全球价值链上代工厂商创牌选择的演化博弈研究
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摘要
经济全球化的今天,许多新兴经济体选择主动融入全球价值链。然而,全球价值链上的先发主体凭借先发优势占据着高附加值环节。后发主体在融入初期通过吸引外商直接投资,带来的技术、资本、管理外溢在企业成长初期会有一定的正面作用,但随着技术、品牌和市场的成长,处于这种依附型关系的后发主体必然会遭遇发展瓶颈。先发主体则依托先发优势,甚至采取封锁措施维护自身在价值链上的利益。本文将演化博弈理论应用于全球价值链上代工厂商和品牌厂商之间的博弈分析,考察了代工厂商在攀升全球价值链的过程中与品牌厂商博弈的损益情况。结果表明,后发主体顺利融入全球价值链并实现产业结构从低端环节向高端环节转型升级的关键在于企业战略和政府扶持。整合、构建国内价值链能起到改善企业经营环境的作用。
Today, many emerging economies are joining in the Global Value Chain(GVC). Developed countries or transnational enterprises occupy the high value-added part with the first-mover advantage, and also, master the leading position of the value chain. Transnational enterprises brought technology, capital and management and positively affect local enterprises in the early stage of their development. But once local enterprises' producing ability grows to a certain stage, they got the ability of development their own brand. So transnational enterprises will have an incentive to "lock" them in the low end of GVC. In this paper, we apply evolutionary game theory to explain the game between brands and OEM manufacturers in the GVC. We study the profit and loss of manufacturers when they choose to build a new brand. The results show that the key to help enterprises climb up the GVC curve from lower segment to higher segment lies in enterprise strategy and government support. Also, The integration and construction of domestic value chain can improve the operation environment of enterprises.
Today, many emerging economies are joining in the Global Value Chain(GVC). Developed countries or transnational enterprises occupy the high value-added part with the first-mover advantage, and also, master the leading position of the value chain. Transnational enterprises brought technology, capital and management and positively affect local enterprises in the early stage of their development. But once local enterprises' producing ability grows to a certain stage, they got the ability of development their own brand. So transnational enterprises will have an incentive to "lock" them in the low end of GVC. In this paper, we apply evolutionary game theory to explain the game between brands and OEM manufacturers in the GVC. We study the profit and loss of manufacturers when they choose to build a new brand. The results show that the key to help enterprises climb up the GVC curve from lower segment to higher segment lies in enterprise strategy and government support. Also, The integration and construction of domestic value chain can improve the operation environment of enterprises.
引文
[1]李莅.全球价值链中后发国产业的技术跨越[D].上海:上海社会科学院,2010.
[2] Kaplinsky R, Morris M, Readman J. Understanding Upgrading Using Value Chain Analysis[J].B.a.m,2002.
[3]Humphrey J, Schmitz H. Governance in Global Value Chains[J].Ids Bulletin,2010,32(3):19-29.
[4]刘志彪,张杰.从融入全球价值链到构建国家价值链:中国产业升级的战略思考[J].学术月刊,2009(9):59-68.
[5]刘仕国,吴海英,马涛,等.利用全球价值链促进产业升级[J].国际经济评论,2015(1):64-84.
[6]王岚,李宏艳.中国制造业融入全球价值链路径研究———嵌入位置和增值能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(2):76-88.
[7]季书涵,朱英明,陈瑛.企业参与价值链分工的策略选择研究[J].科技进步与对策,2014(23):71-76.
[8]徐宁,皮建才,刘志彪.全球价值链还是国内价值链———中国代工企业的链条选择机制研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2014,V34(1):62-74.
(1)这里下标1表示品牌厂商B采取维持合作关系的策略,2表示其中止合作关系的策略。
(2)行表示博弈方自己的纯策略,列表示对手的纯策略。
[2] Kaplinsky R, Morris M, Readman J. Understanding Upgrading Using Value Chain Analysis[J].B.a.m,2002.
[3]Humphrey J, Schmitz H. Governance in Global Value Chains[J].Ids Bulletin,2010,32(3):19-29.
[4]刘志彪,张杰.从融入全球价值链到构建国家价值链:中国产业升级的战略思考[J].学术月刊,2009(9):59-68.
[5]刘仕国,吴海英,马涛,等.利用全球价值链促进产业升级[J].国际经济评论,2015(1):64-84.
[6]王岚,李宏艳.中国制造业融入全球价值链路径研究———嵌入位置和增值能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(2):76-88.
[7]季书涵,朱英明,陈瑛.企业参与价值链分工的策略选择研究[J].科技进步与对策,2014(23):71-76.
[8]徐宁,皮建才,刘志彪.全球价值链还是国内价值链———中国代工企业的链条选择机制研究[J].经济理论与经济管理,2014,V34(1):62-74.
(1)这里下标1表示品牌厂商B采取维持合作关系的策略,2表示其中止合作关系的策略。
(2)行表示博弈方自己的纯策略,列表示对手的纯策略。