特朗普政府需要什么样的全球化
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摘要
特朗普政府倡导反全球化是对美国民粹主义诉求的呼应,具有内在的必然性。但从全球的角度来看,这并不意味着民粹主义和反全球化具有合理性。在民粹主义和反全球化的背后是美国对丧失全球化领导权的担忧和对现行国际经济规则的不满。这种不满不仅体现在对多边主义规则之上,而且体现在对区域主义规则之上。不过,基于经济全球化的双重属性与特朗普政府的执政理念,特朗普政府并非要"去全球化",而是要构建新型全球化或"再全球化"。这种新型全球化是一种排他性的全球化:其主导者是美国及其有共同利益的"志同道合者";其原则是以"公平贸易"理念取代自由贸易理念;其手段是以双边机制替代多边机制;其目标是维护美国(及其盟友)领先者的地位,阻止后来者实现赶超。与排他性全球化相对应的是包容性全球化,反映了全球经济中的后来者或发展中国家的利益诉求。未来全球化与全球治理改革的发展方向将取决于这两种模式的博弈结果:它们各自的被认可度、可行性以及两者能否找到最大公约数。
The Trump administration's anti-globalization stance is a reaction to the American populism appeals and has inherent necessity. But from a global perspective,this does not mean that the populism and anti-globalization are justified. The populism and anti-globalization reflect the United States' fear of losing global leadership and dissatisfaction with current international economic rules. Moreover,the dissatisfaction is not only reflected in the multilateral rules,but also on the regional rules. However,given the dual attribute of globalization and the Trump administration's governing philosophy, we believe that the Trump administration is not to "de-globalize"but to "re-globalize"or to build a new type of globalization. This new type of globalization is an exclusive globalization: its leaders are the United States and its "like-minded partners"with common interests; its principle is to replace free trade with fair trade; its means is to replace multilateral mechanism with bilateral mechanisms.; its goal is to maintain the competitive advantage of the United States( and its allies) and prevent latecomers from achieving catch-up. Corresponding to exclusive globalization is inclusive globalization,reflecting the interests of latecomers or developing countries in the global economy. So,the future direction of globalization and global governance reform will depend on competing results of these two models: acceptance,feasibility,and whether the two can find the greatest common divisor.
The Trump administration's anti-globalization stance is a reaction to the American populism appeals and has inherent necessity. But from a global perspective,this does not mean that the populism and anti-globalization are justified. The populism and anti-globalization reflect the United States' fear of losing global leadership and dissatisfaction with current international economic rules. Moreover,the dissatisfaction is not only reflected in the multilateral rules,but also on the regional rules. However,given the dual attribute of globalization and the Trump administration's governing philosophy, we believe that the Trump administration is not to "de-globalize"but to "re-globalize"or to build a new type of globalization. This new type of globalization is an exclusive globalization: its leaders are the United States and its "like-minded partners"with common interests; its principle is to replace free trade with fair trade; its means is to replace multilateral mechanism with bilateral mechanisms.; its goal is to maintain the competitive advantage of the United States( and its allies) and prevent latecomers from achieving catch-up. Corresponding to exclusive globalization is inclusive globalization,reflecting the interests of latecomers or developing countries in the global economy. So,the future direction of globalization and global governance reform will depend on competing results of these two models: acceptance,feasibility,and whether the two can find the greatest common divisor.
引文
(1)盛斌、宗伟:《特朗普主义与反全球化迷思》,载《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2017年第5期,第38-49页。
(2)陈伟光、郭晴:《逆全球化机理分析与新型全球化及其治理重塑》,载《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2017年第5期,第58-69页;陈伟光、蔡伟宏:《逆全球化现象的政治经济学分析》,载《国际观察》,2017年第3期,第1-18页。
(3)王隽毅:《逆全球化?特朗普的政策议程与全球治理的竞争性》,载《外交评论》,2018年第3期,第102-128页。
(4)蔡拓:《被误解的全球化与异军突起的民粹主义》,载《国际政治研究》,2017年第1期,第15-20页。
(1)Sarah A.Donovan,Marc Labonte and Joseph Dalaker,“The U.S.Income Distribution:Trends and Issues,”Congressional Research Service,December 8,2016.
(2)Zhiyao(Lucy)Lu and Gary Clyde Huffbauer,“Has Global Trade Fueled U.S.Wage Inequality?A Survey of Experts,”August 30,2017,https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/has-global-trade-fueled-uswage-inequality-survey-experts,访问时间:2018年12月10日。
(3)David H.Auto,David Dorn and Gordon H.Hanson,“The China Shock:Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment,”Annual Review of Economics,Vol.8,2016,pp.205-240,https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041,访问时间:2018年12月15日。
(4)Bruce Stokes,“Americans,Like Other Advanced Economies,Not Convinced of Trade’s Benefits,”September 26,2018,http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/09/26/americans-like-many-in-other-advanced-economies-notconvinced-of-trades-benefits/,访问时间:2018年12月15日。
(5)PIIE,“What Is Globalization,and How Has the Global Economy Shaped the United States?”https://piie.com/microsites/globalization/what-is-globalization.html#group-benefits-vs.-costs-esO 4qYy2eG,访问时间:2019年1月10日。
(6)彼得森国际经济研究所的一项研究显示,经合组织国家政府通过税收和财政支出降低基尼系数的幅度平均为37%,其中美国仅为22%。参见Jacob Funk Kirkegaard,“Tax Overhaul Risks Making the U.S.Tax and Transfer System(Even)More Regressive,”Policy Brief 17-28,PIIE,October 2017。
(1)Kristen Bialik,“How the World View the U.S.and Its President in 9 Charts,”October 9,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/09/how-the-world-views-the-u-s-and-its-president-in-9-charts/,访问时间:2018年12月6日;Kat Devlin,“Americans Leery of China as Trump Prepares to Meet Xi at G20,”November 30,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/30/americans-leery-of-china-as-trump-prepares-to-meet-xi-at-g20/,访问时间:2019年1月10日。
(2)“2018 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,”http://www.USCC.gov,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(3)Gustavo López,Kristen Bialik and Jynnah Radford,“Key Findings About U.S.Immigrants,”November30,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/30/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(4)其他多数发达国家外来移民所占比例比美国还要高。例如,澳大利亚为29%,新西兰为23%,加拿大为21%,瑞士为30%,奥地利为19%,瑞典为18%。
(1)Bradley Jones,“Majority of Americans Continue to Say Immigrants Strengthen the U.S.,”January 31,2019,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/31/majority-of-americans-continue-to-say-immigrantsstrengthen-the-u-s/,访问时间:2019年2月12日。
(2)Abigail Geiger,“A Look at Voters’Views Ahead of the 2018 Midterms,”November 1,2018,http://www.pewsearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/01/a-look-at-voters-view-ahead-of-the-2018-midterms/,访问时间:2019年1月10日。
(3)Phillip Connor and Jens Manuel Krogstad,“Many Worldwide Oppose More Migration-Both Into and Out of Their Countries,”December 10,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/many-worldwide-oppose-more-migration-both-into-and-out-of-their-countries/,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(4)这种理念最早是由曾担任白宫首席战略师和资深顾问的史蒂夫·班农倡导。尽管班农已被特朗普解职,但其理念并未被特朗普政府放弃。参见J.Lester Feder,“This Is How Steve Bannon Sees the Entire World,”2016,https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.akBJLPw4g#.hqxN64weq,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(1)李向阳:《特朗普政府的亚洲政策及其影响》,载李向阳主编:《亚洲地区发展报告(2017):特朗普政府的亚洲政策及其影响》,北京:社会科学文献出版社2017年版,第1-16页。
(2)Tetyana Payosova,Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J.Schot,t“The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization:Causes and Cures,”Policy Brief 18-5,PIIE,March 2018;Statement of the United States by Ambassador Dennis Shea at the 14th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America,December 17,2018,https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/december/statement-united-states-ambassador,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(1)WTO规则不仅对区域贸易协定做出了明确的规制,而且已经认同它们与多边贸易机制存在相辅相成的关系。参见WTO,World Trade Report 2011:The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements:From Co-Existence to Coherence,https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_e.htm,访问时间:2019年1月18日。
(2)加利·霍夫鲍尔等对16项经验研究所做的综述显示,全球化不仅过去给美国带来巨大的经济利益,而且未来获益的空间也非常巨大。参见Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Zhiyao Lu,“The Payoff to America from Globalization:A Fresh Look with a Focus on Costs to Workers,”Policy Brief 17-16,PIIE,May 2017。
(1)与最惠国待遇原则并列的是国民待遇原则,前者反映的是要求缔约方平等对待所有其他缔约方,后者要求缔约方同等对待国内外产品与服务。基于表述简便的考虑,本文只提及国民待遇原则。
(1)J.Lester Feder,“This Is How Steve Bannon Sees the Entire World,”2016,https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.akBJLPw4g#.hqxN64weq,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(2)Statement of the United States by Ambassador Dennis Shea at the 14th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America,December 17,2018,https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/december/statement-united-states-ambassador,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(3)正如美国贸易谈判代表莱特希泽所言,美墨加自由贸易区协定是特朗普政府未来贸易谈判的模板。具体地说,它有三大支柱:一是公平;二是包括一系列旨在保护美国竞争优势的数字贸易、知识产权与服务条款;三是包括旨在消除不公平贸易做法的新条款,如对国有企业、汇率操纵、与非市场经济体的关系等方面的严格新规。更有甚者,有学者把这一协定称为WTO规则的颠覆者,因为它以国家至上原则取代了WTO的全球主义原则;以自由与公平的统一市场原则取代了WTO的特殊和差别待遇原则;以契约自治取代了WTO的权威治理。参见《莱特希泽最新演讲:美-墨-加协议将是美国贸易谈判的模板》,https://xueqiu.com/8602517284/114545982,访问时间:2018年12月6日;欧阳俊:《美墨加协定:WTO规则颠覆者》,载《金融时报》,2019年3月4日。
(1)刘卫东、Michael Dunford、高菠阳:《“一带一路”倡议的理论建构:从新自由主义全球化到包容性全球化》,载《地理科学进展》,2017年第11期,第1321-1331页。
(2)陈伟光、郭晴:《逆全球化机理分析与新型全球化及其治理重塑》,载《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2017年第5期,第58-69页。
(1)截至2018年5月,有67个成员针对上诉机构的改革向WTO提交了正式建议,但均被美国否决。
(1)Chad P.Bown,“China-US Bilateral Issues and WTO,”Conference on China-US Relations and the Global Economic System,January 23,2019,PIIE.
(2)按照对美出口受到加征关税冲击的比例,中国位居第一(50.5%),之后依次为俄罗斯(26.0%)、土耳其(16.9%)、巴西(11.8%)。除此之外,其发达经济体贸易伙伴也不同程度地受到冲击,如韩国、加拿大、日本、欧盟分别达到了9.6%、7.3%、3.8%和2.5%。参见Chad P.Bown and Eva(Yiwen)Zhang,“Measuring Trump’s 2018Trade Protection:Five Takeaways,”February 15,2019,https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/measuring-trumps-2018-trade-protection-five-takeaways,访问时间:2019年2月20日。
(2)陈伟光、郭晴:《逆全球化机理分析与新型全球化及其治理重塑》,载《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2017年第5期,第58-69页;陈伟光、蔡伟宏:《逆全球化现象的政治经济学分析》,载《国际观察》,2017年第3期,第1-18页。
(3)王隽毅:《逆全球化?特朗普的政策议程与全球治理的竞争性》,载《外交评论》,2018年第3期,第102-128页。
(4)蔡拓:《被误解的全球化与异军突起的民粹主义》,载《国际政治研究》,2017年第1期,第15-20页。
(1)Sarah A.Donovan,Marc Labonte and Joseph Dalaker,“The U.S.Income Distribution:Trends and Issues,”Congressional Research Service,December 8,2016.
(2)Zhiyao(Lucy)Lu and Gary Clyde Huffbauer,“Has Global Trade Fueled U.S.Wage Inequality?A Survey of Experts,”August 30,2017,https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/has-global-trade-fueled-uswage-inequality-survey-experts,访问时间:2018年12月10日。
(3)David H.Auto,David Dorn and Gordon H.Hanson,“The China Shock:Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment,”Annual Review of Economics,Vol.8,2016,pp.205-240,https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015041,访问时间:2018年12月15日。
(4)Bruce Stokes,“Americans,Like Other Advanced Economies,Not Convinced of Trade’s Benefits,”September 26,2018,http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/09/26/americans-like-many-in-other-advanced-economies-notconvinced-of-trades-benefits/,访问时间:2018年12月15日。
(5)PIIE,“What Is Globalization,and How Has the Global Economy Shaped the United States?”https://piie.com/microsites/globalization/what-is-globalization.html#group-benefits-vs.-costs-esO 4qYy2eG,访问时间:2019年1月10日。
(6)彼得森国际经济研究所的一项研究显示,经合组织国家政府通过税收和财政支出降低基尼系数的幅度平均为37%,其中美国仅为22%。参见Jacob Funk Kirkegaard,“Tax Overhaul Risks Making the U.S.Tax and Transfer System(Even)More Regressive,”Policy Brief 17-28,PIIE,October 2017。
(1)Kristen Bialik,“How the World View the U.S.and Its President in 9 Charts,”October 9,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/10/09/how-the-world-views-the-u-s-and-its-president-in-9-charts/,访问时间:2018年12月6日;Kat Devlin,“Americans Leery of China as Trump Prepares to Meet Xi at G20,”November 30,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/30/americans-leery-of-china-as-trump-prepares-to-meet-xi-at-g20/,访问时间:2019年1月10日。
(2)“2018 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,”http://www.USCC.gov,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(3)Gustavo López,Kristen Bialik and Jynnah Radford,“Key Findings About U.S.Immigrants,”November30,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/30/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(4)其他多数发达国家外来移民所占比例比美国还要高。例如,澳大利亚为29%,新西兰为23%,加拿大为21%,瑞士为30%,奥地利为19%,瑞典为18%。
(1)Bradley Jones,“Majority of Americans Continue to Say Immigrants Strengthen the U.S.,”January 31,2019,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/31/majority-of-americans-continue-to-say-immigrantsstrengthen-the-u-s/,访问时间:2019年2月12日。
(2)Abigail Geiger,“A Look at Voters’Views Ahead of the 2018 Midterms,”November 1,2018,http://www.pewsearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/01/a-look-at-voters-view-ahead-of-the-2018-midterms/,访问时间:2019年1月10日。
(3)Phillip Connor and Jens Manuel Krogstad,“Many Worldwide Oppose More Migration-Both Into and Out of Their Countries,”December 10,2018,http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/many-worldwide-oppose-more-migration-both-into-and-out-of-their-countries/,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(4)这种理念最早是由曾担任白宫首席战略师和资深顾问的史蒂夫·班农倡导。尽管班农已被特朗普解职,但其理念并未被特朗普政府放弃。参见J.Lester Feder,“This Is How Steve Bannon Sees the Entire World,”2016,https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.akBJLPw4g#.hqxN64weq,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(1)李向阳:《特朗普政府的亚洲政策及其影响》,载李向阳主编:《亚洲地区发展报告(2017):特朗普政府的亚洲政策及其影响》,北京:社会科学文献出版社2017年版,第1-16页。
(2)Tetyana Payosova,Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J.Schot,t“The Dispute Settlement Crisis in the World Trade Organization:Causes and Cures,”Policy Brief 18-5,PIIE,March 2018;Statement of the United States by Ambassador Dennis Shea at the 14th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America,December 17,2018,https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/december/statement-united-states-ambassador,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(1)WTO规则不仅对区域贸易协定做出了明确的规制,而且已经认同它们与多边贸易机制存在相辅相成的关系。参见WTO,World Trade Report 2011:The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements:From Co-Existence to Coherence,https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/wtr11_e.htm,访问时间:2019年1月18日。
(2)加利·霍夫鲍尔等对16项经验研究所做的综述显示,全球化不仅过去给美国带来巨大的经济利益,而且未来获益的空间也非常巨大。参见Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Zhiyao Lu,“The Payoff to America from Globalization:A Fresh Look with a Focus on Costs to Workers,”Policy Brief 17-16,PIIE,May 2017。
(1)与最惠国待遇原则并列的是国民待遇原则,前者反映的是要求缔约方平等对待所有其他缔约方,后者要求缔约方同等对待国内外产品与服务。基于表述简便的考虑,本文只提及国民待遇原则。
(1)J.Lester Feder,“This Is How Steve Bannon Sees the Entire World,”2016,https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world?utm_term=.akBJLPw4g#.hqxN64weq,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(2)Statement of the United States by Ambassador Dennis Shea at the 14th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America,December 17,2018,https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/december/statement-united-states-ambassador,访问时间:2019年1月12日。
(3)正如美国贸易谈判代表莱特希泽所言,美墨加自由贸易区协定是特朗普政府未来贸易谈判的模板。具体地说,它有三大支柱:一是公平;二是包括一系列旨在保护美国竞争优势的数字贸易、知识产权与服务条款;三是包括旨在消除不公平贸易做法的新条款,如对国有企业、汇率操纵、与非市场经济体的关系等方面的严格新规。更有甚者,有学者把这一协定称为WTO规则的颠覆者,因为它以国家至上原则取代了WTO的全球主义原则;以自由与公平的统一市场原则取代了WTO的特殊和差别待遇原则;以契约自治取代了WTO的权威治理。参见《莱特希泽最新演讲:美-墨-加协议将是美国贸易谈判的模板》,https://xueqiu.com/8602517284/114545982,访问时间:2018年12月6日;欧阳俊:《美墨加协定:WTO规则颠覆者》,载《金融时报》,2019年3月4日。
(1)刘卫东、Michael Dunford、高菠阳:《“一带一路”倡议的理论建构:从新自由主义全球化到包容性全球化》,载《地理科学进展》,2017年第11期,第1321-1331页。
(2)陈伟光、郭晴:《逆全球化机理分析与新型全球化及其治理重塑》,载《南开学报(哲学社会科学版)》,2017年第5期,第58-69页。
(1)截至2018年5月,有67个成员针对上诉机构的改革向WTO提交了正式建议,但均被美国否决。
(1)Chad P.Bown,“China-US Bilateral Issues and WTO,”Conference on China-US Relations and the Global Economic System,January 23,2019,PIIE.
(2)按照对美出口受到加征关税冲击的比例,中国位居第一(50.5%),之后依次为俄罗斯(26.0%)、土耳其(16.9%)、巴西(11.8%)。除此之外,其发达经济体贸易伙伴也不同程度地受到冲击,如韩国、加拿大、日本、欧盟分别达到了9.6%、7.3%、3.8%和2.5%。参见Chad P.Bown and Eva(Yiwen)Zhang,“Measuring Trump’s 2018Trade Protection:Five Takeaways,”February 15,2019,https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/measuring-trumps-2018-trade-protection-five-takeaways,访问时间:2019年2月20日。