摘要
近年来,引发舆论高度关注的种种社会矛盾表明,公共产品(包括准公共产品)短缺取代私人产品短缺逐渐成为主要矛盾。改革开放以来,中国的经济发展取得了举世瞩目的成就,居民生活水平大幅提高,私人产品供给得到极大丰富。公共需求迅速增长,公共需求结构日益多样化。与此同时,准公共产品领域国有经济一直居主导地位,国有经济在其中的功能及作用问题涉及国有经济性质、国家干预经济角色等一系列重大的理论及实践课题。本文通过对公共产品理论、自然垄断理论、政府干预理论、公共利益理论的系统梳理,从公法和私法结合的视角重点分析国有经济的法律特征,即国有经济是国家私法主体的代位者,由此阐释准公共产品领域国有经济的主要功能,并指出国有经济对准公共产品供给效率、供给公平的影响。通过进一步考察我国准公共产品供给中国有经济的主要表现,总结发达国家相关经验,初步提出优化我国准公共产品领域国有经济功能的思路和建议。
For the past few years, kinds of social contradictions which aroused great concern among the public indicate that private goods shortfall has been superseded by public goods shortfall and has became the primary contradiction. Since the reform and opening, the economic development of China has gained remarkable achievement, with the considerably increased living standard of citizens and the enrichment of private goods supply. Public wants increase rapidly and their structure is diversified increasingly. At the same time, in our country it is the state-owned economy that dominates the domain of quasi-public goods. The functions the state-owned economy perform in it involve a series important academic and practical studies on the nature of the state-owned economy and the role of state intervention in the economy and so on.
The main structure of this paper consists of five chapters and several paragraphs. In Chapter One, a summary of the definition of quasi-public goods and relevant researches is given. There are mainly two parts: part one, the definition of quasi-public goods. A review on the classification and characters indicates along with the changing elements of the economic level, technology, demand states, and transaction cost etc., the range of quasi-public goods can be changed. Part two, the summary of Theory of public goods supply. Theory of public goods supply is an important basis of studying quasi-public goods. Thus when the relevant theories of public goods are summarized , firstly western theories of public goods are summarized. Then, further, three models of quasi-public goods supply are studied: the government supplies, the personal supplies, and the third-department supplies. Finally, relevant researches on the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods are summarized.
Chapter Two is about the theoretical base of the existing of the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods. There are mainly three parts: part one, firstly, the definition of the basic meaning of the state-owned economy. Now that the educational circles have not came out with an unified recognition of the meaning of it, through studying on several opinions, this paper defines its meaning as an unified whole that consists all the state-owned form of ownership economic elements of a sovereignty. It includes state organs at the central and local levels,public institutions and nongovernmental organizations which invest enterprises by the employment of state assets. It also includes public institutions that carry out the enterprise management, and not in the list of allocated funds of the state, or partly receive the allocated funds; nongovernmental organizations which engage in any forms of business; and the above enterprises, public institutions and enterprises invested by nongovernmental organizations with the employment of state assets. In this paragraph, the produce, development and main forms of state-owned economies are summarized. Part two, the gist of the existing of the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods is analyzed here. Theory of public goods, Theory of government intervention, Theory of natural monopoly, Theory of Public Interest, and Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility prepared solid scientific theory foundation for the existing of the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods. Theory of public goods starts with the primary features of quasi-public goods. Theory of government intervention starts with the primary function of the state-owned economy. Theory of natural monopoly starts with the production characteristics of quasi-public goods. Theory of Public Interest starts with the perspective of social welfare. And Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility starts with the social responsibility of the state-owned economy in the new period. It emphasizes the necessity of existence of the existing of the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods. Part three, the method of goods supply of the state-owned economy and of other governmental supply are compared, with comparative advantages and respectively cracks and flaws between the state-owned economy and personal supply, in order to more fully understand the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods.
In Chapter three,Legal Characteristics and its function of the state-owned business in the domain of quasi-public goods is analyzed. There are mainly three parts: part one, public law and private law are briefly reviewed. From different angles of scientific theory between public law and private law, legal characteristics of the state-owned business is studied, indicating that it is an entity with dual legal personality and is the subrogation of state’s private law entity. Thus the state-owned business not only is restricted by the public law, attaining its goal, but also restricted by the private law, attaining the goal of the private law. Part two, primary functions of the state-owned business in the domain of quasi-public goods are clarified, which are functions of configuration of commons' resource, distribution, guarantee, service, exemplary and regulation and replacement. Part three is about determination of the attaining goal of state-owned business during quasi-public goods supply, which is to promote supply impartiality and to provide efficiency of supply. Meanwhile, how the state-owned business effects supply impartiality and efficiency is analyzed. With the Ferreira model, as a main means of providing public goods by the government, the state-owned business decreased the primary impact on the social welfare in various economic development stages. It also indicates that it is mainly through self-separation (landscape separation , vertical separation and mixed separation ) that the state-owned business introduces competition into the quasi-public goods market and promotes the efficiency of supply.
Chapter Four is about the implement and evaluation of the functions of the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods in our country. The supply statue quo of quasi-public goods and the performance of the state-owned economy’s functions are studied. Now, although there is a great increase in the supply of quasi-public goods, the statue quo of supply shortfall has not been changed. Along with the change of economic circumstances, the state-owned economy’s functions in the quasi-public goods supply are changing too. In the planned economy period, the only entity of impure public goods supply is the state-owned economy. With the economy transformation, it has been gradually getting off the rid of the responsibility of quasi-public goods supply. However it is still an important entity in our quasi-public goods supply. Through commenting on it, the paper indicates that the state-owned economy has not been functioning appropriately and analyzes the main reason why it is not functioning well.
Chapter Five is about the international experiences of supervising over the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods and policy proposals on perfecting its functions. Although in most of the developed countries the ratio of the state-owned economy is not high at all, especially countries like the U.S.A, in which people place a premium on free competition, the state-owned economy does exist in their quasi-public goods supply. Studying on the status and the way it is supervised can be used for reference when we understand the state-owned economy in the domain of quasi-public goods and optimize its functions. From the above, policy proposals are made to optimize its functions from four aspects: legislation, supervision, structure of the state-owned economy, and perfecting managerial system of enterprises.
The new ideas of this paper are: first, on the angle of research, the paper orientates the research of public goods. From the aspect of the combination of law and economics, the paper sets research on the state-owned economy’s functions in the domain of quasi-public goods which is an area nobody ever researched. Of the researches on quasi-public goods, educational circles mostly focus on its personal supply or other not traditional ways of supply. Of the researches on he state-owned economy, they mostly focus on the defining of its boundaries and the industry's structure adjustment etc. Seldom are there any scholars link the two to an intensive study. This paper, with the perspective of Law and Economics, makes a new structure of the issue on the state-owned economy’s functions in the domain of quasi-public goods and put forward with policy proposals of optimizing its functions.
Second, on the research way, this paper introduces the concept of public law and private law into studies on the state-owned economy. The principles of the two are different. Public law pursues the concept of“the state or the government intervenes”somehow the private law follows“Autonomy of will”and“Private autonomy”. In former studies, some mentioned the special status of legal entity of the state-owned economy but did not define the nature of its applicable law. This paper introduces the concept of public law and private law and regards it the subrogation of the state private law entity, further, studying on right and obligation that it should implement. This is of certain values of epistemology and methodology to an intensive understanding of the state-owned economy’s functions in the domain of quasi-public goods or other.
Last, this paper puts forward a preliminary policy proposal about optimizing its functions, emphasizing the difference of supervision of the state-owned economy in the domain between quasi-public goods and others. Since in different domains the operation objectives of the state-owned economy are different, its priority of investment and way of act in different domains should be differed. According to this, the paper makes pointed policy proposals on reform and development of the state-owned economy in the domain of the quasi-public goods.
引文
①谢地、陈萍.构建和谐社会与政府的规制角色[J].汉江论坛,2008(6):13-16。
②2003-2004年浙江省社会发展报告http://www.zjdpc.gov.cn/BrowseDocument1.aspx
①张昕竹主编.中国规制与竞争理论和政策[M] .北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000:233-238。
②肖志兴.美英日自然垄断产业改革的共性研究[J].中国工业经济,2001(8):50-55。
①Jmaes M.Buchana. An economic theory of clubs[J]. Economica, 1965(32):1-14.
②P.A.Samuelson. The pure of theory of public expenditure[J]. Review of Economic and Statistics,1954 (11) :387-389.
①在现有研究中,准公共产品的定义有广义和狭义两种,广义的准公共产品指所有的非纯公共产品和由外部性所产生的外部效应一起被称为准公共产品。狭义的准公共产品指只有利益外溢的产品才可称为准公共产品。本文采用的是广义的准公共产品的定义。
②[英] C·V·布朗, P·M·杰克逊.公共部门经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:64。
③高培勇,崔军.公共部门经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004:57。
④Blundel.R.Consumer Behaviour. Theory and Emperical Evidence[J]. Economic Journal.,1990,vol.100:p48.
①[英] C·V·布朗, P·M·杰克逊.公共部门经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:28-30。
②[美]曼昆.经济学原理[M].北京:北京大学出版社.1999:325。
①植草益著,朱绍文等译.微观规制经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1992:232-285。
②V. Ostrom & E.Ostrom: Public goods and public choices in Alternatives for Delivering Public Services. Toward Inproved Performance[M]. Oxford :Westview Press, 1977:30-45.③D.L.Weimer&A.R.Vining:Policy Analysis. Concepts and Practice[M]. New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs,NJ Pretice-Hall,1992:46.
④E.S Savas .Privatization and Pulib-Private Partnership[M].NY: New York Press, 2000:29.
①郑秉文.市场缺陷分析[M].辽宁:辽宁人民出版社,1993:208。
②[英] C·V·布朗,P·M·杰克逊.公共部门经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:38。
③任俊生.论准公共产品的本质特征和范围变化.[J]吉林大学学报(社会科学版),2005(5):54-59.
①马国贤.中国公共支出与预算政策[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2001:362。
②Bryn A. Garner in chief, St.Paul, MINN,Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition[M], West Publishing Co. , 2000:487.
③参见周自强.准公共物品供给理论分析[D].天津:南开大学,2005。
①马国贤.中国公共支出与预算政策[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2001:363。
②马国贤.中国公共支出与预算政策[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2001:363。
①任俊生.中国公用产品价格管制[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2002:37。
①参见任俊生.中国公用产品价格管制[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2002:37。
①[美]缪勒著、杨春学等译.公共选择[M].中国社会科学出版社,1999:150。
①Vscui.w.kip,Vernon,Johu M.and Harrington.Joseph E. Economies of Regulation and antitrust[M].USA: MIT, 2000:453-457.
②曹阳.网络型公用企业竞争的法律监管[M].北京:法律出版社,2007:33-34。
①[英]霍布斯著,黎思复、黎延弼译.利维坦[M].上海:商务印书馆,1997:365。
②[英]休谟著,关文运译.人性论[M](上册).上海:商务印书馆,1997:561。
③John Stuart Mil. Principle of political economy[M] . London: Longman Green&Co,1921:285.
①James M.Buchanan . An Economic Theory of Clubs[J]. Economica ,1965(32):1-14.
②Demsetz.The Private Production of Public Goods[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1975,18 (April):146-157.
③[美]波斯纳.法律的经济分析[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2003:88-89。
④[美]安东尼·阿特金森、约瑟夫·斯蒂格里茨.公共经济学[M](中文版).上海:上海三联书店,1992:643-648。
⑤Sugden,R.,Reciprocity.The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions[J].Economic Journal, 1984: 772-787.
⑥Andreon,iJ. ,L.SamuelsonBuildingRationalCooperation.http://www.ssc.wisc.edu~andreoni/WorkingPapers/AndSam1.pd.f 2004.
①Cornes and Sandler.The Comparative Static Properties of the Impure Public Good Model[J].Journal of Public Economics, 1994(54:)403-421.
②Vicary Simon. Weakest-Link Public Goods:Giving In-Kind or Transferring Money[M]. European Economic 2002(46).
③John Duffy、Jack Ochs、Lise Vesterlund. Giving Little by LittleDynamic Voluntary Contribution Games. http: //www. pitt.edu/~vester/Little. pdf 2004.
④]Ledyard, J. O. Public Goods: a Survey of Experimental Research[M] // in A. Roth and J.Kagel (eds. ) The Handbook ofExperimentalEconomics, PrincetonUniversity Press, 1995:111-181.
⑤Isaac and Walker. Communacation and free-riding behavior:the voluntary contributions mechanism[J]. Economic Inquiry. 1988(26):585-608:
①邓淑莲.国外基础设施私有化及其效率研究[J].世界经济研究,2001(1):49-52。
②王国清.非公有资本与基础设施有效供给[J].当代财经,2004(7):53-57。
③樊丽明.中国公共物品市场与自愿供给的分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005:55-89。
④张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:三联书店、上海人民出版社,,1996。
⑤陈武平.公共产品成本的一种分配机制及其实验验证[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2000(1): 69-73。·
⑥V. Ostrom & E.Ostrom. Public goods and public choices in Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Inproved Performance[M]. Oxford: Westview Press, 1977,p30-p45.
⑦LesterM.Salamon Helmut K.Anheier Defining the Nonprofit Sector--A Cross-national Analysis[M]. Manchester University Press, 1997: 77-78.
⑧Streeten, Paul. Nongovernmental Organizations and Development[J]. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1997 (11): 199.
⑨A.Slivinski. Rival Charities[J] . Journal of Public Economics; 1997(7):56.
①樊丽明.中国公共产品市场与自愿供给[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2005:57-78。
②王磊.公共产品第三部门供给的国内外研究综述[J].中国石油大学学报(社会科学版),2007(2):45-48。
①陈东琪.“公”、“私”配置与公共产品生产[J].东北财经大学学报,1999(1):16-26。
②李建平.我国公用事业价格形成机制问题研究[J].财贸经济,2002(7):22-26。
③卢洪友.公共品生产的市场化与制度创新[J].中央财经大学学报,2002(4):34-40。
④邱勇.国有经济范围与规模研究[J].亚太经济,1997(3):23-29。
①宫希魁.用新视角审读国有经济问题[J].财经问题研究,2001(1):11-17。
①高鸿业主编.西方经济学与我国经济体制改革(第二册) [M].北京:中国社会科学出版社1996:235。
②于光远主编.经济大辞典[M] (下册).上海:上海辞书出版社1992:1345。
③潘岳主编.中国国有经济总论[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1997:2。
④樊纲.渐进改革的政治经济学分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社1996:204。
⑤徐茂魁.国有经济论[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,1998:21。
⑥[英]米什勒等编,吴柏均等译.世界各国的公营企业[M] .辽宁大连:东北财经大学出版社,1991:105。
①褚保一、张幼文.当代帝国主义经济[M].安徽:安徽人民出版社,1985:40。
②徐传谌、张万成.国有经济存在的理论依据[J].吉林大学学报(社会科学版),2002(5):40。
③高德步.世界经济史[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:266。
④高德步.世界经济史[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:232。
①高德步.世界经济史[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:228。
②徐武.中国国有经济的实现形式和路径选择[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,2005:22。
③中共中央马克思恩格斯列宁斯大林著作编译局.马克思恩格斯选集[M](第一卷).北京:人民出版社,1972 :272。
①戚聿东、边文霞、周斌.我国国有经济规模的合理区间探讨[J].当代财经,2008(8):47-50。
①徐武.中国国有经济的实现形式和路径选择[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,2005:31。
②罗卫东.西方国有企业管理模式的分析与比[J].浙江经济,1996(9):13-17。
①刘春勤.意大利的国家控股公司[J].中国工业经济,1995(2):72-77。
①杨丽芳.西方国家管理国有企业的实践与特点[J].财务与会计,2002(6):48-50。
②叶祥松.美国国有企业管理体制对我国国有企业管理体制改革的启示[J].世界经济与政治,1996(7):64-67。
①李建兴.我国国有经济持续稳步发展去年国有资产总量比上年增长百分之十三点八[N].人民日报,1999-08-07。
①杨浩.国有控股公司的性质和成因分析[J].中国纺织经济.1999(4):23-26。
②程恩富.国有控股公司:成因、产权关系与治理结构-国有制实现形式和国有资本运行模式分析[J].学术季刊,1998(2):13-22。
③芮明杰.国有控股公司运行与管理[M].山东:山东人民出版社,1999:18。
④徐传谌,杨洁.国有经济股权融合方式分析[J].长白学刊,2002(3):62-64。
①[英]亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质和原因研究[M](下卷).上海:商务印书馆,1974:252。
②[英]凯恩斯.就业、利息和货币通论[M] .上海:商务印书馆,1963:321。
①斯蒂格勒茨等.政府什么干预经济—政府在市场经济中的角色[M].北京:中国物资出版社,1998:198。
②T H .Farrer.,TheState in Its Relation to Trade[M]. New York: Macmillan.,1902:100-103.
③RichardT .E ly. Outlines of Economics[M]. New York:Macmillan,1937: 55-57.
④Kenneth.W.Clarkson, Roger Leroy Miller. Industrial Organization:Theory,Evidence and Public Policy[M] London: .Mc Craw-HillBookCompany,1982:119.
①王俊豪等著.中国垄断性产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策[M] .上海:商务印书馆,2005:3-12。
②于立等.自然垄断理论演进综述[J].经济学动态,2000(6):70-73。
③陆军荣.国有企业的产业特质—国际经验及治理启示[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,2008:47。
①Herry C. Simons. Economic Policy for a Free Society[M]. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948:34:51.
②李怀.自然垄断理论研究[M].辽宁大连:东北财经大学出版社,2003:27-30。
①[美]克鲁斯克.B.M.杰克逊.公共政策词典[M].上海:上海译文出版社, 1988: 27。
②[美]博登海默,邓正来译.法理学——法律哲学与法律方法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,1999:185。
①[英]约翰·维克斯,康晓红等译.私有化的经济学分析[M] .重庆:重庆出版社,2006:329。
②引自李国鼎.台湾的企业经营与管理[M] .江苏南京:东南大学出版社,1996:264。
③引自李国鼎.台湾的企业经营与管理[M] .江苏南京:东南大学出版社,1996:264。
④Sheldon, O.The SocialResponsibility ofManagement,The Philosophy ofManagement[M]. London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Ltd., 1924.
⑤Bowen, H.Social Responsibilities of the Businessman[M]. New York: Harper, 1953.
①Committee for Economic Development. Social Responsibilities of Business Corporations[M]. New York: Author, 1971 :15.
①国资委研究室.中央企业社会责任研究报告[R]. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n4175042/n4175059/n4175121/n4179367.files/n4179364.doc
②经济合作与发展组织. OECD国有企业公司治理指引[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005:55。
③魏杰.企业社会责任和道义责任不应混同关于企业责任问题的思考[N].光明日报,2005-7-5。
①王晓晔.公用企业滥用优势地位行为的法律规制[J].法学杂志,2005(1):29-31。
②文学国.我国法律对滥用市场优势地位之规制[J].上海交通大学学报(社科版),2003(2):29-33。
①王晓晔.竞争法研究[M].北京:中国法制出版社,1999:23。
①[日]美浓部达吉,黄冯明译,周旋勘校.公法与私法[M] .北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003: 29。
①[日]美浓部达吉,黄冯明译,周旋勘校.公法与私法[M] .北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003: 24。
②[德]奥托·迈耶著,刘飞译.德国行政法[M].北京:商务出版社,2002:12。
①[德]梅迪库斯著邵建东译.德国民法总论[M].北京:法律出版社,2000:14。
①[德]梅迪库斯著邵建东译.德国民法总论[M].北京:法律出版社,2000:14。
②李晓明.私法的制度价值[M].北京:法律出版社,2007:39。
③孔庆明.论私法和私法文化[J].法制与社会,2000:75。
①上述观点参考了孙国华、杨思斌.公私法的划分与法的内在结构[J],载于《法制与社会发展》2004(4):11-15。
②杨力.试论国家作为私法主体的理论依据[J].宁夏党校学报,2003(5):27-32。
③吴金明、荣朝和.基础设施领域国有企业改革新思路[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版)2007(10):44-51。
②吴金明、荣朝和.论公共提供制度安排及法律调整模式[J].中国软件科学,2004(4):18-24。
①刘穷志.国有控股公司功能定位[J].经济管理,2003(4):93-96。
①[法]莱昂·狄骥.公法的变迁:法律与国家[M].辽宁:辽海出版社,1999:50。
①袁曙宏.通过公法变革优化服务[J].国家行政学院学报, 2004(5):33-38。
②[美] E.博登海默,邓正来译.法理学:法律哲学与法律方法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,1999:233。
①世界银行.1994年世界银行发展报告—为发展提供基础设施[M].北京:中国经济财政出版社,1994。
①亚当·斯密.国民财富的性质及原因研究(上卷)[M] .上海:商务印书馆,2005:356。
①[美]罗尔斯著,何怀宏等译.正义论[M] .北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001:292。
②[美]罗尔斯著,何怀宏等译.正义论[M] .北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001:354。
③黄云鹏.公共服务监管研究—以中国教育、医疗监管为例[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008:85.
①何大昌.公平与效率均衡及路径分析[D].南京师范大学,2002:14.
②[加]威尔·金里卡.当代政治哲学[M](上册).上海:上海三联书店,2004:110。
①[美]米尔顿·弗里德曼、罗斯·弗里德曼.自由选择[M] .上海:商务印书馆,1982:152。
②[美]约翰·罗尔斯.正义论[M] .北京:中国社会科学出版社,1988:97。
③参见卡尔多.经济学的福利命题和个人间效用的比较[J].经济学杂志,1939(9):5:50。
④[美]莱宾斯坦.配置效率与“x效率”[J].美国经济评论,1966(3):35-40。
①战松.制度与效率[D].西南财经大学博士论文,2006:47-48。
②[英]加雷斯·D·迈尔斯.公共经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2001:22-24。
③[美]哈尔·瓦里安.微观经济学(高级教程第三版)[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,1997:135。
④赵宝廷.从公共品定义的视角看公共品供给效率问题[J].求索,2006年6:35-36。
①孙钰.公共物品经营效率研究[J].南开经济研究,1999(6):28-32。
②斯蒂格利茨.政府经济学[M].北京:春秋出版杜,1988:2。
①W.吉帕.维斯库斯、约翰.M.弗农.反垄断与管制经济学[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2004:283。
②肖志兴.公用事业市场化与规制模式转型[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2008:196
①数据来源:《2008年中国统计年鉴》[M],北京:中国统计出版社。
②数据来源:《2001年公路水路交通行业发展统计公报》,www.moc.gov.cn/2006/05tongji/t20031117.htm。
③陈东.城市公用事业运营模式改革:以上海为例的研究[J].上海经济研究,2006,11:38-47。
①朱志明.城市供水的政府管制改革研究[J].经济研究参考2003( 25):22-29。
②李猷嘉等.城市燃气行业“十五”技术进步发展规划[J].城市燃气,2002(5):3-12。
③赖元楷等.扩大液化石油气的利用—城市燃气行业“十五”技术进步发展规划子课题[J],城市煤气2001 (10): 3-6。
④数据来源.2003年中国统计年鉴[M] .北京:中国统计出版社。
⑤朱生刚:我国自然垄断产业发展现状及经济影响分析[D].首都经济贸易大学,2006:21。
①黄云鹏.公共服务监管研究——以中国教育、医疗监管为例[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,2008:132
②康红梅.教育支出增长1.26倍农村义务教育已全面纳入财政保障范围》, http://www.bjnw.gov.cn/szyw/t2008 t20080305_173567.html
③李延霞.五年间全国入库税款年均增长23.8%[N].经济参考报,2008-4-2。
④黄云鹏.公共服务监管研究——以中国教育、医疗监管为例[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,2008:189
①王绍光.中国公共卫生的危机与转机比较[M].北京:中信出版社,2003(7):5-7。
②王涛.过渡检查推高医疗成本[N].中国财经报,2006-4-14。
③方智毅.关于公共优效品消费的基本问题[J].南方经济,2005(9):68-71。
④项继权.公共服务均等化:政策目标与制度保障[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版).2008(1):2-9。
⑤高新才.我国公共医疗卫生服务的区域非均等化分析[C].中国公共服务体制:中央与地方.北京:中国经济出版社,2006:68-69。
①参见韩俊、罗丹等:《中国卫生调查》.北京:中国卫生出版社,2007:10。
②项继权.公共服务均等化:政策目标与制度保障[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版).2008(1):2-9.
③郭建军:我国城乡统筹发展的现状、问题和政策建议[C].基本公共服务均等化:新农村建设之重.北京:中国经济出版社,2007:81。
④李学举.《目前全国农村低保人数达2311万温饱为基本标准》http://www.china.com.cn。
⑤刘圆圆:医院门诊费年均上涨l3%卫生部要求杜绝乱收费http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/3331170.html
①参见任俊生,古涛.自然垄断行业国有经济控制力问题研究[J].长白学刊,2005(5):64-67。
①燕峰.中国电力产业的改革与发展[J].理论学刊,2004(3):46-48。
②王俊豪等.中国垄断型产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策[M] .上海:商务印书馆,2006:194-195。
①张卓元.中国国有企业改革30年回顾与展望[M] .北京:人民出版社,2008:159。
②《中国航空运输发展报告(2004/2005)》www.caac.gov.cn
①陈东琪.水务产业是朝阳产业[N].证券时报,2002-7-16。
①参见刘世锦.中国邮政金融体制改革研究[N],中国经济时报,2003年12月1日。
①董辅礽.国有企业改革应从宏观、微观两个层次进行[J].经济研究参考,1999(85):53。
①李培林.国有企业社会成本分析[M] .北京:社会科学文献出版社,2007:15。
①李培林.国有企业社会成本分析[M] .北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2007:79。
②李培林.国有企业社会成本分析[M] .北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2007:25。
①卢洪友.中国城市公共事业经营管制机制研究[M] .北京:经济管理出版社,2007:88。
②朱生刚.我国自然垄断产业发展现状及经济影响分析[D]首都经济贸易大学,2006:21。
①卢洪友.中国城市公共事业经营管制机制研究[M] .北京:经济管理出版社,2007:245。
①郭复初.完善国有资产管理体制问题研究[M].四川成都:西南财经大学出版社,2008:87。
①周耀东.不对称信息与激励性管制选择[J].经济评论,2004(2):37。
①[英]H.L.A哈特.张文显等译.法律的概念[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1996:82-83。
②世界银行、国际金融公司.有关民营企业参与中国基础设施建设的问题和建议[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2001:26。
③曹博.公用企业竞争与管制立法问题探析[J].法学,2002(6):71-73。
①肖炼.美国经济研究[M] .北京:中国友谊出版公司,2007:41。
①赵振元.中外国有企业管理特点比较[J].华东科技,1995(7):4-5。
①仇保兴、王俊豪.中国市政公用事业监管体制研究[M]北京:中国社会科学出版社,2006: 35。
①田虹、王敏.日本公用企业政府规制的借鉴[J].东北亚论坛,2005(7):53-55。
①高德步.世界经济史[M] .北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:145。
②严汉平等.国有经济逻辑边界及战略调整[M] .北京:中国经济出版社,2007:129。
①范合君、柳学信.英国,德国市政公用事业监管的经验及对我国的启示[J].经济与管理研究,2007(8):85。
①郭复初.完善国有资产管理体制问题研究[M] .四川成都:西南财经大学出版社,2008:19。
②刘戒骄.我国公用事业运营和监管改革研究[J].中国工业经济,2006(9):44-50。
①吴金明,荣朝和.基础设施领域国有企业改革新思路[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2007(5):50。
①范合君、王文举.北京市公用事业监管现状、问题及对策,中国政府管制体制改革高层论坛论文集[M] .北京:中国经济出版社,2007:215。
②薜治国、徐启宇、闻力.公用企业垄断模式的非理性成因及立法研究[J].当代法学,2000(1):38。
③薜治国、徐启宇、闻力.公用企业垄断模式的非理性成因及立法研究[J].当代法学,2000(1):40。
①孟德斯鸠著,张雁深译.论法的精神[M] .上海:商务印书馆,1961:156-164。
①张昕竹主编.中国监管与竞争理论和政策[M] .北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000:363。
②Kahn.A.E..The Economics of Regulation:PrimiplesandLnstitutions.[M] NewYork:WlieyPress,1970:23-25.
①于克信.中国国有企业转型过程中的组织管理变革.北京:经济科学出版社,2006:153。
[1] [美]波斯纳:法律的经济分析[M].北京:中国大百科全书出版社,2003:88-89.
[2] [美]考特、尤伦:法和经济学[M].上海:上海三联书店/上海人民出版社,1999.
[3] [日]植草益著,朱绍文等译:微观监管经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1992: 232-285.
[4] [美]丹尼斯·F.史普博著:监管与市场[M].上海:上海三联书店/上海人民出版社,1999.
[5] [美]罗伯特·赖克:国家的作用[M].上海:上海译文出版社,1997.
[6] [美]丹尼尔·W·布罗姆利:经济利益与经济制度—公共政策的理论基础[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1997.
[7] [美]曼瑟尔·奥尔森:集体行动的逻辑[M].上海:上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996.
[8]柯武刚、史漫飞:新制度经济学——社会秩序与公共政策[M].上海:商务印书馆,2001.
[9] [英] C·V·布朗、P·M·杰克逊:公共部门经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2000:28-30,64.
[10] [美]斯蒂格勒茨等:政府为什么干预经济—政府在市场经济中的角色[M].北京:中国物资出版社,1998: 198.
[11] [法]莱昂·狄骥:公法的变迁:法律与国家[M].辽宁:辽海出版社,1999:46.
[12] [日]美浓部达吉,黄冯明译,周旋勘校:公法与私法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2003:24.
[13] [英]米什勒等编,吴柏均等译:世界各国的公营企业[M].辽宁大连:东北财经大学出版社,1991: 105.
[14] H·L·A哈特:法律的概念[M].张文显等译,北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1996: 82-83.
[15] [美]肯尼思·W·克拉克、罗杰·勒鲁瓦·米勒:产业组织:理论、证据和公共政策[M].上海:上海三联出版社,1989.
[16] [美]查里斯·沃尔夫:市场或政府[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2000.
[17] [美]乔·B·史蒂文斯:集体选择经济学[M].上海:上海三联出版社,1999.
[18] [美]丹尼斯·C·缪勒:公共选择理论[M].北京:中国科学出版社,1999.
[19] [日]植草益:微观监管经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1992: 232-285.
[20] [澳]休·史卓顿、莱昂内尔·奥查德:公共产品、公共企业和公共选择[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2000.
[21] [美]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆:多中心治理与发展[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[22] [美]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆:公共事物治理之道[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[23] [美]埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆:制度激励与可持续发展[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[24] [法]孟德斯鸠著,张雁深译:论法的精神[M].上海:商务印书馆,1961: 156-164.
[25] [美]卡尔·帕顿:政策分析和规划的初步方法[M].北京:华夏出版社, 2001.
[26]张昕竹、让·拉丰:网络产业:监管与竞争理论[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000: 233-238.
[27]李晓明:私法的制度价值[M].北京:法律出版社,2007: 39.
[28]张昕竹主编:中国监管与竞争理论和政策[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000: 363.
[29]潘岳主编:中国国有经济总论[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1997:2.
[30]张卓元:中国国有企业改革30年回顾与展望[M].北京:人民出版社,2008:159.
[31]康晓雷:公共产品供给模式的理论分析[M].陕西西安:陕西师范大学出版社,2005.
[32]谢地:自然垄断行业国有经济调整与政府监管改革互动论[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2007.
[33]陈建:政府与市场[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1995.
[34]吴大英:西方国家政府制度剖析[M].北京:经济管理出版社,1996.
[35]世界银行:世界银行共享收入的增长—中国收入问题研究[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,1998.
[36]世界银行:官办企业问题研究——国有经济改革的经济学和政治学[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,1997.
[37]李成威:公共产品的需求与供给:评价与激励[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005.
[38]黄有光:福利经济学[M].重庆:中国友谊出版社,1991.
[39]樊丽明:中国公共产品市场与自愿供给的分析[M].上海:上海人民出版社2005.
[40]卢锋:中国经济转型与经济政策—北京大学中国经济研究中心简报汇编[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2004.
[41]王继军:公法与私法的现代诠释[M].北京:法律出版社,2008.
[42]徐茂魁:国有经济论[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1998: 21.
[43]郑秉文:市场缺陷分析[M].沈阳:辽宁人民出版社,1993:208.
[44]高鸿业主编:西方经济学与我国经济体制改革[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社1996: 235.
[45]徐武:中国国有经济的实现形式和路径选择[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2005:22.
[46]王俊豪等著:中国垄断型产业结构重组分类管制与协调政策[M].上海:商务印书馆,2005: 3-12.
[47]李国鼎,台湾的企业经营与管理[M].江苏南京:东南大学出版社,1996: 264.
[48]陆军荣:国有企业的产业特质—国际经验及治理启示[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008: 47.
[49]国务院国有资产监督管理委员会研究室编:探索与研究-国有资产监管和国有企业改革研究报告[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2006: 69.
[50]严汉平等:国有经济逻辑边界及战略调整[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2007: 129.
[51]李培林:国有企业社会成本分析[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2007: 15.
[52]郭复初:完善国有资产管理体制问题研究[M].四川成都:西南财经大学出版社,2008: 19.
[53]刘溶沧、赵志耕:中国财政理论前沿Ⅲ[M].北京:社会科学出版社,2003.
[54]毛寿龙:有限政府的经济分析[M].上海:上海三联书店,2000.
[55]顾建光:公共政策分析学[M].上海:上海人民出版社, 2004.
[56]卡布尔,于立等译:产业经济学前沿问题[M].北京:中国税务出版社,2000.
[57]王俊豪:中国政府监管体制改革研究[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[58]张昕竹等:网络产业:监管与竞争理论[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000.
[59]余晖:政府与企业:从宏观管理到微观监管[M].福建福州:福建人民出版社,1997.
[60]张昕竹:中国规制与竞争理论和政策[M] .北京:社会科学文献出版社,2000:233-238.
[61]高培勇,崔军:公共部门经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2004:57.
[62] [美]曼昆:经济学原理[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1999:325.
[63]植草益著:朱绍文等译.微观规制经济学[M].北京:中国发展出版社,1992:232-285.
[64]马国贤:中国公共支出与预算政策[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2001:362.
[65]任俊生:中国公用产品价格管制[M].北京:经济管理出版社,2002:37.
[66]曹阳:网络型公用企业竞争的法律监管[M].北京:法律出版社,2007:33-34.
[67] [英]霍布斯著,黎思复,黎延弼译:利维坦[M].上海:商务印书馆,1997:365.
[68] [英]休谟著,关文运译:人性论(上册)[M] .上海:商务印书馆,1997:561.
[69] [英]斯密著,杨敬年译:《国富论》(上卷)[M],陕西:陕西人民出版社,2001,356.
[70] [美]安东尼·阿特金森、约瑟夫·斯蒂格里茨.公共经济学(中文版) [M].上海:上海三联书店,1992:643-648.
[71]于光远主编:经济大辞典(下册) [M].上海:上海辞书出版社1992:1345.
[72]樊纲:渐进改革的政治经济学分析[M].上海:上海远东出版社1996:204.
[73]褚保一、张幼文:当代帝国主义经济[M].安徽:安徽人民出版社,1985:40.
[74]高德步:世界经济史[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2001:266.
[75]马克思恩格斯选集,第一卷[M].北京:人民出版社,1972 :272.
[76]芮明杰:国有控股公司运行与管理[M].山东:山东人民出版社, 1999:18.
[77]亚当·斯密:国民财富的性质和原因研究,下卷[M].上海:商务印书馆,1974:252.
[78]凯恩斯:就业、利息和货币通论[M] .上海:商务印书馆,1963:321.
[79]李怀:自然垄断理论研究[M].辽宁大连:东北财经大学出版社,2003:27-30.
[80] [美]克鲁斯克·B·M·杰克逊:公共政策词典[M].上海:上海译文出版社, 1988: 27.
[81] [美]博登海默,邓正来译:法理学——法律哲学与法律方法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,1999:185.
[82]约翰·维克斯,康晓红等译;私有化的经济学分析[M] .重庆:重庆出版社,2006:329.
[83]经济合作与发展组织. OECD国有企业公司治理指引[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2005:55.
[84]王晓晔:竞争法研究[M].北京:中国法制出版社,1999:23.
[85]世界银行.1994年世界银行发展报告—为发展提供基础设施[M].北京:中国经济财政出版社,1994.
[86]亚当·斯密:国民财富的性质及原因研究(上卷)[M] .上海:商务印书馆,2005:356.
[87] [美]罗尔斯著,何怀宏等译:正义论[M] .北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001:292.
[88]黄云鹏:公共服务监管研究—以中国教育、医疗监管为例[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008:85.
[89] [加]威尔·金里卡:当代政治哲学[M] .上海:上海三联书店,2004.
[90] [美]米尔顿·弗里德曼、罗斯·弗里德曼:自由选择[M] .上海:商务印书馆,1982:152.
[91]加雷斯·D·迈尔斯:公共经济学[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社, 2001:22-24.
[92] [美]哈尔·瓦里安:微观经济学(高级教程第三版)[M] .北京:经济科学出版社,1997:135.
[93]斯蒂格利茨:政府经济学[M].北京:春秋出版杜,1988:2.
[94]肖志兴:公用事业市场化与规制模式转型[M].北京:中国财政经济出版社,2008:196.
[95]王绍光:中国公共卫生的危机与转机比较[M].北京:中信出版社,2003,7:5-7.
[96]卢洪友:中国城市公共事业经营管制机制研究[M] .北京:经济管理出版社,2007:88.
[97]肖炼:美国经济研究[M] .北京:中国友谊出版公司,2007:41.
[98]范合君、王文举:北京市公用事业监管现状、问题及对策,中国政府管制体制改革高层论坛论文集[M] .北京:中国经济出版社,2007:215.
[99]张冀湘:论国有控股公司的政府功能[J].中国工业经济,1996(1): 11-15.
[100]洪银兴:政府干预效率的经济学分析[J].江苏行政学院学报,2003(2):40-47.
[101]平新乔:中国国有资产控制方式与控制力的现状[J].经济社会体制比较,2003(4):61-66.
[102]洪银兴:政府干预市场的效率和规则[J].山西大学学报(哲社版),2003(1):1-9.
[103]王晓奇:中央企业购有经济布局与结构调整地思考[J].国有资产管理,2004(3):15-18.
[104]杰斐逊:(美):中国的国有经济:公共产品、外在化和科斯理论[J].国外社会科学文摘,1998(5):24-25.
[105]吴俊培、卢洪友:公共品德“公”、“私”供给效率制度安排—一个理论假说[J].经济学评论,2004(4):33-38.
[106]吕恒立:“入世”条件下我国政府经济监管变革[J].政治学研究,2002(7):44-49.
[107]陈富良:利益集团博弈与监管均衡[J].当代财经,2004(1):24-30.
[108]雷晓康:政府直接生产公共产品的理论分析[J].西北大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005(1):108-111.
[109]陈武平:公共产品成本的一种分配机制及其试验验证[J].厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2000(1):70-74.
[110]樊丽明:美国非赢利组织公共品供给分析[J].经济学动态,2002(10):33-39.
[111]贺雪峰、罗兴佐:论农村公共物品供给中的均衡[J].经济学家,2006(1):63-70.
[112]贾明德、雷晓康:市场机制与公共产品的提供模式[J].上海经济,2002(9):27-29.
[113]李郁芳:政府公共品供给行为的外部性探析[J].南方经济,2005(6):23-25.
[114]刘志铭:公共产品的私人提供与合作生产:理论的扩展[J].生产力研究,2004(3):33-38.
[115]曲创、臧旭恒:消费的机会成本与公共物品的有效供给[J].消费经济2004(4):4-7.
[116]徐传谌、张万成:国有经济存在的理论依据[J].吉林大学学报(社会科学版),2002(5): 37-45.
[117]于立等:自然垄断理论演进综述[J].经济学动态,2000(6): 70-73.
[118]戚聿东、边文霞、周斌:我国国有经济规模的合理区间探讨[J].当代财经,2008(8): 47-50.
[119]孙国华、杨思斌:公私法的划分与法的内在结构[J].法制与社会发展,2004(4): 100-109.
[120]郑德光:公私法理论争议[J].韶关学院学报(社会科学版),2001(7): 37-40.
[121]袁曙宏:通过公法变革优化服务[J].国家行政学院学报, 2004(5): 33-38.
[122]杨力:试论国家作为私法主体的理论依据[J].宁夏党校学报,2003(5): 27-32.
[123]谢增毅:宏观调控法基本原则新论[J].厦门大学学报,2003(5): 62-68.
[124]朱志明:城市供水的政府管制改革研究[J].经济研究参考2003(25): 22-29.
[125]李闽榕:关于公平与效率的争论及其启示[J].经济学动态,2005(2): 58.
[126]曹博:公用企业竞争与管制立法问题探析[J].法学,2002(6): 71-73.
[127]周耀东:不对称信息与激励性管制选择[J].经济评论,2004(2): 37.
[128]徐理结:新农村建设与农村公共产品投入机制创新[J].经济研究参考2007(10):15-21.
[129]孙钰:公共物品经营效率研究[J].南开经济研究,1999(6):22-27.
[130]陈小安:我国准公共产品垄断与竞争性供给改革[J].经济体制改革,2006(5):22-26.
[131]王序坤:准公共产品提供方式选择的依据[J].山东财政学院学报,1999(6):20-23.
[132]崔国胜、唐忠:蒂布特模型启迪下的可流动公共产品供给[J].中国人民大学学报2006(4):95-99.
[133]冯秋雁:国企改革的新视角:公共物品的外部性及修正[J].经济师,2000(3):34-35.
[134]周燕、梁樑：国外公共物品多元化供给研究综述[J].经济纵横,2006(2):76-78.
[135]张高旗:准公共物品分类探讨[J].延安大学学报(社会科学版) ,2006(6):60-62.
[136]卢洪友:中国公共品供给制度变迁与制度创新[J].财政研究,2003(3):11-13.
[137]卢洪友:公共品生产的市场化与制度创新[J].中央财经大学学报,2002(4): 34-40.
[138]吕达:公共产品的私人供给机制研究[J].天津师范大学学报张,2002(2):11-16.
[139]张耀辉:产业发展中的公共产品作用[J].暨南大学学报(哲学社会科学版,2006(4):47-51.
[140]陈小安:准公共产品竞争性供给改革分析框架[J].中央财经大学学报,2006(11):18-23.
[141]孙钰、姚晓东:中国城市公共产品市场化运营的路径选择[J].东北财经大学学报,2001(2):33-38.
[142]吴伟:西方公共产品理论的最新进展[J].财贸经济,2004(4):18-23.
[143]彭积敷:论城市准公共物品的合理提供[J].经济经纬,2005(3):76-78.
[144]禹来、昌智:国有企业的公共物品性质分析[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2002(3):34-38.
[145]崔国胜,唐忠:蒂布特模型启迪下的可流动公共产品供给[J].中国人民大学学报,2006(4):95-99.
[146]熊巍:公共产品供给次优论[J].经济研究参考,2002(79):11-12.
[147]陈东琪:“公”、“私”配置与公共产品生产[J].东北财经大学学报,1999(1): 16-26.
[148]陈宏平:市场结构的动态性与政府监管对策[J].经济评论,2001(1):65-68.
[149]肖兴志:自然垄断型国企改革的战略思考[J].改革,2001(3):12-18.
[150]肖兴志:中国自然垄断产业监管改革模式研究[J].中国工业经济,2002(4):18-23.
[151]于立:肖兴志:自然垄断理论演进综述[J].经济学动态2000(6): 70-73.
[152]肖志兴:美英日自然垄断产业改革的共性研究[J].中国工业经济,2001(8):50-55.
[153]任俊生:论准公共产品的本质特征和范围变化.[J]吉林大学学报(社会科学版),2005(5):54-59.
[154]张馨:公共产品发展论之沿革[J].财政研究,1995(3):26-32.
[155]邓淑莲:国外基础设施私有化及其效率研究[J].《世界经济研究》,2001(1):49-52.
[156]王国清:非公有资本与基础设施有效供给[J].《当代财经》,2004(7):53-57.
[157]王磊:公共产品第三部门供给的国内外研究综述[J].中国石油大学学报(社会科学版),2007(2):45-48.
[158]李建平:我国公用事业价格形成机制问题研究[J].财贸经济,2002(7):22-26.
[159]邱勇:国有经济范围与规模研究[J].亚太经济,1997(3):23-29.
[160]宫希魁:用新视角审读国有经济问题[J].财经问题研究,2001(1):11-17.
[161]罗卫东:西方国有企业管理模式分析与比较[J].浙江经济,1996(9):58-64.
[162]李华:发达国家对国有经济管理的经验借鉴[J].经济社会体制比较,2001(4):48-53.
[163]刘春勤:意大利的国家控股公司[J].中国工业经济,1995(2):72-77.
[164]杨丽芳:西方国家管理国有企业的实践与特点[J].财务与会计,2002(6):48-50.
[165]叶祥松:美国国有企业管理体制对我国国有企业管理体制改革的启示[J].世界经济与政治,1996(7):64-67.
[166]杨浩:国有控股公司的性质和成因分析[J].中国纺织经济.1999(4):23-26.
[167]程恩富:国有控股公司:成因、产权关系与治理结构-国有制实现形式和国有资本运行模式分析[J].学术季刊.1998(2):13-22.
[168]徐传谌,杨洁:国有经济股权融合方式分析[J].长白学刊.2002(3):62-64.
[169]王晓晔:公用企业滥用优势地位行为的法律规制[J].法学杂志,2005(1):29-31.
[170]文学国:我国法律对滥用市场优势地位之规制[J].上海交通大学学报(社科版),2003(2):29-33.
[171]吴金明、荣朝和:基础设施领域国有企业改革新思路[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版)2007(10):45.
[172]吴金明、荣朝和:论公共提供制度安排及法律调整模式[J].中国软件科学,2004(4):18-24.
[173]刘穷志:国有控股公司功能定位[J].经济管理,2003(4):93-96.
[174]卡尔多.:经济学的福利命题和个人间效用的比较[J].经济学杂志,1939(9):5:50.
[175] [美]莱宾斯坦:配置效率与“x效率”[J].美国经济评论,1966(3):35-40.
[176]赵宝廷:从公共品定义的视角看公共品供给效率问题[J].求索,2006(6):35-36.
[177]陈东:城市公用事业运营模式改革:以上海为例的研究[J].上海经济研究,2006,11:38-47.
[178]李猷嘉等:城市燃气行业“十五”技术进步发展规划[J].城市燃气,2002,5:3-12.
[179]赖元楷等:扩大液化石油气的利用—城市燃气行业“十五”技术进步发展规划子课题[J],城市煤气2001(10):3-6.
[180]方智毅:关于公共优效品消费的基本问题[J].南方经济,2005(9):68-71.
[181]项继权:公共服务均等化:政策目标与制度保障[J].华中师范大学学报(人文社会科学版).2008(1):2-9.
[182]任俊生,古涛:自然垄断行业国有经济控制力问题研究[J].长白学刊,2005(5):64-67.
[183]燕峰:中国电力产业的改革与发展[J].理论学刊,2004,3:46-48.
[184]董辅礽:国有企业改革应从宏观、微观两个层次进行[J].经济研究参考,1999(85):53.
[185]赵振元:中外国有企业管理特点比较[J].华东科技,1995(7):4-5.
[186]范合君、柳学信:英国,德国市政公用事业监管的经验及对我国的启示[J].经济与管理研究,2007,8:85.
[187]刘戒骄:我国公用事业运营和监管改革研究[J].中国工业经济,2006年9:44-50.
[188]薜治国、徐启宇、闻力:公用企业垄断模式的非理性成因及立法研究[J].当代法学,2000(1):38.
[189] From .Studies in Public Regulation .Cambridge [M].MA: MIT Press, 1981.
[190] Stone D. Policy Paradox [M]. New York: Norton& Company, Inc., 2002.
[191] Hood C. The Tools of Government [M].London: Macmilan, 1983.
[192] Conley J.P and M.Wooders. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods [M]. London: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
[193] Viscusi W.K. J.M. Vernon J.E. Harrington .Economics of Regulation and Antitrust [M].Massachusetts:The MIT Press, 1995.
[194] Tollison R.D. Regulation and Interest Groups , in Regulation—Economics and History[M]. Michigan: Michigan Press,1991:99-102.
[195] Utton.M.A. The Economics of Regulation Industry [M]. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986:88-93.
[196] Olson Mancur .The Logic of Collective Action[M]. Boston : Harvard University Press,1965:184-196.
[197] Crew M. A. P. R. Kleindorfer .The Economics of Public Utility Regulation [M].London: The Macmilian Press,1986.
[198] Little child. Regulation of British Telecommunications Profitability [M].London:HMSO,1983.
[199] Armstrong M. S. Cowan and J. Vickers. Regulatory reform .Economic analysis and British experience[M]. MA :The MIT Press,1994.
[200] CrewM.A.P.R.Kleindorfer.TheEconomicsofPublicUtilityRegulation[M].London:The Macmilian Press,1986;216:234.
[201] Demsetz. The Private Production of Public Goods and Market Failure[M]. Chicago:Transaction Publicshers,1992.
[202] Gidron R.Salmon Government and The Third Sector[M]. SanFrancisco:Jossey Bass Publisher,1993.
[203] Lawrence J. White. U.S Public Policy Toward Network Industries[M]. N.Y.:AEI-Brookings Joint Center,1999.
[204] ReesR.APositiveTheoryofThePublicEnterprise[M].Bonn:M.Marchand ,P.Pestieau and H.Tulkens .eds,1984;124-156.
[205] Paul S.and A. Israel Nongovernmental Organizations and the World Bank[M].The World Bank,1991.
[206] V. Ostrom & E.Ostrom: Public goods and public choices in Alternatives for Delivering Public Services: Toward Inproved Performance[M]. Oxford :Westview Press,1977: 30-45.
[207] D.L. Weimer A.R. ViningPolicy Analysis : Concepts and Practice .Englewood Cliffs[M]. New Jersey:NJ Pretice-Hall,1992:46.
[208] Vscui.w.kip Vernon Johu M. and Harrington .Joseph E Economies of Regulation and antitrust[M].Boston:MIT,2000: 453-457.
[209] E.S Savas. Privatization and Pulib-Private Partnership[M]. NY: New York Press,2000: 29.
[210] Ellickson B.Grodal. S. Scotchmer and W. Zame. Clubs and Market: Continuum Economies[R]. UCLA Working Paper,1997.
[211] Hadi Salehi Esfahami. What Determines the Extent of Pulic Ownership? [R].SSRN Working Paper Series No.396121,2002(4)
[212] Besley Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. Public Private Partnerships in the Provision of Public Goods[R]. Development Economics Discussion Paper Series No.17.
[213] Ghatak Maitreya. Relationship between the Government[R]. NGOS and Panchayati Raj in West Bengal, Working Paper, IMSE.
[214] Glaeser Edward L and A ndrei Shleifer. Not-For-Profit Entreneurs[R]. Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Paper No. 1852.
[215] Sen, S.Defining the Nonprofit Sector: India[R]. Working Papers of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project,1993,No.12.
[216] Besley.Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. Public Private Partnerships in the Provision of Public Goods : Theory and Application to NGOs[R]. Develop-ment Economics Discussion Paper , STICERD, London School of Economics,1999 No.17.
[217] Grantt.ZAH. Financial Performance of Government Owned Corporations in Less Developed Countries[R]. Staff Paper 1968(3)
[218] Deepak Lal. Private Provision of Public Goods and Services[R]. UCLA Dept. of Economics Working Paper No758,1996(10).
[219] P.K.Else T J James. Privatisation and The Quality of Rail Services[R]. Ttansportation Research ,1995(A 35).
[220] Ferrouccio Ponzano.Optimal Privision of Public Goods under Imperfect Intergovermental Competition[R]. POLIS woking paper 50.
[221] Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak. Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods[J].The Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001(4):23-27.
[222] Champsaur P. How to Share the Cost of a Public Good[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 1975(4):14-37.
[223] Milleron J.C. Theory of Value with Public Goods; A Survey Article[J].Journal of Economic Theory,1975(5):22-36.
[224] Makoto Tawada. The Production Possibility Set with Public Intermediate Goods[J].Econometrica,1980(4):54-67.
[225] Burton Mark L. Railroad Deregulation, Carrier Behavior and Shipper Response[J].Journal of Regulatory Economics,1995(5).
[226] MacDonald. Railroad Deregulation, Innovation and Competition[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1989(4):88-97.
[227] Werden Gregory. The Law and Economics of the Essential Facilities Doctrine[J].St.Louis University Law Review,1988(32).
[228] Wilson Wesley W. Market-Specific Effects of Rail Deregulation [J]. Journal of Industrial Economics,1994(3).
[229] Gerald R. Faulhaber .Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises[J].The American Economic Review,1975(5).
[230] Tsung-Sheng Tsai. Private Privision of Public Goods Under Delegated Common Agency[J].Economics Bulletin,2005(8).
[231] Buchanan J . An Economic Theory of Clubs[J].Economica,1965(32): 1-14.
[232] Bagolin M and B.Lipman. Private Privision of Public Goods can be Efficient[J].Public Choice,1992(74).
[233] Mari Rege. Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods[J]. Journalof Public Economic Theory, 2004(6).
[234] Andrei Shleifer. Politications and Firms[J].Journal of Economics ,1994(11).
[235] Marmolo.E.A. A Constitutional Theory of Public Goods[J].Journal of Economic Behavior&Organization,1999(38).
[236] Chamberlin. Provision of Collective Goods as a Function of Group Size[J].American political science review,1974(64).
[237] Hansmann .H The Role of Nonprofit Enterprises [J].Yale Law Journal , 1980(89).
[238] Keithl Dougherty. Public Goods Theory from Eighteenth Century Political Philosophy to Twentieth Century Economics[J].Public Choice , 2003(7).
[239] Bartel R and F. Schneider. The Mess of Public Industrial Production in Austria: A Typical Case of Public Sector Inefficiency[J].Public Choice,1991(68).
[240] Bruno De Borger. The Behavior of Public Enterprises Offering a Quasi-Public Goods [J].European Journal of Polictical Economy, 1995 (11).
[241] Martimort D. The Multi principal Nature of Government[J].European Economic Review,1996(40).
[242] Duggal R. NGOs. Government and Private Sector in Health[J].The Economic and Political Weekly of India,1988(3).
[243] Fowler A. The Role of NGOs in Changing State-Society Relations; Perspectives from Eastern and Southern Africa[J]. Development Policy Review,1991(9).
[244] Osborne.Martin and Al Slivinski. A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996,106(1) .
[245] Besley.Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001(4).
[246] Francois, P. Public service motivation as an argument for govern-ment provision [J].Journal of Public Economics, 2000(7).
[247] Francois P. Not-for-proot provision of public services [J]. Economic Journal,2003(11).
[248] Jmaes M.Buchana an economic theory of clubs [J].Economica , 1965(32): p1-14.
[249] P.A.Samuelson The pure of theory of public expenditure[J]. Review ofEconomic and Statistics, 1954 (11) :p387-389.
[250] Blundel.R . Consumer Behaviour . Theory and Emperical Evidence[J]. Economic Journal, 1990,vol.100:48.
[251] Tullock Gordon. Provision of Public goods through privation [J].Kyklos,1996 (2): 221-224.
[252] James Andreoni . Impure altruism and donations to public goods :a theory of warm-glow giving[J].The Economic Journal, 1990,100:p464-477.
[253] Sugden R.Reciprocity. The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions[J].Economic Journal, 1984:772-787.
[254] Vogelsang I.and J. Finsinger. A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms[J].Bell Journal of Economics, 1979(10).
[255] Becker G. S A .Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1983(8) .
[256] Hettich W.and S. L.Winer .Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure [J].American Economic Review,1988(9) .
[257] Magat W.Introduction. Managing the Transition to Deregulation [J].Law and Contemporary Problems,1981(44).
[258] Peltzman S.Toward a More General Theory of Regulation [J].Journal of Law and Economics,1976(8).
[259] PosnerR.A.TheoriesofEconomicRegulation[J].BellJournalof Economics,1974(5) .
[260] Stigler G. J.and C. Friedland. What can the Regulators Regulate:The Case of Electricity [J],Journal of Law and Economics,1962.
[261] Stigler G. J. The Theory of Economic Regulation [J]. Bell Journal of Economicss, 1971(2).