地方政府债务对企业创新的门限效应
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摘要
基于2005-2015我国省际面板数据,采用面板门限效应模型和固定效应模型,从全国和分地区视角,就地方债务水平与企业创新之间关系进行实证分析。研究发现,从全样本视角来看,地方债对企业创新具有显著的门限效应,且只存在单一门限。在门限值以内,地方债增长能够激励企业创新。一旦超越门限值,地方债上升导致的企业融资约束趋紧进而会抑制企业创新。此外,地方债对企业创新的门限效应受区域经济发展不平衡的影响。从分组回归看,地方债对东部地区不存在门限效应,这与东部地区已经跨越以债务促发展阶段有关;相较于西部地区,中部地区地方债对企业创新的促进作用更显著且强度更大,门限值相对较低。当地方债水平超越该门限值,中部地区的地方债对企业创新的促进作用会减弱,西部地区的地方债会明显阻碍企业创新。
Based on the provincial sample data from 2005 to 2015, and using the threshold effect model and the fixed effect model, this paper analyzes the relationship between local debt level and enterprise innovation from national and regional perspectives. The results show that the local debt has an obvious threshold effect on enterprise innovation from the national perspective which is the only threshold. Growth of local debt can promote enterprise innovation within the threshold.The tightening of financing constraints caused by this growth will restrain the innovation of enterprises when local debts break through the threshold. In addition, the threshold effect of local debt on enterprise innovation is affected by the imbalance of regional economic development.According to the grouped regression, there is no threshold effect of local debts on the eastern regions, for they have crossed the debt-for-development stage.Compared with the western regions, the promotion effect of local debt in the central regions on enterprise innovation is more significant and stronger, and the threshold value is relatively low.The promotion effect of local debt in the central regions on enterprise innovation will be weakened, and the local debt in the western region will hinder enterprise innovation obviously when its level exceeds this threshold value.
Based on the provincial sample data from 2005 to 2015, and using the threshold effect model and the fixed effect model, this paper analyzes the relationship between local debt level and enterprise innovation from national and regional perspectives. The results show that the local debt has an obvious threshold effect on enterprise innovation from the national perspective which is the only threshold. Growth of local debt can promote enterprise innovation within the threshold.The tightening of financing constraints caused by this growth will restrain the innovation of enterprises when local debts break through the threshold. In addition, the threshold effect of local debt on enterprise innovation is affected by the imbalance of regional economic development.According to the grouped regression, there is no threshold effect of local debts on the eastern regions, for they have crossed the debt-for-development stage.Compared with the western regions, the promotion effect of local debt in the central regions on enterprise innovation is more significant and stronger, and the threshold value is relatively low.The promotion effect of local debt in the central regions on enterprise innovation will be weakened, and the local debt in the western region will hinder enterprise innovation obviously when its level exceeds this threshold value.
引文
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[11]王春元,叶伟巍.税收优惠与企业自主创新:融资约束的视角[J].科研管理,2018,39(3):37-44.
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[15]胡胜,陈小林,蔡报纯,等.地方政府债务风险的博弈论分析及优化治理研究[J].中国软科学,2017(8):82-90.
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[19]吕健.地方债务对经济增长的影响分析——基于流动性的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):16-31.
[20]胡奕明,顾雯.地方政府债务与经济增长[J].行政科学论坛,2017(7):39-39.
[21]徐长生,程琳,庄佳强.地方债务对地区经济增长的影响与机制——基于面板分位数模型的分析[J].经济学家,2016(5):77-86.
[22]陈志刚,吴国维.地方政府债务促进了区域经济增长吗?——基于地方政府“招拍挂”工具变量视角[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2018(4):48-60.
[23]范剑勇,莫家伟.地方债务、土地市场与地区工业增长[J].经济研究,2014(1):41-55.
[24]胡凤玲,张敏.人力资本异质性与企业创新绩效——调节效应与中介效应分析[J].财贸研究,2014(6):121-128.
[25]ACHARYA V, XU Z X. Financial dependence and innovation:The case of public versus private firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2016(124):223-243.
[26]彭国华.中国地区收入差距、全要素生产率及其收敛分析[J].经济研究,2005(9):19-29.
[2]朱晨赫,杨筝,程晨.地方政府债务与企业创新——基于省级面板数据和国务院43号文件的实证研究[J].当代财经,2018(8):77-89.
[3]洪源,王群群,苏知立.地方政府债务风险非线性先导预警系统的构建与应用研究[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2018(6):95-113.
[4]CHUANG H, HO H C. Measuring the default risk of sovereign debt from the perspective of network[J]. Physica A:Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 2013, 392(9):2235-2239.
[5]宋林清.地方债发行与房价上涨——基于中国35个大中城市的实证研究[J].金融论坛,2017(12):68-78.
[6]李西杰.新常态下地方政府融资模式与商业银行金融市场业务研究[J].金融经济,2018(18):69-72.
[7]CHEN T. Institutions, board structure, and corporate performance:Evidence from Chinese firms[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015, 32:217-237.
[8]杨蓉,刘婷婷,高凯.产业政策扶持、企业融资与制造业企业创新投资[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(11):41-51.
[9]谭劲松,冯飞鹏,徐伟航.产业政策与企业研发投资[J].会计研究,2017(10):58-64.
[10]李万福,杜静,张怀.创新补助究竟有没有激励企业创新自主投资——来自中国上市公司的新证据[J].金融研究,2017(10):130-145.
[11]王春元,叶伟巍.税收优惠与企业自主创新:融资约束的视角[J].科研管理,2018,39(3):37-44.
[12]ALESINAA, TABELLINI G. Positive and normative theories of public debt and inflation in historical perspective[J].European Economic Review, 2004, 36(2-3):337-344.
[13]庞晓波,李丹.中国经济景气变化与政府债务风险[J].经济研究,2015(10):18-33.
[14]韩健.美国国债市场高流动性的成因分析与借鉴[J].学习与实践,2017(2):14-20.
[15]胡胜,陈小林,蔡报纯,等.地方政府债务风险的博弈论分析及优化治理研究[J].中国软科学,2017(8):82-90.
[16]郭玉清,何杨,李龙.救助预期、公共池激励与地方政府举债融资的大国治理[J].经济研究,2016(3):81-95.
[17]张绘,武靖州.从预算绩效、绩效预算到政府治理绩效[J].财政监督,2017(24):55-59.
[18]吴小强,韩立彬.中国地方政府债务竞争:基于省级空间面板数据的实证研究[J].财贸经济,2017,38(9):48-62.
[19]吕健.地方债务对经济增长的影响分析——基于流动性的视角[J].中国工业经济,2015(11):16-31.
[20]胡奕明,顾雯.地方政府债务与经济增长[J].行政科学论坛,2017(7):39-39.
[21]徐长生,程琳,庄佳强.地方债务对地区经济增长的影响与机制——基于面板分位数模型的分析[J].经济学家,2016(5):77-86.
[22]陈志刚,吴国维.地方政府债务促进了区域经济增长吗?——基于地方政府“招拍挂”工具变量视角[J].现代财经(天津财经大学学报),2018(4):48-60.
[23]范剑勇,莫家伟.地方债务、土地市场与地区工业增长[J].经济研究,2014(1):41-55.
[24]胡凤玲,张敏.人力资本异质性与企业创新绩效——调节效应与中介效应分析[J].财贸研究,2014(6):121-128.
[25]ACHARYA V, XU Z X. Financial dependence and innovation:The case of public versus private firms[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2016(124):223-243.
[26]彭国华.中国地区收入差距、全要素生产率及其收敛分析[J].经济研究,2005(9):19-29.