多方博弈视角下既有建筑节能改造市场主体行为策略
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摘要
从信息经济学视角来看,既有建筑节能改造市场有序运行是多方主体行为博弈的结果,探索既有建筑节能改造市场多主体行为博弈演化策略具有重要的理论与实践价值。从既有建筑节能改造市场核心三方主体行为策略分析入手,构建了ESCO、政府和业主的三方博弈模型,运用演化博弈理论探讨了三方主体进化稳定策略形成的动态演化过程。研究结果表明,在各方信息不对称条件下,ESCO、政府和业主的三方动态利益博弈并不会固定地收敛于某一个稳定策略集合,其在各自不同概率范围内的不同行为取向均会造成不同收益结果,推动市场健康有序运行需要三方主体共同努力,政府针对ESCO和业主设置合理的补贴与罚金,有效控制不同行为决策下ESCO与业主的损益水平,引导与调动ESCO和业主既有建筑节能改造行为的积极性是关键。
From the perspective of information economics,the orderly operation of the existing building energy-saving renovation market is the result of multi-party behavioral game. It is of great theoretical and practical value to explore the multi-agent behavior game evolution strategy of the existing building energy-saving renovation market. Starting from the analysis of the core behaviors of the three parties in the existing building energy-saving renovation market,this paper constructs a three-party game model of ESCO,government and owner,and uses evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamic evolution process of the three-party evolutionary stability strategy. The research results show that under the condition of information asymmetry,the three-party dynamic interest game of ESCO,the government and owners do not converge to a certain stable strategy set,and their different behavioral orientations within different probability ranges will cause different revenue outcomes to promote the healthy and orderly operation of the market,it is necessary for the three parties to work together. The government sets reasonable subsidies and fines for the ESCO and the owners,effectively controls the profit and loss level of the ESCO and the owners under different behavior decisions. It is the key to guide and mobilize the enthusiasm of the ESCO and the owners of the existing building energy conservation transformation.
From the perspective of information economics,the orderly operation of the existing building energy-saving renovation market is the result of multi-party behavioral game. It is of great theoretical and practical value to explore the multi-agent behavior game evolution strategy of the existing building energy-saving renovation market. Starting from the analysis of the core behaviors of the three parties in the existing building energy-saving renovation market,this paper constructs a three-party game model of ESCO,government and owner,and uses evolutionary game theory to explore the dynamic evolution process of the three-party evolutionary stability strategy. The research results show that under the condition of information asymmetry,the three-party dynamic interest game of ESCO,the government and owners do not converge to a certain stable strategy set,and their different behavioral orientations within different probability ranges will cause different revenue outcomes to promote the healthy and orderly operation of the market,it is necessary for the three parties to work together. The government sets reasonable subsidies and fines for the ESCO and the owners,effectively controls the profit and loss level of the ESCO and the owners under different behavior decisions. It is the key to guide and mobilize the enthusiasm of the ESCO and the owners of the existing building energy conservation transformation.
引文
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[12]刘玉明,刘长滨.既有建筑节能改造的经济激励政策分析[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2010,9(2):52-57.
[13]王星,郭汉丁,陶凯,等.中国节能服务产业发展协同激励路径优化对策[J].科技进步与对策,2016,33(16):129-134.
[14]蒋致远,李畅帆.三方博弈模型下零售商主导型供应链演化研究[J].商业经济研究,2015,(29):4-6.
[15]Selten R.A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology,1980,84(1):93-101.
[2]Azar E,Ansari H A,Yan J.Framework to investigate energy conservation motivation and actions of building occupants:The case of a green campus in Abu Dhabi,UAE[J].Applied Energy,2017,190:563-573.
[3]王艳艳,任宏.非对称信息下节能建筑开发商激励机制研究[J].科技进步与对策,2013,30(23):44-47.
[4]邓志坚,汪霄,王伟.基于合同能源管理的公共建筑节能改造的激励机制分析[J].工程管理学报,2011,25(1):37-40.
[5]芮隽,汪霄.中国大型公共建筑节能激励机制研究[J].生态经济(中文版),2011,(7):131-133.
[6]陶凯,郭汉丁,王毅林,等.建筑节能改造项目风险共担协同优化机理研究[J].科技管理研究,2017,(23):240-245.
[7]赵倩倩,郭汉丁,张宝震,等.政府管制下建筑节能服务公司与业主策略行为的进化博弈分析[J].科技管理研究,2016,(9):198-203.
[8]凌阳明月,凌阳明星,赵帆.基于EPC模式的节能改造项目利益分配[J].土木工程与管理学报,2016,33(6):115-120.
[9]Harputlugil G U,Harputlugil T.A research on occupant behaviour pattern of dwellings in the context of environmental comfort and energy saving[J].Journal of the Faculty of Engineering and Architecture of Gazi University,2016,31(3):696-709.
[10]刘晓君,张晨曦.既有居住建筑节能改造中业主与ESCO进化博弈分析---基于合同能源管理模式(EMC)[J].建筑经济,2015,36(9):100-103.
[11]邓建英,兰秋军.博弈视角下政府对建筑节能服务机构的监管效能分析[J].系统工程,2015,33(12):96-100.
[12]刘玉明,刘长滨.既有建筑节能改造的经济激励政策分析[J].北京交通大学学报(社会科学版),2010,9(2):52-57.
[13]王星,郭汉丁,陶凯,等.中国节能服务产业发展协同激励路径优化对策[J].科技进步与对策,2016,33(16):129-134.
[14]蒋致远,李畅帆.三方博弈模型下零售商主导型供应链演化研究[J].商业经济研究,2015,(29):4-6.
[15]Selten R.A note on evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric animal conflicts[J].Journal of Theoretical Biology,1980,84(1):93-101.