矿产资源最优开采问题研究——环境约束、后备替代与Hotelling法则
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摘要
矿产资源最优开采研究对资源的优化配置和社会可持续发展至关重要。经典的Hotelling模型是研究矿产资源最优开采的主要工具,但是Hotelling法则在现实中并不总是成立,一个主要原因是模型中没有考虑矿产资源开采中的环境外部性及后备替代问题。本文建立的相关数学模型,利用动态最优化方法系统地研究了在环境约束及后备替代条件下矿产资源最优开采路径,对Hotelling模型进行拓展。结果发现:不考虑环境约束、矿产资源储量较少时,资源价格路径遵循Hotelling法则,在高于后备替代价格后退出市场,并且矿产资源成本、后备替代成本等因素都会对替代节点产生影响。考虑环境因素时,若污染未达阈值,资源储量较少时,价格的变化体现了环境外部性和稀缺性,变化率高于贴现率;当污染达到阈值,并且资源储量较丰富时,价格先保持不变,体现能源消费总量控制,然后由于稀缺性促使价格上升,遵循Hotelling法则;当污染达到阈值、存在资源进口时,价格的变化与资源出口国贴现率密切相关。
The optimal exploitation of mineral resources is very important to the allocation of resources and the sustainable development.Classic Hotelling model was a major means to discuss the optimal mining of mineral resources, but it was found that Hotelling rule was not always true in the reality.A main reason was that the model did not consider externalities of environment and backstop substitution.In this paper, some mathematical models were established to study the optimal exploitation path by dynamic optimization under the constraints of environment and backstop.The results shown that when the environmental constraint was not taken into account and the reserves of mineral resources was small, the resource price path follows the Hotelling principle and exits the market after higher than the reserve replacement price.In addition, the cost of mineral resources, reserve replacement cost had an impact on the substitution node.When considering environmental factors, if the pollution did not reach the threshold and the resource reserves were small, the price change reflected the environmental externality and scarcity, and the change rate was higher than the discount rate.When pollution reached the threshold and resources was abundant, the price remained unchanged to reflect the total energy consumption control, and then increased due to scarcity, following the Hotelling principle.Finally, when pollution reached the threshold and resource import existed, the price change was closely related to the discount rate of resource exporting country.
The optimal exploitation of mineral resources is very important to the allocation of resources and the sustainable development.Classic Hotelling model was a major means to discuss the optimal mining of mineral resources, but it was found that Hotelling rule was not always true in the reality.A main reason was that the model did not consider externalities of environment and backstop substitution.In this paper, some mathematical models were established to study the optimal exploitation path by dynamic optimization under the constraints of environment and backstop.The results shown that when the environmental constraint was not taken into account and the reserves of mineral resources was small, the resource price path follows the Hotelling principle and exits the market after higher than the reserve replacement price.In addition, the cost of mineral resources, reserve replacement cost had an impact on the substitution node.When considering environmental factors, if the pollution did not reach the threshold and the resource reserves were small, the price change reflected the environmental externality and scarcity, and the change rate was higher than the discount rate.When pollution reached the threshold and resources was abundant, the price remained unchanged to reflect the total energy consumption control, and then increased due to scarcity, following the Hotelling principle.Finally, when pollution reached the threshold and resource import existed, the price change was closely related to the discount rate of resource exporting country.
引文
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[15]魏晓平,周肖肖, 程晓娜.中国能源矿产开采路径与最优开采路径相悖原因[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2013, 15(3):1-7.
[16]Tahvonen O.Trade with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1996,30(1):1-17.
[17]Salant S.Exhaustible Resource and Industrial Structure:A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market[J].Journal of Political Economy,1976,84(5):1079-1094.
[18]Ulph A,Folie G M.Exhaustible Resources and Cartels:An Intertemporal Nash-Cournot Model[J].Canadian Journal of Economics,1980,13(4): 645-658.
[19]Gilber R.Dominant Firm Pricing Policy in a Market for an Exhaustible Resource[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1978,9(2):385-395.
[20]Loury G C.A Theory of Oiligopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible Resource Market with Fixed Supplies[J].International Economic Review,1986,27(2):285-301.
[21]Lewis T R,Schmalensee R.On Oligopolistic Market for Non-renewable Natural Resources[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1980,93(3):295-410.
[22]Polasky S.Do Oil Producers Act as Oligopolists?[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1992, 23:216-247.
[23]Long N V, Soubeyran A.Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach [J].International Economic Review,1998,42(2):505-533.
[2]Gerard G.On Comparing Monopoly and Competition in Exhaustible Resource Exploitation[J].Journal of Environment Economics and Management, 1988,15:412-418.
[3]Lewis T R,Matthews S A,Burness H S, Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources:Note[J].1979, 69(1):227-230.
[4]Villamor G.The Taxation of Exhaustible Resources [J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985,100(1):165-181.
[5]Im J B.Optimal Taxation of Exhaustible Resource Under Monopoly[J].Energy Economics, 2002,24(3):183-197.
[6]Hung N M,Quyen N Y.Specific or Ad Valorem Tax for an Exhaustible Resource?[J].Economics Letters,2009,102(2):132-134.
[7]Stiglitz J E.Monopoly and the Rate of extraction of an Exhaustible Resource[J].The American Economic Review,1976, 66(4):655-661.
[8]Salant S.Exhaustible Resource and Industrial Structure:A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market[J].Journal of Political Economy,1976,84(5):1079-1094.
[9]Im J B.Optimal Taxation of Exhaustible Resource Under Monopoly[J].Energy Economics, 2002,24(3):183-197.
[10]魏晓平,王立杰.市场经济条件下矿产资源价值与最佳配置研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,1997,17(6): 26-29.
[11]魏晓平,王新宇.矿产资源最适耗竭经济分析[J].中国管理科学,2002,10(5): 78-81.
[12]王新宇,魏晓平.具有多元经营主体的矿产资源开发动态决策研究(I)——理论模型[J].预测,2002, 21(2):63-66.
[13]周德群,葛世龙.可耗竭资源跨期配置中不确定问题研究进展[J].经济学动态,2008(3):91-96.
[14]葛世龙,周德群,陈洪涛.储量不确定对可耗竭资源优化开采的影响研究[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(6):137-141.
[15]魏晓平,周肖肖, 程晓娜.中国能源矿产开采路径与最优开采路径相悖原因[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2013, 15(3):1-7.
[16]Tahvonen O.Trade with Polluting Nonrenewable Resources[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,1996,30(1):1-17.
[17]Salant S.Exhaustible Resource and Industrial Structure:A Nash-Cournot Approach to the World Oil Market[J].Journal of Political Economy,1976,84(5):1079-1094.
[18]Ulph A,Folie G M.Exhaustible Resources and Cartels:An Intertemporal Nash-Cournot Model[J].Canadian Journal of Economics,1980,13(4): 645-658.
[19]Gilber R.Dominant Firm Pricing Policy in a Market for an Exhaustible Resource[J].The Bell Journal of Economics,1978,9(2):385-395.
[20]Loury G C.A Theory of Oiligopoly: Cournot Equilibrium in Exhaustible Resource Market with Fixed Supplies[J].International Economic Review,1986,27(2):285-301.
[21]Lewis T R,Schmalensee R.On Oligopolistic Market for Non-renewable Natural Resources[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1980,93(3):295-410.
[22]Polasky S.Do Oil Producers Act as Oligopolists?[J].Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1992, 23:216-247.
[23]Long N V, Soubeyran A.Cost Manipulation in Oligopoly: A Duality Approach [J].International Economic Review,1998,42(2):505-533.