工社会保险制度的参与激励》,载《经济研究》,2013(7)。
[9][34]赵静、毛捷、张磊:《社会保险缴费率、参保概率与缴费水平---对职工和企业逃避费行为的经验研究》,载《经济学(季刊)》,2016(1)。
[10]Harberger,A.C.,"Taxation,Resource Allocation and Welfare",Due J.(Ed.),in The Role of Direct and Indirect Taxes in the Federal Revenue System,Princeton University Press,1964.
[11]Auerbach,A.J.,"The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation",Handbook of Public Economics,1:61-127,1985.
[12]Hausman,J.A.,"Taxes and labor supply",Handbook of Public Economics,1:213-263,1985.
[13]Browning,E.K.,"On the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation",American Economic Review,77(1):11-23,1987.
[14]Feldstein,M.,"The Effects of Tax-Based Saving Incentives on National Saving and Government Revenue",NBER Working Paper,No.4021,1992.
[15]Feldstein,M.,"The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income:A Panel Study of The 1986 Tax Reform Act",Journal of Political Economy,103(3):551-572,1995.
[16][17]Feldstein,M.,"Tax Avoidance and The Deadweight Loss of The Income Tax",The Review of Economics and Statistics,81(4):674-680,1999.
[18]Gruber,J.,and E.Saez,"The Elasticity of Taxable Income:Evidence and Implications",Journal of Public Economics,84(1):1-32,2002.
[19]Piketty,T.,and E.Saez,"Income Inequality in the United States,1913-1998",Quarterly Journal of Economics,118(1):1-39,2003.
[20]Giertz,S.H.,"The Elasticity of Taxable Income:Influences on Economic Efficiency and Tax Revenues,and Implications for Tax Policy",Economics Department Faculty Publications,64:101-136,2009.
[21]Fisman,R.,and S.J.Wei,"Tax Rates and Tax Evasion:Evidence from'Missing Imports'in China",Journal of Political Economy,2004,112(2):471-496,2004.
[22]Mishra,P.,A.Subramanian,and P.Topalova,"Tariffs,Enforcement,and Custom Evasion:Evidence from India",Journal of Public Economics,92(10-11):1907-1925,2008.
[23]Cai,H.,and Q.Liu,"Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance:Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms",Economic Journal,119(537):764-795,2009.
[26]Nyland C.,S.B.Smyth,and C.J.Zhu,"Employer Attitudes towards Social Insurance Compliance in Shanghai",International Social Security Review,64(4):73-98,2011.
[28]孙祁祥:《“空账”与转轨成本---中国养老保险体制改革的效应分析》,载《经济研究》,2001(5)。
[29]赵耀辉、徐建国:《我国城镇养老保险体制改革中的激励机制问题》,载《经济学(季刊)》,2001(1)。
[30]艾慧、吴延东、李洁明、杨长昱:《我国城镇职工基本养老保险金征缴的不利因素研究---基于统筹账户精算视角》,载《华东经济管理》,2012(3)。
[32]陈曦:《养老保险降费率、基金收入与长期收支平衡》,载《中国人口科学》,2017(3)。
[35]陈强:《高级计量经济学及stata应用》,79~81页,北京,高等教育出版社,2010.
[36]Chetty,R.,and E.Saez,"Teaching the Tax Code:Earning Responses to an Experiment with EITC Claimants",NBERWorking Paper,No.14836,2009.
[37]Saez,E.,J.B.Slemrod,and S.H.Giertz,2012."The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates:ACritical Review",Journal of Economic Literature,50(1):3-50.
(1)数据来源:United States Social Security Administration."Social Security Programs Throughout the World",2016.
(2)数据来源于人力资源和社会保障部社会保险事业管理中心:《中国社会保险发展年度报告2015》,北京,中国劳动社会保障出版社,2016。
(1)与企业职工养老保险一样,深圳市医疗保险对象也分为本市户籍职工和非本市户籍职工。其中,本市户籍的参加综合医疗保险、地方补充医疗保险,非本市户籍的参加住院医疗保险与地方补充医疗保险,同时,经用人单位申请,非本市户籍的在职人员也可以参加综合医疗保险。2008年深圳市住院医疗保险下调至0.6%,由于只有0.2个百分点的降幅,且住院医疗保险仅针对部分非深圳户籍参保对象,因此本文忽略住院医疗保险费率的极小幅度调整。
(2)我们假设深圳市本地户籍与外地户籍职工各占50%,在此条件下,深圳市基期的企业职工养老保险统筹缴费比例为8.5%,基本医疗保险政策缴费率为6%×0.5+0.8%×0.5+(0.5%+0.2%)×0.5=12.25%,养老保险与医疗保险企业总缴费比例为12.15%;实验期深圳市养老保险与医疗保险企业总缴费比例为14.15%。
(3)由于深圳市政策缴费率调整是在2006年8月实施的,按照双重差分对处理期的定义,干预应该发生在基期最后一期结束时和实验期第一期之前。为了避免年中调整政策缴费率对处理期和实验期确定造成的影响,我们仅使用2004年、2005年、2007年数据。
(1)准确估计α1的取值需要有不同政策缴费率调整幅度的样本,利用连续DID方法进行估计。
(1)目前除广东、浙江和福建部分地区之外,多数省份养老保险企业政策缴费率在19%~20%,医疗保险企业政策缴费率为8%,因此,本文按28%的政策缴费率水平进行估算。