摘要
发展高新技术产业是我国的一项长期性基本国策,是构建21世纪我国竞争优势和核心竞争力的重要战略。高新技术产业是高投入、高回报和高风险的产业,其特点决定了传统投资方式难以满足它的发展需要。风险投资业在发达国家的实践业已证明,风险投资的发展在促进一国高科技的发展、强化工业基础、调整产业结构、提高经济竞争力以及推进就业等方面具有不可替代的作用。发展风险投资已成为在二十一世纪知识经济以及全球化的挑战下,提高我国企业竞争力,提升高技术产业发展水平和促进国民经济健康、迅速发展的关键举措。
我国风险投资由于起步较晚,经过近20年时间的努力,虽然在实践上和理论上都得到了迅速发展,但与发达国家相比仍处于初始阶段,风险投资面临的风险和不确定性更大、更具复杂性,目前我国风险投资发展缓慢,问题重重,比如,在宏观层面上,法律保障体系不完善,资本退出障碍不顺畅,信用体系缺失等;在微观层面上,风险企业内、外部存在着巨大的“资本”和“技术”间的信息不对称,风险投资行为短期化严重,风险资本收益率低,风险投资主体投资决策非理性因素多、科学性差;风险企业创业成功率普遍偏低等等。这些问题的出现,已经严重制约了风险投资在我国的发展,也逐渐成为国内经济学、管理学和金融学界的研究热点。
本文正是在这一背景下,通过回顾风险投资理论与方法的发展历程,分析了风险投资的内涵和特征,通过实证调查,分析了影响我国风险投资业发展的主要困难和障碍,运用委托代理理论,研究了参与风险投资的主体之间的博弈过程,探讨了风险投资机构向风险企业提供增值服务的方式和内容,并就风险资本退出方式和退出时机等问题通过建立数学模型进行了研究。
本文的主要研究成果和创新性主要体现在以下几个方面:
1.提出了一个包括风险投资发展的宏观环境分析、风险投资参与主体的博弈分析和动力机制、风险投资的增值服务安排、风险投资的退出时机和退出方式选择等在内的完整的研究框架,对风险资本运作各个阶段的主要规律进行了完整而深入的探讨。
2.在充分占有现有研究成果的基础上,运用对比研究,建立影响我国风险投资业发展的宏观环境因素假设,并以风险投资家(风险投资机构经理)为主要调查对象,通过问卷调查和实证分析,提炼出影响我国风险投资业发展的宏观环境风险因素以及对以上因素的改善建议,有助于我国风险投资实践的发展。
3.运用委托代理理论,研究了投资者、风险投资家(代表风险投资机构)和风险企业家(代表风险企业)之间的博弈,投资者、风险投资家和风险企业家基于个体效用最大化原则参与风险资本运作,并进行相应的策略选择。论文在已有研究成果的基础上,重新设计了有关各方参与博弈的预期收益和效用函数,并创造性的将三者博弈分为两个层次,第一个层次研究投资者与风险投资家之间以及风险投资家与风险企业家之间的博弈,主要包括基于道德风险的基本博弈、基于声誉效用的重复博弈以及在各种策略下双方的完整博弈;第二个层次,对投资者与风险投资家之间以及风险投资家与风险企业家之间的博弈进行了综合分析,研究了两个基本博弈之间的相互作用,尤其对影响两个博弈过程的共同要素进行了探讨,分析如何进行相关制度设计和安排以更好的促进各方均衡解的达成。
4.从管理服务、资源整合服务、战略规划服务等三个角度探讨风险投资家如何向风险企业提供适合其自身需要的增值服务,同时针对目前对风险投资家增值服务水平只停留在定性评价或简单的定量评价这一问题,运用属性综合评价方法应用于风险投资家增值服务水平的评价领域。建立了针对风险投资家增值服务水平评价指标体系,运用属性综合评价方法,结合具体案例进行了计算与分析。
5.在分析风险资本退出的主要方式及其特点基础上,运用实物期权理论,通过引入可观察的财务指标——利润流,作为风险资本退出的内生变量建立决策模型,研究了风险资本退出的最佳方式和最优时机。
High-tech investment, or venture investment is called the“engine”to enhance enterprise develop and economic advancement. The developing history of venture investment has been verified that it can play crucial role in enhancing development of high-tech, strengthening of industry basis, adjustment of industry structure and economic competitive ability. It is urgent for China to develop VI in era of globalization.
Venture investment starts up later in China compared to developed countries, and after 20 years of development, we have made much progress in venture investment. At the same time, it also demonstrates a lot of problem both in macro angel such as lack of law insurance system, obstacle in venture capital exit and lack of credit system and in micro angles such as information asymmetry, short-term behaviors in venture investment, low reciprocating rate of venture capital and wrong decisions in venture investment. Those problems have greatly impacted the development of venture investment in China and also have become the hot topic in scholar field.
Under these circumstances, this dissertation retrospect the developing history of venture investment theory and practice, analyzes the meaning as well as characteristics of venture investment, discusses the key obstacles to hinder development of venture investment and making use of principal-agent theory, study the game among participants in venture investment. In the end, this dissertation discusses the mode and content of value-added service and studies the exit mode and exit opportunity of venture capital.
The most significant results and innovations are as follows:
Firstly, this paper puts forward a systematic research framework including external environment factors, game among participants in venture investment, value-added service arrangement, exit mode and exit opportunity of venture capital, and deeply discusses the key phases of venture investment operation.
Secondly, making use of contrasting research, this paper builds up macro environment factors hypothesis, and by sending out questionnaire, carries out empirical analysis to find out the 21 macro factors which can impact the development of venture investment in China.
Thirdly, this paper making use of principal-agent theory, studies the game among investors, risk investors and risk entrepreneurs. All of them participate in the game and choose proper measures based on maximizing individual utility. Based on current literature, this paper reconstructs the income function and utility function and divides the game into two arrangements. The first arrange include the game between investors and risk investors and also the game between risk investors and risk entrepreneurs, and both game include moral hazard game, repeated game based on reputation effect and the complete game. The second arrange take those two games as a whole, discusses the inter-dependence of those two games, analyze the common elements to impact both games and points out how to carry out rule arrangement to better enhance the equilibrium of the games.
Fourthly, this paper discusses how to provide proper value-added service by risk investors. The provision of value-added service includes management, resource integration and strategy planning. At the same time, this paper makes use of attribute comprehensive evaluation method to evaluate the value-added service level provided by risk investors and builds up the evaluation index system.
Finally, making use of real option theory, this paper introduces the observably financial index, profit flow and builds up the model to help decide the optimal exit mode and time.
引文
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