基于中小企业的物流金融三方主体博弈分析
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摘要
当前,物流金融可以有效支持中小企业融资活动。在委托代理关系中,金融企业委托第三方物流企业对中小企业进行监管和控制。文章定量研究物流金融主体间三方博弈模型,得出在三方主体不同行为条件下,第三方物流企业与中小企业合谋的最佳概率、金融机构进行监管的最佳概率。文章研究结论指出金融机构工作能力、不同选择行为的损失和收益之间的差异化程度可以有效减少寻租行为发生概率。这些定量分析的结果对物流金融服务市场抑制合谋有较强的借鉴价值。
At present,finance services for logistics can effectively support the medium and small enterprises' financing activities.In principal and agent relationship financial enterprise entrusts a third-party logistics companies to regulate and control the medium and small enterprises.This article quantitatively researches tripartite game model between the three subjects.Under the conditions of the different behaviors of the three subjects,the best probability of third-party logistics companies and the medium and small enterprises' collusion,the best probability of financial institutions' regulatory can be deduced.This paper studies concluded that the financial enterprises' ability to work,the degree of differentiation between losses and gains of the different options for behavior could effectively reducing the profanity of occurrence in reducing rent-seeking behavior.The results of quantitative analysis could inhibit the collusion in the finance services market for logistics.
At present,finance services for logistics can effectively support the medium and small enterprises' financing activities.In principal and agent relationship financial enterprise entrusts a third-party logistics companies to regulate and control the medium and small enterprises.This article quantitatively researches tripartite game model between the three subjects.Under the conditions of the different behaviors of the three subjects,the best probability of third-party logistics companies and the medium and small enterprises' collusion,the best probability of financial institutions' regulatory can be deduced.This paper studies concluded that the financial enterprises' ability to work,the degree of differentiation between losses and gains of the different options for behavior could effectively reducing the profanity of occurrence in reducing rent-seeking behavior.The results of quantitative analysis could inhibit the collusion in the finance services market for logistics.
引文
[1]李金恒.物流金融的学科研究[J].北京城市学院学报,2006(6):90-94.
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[3]谢鹏.物流金融运作模式探讨[J].福建金融,2007(2):45-48.
[4]冯耕中.物流金融业务创新分析[J].预测,2007,26(1):49-54.
[5]李雪梅,陆音.物流企业的衍生服务——物流金融[J].物流技术,2009(1):32-35.
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[7]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:403-408.
[8]Joerg C.Warehouse Receipt Financing:Securing the Frontier Supplies[J].Trade Finance,2002(3):6-8.
[9]Christa Hainz.Bank competition and credit markets in transition Economics[J].Journal of comparative Economies,2003(31):19-21.
[2]任文超.从“物资银行”到“物流银行”[J].中国物流与采购,2006(9):16-18.
[3]谢鹏.物流金融运作模式探讨[J].福建金融,2007(2):45-48.
[4]冯耕中.物流金融业务创新分析[J].预测,2007,26(1):49-54.
[5]李雪梅,陆音.物流企业的衍生服务——物流金融[J].物流技术,2009(1):32-35.
[6]闫俊宏,许祥秦.基于供应链金融的中小企业融资模式分析[J].上海金融,2007(2):14-16.
[7]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:403-408.
[8]Joerg C.Warehouse Receipt Financing:Securing the Frontier Supplies[J].Trade Finance,2002(3):6-8.
[9]Christa Hainz.Bank competition and credit markets in transition Economics[J].Journal of comparative Economies,2003(31):19-21.