摘要
随着信息全球化和市场竞争的加剧，导致产品的生命周期越来越短以及产品的复杂度不断提高，从而对企业的创新能力要求越越来越高，为了充分利用外部资源、降低创新风险、分担创新成本，企业选择与相关的其他企业一起进行合作开发，以集体优势赢得市场竞争。合作创新能够有效的实现研发的规模经济，使合作伙伴从中获得对他们的生存和成长来说所需要的互补资源，但同时也会带来新的合作风险。如果参与合作的成员不能或不愿提供创新所需的资源，或者在合作伙伴的投资基础上“搭便车”，而合作伙伴在预测其他成员会“搭便车”时首先选择减少提供资源，进而导致合作创新陷入“恶性循环”，这些因素将使前面所提到的潜在优势消失，并且会在一定程度上导致合作创新的失败。因此，对合作创新中成员企业在一定的环境因素下的研发投入情况进行深入研究，从而识别出成员的投资意愿对提高合作创新成功率具有一定的现实意义。
本文结合合作创新理论，运用文献、博弈论和仿真等研究方法对供应商参与合作创新的研发投入行为进行了较为系统的研究，主要研究内容有：
（1）通过建立一个供应商与一个生产商进行合作创新的博弈模型，研究供应商和生产商进行有效合作时，企业的研发投入量、利润、消费者剩余和社会福利在三种合作模式下的差异，以此来探讨企业对合作模式的选择问题。
（2）通过建立多个同质供应商与一个生产商进行合作创新的博弈模型，研究了四种合作模式下，横向和纵向研发溢出、供应商的参与个数等因素对企业研发投入的影响，以此来探讨企业在不同合作模式下为提高其研发投入量而需要采取的相应措施。
（3）对存在市场风险的供应商参与合作创新构建博弈模型，研究参与创新的供应商数目、供应商分配中间产品的方式以及新产品效用函数的形式等因素对合作成员的研发投入以及供应商研发总量和供应链研发总量的影响，以此来探讨合作创新过程中对合作伙伴以及合作方式的选择问题。
（4）建立了考虑产品核心价值的供应商参与合作创新博弈模型，探讨当生产商处于产品创新的核心地位时，收益分配方式、市场规模以及生产商和供应商的相对资本规模等因素对供应商和生产商的研发投入意愿的影响。
（5）对供应商和生产商之间存在研发溢出的合作创新建立博弈模型，探讨了溢出效率、企业创新能力、企业对溢出的吸收能力等因素对供应商和生产商的研发投入意愿的影响，还进一步探讨了按研发投入比例分配收益时资本测量的相对准确度对合作研发的期望投入的影响。
通过研究，本文得出如下结论：
（1）在供应商和生产商进行有效合作时，研发投入量随着合作紧密程度的增加而增加，即共谋研发模式大于协作研发模式、协作研发模式大于非联盟研发模式。
（2）纵向溢出对提高供应商和生产商的研发投入量有正效应，而横向溢出对研发投入量的影响与合作模式和市场结构相关。
（3）参与创新的供应商个数越多，供应商和生产商的研发投入量越少，但是就供应商和生产商的总研发投入量来看，选择正确的合作对象和分配方式时也能使总研发投入量保持在较高的水平。
（4）当生产商处于产品创新的核心地位时，有很大的概率会将其全部资本投入研发，而供应商在市场收益较低以及平分收益时具有较高的“搭便车”意愿，随着市场收益的增加或者采用按比例分配收益，其投入全部资本的意愿将迅速上升。
With the globalization of information and market competition intensifies, productlife cycles are getting shorter, and products are more complex. Enterprises need to bemore innovative. So they chose to cooperate with other enterprises for using of externalresources, reducing innovation risk, sharing the cost of innovation, and win thecompetition in the market by collective advantage. Cooperation innovation can achieveeconomies of scale, and partners can obtain complementary resources that can helpthem survive and grow, but it will also bring new risks of cooperation. These factorsmake the aforementioned potential advantage disappears, and to some extent, lead to thefailure of cooperation innovation, if partners are unable or unwilling to provide theresources needed for innovation, or partners may free ride on other member’ R&Dinvestment, and partners will first choose to reduce the provision of resources, this willlead to cooperation innovation into a vicious circle. So it has certain practicalsignificance to improve the success rate of cooperative innovation through depth studyof member companies in a certain environment factors R&D investment case andidentify the members’ the willingness to invest.
This dissertation uses measures such as literature research, game theory, simulationstudy and so on to study systematically partners’ behavior of R&D investment ofsuppliers to participate in collaborative innovation. The main contents of this paper areas follows:
(1) A game model with one supplier and one manufacturer for cooperationinnovation is created to study the difference under three cooperation modes of theamount of R&D investment, profits, consumer surplus and social welfare in thecondition of effective cooperation, then discusses the selection problem of enterprise tocooperation model.
(2) A game model with homogeneous multi-suppliers and one manufacturer forcooperation innovation is created to study the effect of horizontal and vertical spillovers,the number of suppliers involved on partner’s R&D investment, then discusses thatenterprises need to take corresponding measures to improve their R&D inputs undercooperation in different modes.
(3) A game model that suppliers take part in cooperation innovation with market risk is created to study the effect of the number of suppliers involved, the methods ofsuppliers to distribute intermediate goods, and new products' form of the utility functionon partners' R&D investment, and suppliers' total R&D investment, and supply chain'stotal R&D investment, then discusses the selection problem of partners and cooperationmode in cooperation innovation process.
(4) A game model that suppliers take part in cooperation innovation considered thecore values of product is created to study the effect of income distribution, market size,and manufacturers and suppliers of capital relative to the size and other factors when themanufacturer is at the core of product innovation on suppliers and manufacturers’ R&Dinvestment willingness.
(5) A game model with suppliers and manufacturers for cooperation innovationexisted spillovers is created to study the effect of spillover efficiency, enterprise'sinnovation ability, and enterprise's absorption capacity to the spillover on the suppliersand manufacturers’ R&D investment willingness, then discusses the effect of measurethe relative accuracy of the capital on Expected investment of R&D cooperation underproportional profit sharing.
The dissertation comes out with these main conclusions:
(1) In the condition of effective cooperation, suppliers and manufacturers’ R&Dinvestment increase with the increase of degree of cooperation, namely, collusion R&Dmodel is greater than collaborative R&D model, and collaborative R&D model isgreater than non-alliance R&D model.
(2) An increase in vertical spillovers always increases suppliers and manufacturers’R&D investment, but the effect of horizontal spillovers on R&D investment is related tocooperation model and market structure.
(3) The number of suppliers are more, the suppliers and manufacturers’ R&Dinvestment are less. But in the point of suppliers and manufacturers’ total R&Dinvestment, the right choice of partners and distribution method can maintain the totalR&D investment at a high level.
(4) When the manufacturer is at the core of product innovation, it has a greatprobability to put its all capital into R&D. Suppliers have higher "free rider" willingnessat lower income market returns and equal profit sharing. With the increase of marketreturns or proportional profit sharing, suppliers will increase quickly R&D investment.
引文
[1] J. Bamford, D. Ernst. Managing an Alliance Portfolio[J]. Mckinsery Quarterly,2002,3:28-39
[2] B. Sadowski, Duysters G. Strategic Technology AllianceTermination: an EmpiricalInvestigation[J]. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management,2008,25(4):305-320
[3] J. H. Dyer, P. Kale, H. Singh. When to Ally&when to Acquire[J]. Harvard Business Review,2004,27(4):104-126
[4]李华，王征.新产品开发中供应商的职责研究[J].研究与发展管理，2005，17(6)：77-83
[5]侯吉刚，刘益，杨翩翩.供应商参与对制造商产品创新模式影响的分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理，2008，48-51.
[6] B. Verworn, C. Lüthje, C. Herstatt. Cornelius: Innovationsmanagement in kleinen und mittlerenUnternehmen, Arbeitspapier Nr.7, TU Hamburg-Harburg, Oktober2000
[7] P. K. C. Lee, A. C. L. Yeung, T. C. Edwin Cheng.Supplier Alliances and EnvironmentalUncertainty: an Empirical Study[J]. International Journal of Production Economics,2009,120:190-204.
[8] K. B. Clark. Project Scope and Project Performance: the Effect of Parts Strategy and SupplierInvolvement on Product Development[J]. Management Science,1989,35(10):1247-1263
[9] L. H. Wang, E. J. Zajac. Alliance or Acquisition? A Dyadic Perspective on Interfirm ResourceCombinations[J]. Strategic Management Journal,2007,28(13):1291-1317
[10]陈一君.基于战略联盟的相互信任问题探讨[J].科研管理，2004，25(5)：34，41-45
[11] B. Kogut. Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives[J]. Strategic ManagementJournal,1988,9(4):319-332
[12]詹美求，潘杰义.校企合作创新利益分配问题的博弈分析[J].科研管理,2008，29(1)：8-13,28
[13] R. Bergmann, Friedl G. Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and asymmetricinformation[J]. Research Policy,2008,37(9):1504-1514
[14]亨利.切萨布鲁夫，维姆.范哈弗贝克，乔.韦斯特.开放创新的新范式[M].陈劲，李王芳，谢芳等译，北京：科学出版社，2010
[15] E. Von Hippel. The Sources of Innovation[M]. New York: Oxford University Press,1988
[16] G. Steurs. Inter-industry R&D Spillovers: What Difference do They Make?[J]. InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization,1995,13(2):249-276
[17] H.1. Fusfeld, C. S. Haklisch. Cooperative R&D for Competitors[J].Harvard Business Review,1985,(November/December):60-76
[18] P. W. Mattessich, B. R. Monsey. A Review of Research Literature on Factors InfluencingSuccessful Collaboration[M]. Amberst H. Wilder Foundation,919Lafond, St. Paul, MN55104,1992
[19] R. Katz, E. S. Rebentisch, T. J. Allen. A Study of Technology Transfer in MultinationalCooperative Joint Venture[J]. IEEE Transaction on Engineering Management,1996.43(1):97-105.
[20] M. Fritsch, R. Lukas. Who Cooperates on R&D[J]. Research policy,2001,30(2):297-312
[21]傅家骥.技术经济学[M].北京：清华大学出版社，1998
[22]刘学，庄乾志.合作创新的风险分摊和利益分配[J].科研管理，1998，19(5)：31-35
[23]罗伟，唐元虎.国内外合作创新述评[J].科学管理研究，2000，18(4)：14-19
[24]苏敬勤，王延章.合作技术创新理论及机制研究[M].大连：大连理工大学出版社，2002
[25] M. Sakakibara. Heterogeneity of Firm Capabilities and Cooperative Research and Development:An Empirical Examination of Motives[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1997,18(sl):143-164
[26] M. Sakakibara. Evaluating Government-sponsored R&D Consortia in Japan: who Benefits andHow? Research Policy,1997,26(4-5):447-473
[27] O. Granstrand, P. Patel, K. Pavitt-California. Multi-Technology Corporations:Why They haveDistributed’ Rather than Distinctive’ Core Competence.[J]. California Management Review,1997,4(39):8-25
[28] R. Gulati. Alliances and Networks[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,4(19):293-317
[29] B. Nooteboom. Inter-Firm Alliances:Analysis and Design[M], London:Routledge,1999
[30]朱涛.产业集群内企业之间合作创新的理论分析[J].经济经纬，2007,3(３)：88-90
[31]邹艳，杨乃定，韦铁等.组织学习对企业合作创新知识转移的影响研究：协调机制的中介作用[J].科学学与科学技术管理，2009，30(1)：96-100
[32]罗炜，唐元虎.企业合作创新的原因与动机[J].科学学研究，2001，19(3)：91-95
[33] G. Hamel. Competition for Competence and Interpartner Learning within International StrategicAlliances[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1991,12(s1):83-103
[34] C. Mothe, B. Quelin. Creating New Resources Through European R&D Partnerships[J].Technology Analysis&Strategic Management,1999,11(1):31-44
[35] K. R. Harrigan. Joint Ventures and Competitive Strategy[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1988,9(2):141-158
[36] N. Bloom. Uncertainty and the Dynamics of R&D[J], American Economic Review,2007,97(2):250-255
[37] R. Narula, J. Hagedoorn. Innovating Through Strategic Alliances: Moving towards InternationalPartnerships and Contractual Agreements[J]. Technovation,1999,19(5):283-294
[38]英特尔日立联合开发固态硬盘，分担研发成本[EB/OL]. http://news.cnfol.com/081203/101,1587,5146623,00.shtml
[39]外媒：宝马现代寻求发动机合作，分担研发成本[EB/OL]. http://money.163.com/12/0508/10/80VNQBE4002534NV.html
[40] C. Aspremont, A. Jacquemin. Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in a Duopoly withSpillovers[J]. American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137
[41] J. A. Poyago-Theotoky. Equilibrium and Optimal Size of a Research Joint Venture in anOligopoly with Spillovers[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics,1995,43(2):209-226
[42] R. R.Nelson. The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research[J]. Journal of PoliticalEconomy,1959,3(67):297-306
[43] H. Chesbrough, R. S. Rosenbloom. The Role of the Business Model in Capturing Value FormInnovation: Evidence from Xerox Corporation’s Technology Spin-off Companies[J], Industrialand Corporate Change,2002,3(11):529-555
[44] H. Chesbrough. Graceful Exits and Missed Opportunities: Xerox’s Management of itsTechnology Spin-off Organizations[J], Business History Review,2002,4(76):803-838
[45] T. Khanna, R. Gulati, N. Nohria. The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition,Cooperation, and Relative Scope[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(3):193-210
[46]赵曙明，沈群红.知识企业与知识管理[M].南京：南京大学出版社，2000
[47] V. K. Narayanan.技术战略与创新一竞争优势的源泉[M].程源，高建，杨湘玉等译.北京：北京电子工业出版社，2002
[48] E. M. Rigers, E. G. Carayannis, K. Kurihara, et al. Cooperative Research and DevelopmentAgreements (CRADAs) as Technology Transfer Mechanisms[J]. R&D Management,1998,28(2):79-88.
[49] J. Hagedoorn, J. Schakenraad. The Effect of Strategic Technology Alliances on CompanyPerformance[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1994,15(4):291-309
[50] R. H. Coase. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica,1937,4(16):386-405
[51] O. E. Williamson. Transaction Cost Economics: the Governance of Contractual Relation[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1979,22(2):233-261
[52] O. Williamson. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism[M]. New York: Free Press,1985
[53] J. H. Love, S. Ropper. Internal Versus External R&D: A Study of R&D Choice with SampleSelection[J]. International Journal of the Economics of Business,2002,9(2):239-255
[54] T. S. Robertson, H. Gatignon. Technology Development Mode: A Transaction CostConceptualizetion[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998,19(6):515-531
[55] D. A. Irwin, P. J. Klenow. High-tech R&D Subsidies Estimating the Effects of Sematech[J],Journal of International Economics,1996,40(3-4):323-344
[56] R. Gulati. Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for ContractualChoice in Alliances[J]. Academy of ManagementJournal,1995,38(1):85-112.
[57] G. Hamel, Y. L. Doz, C. K. Prahalad. Collaborate with your Competitors and Win[J]. HarvardBusiness Review,1989,67(1):133-139
[58] P. S. Ring. Networked Organization: A Resource Based Perspective[M]. Uppsala: Uppsala ActaUniversitatis Upsaliensis,1996
[59] R. Gulati, H. Singh. The Architecture of Cooperation:Managing Coordination Costs andApprop-riation Concerns in Strategic Alliances[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly,1998,43(4):781-814
[60] B. Wernerfelt. A Resource-based View of the Firm[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1984,5(2):171-180
[61] J. Barney. Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage[J]. Journal of ManagementStudies,1991,17(1):99-120
[62] R. Amit, P. J. H. Schoemaker. Strategic assets and organizational rent[J].Strategic ManagementJournal,1993,14(1):33-46
[63]刘立.企业R＆D投入的影响因素：基于资源观的理论分析[J].中国科技论坛，2003，(6)：75-78
[64]贺小刚.企业持续竞争优势的资源观阐释[J].南开管理评论，2002，4：32-37
[65] C. K. Prahalad, Q. Hamel. The Core Competence of the Corporation[J]. Harvard BusinessReview,1990,68(3):79-91.
[66] D. E. Mitchell, S. Yildiz, M. Batie. Five Faculty Labor Market Dilemmas Facing CommunityColleges in the New Economy[J]. Community College Journal of Research and Practice,2011,35(8):620-644.
[67] S. Levine, P. E. White. Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study ofInterorganizational Relationships[J]. Administrative ScienceQuarterly,1961,5(4):583-601
[68]牛晓帆.西方产业组织理论的演化与新发展[J].经济研究，2004，3：116-123
[69]牛丽贤，张寿庭.产业组织理论研究综述[J].经济技术与管理研究，2010，6：136-139
[70] C. Fershtman, N. Gandal. Direct and Indirect Knowledge Spillovers: The “Social Network” ofOpen-source Projects[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics,2011,42(1):70-91
[71] B. Cabrer-Borras, G. Serrano-Domingo. Innovation and R&D Spillover Effects in SpanishRegions: Aspatial Approach[J]. Research Policy,2007,36(9):1357-1371
[72] J. Hinloopen, J. Vandekerckhove. Dynamic Efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand Competition:Input Versus Output Spillovers[J]. Journal of Economics,2009,98(2):119-136
[73] R. Cellini, L. Lambertini. Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2009,33(3):568-582
[74]孟卫东，黄波，李宇雨.基于投资溢出的研发联盟成员投资策略研究[J].中国管理科学，2009，174(4)：133-140
[75]黄波，孟卫东，任玉珑.基于投资溢出的并行研发联盟成员投资策略研究[J].预测，2009，28(2)：42-46
[76] Q. He, J. Y. Zhao. An Analysis of the Economic Effect of Spatial R&D KnowledgeSpillovers[J]. International Journal of Learning and Intellectual,2009,6(4):402-414
[77] H. L. Liu, H. Y. Lin, S. K. Peng. The Spillover Effects of R&D on Manufacturing Industry inTaiwan’s Metropolitan Areas[J]. The Annals of Regional Science,2010,45(3):519-546
[78] D. T. Coe, E. Helpman, A. W. Hoffmaister. International R&D Spillovers and Institutions[J].European Economic Review,2009,53(7):723-741
[79] G. Femminis, G. Martini. Irreversible Investment and R&D Spillovers in a Dynamic Duopoly[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2011,35(7):1061-1090
[80] M. O'Mahony, M. Vecchi. R&D, Knowledge Spillovers and Company ProductivityPerformance[J]. Research Policy,2009,38(1):35-44
[81] A. Seck. International Technology Diffusion and Economic Growth: Explaining the SpilloverBenefits to Developing Countries[J]. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics,2012,23(4):437-451
[82] L. Chen, A. C. Chu. On R&D Spillovers, Multiple Equilibria and Indeterminacy[J]. Journal ofEconomics,2010,100(3):247-263
[83]侯光明，艾凤义.基于混合溢出的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理工程学报，2006，20(4)：94-97
[84] A. Tesoriere. A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&D Duopoly[J].Review of Industrial Organization,2008,33(2):177-184
[85] A. Tesoriere. Endogenous R&D Symmetry in Linear Duopoly with One-way Spillovers[J].Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,2008,66(2):213-225
[86] E. Lorenz, B. Lundvall. Accounting for Creativity in the European Union: A Multi-levelAnalysis of Individual Competence, Labour Market Structure, and Systems of Education andTraining[J]. Cambridge Journal of Economics,2011,35(2):269-294
[87] L. E. Ruff. Research and Technological Progress in a Cournot Economy[J], Journal ofEconomic Theory,1969,1:397-415
[88] M. Spence. Cost Reduction, Competition and Industry Performance[J], Econometrica,1984,52(1):101-121
[89] C. d’Aspremont, A. Jacquemin. Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D in Duopoly withSpillover[J]. American Economic Review,1988,78(5):1133-1137
[90] R. De Bondt, R. Veugelers. Strategic Investment with Spillovers[J]. European Journal ofPolitical Economy,1991,7(3):345-366
[91] R. De Bondt, P. Slaets, B. Cassiman. The Degree of Spillovers and the Number of Rivals forMaxi-mum Effective R&D[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1992,10(1):35-54.
[92] A. Rokuhara. R&D and Anti Monopoly Policy[M]. Tokyo in Japan: Gyousei Press,1985
[93] G. Licht, K. Zoz. Patents and R&D, An Econometric Investigation Using Applications forGerman, European and US patents by German Firms, in D. Encaoua, B. Hall, F. Laisney andJ.Mairesse(eds.), The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation[M]. Boston: KluwerAcademic Publishers,2000
[94] N. Harabi. Vertical Relations between Firms and Innovation: An Empirical Investigation ofGerman Firms[Z]. ZEW discussion paper No.97-10:12,1997
[95] P. L. Marin, G. Siotis. Market Structure, Competition, and Innovation in the European and USChemical Industries, in Cesaroni F., Gambardella, A., Garcia-Fontes, F. R&D(eds.), Innovationand Competitiveness in the European Chemical Industry[M]. Amsterdam: Kluwer Publishers,2004.
[96]刘宏，杨克华.市场结构与合作技术创新行为关系研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理，2003，24(6)：56-59
[97] Hamel, C. K. Prahalad. Competing for the Future: Unleashing the Power of the Workforce[M].Boston: Harvard Business School Press.1994
[98] J. B. Quinn, T. L. Doorley, P. C. Paquette. Beyond products: Services-based Strategy[J].Harvard Business Review,1990, April-March,(2):58-67
[99] M. H. Meyer, J. M. Utterback.The Product Family and the Dynamics of Core Capability[J].Sloan Management Review,1993,34:29-47
[100] M. Javidan. Core Competence: What does it Mean in Practice?[J]. Long Range Planning,1998,31(1):60-71
[101]维娜.艾莉.知识的进化[M].刘民慧译，广州：珠海出版社，1998
[102]王毅，陈劲，许庆瑞.企业核心能力:理论溯源与逻辑结构剖析[J].管理科学学报，2000，3(3)：24-43
[103] M. Kesler, D. Klostad, W. E. Clark. Third Generation R&D: The Key to Leveraging CoreCompetence[J]. The Columbia Journal of World Business,1993,28:34-44
[104] J. Klein, D. Gee, H. Jones. Analysing Clusters of Skills in R&D—Core Competencies,Metaphors, Visualization, and the Role of IT[J]. R&D Management,1998,28(1):37-42
[105] R. Sanchez, A. Heene, H. Thomas. Dynamics of Competence-based Competition: Theory andPractice in the new Strategic Management[M]. Oxford: Pergamon,1996
[106] T. Durand. Strategizing for Innovation: Competence Analysis in Assessing Strategic Change[M].In Aime Heene and Ron Sanchez,(eds.), Competence-based Strategic Management, Chichester:John Wiley.1995
[107] K. Prahalad, G..Hamel. The Core Competency of the Corporation[M]. Harvard BusinessReview, May-June,1990:79-90
[108] R. Coombs. Core Competencies and the Strategic Management of R&D[J]. R&D Management,1996,26(4):345-355
[109]郭斌.基于核心能力的企业组合创新理论与实证研究[D].杭州：浙江大学，1998
[110]魏江.企业技术能力:增长过程、机理与模式[D].杭州：浙江大学，1997
[111] R. Henderson, I. Cockburn. Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmace-utical Research[J]. Strategic Management Journal, Winter Special Issue,1994,15(S1):63-84
[112] M. H. Meyer. Revitalizing your Product Lines through Continuous Platform Renewal[J]. Re-search Technology Management, March-April1997,34-42
[113] P. Patel, K. Pavitt. The Technological Competencies of the World's Largest Firms: Complex andPath-dependent, but not much Variety[J]. Research Policy,1997,26:141-156
[114] L. D. Barton. Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing new ProductDevelopment[J]. Strategic Management Journal,1992,13(s1):111-125
[115]张春华，史春凤.企业核心竞争力的变迁研究［J］.世界经济与政治论坛，2006(4)：109-113
[116]杰伊.巴尼．获得与保持竞争优势（第2版）[M].王俊杰等译，北京：清华大学出版社，1997
[117]魏江，叶学锋.基于模糊方法的核心能力识别和评价系统[J].科研管理，2001，22(2)：96-103
[118] C. K. Prahalad, G. Hamel. The Core Competency of the Corporation[J], Harvard BusinessReview,1990,68(3):79-91
[119] J. Von.Nrumann, Morgen-stern. O. The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior[M].Princeton: Princeton University Press,1994
[120] K. J. Arrow.“Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation,” in NationalBureau Committee for Economic Research. The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity[M].NJ: Princeton University Press,1962
[121] K. Kultti, T. Takalo. R&D Spillovers and Information Exchange[J]. Economics Letter,1998,61(1):121-123
[122] E. Dietzenbacher. Spillovers of Innovation Effects[J]. Journal of Policy Modeling,2000,22(1):27-42
[123] M. K. H. Chen, H. M. Hsiao, H. Y. Yang. Spillover Effects of Innovation: TaiwaneseEvidence[J]. Applied Economics,2010,42(26):3417-3437
[124] Y. F. Sun. What Matters for Industrial Innovation in China: R&D, Technology Transfer orSpillover Impacts from Foreign Investment?[J]. International Journal of Business and SystemsResearch,2010,4(5-6):621-647
[125]霍沛军，陈继祥，陈剑.R&D补贴与社会次佳R&D[J].管理工程学报，2004，18(2)：1-3
[126] S. Ziss. Strategic R&D with Spillovers, Collusion and Welfare[J]. The Journal of IndustrialEconomics,1994,42(4):375-393
[127] R. C. Levin, P. C. Reiss. Cost-reducing and Demand-creating R&D with Spillovers[J]. RANDjournal of Economics,1988,19(4):538-556
[128] R. S. Jarmin. Asymmetric Learning Spillovers[M]. Economic Studies,1993
[129] M. L. Petit, B. Tolwinski. R&D Cooperation or Competition[J]. European Economic Review,1999,43(1):185-208
[130] R. Amir, Y. J. Jim, M. Troege. On Additive Spillovers and Returns to Scale in R&D[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26(3):695-70
[131] D. B. Silipo, A. Weiss. Cooperation and Competition in an R&D Market with Spillovers[J].Research in Economics,2005,59(1):41-57
[132] R. Cellini, L. Lambertini. Dynamic R&D with Spillovers: Competition vs Cooperation[J].Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2009,33(3):568-582
[133] Z. H. Ge, Q. Y. Hu. Collaboration in R&D Activities: Firm-specific Decisions[J]. EuropeanJournal of Operational Research,2008,185(1,2):864-883
[134]易余胤，盛昭瀚，肖条军.具溢出效应的有限理性双寡头博弈的动态演化[J].系统工程学报，2004，19(3)：244-250
[135]孙树垒.生产与研发成本差异下双寡头横向R&D合作[J].中国管理科学，2008，16(10)：63-67
[136]侯光明，艾凤义.基于混合溢出的双寡头横向R&D合作[J].管理工程学报，2006，20(4)：94-97
[137] J. Peters. Inter-industry R&D-Spillovers between Vertically Related Industries: Incentives,Strategic Aspects and Consequences[R]. University of Augsburg Discussion Paper,1995
[138] M. R. Ward, D. Dranove. The Vertical Chain of Research and Development in thePharmaceutical Industry[J]. Economic Inquiry,1995,33(1):70-87
[139] K. Suzuki. R&D Spillovers and Technology Transfer among and Within Vertical KeiretsuGroups[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1993,11(4):573-591
[140] G. Atallah. Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation[J].Economics of Innovation and New Technology,2002,11(3):179-209
[141] T. A. Watkins, L. A. Paff. Absorptive Capacity and R&D Tax Policy: Are In-house and ExternalContract R&D Substitutes or Complements?[J]. Small Business Economics,2009,33(2):207-227
[142] S. A. Zahra, J. C. Hayton. The Effect of International Venturing on Firm Performance: TheModerating Influence of Absorptive Capacity[J]. Journal of Business Venturing,2008,23(2):195-220
[143] D. Leahy, J. P. Neary. Absorptive Capacity, R&D Spillovers, and Public Policy[J]. InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization,2007,25(5):1089-1108
[144] M. Kamien, I. Zang. Meet me Halfway: Research Joint Ventures and Absorptive Capacity[J].International Journal of Industrial Organization,2000,18:995-1012
[145] E. Penningsa, L. Sereno. Evaluating Pharmaceutical R&D under Technical and EconomicUncertainty[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2011,212(2):374-385
[146] S. Solak, J. B. Clarke, E. L. Johnson, et al. Optimization of R&D Project Portfolios underEndogenous Uncertainty[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2010,207(1):420-433
[147] N. Erkala, D. Piccinin. Cooperative R&D under Uncertainty with Free Entry[J]. InternationalJournal of Industrial Organization,2010,28(1):74-85
[148] R. M. Cyert, P. S. Goodman. Creating Effective University-lndustly Alliances: AnOrganizational Learning Perspective[J], Organizational Dynamics,1997,25(4):45-57
[149] K. Managua, Y. Ohno. Uncertainty, Spillovers, and Cooperative R&D [J]. International Journalof Industrial Organization,2002,20(6):855-876
[150]徐斌.不确定性、溢出效应与R&D合作[J].科技进步与对策，2008，25(12)：12-14
[151]黄波，孟卫东，李宇雨等.不确定环境下研发联盟成员投资激励机制研究[J].管理工程学报，2010，24(4)：58-65
[152]黄波，孟卫东，李宇雨.基于双边激励的产学研合作最优利益分配方式[J].管理科学学报，2011，14(7)：31-42
[153] M. Maschler, B. Peleg, L. S. Shapley. Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, andRelated Solution Concepts[J]. Mathematics of Operational Research,1997,4(4):303-338
[154] S. Gavirneni. Benefits of Co-operation in a Production Distribution Environment[J]. EuropeanJournal of Operational Research,2001,130(3):612-622
[155] G. Burrows, C. Black. Profit Sharing in Australian Big6Accounting Firms: an ExploratoryStudy[J]. Accounting Organizations and Society,1998,23(5,6):517-530
[156] Hendrik Jahn, Matthias Zimmermann, Marco Fischer et al. Performance Evaluation as anInfluence Factor for the Determination of Profit Shares of Competence Cells inNon-hierarchical Regional Production Netwtworks[J]. Robotics and Computer-IntegratedManufacturing,2006,22(5,6):526-535
[157]郑文军，张旭梅，刘飞等.敏捷虚拟企业利润分配机制研究[J].管理工程学报，2001，15(1)：26-28
[158]沈玉志，王红亮.不确定性环境下不平等联盟利益分配模型研究[J].中国软科学，2003(1)：135-137
[159]王雪原，王雅林.R＆D联盟产出分配研究[J].科研管理，2011，32(3)：29-35
[160]生延超.纵向技术联盟利益分配机制研究[J].华东经济管理，2008，22(8)：153-158
[161]陈爱祖，唐雯，康继红.产业技术创新战略联盟利益分配模型研究[J].科技管理研究，2013，12：119-122
[162]华金秋，华金科.基于技术标准的企业协作研发收益分配研究[J].软科学，2006，20(1)：123-125，137
[163]熊国强，潘泉，张洪才.技术创新联盟收益分配的群体协商模型及求解方法[J].科学学与科学技术管理，2008，29(5)：69-72，79
[164]兰天，徐剑.企业动态联盟利益分配的机制与方法[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版)，2008，29(2)：301-304
[165]刘书庆，杨帆.虚拟企业设计合作伙伴利益分配方案及其应用[J].工业工程，2009，12(1)：92-100
[166]生延超.基于改进的Shapley值法的技术联盟企业利益分配[J].大连理工大学学报(社会科学版)，2009，30(2)：34-39
[167]张捍东，严钟，方大春.应用ANP的Shapley值法动态联盟利益分配策略[J].系统工程学报，2009，24(2)：205-211
[168]戴建华，薛恒新.基于Shapley值法的动态联盟伙伴企业利益分配策略[J].中国管理科学，2004，12(4)：33-36
[169]魏纪泳，汤书昆，崔浩等.基于利益相关者合作博弈的决策优化与收益分配[J].运筹与管理，2005，14(2)：79-83.
[170] G. Duysters, B. Lokshin. Determinants of Alliance Portfolio Complexity and its Effect onInnovative Performance of Companies[J]. Journal of Product Innovation Management,2011,28(4):570-585.
[171] F. Castellucci, G. Ertug. What's in it for them? Advantages of Higher-status Partners inExchange Relationships[J]. The Academy of Management Journal,2010,53(1):149-166
[172] S. Thorgren, J. Wincent, H. Boter. Small Firms in Multipartner R&D Alliances: GainingBenefits by Acquiescing[J]. Journal of Engineering and Technology Management,2012,29(4):453-467
[173] A. Carboni. An Empirical Investigation of the Determinants of R&D Cooperation: AnApplication of the Inverse Hyperbolic Sine Transformation[J]. Research in Economics,2012,66(2):131-141
[174] B. Laan, H. Voordijk, G. Dewulf. Reducing Opportunistic Behaviour through a ProjectAlliance[J]. International Journal of Managing Projects in Business,2011,4(4):660-679
[175] Montoro-Sánchez, M. Ortiz-de-Urbina-Criado, E. M. Mora-Valent. Effects of KnowledgeSpillovers on Innovation and Collaboration in Science and Technology Parks[J]. Journal ofKnowledge Management,2011,15(6):948-970
[176] W. Amaldoss. Collaboration to Compete[J]. Marketing Science,2000,19(2):105-126
[177]孙红侠，李仕明.并行研发联盟中合作伙伴资源投人决策分析[J].预测，2005，24(2)：42-45
[178] W. Amaldoss, R. Staelin. Cross-function and Same-function Alliances: how does AllianceStructure Affect the Behavior of Partnering Firms?[J]. Management Science,2010,56(2):302-317
[179]熊麟，冯婷婷，鲁若愚.基于竞赛模型的研发联盟资本投入博弈分析[J].技术经济，2013，32（6）：21-25
[180] A. Rokuhara. R&D and Antimonopoly Policy[R]. Gyosei, Tokyo,1985.
[181] R. Veugelers. A Profile of Companies in Alliances[J]. Research Report DTEW9325, K ULeuven,1993
[182] P. Grindley, D. Mowery, B. Silverman. SEMATECH and Collaborative Research: Lessons forthe Design of high Technolgy Consortia[J]. Journal of Policy analysis and Management,1994,13(4):723-758
[183] J. Peters. Inter-Industry R&D Spillovers Between Vertically Related Industries: Incentives,Strategic Aspects and Consequences[R]. University of Augsburg Discussion Paper,1995
[184] B. Cassiman, R. Veugelers. R&D Cooperatiion and Spillovers: Some Empirical Evidence[J],Research Report,1998,1-37
[185] R. B. Handfield, B. Lawson. Integrating Suppliers into New Product Development[R].Research-Technology Management,2007,50(5):44-51
[186] A. Kambil. Good Ideas are Not Enough, Accenture [EB/OL]. www.accenture.com/Global/Research_and_Insights/By_Subject/Innovation/GoodEngines.htm.
[187] D. Vahs, R. Burmester. Innovationsmanagement-Von der Produktidee zur erfolgreichenVermarktung [M]. Stuttgart: Sch ffer-Poeschel Verlag,1999
[188] F. E. A. Van Echtelt, F. Wynstra. Managing Supplier Involvement in New Product Development:a Multiple-case Study[J]. Journal of Product Innovation Management,2008,25(2):180-201
[189] J. H. Mikkola, T. Skjoett-Larsen. Early Supplier Involvement: Implications for New ProductDevelopment Outsourcing and Supplier-Buyer Interdependence[J]. Global Journal of FlexibleSystems Management,2003,4(4):31-41
[190]段小华，柳卸林.服务业R&D的投入强度及其国际比较[J].中国科技论坛，2005，(4)：131-135
[191]罗晔.Teamcenter供应商关系管理(SRM).2007： http://articles.e-works.net.cn/pdm/article49007.htm.
[192] S. A. Chung, G. M. Kim. Performance Effects of Partnership between Manufacturers andSuppliers for new Product Development: The Supplier’s Standpoint[J]. Research Policy,2003,32(4):587-603
[193] N. Lakemond, C. Berggren, A. Weele. Coordinating Supplier Involvement in ProductDevelopment Projects: a Differentiated Coordination Typology[J]. R&D Management,2006,36(1):55-66
[194] A. Bonaccorsi, A. Lippaini. Strategic Partnerships in new Product Development: An ItalianCase Study[J].Journal of Product Innovation Management,1994,11(2):134-145
[195] M. Fritsch. Co-operation in Regional Innovation Systems[J]. Regional Studies,2001,35(4):297-307.
[196]叶飞，李怡娜，徐学军.供应商早期参与新产品开发的动机与模式研究[J].研究与发展管理，2006，18(6)：51-57
[197] S. S. Chauhan, J. M. Proth. Analysis of a Supply Chain Partnership with Revenue Sharing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2005,97(1):44-51
[198] D. Gupta, W. Weerawat. Supplier-manufacturer Coordination in Capacitated Two-stage SupplyChains[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2006,175(1):67-89
[199] E. anako lu, T. Bilgic. Analysis of a Two-stage Telecommunication Supply Chain withTechnology Dependent Demand[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2007,177(2):995-1012
[200]付影.企业与供应商合作中的信任研究[D].哈尔滨工业大学硕士学位论文，2007.3
[201]侯吉刚，刘益，杨翩翩.供应商参与对制造商产品创新模式影响的分析[J].科学学与科学技术管理，2008，29(5)：48-51
[202]李霞，项平，宋素玲等.供应商参与对创新风险的影响因素的概念模型[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)，2010，32(1)：147-150
[203] G. Tullock. The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft[J]. Western Economic Journal,1967,5(3):224-232