摘要
党的十六大以来,中央开始更加重视反腐败问题,将其视为和平时期最大的执政威胁,将反腐败工作上升到反腐败斗争高度,于2005年1月颁布了《建立健全教育、制度、监督并重的惩治和预防腐败体系实施纲要》,确立了“标本兼治、综合治理、惩防并举、注重预防”的反腐倡廉战略方针,标志我国反腐倡廉建设开始进入科学化、法制化、系统化的创新发展阶段。2008年5月,中央又颁布了《建立健全惩治和预防腐败体系2008—2012年工作规划》,其中明确将完善工程建设项目招标投标制度,健全工程建设项目招标投标行政监督机制,深化政府采购制度改革,加强对政府采购各个环节的监管,规范国有企业采购招标投标等列为重点工作。廉洁风险防控机制建设,是惩治和预防腐败体系建设的重要组成部分。因此积极开展招投标廉洁风险防控机制研究有着重要的现实意义。
论文围绕“问题提出->问题分析->重点问题机理分析->问题应对->结论”的研究思路展开,共分七章,各章主要内容如下。
第一章绪论,是问题提出。主要是对论文选题的背景和意义、国内外相关研究现状、与选题有关的基本概念、研究思路和拟采用的研究方法、论文结构逻辑及主要内容、研究创新等进行总体性的概述。基于选题研究目的,将机制定义为涵盖与招投标活动监管和风险防控有关的管理体制、法律规范、程序方法、技术支持等。在简述招投标基本概念和基本流程基础上,特别指出招投标与拍卖的经济学理完全相同,只是两者的交易性质反向,完全可基于拍卖理论来分析招投标经济机理。在大量研讨文献基础上,对国内外研究现状从制度机理、技术方法、支持系统三个层面进行了归集阐述。
第二章相关理论基础,是分析问题的理论指导。主要是对本文研究主题涉及的相关理论基础集中进行简要介绍。这些理论包括拍卖理论、博弈理论、机制设计和委托代理理论、腐败与反腐败理论、风险管理理论等。每一理论基础都将被用于指导后文一个或几个章节的研究。拍卖理论和博弈理论用于分析横向串标(合谋)和纵向串标(腐败)的经济机理。机制设计和委托代理理论用于纵向串标有关机制设计分析。腐败与反腐败理论用于指导全文研究框架设计和招投标监管机制设计。风险管理的基本概念和思想则是本文研究的出发点与落脚点,其贯穿于全文各章节的分析与研究。
第三章我国招投标实践中的廉洁风险分析,全面分析问题的表现形式、性质分类、产生原因。对招投标实践中的种种问题,按可能引发问题和风险的招投标活动相关主体分类归集分为：招投标监管部门的不合理行政干预、招标(代理)方的不规范或暗箱操作、投标方的限制竞争行为、评标专家的失职渎职行为等四大类。同时按问题所关联的行为方互动(串谋)特征分类归集分为：横向串标行为、纵向串标行为、混合串标行为、非串谋不良行为等四类。在此基础上,对招投标廉洁风险问题表象背后的主要原因,从信息不对称、产权激励约束机制、法律法规、监管体制、评标机制、市场诚信环境等多方面进行了剖析。
第四章横向串标机理分析,对重点问题之一横向串标进行详细经济机理分析。在分析横向串标的基本概念及关键特征基础上,通过建立一个典型的一维价格招标采购标准模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析横向合谋串标的均衡特性,并重点分析投标参与人数、保留价格、实施成本等外控因素对横向合谋串标均衡的影响,以及合谋的风险博弈。此外,还对横向合谋串标的认定和检测方法进行了初步分析。
第五章纵向串标机理分析,对另一重点问题纵向串标进行详细经济机理分析。在分析指出纵向串标问题的本质特征在于评标自由裁量权滥用的基础上,通过建立一个关于质量和价格的二维属性标准竞标模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析其均衡特性,评标自由裁量权对竞标均衡解和最优招标机制的影响,及其与腐败决策、腐败率之间的相关关系。并应用寻租理论和博弈理论构建一个由招标委托人(监管者)、设租招标人(招标代表或代理机构)、寻租投标人参与的三方动态博弈模型,分析腐败的查处率与惩罚强度、串标收益的相互关系,招标人和投标人的腐败率之间的相互关系,以及腐败率与监管查处成本、惩罚强度、代理酬金(薪酬)、行贿受贿大小之间的静态比较关系。
第六章招投标廉洁风险防控机制设计,是关于问题的应对措施分析。在对国外发达市场经济国家(美国、德国、日本)与我国的招投标监管制度进行全面比较分析基础上,针对我国招投标监管中存在的主要问题和不足,借鉴国外先进经验,结合国家反腐败战略方针,从不敢腐的惩戒机制、不能腐的防范机制、不易腐的保障机制三个方面着重论述了我国招投标廉洁风险防控机制的完善设计对策。
第七章总结和展望。是对全文研究内容和相关结论进行总结回顾,提炼概括本文研究成果的创新点,并对需要进一步深入研究的相关问题进行展望。
论文的主要创新工作可总结为以下四个方面：
(1)基于大量文献研究对招投标全过程各环节的各种不廉洁问题进行了全面梳理和分类归集。一是从可能引发问题和风险的招投标活动相关主体角度,将各种问题归集分为：招投标监管部门的不合理行政干预、招标(代理)方的不规范或暗箱操作、投标方的限制竞争行为、评标专家的失职渎职行为等四大类,这样归集便于各相关主体所属部门通过完善制度、规范、流程等针对性地加强内部风险管控。二是从问题所关联的行为方互动(串谋)角度,将招投标实践中反映出的各类问题和风险归集分为：横向串标行为、纵向串标行为、混合串标行为、非串谋不良行为等四类,这样归集便于问题防范的机制设计。同时对招投标廉洁风险问题表象背后的主要原因,从信息不对称、产权激励约束机制、法律法规、监管体制、评标机制、市场诚信环境等方面进行了总结分析。
(2)在分析横向串标的基本概念及横向串标问题的关键特征基础上,建立了一个一维价格招标采购标准模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析了横向合谋投标与非合谋投标的均衡解及均衡特征,并重点分析了投标参与人数、保留价格、实施成本等外控因素对横向合谋投标均衡的影响,以及合谋的风险博弈,通过论证分析得到关于横向投标合谋及防范的有指导意义的六点主要结论。同时初步分析了横向合谋的认定和检测方法。
(3)在分析指出纵向串标问题的本质特征在于评标自由裁量权滥用的基础上,通过建立一个关于质量和价格的二维属性标准竞标模型,应用拍卖理论详细分析了评标自由裁量权对竞标均衡解和最优招标机制的影响,及其与腐败决策、腐败率之间的相关关系。此外,应用寻租理论和博弈论构建了一个由招标委托人(监管者)、设租招标人(即招标代表或代理机构)、寻租投标人参与的三方动态博弈模型,在给出博弈均衡解的基础上,分析了招标委托监管方对腐败的查处率与惩罚(罚款)强度、串标收益的相互关系,设租招标人(招标代表或代理机构)和寻租投标人的腐败率之间的相互关系,以及腐败率与监管查处成本、惩罚(罚款)强度、招标代理酬金(薪酬)、行贿受贿大小之间的静态比较关系。相关研究结论被总结成七条定理。
(4)在对国内外招投标监管机制比较和借鉴基础上,结合国家反腐败战略方针,以廉洁风险防控视角,基于系统工程思想,从不敢腐的惩戒机制、不能腐的防范机制、不易腐的保障机制三个方面着重论述了我国招投标廉洁风险防控机制的完善设计措施。不敢腐的惩戒机制,主要体现在完善招投标相关法律制度、加快招投标诚信体系建设两方面。不能腐的防范机制,主要体现在改革招投标监管体制、强化招投标过程内控管理两方面。不易腐的保障机制,主要体现在合理设定评标方法、提升招投标监管信息化水平两方面。分别在以上六个方面提出了若干针对性的完善措施和建议。
The Party Central Committee begins to pay more attention to the anti-corruption issues since the Sixteenth CPC National Congress. Corruption is regarded as the greatest threat to the regime in peacetime, and anti-corruption work is upgraded to anti-corruption battle. In January2005,"the Implementation Outline of Establishing the Sound System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption Paying Equal Attention to Education, Institution and Supervision" has been promulgated, which indicates the foundation of strategic policy to fight corruption and to promote honesty and cleanness by "Curing both Symptoms and Root Cause, Comprehensive Treatment, Consideration both Punishment and Prevention, Focusing on Prevention". It marks that the construction of fighting corruption and promoting honesty and cleanness comes to the new stage which is scientific, legal and systematic innovation and development. In May2008,"the Work Plan of Establishing the Sound System of Punishing and Preventing Corruption in2008-2012" has been promulgated by the Party Central Committee again, in which the key works are confirmed: improving bidding and bid institution of construction projects, consummating administrative supervision mechanism of bidding and bid of construction projects, deepening the reform of government procurement system, strengthening the supervision of each link of government procurement, standardizing the bidding and bid in state-owned enterprises procurement. The establishment of risk prevention and control mechanism for honesty and cleanness is an important part of the construction of the punishing and preventing corruption system. So it is practically significant to actively carry out the research on the risk prevention and control mechanism for honesty and cleanness in bidding and bid.
Around the research ideas of "Emerging of Problems-> Analysis of Problems-> Mechanism Analysis of Key Problems-> Countermeasures to Problems-> Conclusions", the thesis is divided into seven chapters, and the main content of each chapter is as follows:
The first chapter is the introduction, and focus on the emerging of problems. It mainly explains the overall overview of the following contents:the background and significance of the selected topic of the thesis, the related research status quo at home and abroad, the basic concepts related to the topic, the research ideas and methods, the structure logic and main content of the full text. Based on the research purpose of the selected topic, the "mechanism" is defined as the management rules, legal norms, procedures and methods, technical support, all of which are related to the supervision and risk prevention of bidding and bid activities. Based on briefly explaining the basic concepts and process of bidding and bid, it is especially pointed out that the economic theory of bidding and auction is exactly the same, but just their directions of trading reverse. So the auction theory can be entirely used to analyze the economic mechanism of bidding and bid. Based on the study of a large number of literatures, overseas and domestic research status quo is summarized from three levels:management mechanism, technical method and information support system.
The second chapter briefly introduces the related theoretical basis to guide to analyze the problems. In this chapter, the theoretical basis related to the research topic of the thesis is intensively and briefly introduced. These theories include auction theory, game theory, mechanism design and principal-agent theory, the theory of corruption and anti-corruption, and the theory of risk management. Each theoretical basis will be used to guide the research of one or several chapters. The auction theory and game theory are applied to the analysis of economic mechanism of transverse and vertical collusion bid. The mechanism design and principal-agent theory are applied to the analysis of mechanism design and analysis related to vertical collusion bid. The theory of corruption and anti-corruption are applied to guide for the designs of this thesis framework and the supervision mechanism of bidding and bid. The basic concept and thought of risk management run throughout the analysis of each chapter and it is the starting and foothold point of the full text.
The third chapter analyzes the risk of honesty and cleanness in bidding and bid practice in our country, the main content of this chapter includes the comprehensive analysis of forms, qualities, classifications, causes of the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid. According to the participants in bidding and bid activities who are likely to cause problems and risks, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is approximately classified into four categories:unreasonable administrative interventions of supervision departments, non-standard or black-box operations of the tenderee or its agency, limit competition behaviours of bidders, malfeasance behaviours of bid evaluation experts. In addition, according to the interaction features of collusion participants, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is also classified into the following four categories:transverse collusion bid, vertical collusion bid, mixed collusion bid and non-collusion mal-behaviors. Based on the above problem analysis, the main deep reasons behind representations of the dishonesty risk problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market.
The fourth chapter analyzes in detail the economic mechanism of transverse collusion bid which is one of the key research problems of this thesis. Based on the analysis of the basic concepts and key features of transverse collusion bid, a typical one-dimensional (price) standard bidding model is established. The equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid are analyzed in detail by auction theory. The influence of external factors, which mainly include the number of bidder, reserve price, implementation cost of collusion, on the equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid as well as the risk game of collusion, are analyzed emphatically. In addition, the recognition and detection methods of transverse collusion bid are analyzed preliminarily.
The fifth chapter analyzes in detail the economic mechanism of vertical collusion bid which is another one of the key research problems of this thesis. On the basis of pointing out that the essential characteristic of vertical collusion bid problems is ascribed to the abuse of bid evaluation discretion, a two-dimensional attributes (quality and price) standard bidding model is established. By auction theory, the following contents related the model are analyzed in detail:the auction equilibrium characteristics, the influence of bid evaluation discretion on the auction equilibrium solution and the optimal bidding mechanism as well as the relationship between corruption decision-making, corruption rate and bid evaluation discretion. By rent-seeking theory and game theory, a three-party dynamic game mode is built that consists of the tenderee or supervisor which is the principle, the bidding delegate or agency which is the rent-creating middle agent, and the bidder which is the rent-seeking terminal agent. The relationships between the punishment rate of corruption and punishment intensity as well as collusion benefit are analyzed. The relationships of the corruption rate between bidding delegate and bidder is discussed. In addition, the static comparative relationships between the corruption rates of bidding delegate and bidder and supervision cost, punishment intensity (fine), bidding agency fee (emolument), and bribery magnitude, are demonstrated.
The sixth chapter focus on the countermeasures of the above mentioned problems and the mechanism design of prevention and control of dishonesty risk in bidding and bid. Based on the comprehensive comparison of bidding supervision system in our country and foreign countries such as the United States, Germany and Japan, aiming at the main problems and shortages existing in the bidding supervision system in our country, drawing lessons from the advanced overseas experience, combining with the national anti-corruption policy, the improvement countermeasures to prevent and control the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid in our country are discussed from three aspects, which are the punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt, the prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt and the guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt.
The seventh chapter is summary and outlook. The research content and related conclusions are summarized and reviewed, the innovations of the research work are refined, and the outlooks of related problems which need to be further researched are finished.
The main innovation work of the thesis can be summarized as the following four aspects:
(1) Based on a large number of literature research, all kinds of dishonesty problems in each link of the whole process of bidding and bid are summarized and classified comprehensively. Firstly, according to the participants in bidding and bid activities who are likely to cause problems and risks, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is approximately classified into four categories:unreasonable administrative interventions of supervision departments, non-standard or black-box operations of the tenderee or its agency, limit competition behaviors of bidders, malfeasance behaviors of bid evaluation experts. The above classification is convenient for the department of each participant belongs to strengthening the internal risk management and control by improving and perfecting the related systems, rules and processes. Secondly, according to the interaction features of collusion participants, the dishonesty risk problems of bidding and bid is also classified into the following four categories:transverse collusion bid, vertical collusion bid, mixed collusion bid and non-collusion bad behaviors. Based on the above problem analysis, the main deep reasons behind representations of the problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market. This classification is convenient for prevention mechanism design. Thirdly, the main deep reasons behind representations of the dishonesty risk problems are dissected separately from the viewpoints of information asymmetry, property rights incentive constraint mechanism, laws and regulations, supervision system, bid evaluation mechanism, honesty environment of market.
(2) Based on the analysis of the basic concepts and key features of transverse collusion bid, a typical one-dimensional (price) standard bidding model is established. The equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid are analyzed in detail by auction theory. The influence of external factors, which mainly include the number of bidder, reserve price, implementation cost of collusion, on the equilibrium characteristics of transverse collusion bid as well as the risk game of collusion, are analyzed emphatically. And so, six main conclusions with guidance significance related to transverse collusion bid are achieved. In addition, the recognition and detection methods of transverse collusion bid are analyzed preliminarily.
(3) On the basis of pointing out that the essential characteristic of vertical collusion bid problems is ascribed to the abuse of bid evaluation discretion, a two-dimensional attributes (quality and price) standard bidding model is established. By auction theory, the following contents related the model are analyzed in detail:the influence of bid evaluation discretion on the auction equilibrium solution and the optimal bidding mechanism, the relationship between corruption decision-making, corruption rate and bid evaluation discretion. By rent-seeking theory and game theory, a three-party dynamic game mode is built that consists of the tenderee or supervisor which is the principle, the bidding delegate or agency which is the rent-creating middle agent, and the bidder which is the rent-seeking terminal agent. The relationships between the punishing corruption rate and punishment intensity as well as collusion income are analyzed. The relationships of the corruption rate between bidding delegate and bidder is discussed. In addition, the static comparative relationships between the corruption rates of bidding delegate and bidder and supervision cost, punishment intensity, bidding agency fee, and bribery magnitude, are demonstrated. The related research conclusions are summarized into seven theorems.
(4) Based on the comprehensive comparison of bidding supervision system in our country and foreign countries, by the reference of the advanced overseas experience, from the perspective of the prevention and control of honesty and cleanness, guided by the concepts of system engineering, combining with the national anti-corruption policy, the improvement countermeasures to prevent and control the dishonesty risk in bidding and bid in our country are discussed from three aspects, which are the punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt, the prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt and the guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt. The punishment mechanism of not-dare-to-corrupt is embodied in two aspects:improving the legal system of bidding and bid, and speeding up the construction of honesty and credit system of bidding and bid. The prevention mechanism of can-not-corrupt is embodied in the following two aspects:reforming the supervision system of bidding and bid, and for a tenderee to strengthen the internal management and control in bidding process. The guarantee mechanism of not-easy-to-corrupt is also embodied in two aspects:reasonably selecting bid evaluation method and upgrading the information level of management and supervision in bidding and bid process. Further more, some corresponding concrete measures and suggestions are put forward respectively in the above six aspects.
引文
① P. Bajari, L. Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,2003,85 (4):971-989.
② ubbard T.P., Paarsch H.J.. Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,17:1-14.
① Paul Milgrom(杜黎等译).拍卖理论与实务[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2006.
② 李漫江.卖方市场条件下的招投标方式研究[D].长沙理工大学,2010.
① Maskin E S, Rilley J G. Asymmetric Auctions[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2000,67:413-438.
② Robinson M S. Collusion and the Choice of Auctions[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1985,16:141-145.
③ McAfee P, McMillan J. Bidding rings[J]. American Economic Review,1992,82(3):579-599.
④ Graham D A, Marshall R C. Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1987,95:1217-1239.
⑤ McAfee P, McMillan J. Bidding rings[J]. American Economic Review,1992,82(3):579-599.
⑥ Hansen R G. Auctions with Endogenous Quantity[J]. Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19:44-58.
① Riley J G,Samuelson W.Optimal auctions[J].American Economic Review,1981,71(3):381-392.
② Myerson R.Optimal auction design[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,1981,6(1):58-73.
① Levin Dan,Smith James L.Optimal reservation prices in auctions[J].Economic Journal,1996,106:1271-1283.
② 张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004,p238.
① Myerson R. Game theory:analysis of conflict[M]. Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1991,p263.
① Holmstrom,B.Moral Hazard and Obervability[J]. Bell Journal of Economics,1979(10):74-91.
① Jean-Jacques LafFont, David Martimort(陈志俊等译).激励理论(第一卷)委托—代理模型[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002.
①于风政.论“腐败”的定义[J].新视野,2003(5),P42.
② [美]戈登·塔洛克(李政军译).寻租——对寻租活动的经济学分析[M],P1.成都：西南财经大学出版社,2000.
③ 李建华,周小毛.腐败论[M],P15.长沙：中南工业出版社,1997.
④杰瑞米·波普(清华大学公共管理学院廉政教研室译).制约腐败——构建国家廉政体系[M],P5.北京：中国方正出版社,2003.
① 王俊民.对腐败群体分类的法理思考[J].检察风云,2005(8),P57.
① 王琛.建筑市场寻租与完善招投标机制的研究[D],P9.西安建筑科技大学,2004.
① 秦萍丽.招投标领域预防腐败策略研究——以甘肃为例[D],P4.兰州大学,2010.
① 钟研.工程招标投标“十八怪”[N].人民日报,2001-04-23.
② 刘心家,李学文.招投标体制缺陷及对策研究[J].中国招标,2008(52)：17-25.
③ 刘心家,李学文.招投标体制缺陷及对策研究[J].中国招标,2008(52)：17-25.
④ 董海涛.当前我国工程招投标活动中存在的主要问题及对策建议[J].建筑经济,2003(8)：54-56.
① 赵曾海.招投标腐败频出背后[J].中国经济周刊,2011(7)：62-64.
① 钟研.工程招标投标“十八怪”[N].人民日报,2001-04-23.
① 赵曾海.招投标腐败频出背后[J].中国经济周刊,2011(7)：62-64.
② 钟研.工程招标投标“十八怪”[N].人民日报,2001-04-23.
① 赵曾海.招投标腐败频出背后[J].中国经济周刊,2011(7)：62-64.
① 周金娥.建设工程招投标中横向合谋现象分析及治理机制研究[D].天津理工大学,2010.
② 李智勇.串通投标行为及其监管[J]建筑,2005(5)：37-39.
① 李志勇.我国工程招投标中防腐败机制研究[D].西南交通大学,2003.
② 刘营.议《政府采购法》与《招标投标法》的冲突与法律适用[J].中国政府采购,2011(8)：44-46.
① 刘营.议《政府采购法》与《招标投标法》的冲突与法律适用[J].中国政府采购,2011(8)：44-46.
① 丁毅中.《招标投标法律制度研究》[D],黑龙江大学,2003,P46。
① 王宏,周勤.拍卖中的合谋与腐败研究综述[J].产业经济评论,2011,10(2)：62-114.
② 李秀玲.我国政府采购招标中的合谋与防合谋研究——以均值招标法与综合评标法为例[D],P5.华南师范大学硕士学位论文,2007.
③ 陈卫萍.工程建设项目招投标串通问题及对策研究[D],P15-16.国防科学技术大学,2009.
①周金娥.建设工程招投标中横向合谋现象分析及治理机制研究[D].天津理工大学,2010.
王宏,陈宏民,杨剑侠.多维信息招投标中的最优机制及其实施[J].管理科学学报.2010,13(8)：1-13.
①刘春晖.拍卖(招投标)中的若干腐败问题研究[D].天津大学,2006.
② Che Y K. Design competition through multi-dimensional auctions[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4): 668-680.
③ Shulin Liu, Jun Li, De Liu. Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers. Economics Letters, 2012,115(3):408-411.
① McAfee, P., McMillan, J. Bidding rings. American Economic Review,1992,82(3):579-599.
① Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx. Bidder collusion. Journal of Economic Theory,2007,133 (1):374-402.
① 张利荣,王素梅.一级密封招标的最优报价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(6)：121-124。
② McAfee, P., McMillan, J. Bidding rings. American Economic Review,1992,82(3):579-599.
① Vijay Krishna.拍卖理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2010,P14.
② Charles J. Thomas. Using reserve price to deter collusion in procurement competition. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2005,53(3):301-326.
① 王平平.拍卖机制中最优保留价比较分析[J].科技和产业.2004,4(12)：20-22.
② 杨颖梅,王文举.招标支付等价性及最优保留价博弈分析[J].经济与管理研究.2007(11)：54-58.
① Charles J. Thomas. Using reserve price to deter collusion in procurement competition. Journal of Industrial Economics, 2005,53(3):301-326.
② 卢现祥,朱巧玲.新制度经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2007,P149-153.
① 周金娥.建设工程招投标中横向合谋现象分析及治理机制研究[D].天津理工大学,2010.
② 财政部颁布的《企业会计准则——关联方关系及其交易的披露》(财会字[1997]21号)对关联关系的定义：在企业财务和经营决策中,一方有能力直接或间接控制、共同控制另一方或对另一方施加重大影响,或两方或多方同受一方控制的情形。例如：直接或间接地控制其他企业或受其他企业控制,以及同受某一企业控制的两个或多个企业(例如：母公司、子公司、受同一母公司控制的子公司之间)；合营企业；联营企业；主要投资者个人、关键管理人员或与其关系密切的家庭成员；受主要投资者个人、关键管理人员或与其关系密切的家庭成员直接控制的其他企业。
③ P. Bajari, L. Ye. Competition versus collusion in procurement auctions:identification and testing[R]. Stanford University Working Paper,2001.
④ P. Bajari, L. Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,2003,85 (4):971-989.
① Rieko Ishii (Favor exchange in collusion:Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,27 (2):137-144.)对日本冲绳那霸市4个财政年度(2001-2004)的175个政府拆迁工程补偿咨询合同拍卖数据进行了统计分析,发现可将所有投标报价大致分为两组不同类型：第一类报价数据具有较低方差和较高中标价格占比,说明其合谋性较强；第二类报价数据具有较高方差和较低中标价格占比,说明其竞争性较强。
② P. Bajari, L. Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics,2003,85 (4):971-989.
③ Sidhartha S. Padhi, Pratap K.J. Mohapatra. Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions[J]. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2011,17 (4):207-221.
④ Sidhartha S. Padhi, Pratap K.J. Mohapatra. Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions[J]. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2011,17 (4):207-221.
① Mathews, P.G.. Design of experiments with MINITAB. Pearson Education Pvt. Ltd, Singapore,2005.
① 王宏,周勤.拍卖中的合谋与腐败研究综述[J].产业经济评论,2011,10(2)：62-114.
② 广元市通报五起招投标领域违规违法典型案例[EB/OL]. http://www.ctba.org.cn/list_show.jsp?record_id=207009, 2013-09-12.
① Yvan Lengwiler, Elmar Wolfstetter. Auctions and corruption:An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2010,34 (10):1872-1892.
② Roberto Burguet. Yeon-Koo Che. Competitive procurement with corruption. Rand Journal of Economies,2004,35(1):50-68.
① 王宏,陈宏民,杨剑侠.多维信息招投标中的最优机制及其实施[J].管理科学学报.2010,13(8)：1-13.
② Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort(陈志俊等译).激励理论(第一卷)委托—代理模型[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P105.
① Yeon-Koo Che. Design competition through multi-dimensional auctions[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4): 668-680.
② Shulin Liu, Jun Li, De Liu. Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers. Economics Letters, 2012,115(3):408-411.
① Roberto Burguet. Yeon-Koo Che. Competitive procurement with corruption. Rand Journal of Economies,2004,35(1):50-68.
① Vijay Krishna.拍卖理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2010,P14.
① Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort(陈志俊等译).激励理论(第一卷)委托—代理模型[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P28.
① Yeon-Koo Che. Design competition through multi-dimensional auctions[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4): 668-680.
① Marco Celentani, Juan-Jose Ganuza. Corruption and competition in procurement. European Economic Review,2002,46 (7):1273-1303.
① 陈卫萍.工程建设项目招投标串通问题及对策研究[D].国防科学技术大学,2009.
① 全国查处3305件工程建设招投标环节违纪违法案件[EB/OL].http://www.ctba.org.cn/list_show.jsp?record_id=173289,2012-04-28.
① 曹星钊.我国代建制的发展现状及推广意义[J].中国招标,2013(33)：23-25.
①蒋德.检察官解密建设领域招投标腐败五大花招[N].法制日报,2008-3-28.
① 张红岩,张文杰.集中招标采购对投标人的机制设计研究[J].中国软科学,2008(5)：129-135.
① 重庆江北探索分权制衡一把手：不直接分管人财物[EB/OL].
① Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim. Optimal collusion-proof auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,2009,144 (2):565-603.
① 雷蕾,谭跃进.招标评标方法的适用性研究[J].空军工程大学学报(自然科学版),2003(3)：87-91。
② 张莹.我国招标投标的理论与实践研究[D].浙江大学,2002。
①童佳民.无标底招标的两种评标标准[J].国际经济合作,2002(2)：31-33。
② Emmanuelle Auriol. Corruption in procurement and public purchase. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2006,24 (5):867-885.
[1]贺国强.在中国共产党第十七届中央纪律检查委员会第六次全体会议上的工作报告[R].2011,1.
[2]贺国强.在中国共产党第十七届中央纪律检查委员会第七次全体会议上的工作报告[R].2012,1.
[3]孙国祥.招投标仍是预防工程建设领域腐败的重点[N].检察日报,2009-09-01.
[4]陈柏新.遏制招投标腐败需多措并举[J].建筑,2011(15)：24-25.
[5]王研.遏制招投标领域腐败需制度创新[N].经济参考报,2011-10-13.
[6]江毅.(新华时评)招投标腐败泛滥源于打击不力[N].新华网,2009-09-07.
[7]胡锦武,周立权.“无标不串”成招投标领域公开秘密[N].经济参考报,2011-09-15.
[8]周斌.业内流传“无标不串”反腐利器亦被腐蚀围标串标陪标成招投标潜规则[N].法制日报,2009-11-19.
[9]赵青松.招投标机制设计及应用研究[D].国防科学技术大学,2001.
[10]赵道致,张文慧.招投标中的激励机制设计[J].现代财经,2002,22(11)：12-15.
[11]李志勇.我国工程招投标中防腐败机制研究[D].西南交通大学,2003.
[12]付晓灵.浅析工程招投标中的激励机制[J].工程建设与设计,2003(12)：26-28.
[13]邓培林,张瑞明.招投标腐败行为博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2003,38(6)：690-693.
[14]夏杰长,杨欣.政府竞争性招标采购中的寻租行为分析[J].财贸经济,2003(4)：52-55.
[15]张莹.招标投标机制的经济学分析(一)[J].中国招标,2004(41)：4-7.
[16]张莹.招标投标机制的经济学分析(二)[J].中国招标,2004(46)：19-23.
[17]张莹.招标投标机制的经济学分析(三)[J].中国招标,2004(51)：4-6.
[18]王宗胜.两种密封招标效率的对比分析——博弈论视角[J].河南商业高等专科学校学报,2004,17(2)：31-34.
[19]李玉萍,于萍.招标投标制度的博弈分析及“寻租”问题[J].山东化工,2005,34(4)：52-54.
[20]马东艳.建设工程招投标寻租研究[D].重庆大学,2007.
[21]王琛.建筑市场寻租与完善招投标机制的研究[D].西安建筑科技大学,2004.
[22]刘春晖.拍卖(招投标)中的若干腐败问题研究[D].天津大学,2006.
[23]赵娜.我国招标投标法律制度的经济分析[D].天津大学,2008.
[24]罗伟,王孟钧.机制设计理论与中国建筑市场[J].统计与决策,2008(7)：78-81.
[25]陈卫萍.工程建设项目招投标串通问题及对策研究[D].国防科学技术大学,2009.
[26]周金娥.建设工程招投标中横向合谋现象分析及治理机制研究[D].天津理工大学,2010.
[27]黄严.工程串通投标收益计算与分析[J].中国招标,2010(4)：9-12.
[28]李智勇.串通投标行为及其监管[J].建筑,2005(5)：37-39.
[29]何红峰.基于合同管理的招标理论研究[D].天津大学,2006.
[30]武晋伟.串通招投标法律问题研究[D].天津大学,2006.
[31]胡彦.我国招标投标法律问题的研究[D].郑州大学,2006.
[32]吴旭丹.工程招投标中法律问题的研究[J].建筑管理现代化,2007(4)：47-50.
[33]程功浩.我国招标投标机制研究[D].北京交通大学,2007.
[34]金健.‘我国工程建设招投标监督机制的问题分析及对策研究[D].华东师范大学,2007.
[35]赵德兵.我国招投标制度中存在的问题与完善[D].安徽大学,2007.
[36]王岩.我国招投标活动中防治商业贿赂问题研究[D].郑州大学,2007.
[37]刘同祝.建筑工程项目投标监管机制研究[D].山东师范大学,2008.
[38]廖勇.工程招投标过程中的规范化及对策研究[D].重庆大学,2008.
[39]房艳丽.甘肃省招标投标监管机制的改革与完善[D].兰州大学,2010.
[40]胡冰.建设工程“黑白合同”法律效力问题探讨[J].山西建筑,2010,36(28)：199-200.
[41]杨建强.完善招标投标法促进招投标市场健康发展——关于完善招标投标法的几点思考[J].建筑市场与招标投标,2010(3)：49-351.
[42]秦萍丽.招投标领域预防腐败策略研究——以甘肃为例[D].兰州大学,201 0.
[43]周德兵.完善招投标监管制度的法律思考[J].重庆与世界,2011,28(11)：24-26.
[44]胡菲.我国建设工程招投标法律制度的研究[D].复旦大学,2011.
[45]赖剑凌.投标参与者的权益保护[D].中国政法大学,2011.
[46]秦刚.工程建设招投标监管机制问题与对策研究[D].天津大学,2011.
[47]宿燕.我国建筑市场信用体系构建的研究[D].武汉理工大学,2007.
[48]马晓军.试议国有大型企业集团招标管理工作[J].甘肃科技,2007(11)：161-162.
[49]曾碧红.国有企业招投标中的监督反思[J].金融经济,2008(14)：14-15.
[50]尚莉,石建华.建设工程企业自主招标模式的研究[J].山西建筑,2008,11(21)：223-224.
[51]郝建丽.谈大型国有企业内部招投标的实践与发展[J].山西建筑,2009,35(16)：253-254.
[52]杨位星,满令元.企业招标采购过程中的审计监督[J].中国招标,2010(46)：17-18.
[53]颜成慧.电力工程建设领域反腐败工作研究[J].贵州水利发电,2011,25(5)：82-85.
[54]席宇鹏,权力.企业自行招标存在的问题及对策[J].中国钼业,2008(5)：54-55.
[55]Emblen D. Competitive bidding for corporate securities. Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia university, New York,1944.
[56]Friedman L. A Competitive bidding strategy[J]. Operations Researeh,1956,4(1):104-112.
[57]Myerson R, Swatterthaite M. Efficient mechanisms of bilateral trading[J]. Journal of Economic Theory,1983(28),265-81.
[58]Richard Engelbreeht-Wiggans. The effect of regret on optimal biding in auctions. Management Sciences,1989.
[59]刘禹.工程建设招投标的博弈分析与体制设计[J].建筑经济,2004(10)：33-35.
[60]洪宇.应用第二价格密封拍卖理论的招标模式研究[D].天津大学,2005.
[61]秦旋.对策理论模型下的招标机制与投标策略研究[D].天津大学,2005.
[62]李勇.工程量清单计价模式下招投标制度发展的探讨[J].山西建筑,2009,35(23)：271-272.
[63]李漫江.卖方市场条件下的招投标方式研究[D].长沙理工大学,2010.
[64]苏明辉.招投标过程中招标人常见的问题及改进意见的探讨[J].陕西建筑,2007(8)：52-55.
[65]韦世明.招标文件编制中若干问题的探讨[J].西部交通科技,2008(1)：113-116.
[66]李友春.浅谈招标文件漏洞分析与巧妙利用[J].山西建筑,2009,35(27)：256-257.
[67]张利荣,王素梅.一级密封招标的最优报价策略研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2005(6)：121-124.
[68]McAfee, P., McMillan, J. Bidding rings. American Economic Review,1992, 82(3):579-599.
[69]Marco Celentani, Juan-Jose Ganuza. Corruption and competition in procurement. European Economic Review,2002,46 (7):1273-1303.
[70]Masaki Aoyagi. Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,2003,112 (1):79-105.
[71]Andrzej Skrzypacz, Hugo Hopenhayn. Tacit collusion in repeated auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,2004,114 (1):153-169.
[72]Csaba Csaki, Peter Gelleri. Conditions and benefits of applying decision technological solutions as a tool to curb corruption within the procurement process:The case of Hungary. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2005,11 (5-6):252-259.
[73]Ryan Porter, Yoav Shoham. On cheating in sealed-bid auctions. Decision Support Systems,2005,39(1):41-54.
[74]Charles J. Thomas. Using reserve price to deter collusion in procurement competition. Journal of Industrial Economics,2005,53(3):301-326.
[75]Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro. Corruption and auctions. Journal of Mathematical Economics,2006,42 (1):97-108.
[76]Leandro Arozamena, Federico Weinschelbaum. The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions. European Economic Review,2009,53(6):645-657.
[77]Yvan Lengwiler, Elmar Wolfstetter. Auctions and corruption:An analysis of bid rigging by a corrupt auctioneer. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,2010, 34 (10):1872-1892.
[78]Emmanuelle Auriol. Corruption in procurement and public purchase. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2006,24 (5):867-885.
[79]Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx. Bidder collusion. Journal of Economic Theory, 2007,133 (1):374-402.
[80]Vianney Dequiedt. Efficient collusion in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,2007,136 (1):302-323.
[81]Prabal Roy Chowdhury. Controlling collusion in auctions:The role of ceilings and reserve prices. Economics Letters,2008,98 (3):240-246.
[82]Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim. Optimal collusion-proof auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,2009,144 (2):565-603.
[83]Nicolas Gruyer. Optimal auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders. The Journal of Industrial Economics,2009,57(4):835-850.
[84]Gil Kivetz, Yair Tauman. Simple collusive agreements in one-shot first-price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior,2010,69(1):138-149.
[85]Hong Wang. Contingent payment auction mechanism in multidimensional procurement auctions. European Journal of Operational Research,2012,224 (2): 404-413.
[86]Shiran Rachmilevitch. Bribing in first-price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 2013,77(1):214-228.
[87]张红岩,张文杰.集中招标采购对投标人的机制设计研究[J].中国软科学,2008(5)：129-135.
[88]张鼎祖,赵华.建设项目招投标合谋防范对策研究[J].建筑经济,2008(6)：100-103.
[89]王园园.不同评标规则下工程招投标中的串标问题研究[D].西南交通大学,2009.
[90]吴长才.公路建设项目围标串标行为研究[D].中南大学,2009.
[91]Anthony M. Kwasnica. The choice of cooperative strategies in sealed bid auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2000,42(3):323-346.
[92]Katerina Sherstyuk. Collusion in private value ascending price auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2002,48 (2):177-195.
[93]Douglas D. Davis, Bart J. Wilson. Collusion in procurement auctions:an experimental examination. Economic Inquiry,2002,40(2):213-230.
[94]Astri Muren, Roger Pyddoke. Collusion without communication. Information Economics and Policy,2006,18 (1):43-54.
[95]Anthony M. Kwasnica, Katerina Sherstyuk. Collusion and equilibrium selection in auctions. The Economic Journal,2007,117(516):120-145.
[96]Jin Li and Charles r. Plott. Tacit collusion in auctions and conditions for its facilitation and prevention:equilibrium selection in laboratory experimental markets. Economic Inquiry,2009,47(3):425-448.
[97]Michel Mougeot, Florence Naegelen, Benjamin Pelloux, Jean-louis Rulliere. Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation:An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Markets. Journal of Public Economic Theory,2011,13(5):829-856.
[98]Atsushi Iimi. (Anti-)Competitive effect of joint bidding:evidence from ODA procurement auctions. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,2004,18 (3):416-439.
[99]Michael K. Price. Using the spatial distribution of bidders to detect collusion in the marketplace:evidence from timber auctions. Journal of Regional Science,2008, 48(2):399-417.
[100]Rieko Ishii. Favor exchange in collusion:Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,27 (2): 137-144.
[101]Patrick Bajari, Jungwon Yeo. Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions. Information Economics and Policy,2009,21(2):90-100.
[102]Fei Dong, Sol M. Shatz, Haiping Xu. Combating online in-auction fraud:Clues, techniques and challenges. Computer Science Review,2009,3(4):245-258.
[103]Sidhartha S. Padhi, Pratap K.J. Mohapatra. Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management,2011,17 (4): 207-221.
[104]Koki Arai, Ikuo Ishibashi, Rieko Ishii-Ishibashi. Research and analysis on bid rigging mechanisms. Japan and the World Economy,2011,23 (1):1-5.
[105]Pablo Ballesteros-Perez, Ma Carmen Gonzalez-Cruz, Antonio Canavate-Grimal, Eugenio Pellicer. Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering. Automation in Construction,2013,31 (5):215-229.
[106]Gaurab Aryal, Maria F. Gabrielli. Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2013,31(1):26-35.
[107]Patrick Bajari, Lixin Ye. Deciding between competition and collusion. The Review of Economics and Statistics,2003,85:971-989.
[108]Hubbard T.P., Paarsch H.J.. Investigating bid preferences at low-price, sealed-bid auctions with endogenous participation. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2009,17:1-14.
[109]马俊,邱菀华,张浩.招投标决策模型及其应用[J].北京航空航天大学学报,2000,26(4)：470472.
[110]詹文杰,张金隆,杨洁.二阶段投标商评价方法[J].武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版),2002,24(3)：96-99.
[111]雷蕾,谭跃进.招标评标方法的适用性研究[J].空军工程大学学报(自然科学版),2003(3)：87-91.
[112]郭薪.公路招投标“专家评审—抽签中标法”研究[D].国防科学技术大学,2005.
[113]万江.多层次模糊评价法在科技招标项目评标中的应用[J].科技和产业,2005,8(8)：17-23.
[114]王志强,邵良杉.基于AHP的标书模糊综合评价方法[J].科技情报开发与经济,2007,17(9)：176-178.
[115]刘春杰.网上科技项目招投标评标机制设计与系统设计实现[D].哈尔滨工业大学,2006.
[116]秦旋,何伯森.招投标机制的本质及最低价中标法的理论分析[J].中国港湾建设,2006(6)：61-64.
[117]邢会歌,王卓甫,陈云祥.工程招标交易之标底设计研究[J].建筑经济,2007(11)：114-116.
[118]董巧婷,解海顺,李明.评标价确定方法研究[J].建筑经济,2007(8)：105-108.
[119]李秀玲.我国政府采购招标中的串谋与防串谋研究——以均值招标法与综合评标法为例[D].华南师范大学,2007.
[120]樊文厂.经评审的最低投标价法的研究[D].大津大学,2008.
[121]张宝魁,马清珍.经评审的最低投标价确定方法研究[J].铁路工程造价管理,2009(1)：16-19.
[122]陆军.论评标专家的规制与管理[J].机电信息,2008,176(2)：5-10.
[123]李菁菁.国家投资建设项目网上招投标研究[D].电子科技大学,2009.
[124]崔东红,杨榕,姚莉.基于灰色模糊理想解的资格预审评审模型[J].沈阳工业大学学报(社会科学版),2010,3(10)：355-360.
[125]陈林刚,蒋柳柏.资格预审改为资格后审的利与弊[J].中国招标,2009(32)：10-11.
[126]童佳民.无标底招标的两种评标标准[J].国际经济合作,2002(2)：31-33.
[127]陈艳,宋国贵.评标方法和标准之比较[J].中国招标,2008(1)：24-27.
[128]李芳,雷春美.“均价法”的“阳光效应”[N].中国纪检监察报,2008-12-16.
[129]T.S. Liao, M.T. Wang, H.P. Tserng. A framework of electronic tendering for government procurement:a lesson learned in Taiwan. Automation in Construction, 2002,11(6):731-742.
[130]Pin-Yu Chu, Naiyi Hsiao, Fung-Wu Lee, Chun-Wei Chen. Exploring success factors for Taiwan's government electronic tendering system:behavioral perspectives from end users. Government Information Quarterly,2004,21 (2):219-234.
[131]Wen-Shenq Juang, Horng-Twu Liaw, Po-Chou Lin, Chi-Kai Lin. The design of a secure and fair sealed-bid auction service. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 2005,41 (8-9):973-985.
[132]Thomas Barnebeck Andersen. E-Government as an anti-corruption strategy. Information Economics and Policy,2009,21 (3):201-210.
[133]Seongcheol Kim, Hyun Jeong Kim, Heejin Lee. An institutional analysis of an e-government system for anti-corruption:The case of OPEN. Government Information Quarterly,2009,26 (1):42-50.
[134]Dong-Her Shih, David C. Yen, Chih-Hung Cheng, Ming-Hung Shih. A secure multi-item e-auction mechanism with bid privacy. Computers & Security,2011,30 (4):273-287.
[135]Hu Xiong, Zhong Chen, Fagen Li. Bidder-anonymous English auction protocol based on revocable ring signature. Expert Systems with Applications,2012,39 (8): 7062-7066.
[136]徐讳.电子招标系统应用模式研究[D].上海交通大学,2008.
[137]胡珊.中国招投标的发展趋势[J].经济,2009(9)：72-73.
[138]谭杰.政府电子招投标机制的构建与实现研究[D].中南大学,2009.
[139]张莹.推进招投标电子化平台建设的思考[J].中国招标,2010(49)：21-22.
[140]黄素龙.推动网上招投标实现科技防腐、绿色交易[J].建筑市场与招标投标,2011(2)：21-23.
[141]张本松,刘宝春,胡波.网上招标投标的实践与创新[J].中国招标,2011(44)：12-15.
[142]达峻.推进工程电子化招投标的再思考[J].建筑经济,2011(6)：55-58.
[143]朱建元.中国电子化招标投标制度建设[J].建筑市场与招标投标,2012(2)：34-36.
[144]R.Mark Isaac, James M. Walker. Information and conspiracy in sealed bid auctions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,1985,6(2):139-159.
[145]Dan Levin,James L.Smith. Optimal reservation in auction[J]. The Economic Journal,1996,106(9):1271-1283.
[146]Dong-Her Shih, Hsin-Yi Huang, David C. Yen. A secure reverse Vickrey auction scheme with bid privacy. Information Sciences,2006,176 (5):550-564.
[147]Andreas Blume, Paul Heidhues. Private monitoring in auctions. Journal of Economic Theory,2006,131(1):179-211.
[148]Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim. Robustly collusion-proof implementation. Econometrica,2006,74(4):1063-1107.
[149]Mamata Jenamani, Yuhui Zhong, Bharat Bhargava. Cheating in online auction -Towards explaining the popularity of English auction. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications,2007,6(1):53-62.
[150]Katerina Sherstyuk, Jeremy Dulatre. Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions:Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2008,26 (2):557-572.
[151]Gregory Pavlov. Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions. Economics Letters,2008,26 (2):345-348.
[152]Claudio Mezzetti, Ilia Tsetlin. On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions. Journal of Mathematical Economics,2008,44 (9-10):1040-1048.
[153]Ken Hendricks, Robert Porter, Guofu Tan. Bidding rings and the winner's curse. The rand journal of economics,2008,39(4):1018-1041.
[154]Miguel Amaral, Stephane Saussier, Anne Yvrande-Billon. Auction procedures and competition in public services:The case of urban public transport in France and London. Utilities Policy,2009,17 (2):166-175.
[155]Omer Biran, Francoise Forges. Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values. Games and Economic Behavior,2011,73(1):52-64.
[156]Kirill Chernomaz. On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions:An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior,2012,76 (2): 690-710.
[157]Shulin Liu, Jun Li, De Liu. Multi-attribute procurement auctions with risk averse suppliers[J]. Economics Letters,2012,115(3):408-411.
[158]Yeon-Koo Che. Design competition through multi-dimensional auctions[J]. RAND Journal of Economics,1993,24(4):668-680.
[159]Roberto Burguet. Yeon-Koo Che. Competitive procurement with corruption. Rand Journal of Economies,2004,35(1):50-68.
[160]Jean-Jacques Laffont, Jean Tirole. Auction design and favoritism. International Journal of Industrial Organization,1991,9(1):9-42.
[161]Hansen R G. Auctions with Endogenous Quantity[J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1988,19:44-58.
[162]Levin Dan, Smith James L. Optimal reservation prices in auctions[J]. Economic Journal,1996,106:1271-1283.
[163]张莹.我国招标投标的理论与实践研究[D].浙江大学,2002.
[164]王彦,李楚霖.拍卖中的串通出价[J].管理工程学报,2004(3)：16-21.
[165]邵晓双,谭德庆.招投标理论研究现状[J].中国市场,2008(26)：101-102.
[166]王宏,周勤.拍卖中的合谋与腐败研究综述[J].产业经济评论,2011,10(2)：62-114.
[167]曾先科.基于博弈论的多属性拍卖模型与机制研究[D].哈尔滨工业大学,2010.
[168]殷红,王先甲.政府采购招标的最优机制设计[J].系统管理学报,2008,17(4)：366.
[169]王宏,陈宏民,杨剑侠.多维信息招投标中的最优机制及其实施[J].管理科学学报.2010,13(8)：1-13.
[170]王平平.拍卖机制中最优保留价比较分析[J].科技和产业,2004,4(12)：20-22.
[171]Vijay Krishna拍卖理论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2010.
[172]Paul Milgrom(杜黎等译).拍卖理论与实务[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2006.
[173]谢识予.经济博弈论(第二版)[M].上海：复旦大学出版社,2002.
[174]Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole(黄涛等译).博弈论[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[175]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2004.
[176]Jean-Jacques Laffont, David Martimort(陈志俊等译).激励理论(第一卷)委托—代理模型[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002.
[177]刘有贵,蒋年云.委托代理理论述评[J].学术界,2006(1)：69-78.
[178]Pranab Bardhan. The economist's approach to the problem of corruption. World Development,2006,34(2):341-348.
[179]Sevket Alper Koc, William S. Neilson. Interim bribery in auctions. Economics Letters,2008,99 (2):238-241.
[180]Christopher Kingston. Social structure and cultures of corruption. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,2008,67 (1):90-102.
[181]Monika Cule, Murray Fulton. Business culture and tax evasion:Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2009,72 (3):811-822.
[182]Antonio Estache, Lourdes Trujillo. Corruption and infrastructure services:An overview. Utilities Policy,2009,17 (2):153-155.
[183]Pierre-Guillaume Meon, Laurent Weill. Is Corruption an Efficient Grease? World Development,2010,38 (3):244-259.
[184]Ase Berit Gr(?)deland, Aadne Aasland. Fighting corruption in public procurement in post-communist states:Obstacles and solutions. Communist and Post-Communist Studies,2011,44(1):17-32.
[185]Bin Dong, Benno Torgler. Causes of corruption:Evidence from China. China Economic Review, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 2 October 2012.
[186]Ulli Arnold, Joerg Neubauer, Tobias Schoenherr. Explicating factors for companies' inclination towards corruption in Operations and supply chain management:An exploratory study in Germany. International Journal of Production Economics,2012, 138(1):136-147.
[187]Nnaoke Ufere, Sheri Perelli, Richard Boland, Bo Carlsson. Merchants of Corruption: How Entrepreneurs Manufacture and Supply Bribes. World Development, In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online 2 July 2012.
[188]熊光清.当前中国的腐败问题与反腐败策略[J].社会科学研究,2011(5)：53-58.
[189]陈雷雷.论当前中国的腐败问题与制度反腐[J].经济研究导刊,2010(1)：217-218.
[190]易正春.多学科视角下的腐败问题研究[J].科协论坛(下半月),2007(1)：3-6.
[191]余东华.商业代理行为的博弈分析[J].商业研究,2004(10)：9-11.
[192]邹波.腐败与委托代理失灵[J].中国发展,2002(2)：59-62.
[193]孙恒山.“腐败”概念的分析与刑法学思考[J].当代法学,2005,19(1)：99-104.
[194]刘仁军,胡立君.企业创租行为分析[J].中南财经大学学报,2001(2)：69-72.
[195]赵文华,安立仁,席酉民.国有企业中共谋问题的研究[J].中国软科学,1998(8)：90-94.
[196]安立仁,赵文华,席酉民.腐败问题的博弈分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,1999(9)：33-40.
[197]李致平,董梅生.腐败的三方动态博弈模型及其治理对策[J].运筹与管理,2003,12(3)：27-31.
[198]任建明,杜志洲.腐败与反腐败：理论、模型和方法[M].北京：清华大学出版社,2009.
[199]张云鹏.反腐败经济学[M].北京：社会科学文献出版社,2009.
[200]张岚.廉政风险防范管理[M].北京：学习出版社,2009.
[201]庄德水.廉政风险管理的分析框架：理论、过程和机制[J].广州大学学报(社会科 学版),2011,10(10)：5-10.
[202]刘钧.风险管理概论[M]第2版.北京：清华大学出版社,2008.
[203]卢现祥,朱巧玲.新制度经济学[M].北京：北京大学出版社,2007.
[204]姜春海.腐败的经济学分析——基于成本收益的视角[J].河北经贸大学学报,2007,28(2)：19-22.
[205]查丽娟.建设工程招投标过程中串标问题分析及对策研究[D].郑州大学,2011.
[206]汪静,秦旋.不同制度下建筑市场行为主体合谋动因分析[J].建筑经济,2011(S1)：1-5.
[207]钟研.工程招标投标“十八怪”[N].人民日报,2001-04-23.
[208]刘心家,李学文.招投标体制缺陷及对策研究[J].中国招标,2008(52)：17-25.
[209]董海涛.当前我国工程招投标活动中存在的主要问题及对策建议[J].建筑经济,2003(8)：54-56.
[210]齐进.我国建设工程招标投标定标运行的现状、存在问题及建议[J].中国招标,2004(6)：37-38.
[211]王会霞.论招投标制度实施过程中存在问题及应对策略[J].建筑经济,2008(4)：344-345.
[212]马光明.招标投标工作中存在的问题及对策[J].行政管理改革,2010(4)：15-19.
[213]蒋德.检察官解密建设领域招投标腐败五大花招[N].法制日报,2008-3-28.
[214]招投标领域五大问题待破解[J].中国建材资讯,2009(5)：35-36.
[215]赵曾海.招投标腐败频出背后[J].中国经济周刊,2011(7)：62-64.
[216]刘营.议《政府采购法》与《招标投标法》的冲突与法律适用[J].中国政府采购,2011(8)：44-46.
[217]文杰.我们的差距在哪里——中美招投标比较[J].廉政瞭望,2005(2)：6-7.
[218]美国联邦政府采购方式变革及启示[EB/OL].http://www.ctba.org.cn/list_show.jsp?record_id=188166,2013-01-24.
[219]吴福良,胡建文.中美建设工程施工招标方法比较研究[J].建筑经济,2001(7)：11-13.
[220]袁平.德国招投标实践及对我们的启示[J].中国招标,2006(11)：28-29.
[221]德国政府采购制度简介[EB/OL].http://www.ctba.org.cn/list_show.jsp?record_id=134372,2010-08-17.
[222]杨丹华.法德两国招投标做法及其对我国的启示[J].中国招标,2010(3)：7-10.
[223]范建亭.日本防治公共工程串通投标行为的经验及其启示[J].现代日本经济,2009(1)：53-58.
[224]日本的工程招标投标制度[EB/OL]. http://www.jianshe99.com /new/66_161/2009_11_13_li960941582613111900214943.shtml,2009-11-13.
[225]吴旭丹.国际和国内工程招投标的差异对比[J].建筑市场与招标投标,2007(3)：33-34.
[226]美国政府采购制度[EB/OL].http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/wtogpa/govpzd/1166392.shtml,2010-08-26.
[227]德国政府采购制度[EB/OL].http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/wtogpa/govpzd/1166394.shtml,2010-08-26.
[228]日本政府采购制度[EB/OL].http://www.ccgp.gov.cn/wtogpa/govpzd/1166400.shtml,2010-08-26.
[229]田旭.发达国家的政府采购规制及借鉴.经济纵横,2005(6)：56-58.
[230]王玉辉,武晋伟.日本串通招投标规制机关研究——兼论我国立法时如何借鉴其优长处[J].河南大学学报(社会科学版),2006,46(4)：72-76.
[231]张晶.国外招投标的监督与管理[J].施工企业管理,2006(4)：24.
[232]梁晓梅.国内外工程招标的比较[J].中国招标,2004(36)：40-42.
[233]达峻.中外招投标模式的分析与比较[J].建设监理,2010(2)：34-37.
[234]李占荣,张滨,冯洋,等.国外招投标规则浅析[J].测绘与空间地理信息,2008,31(2)：34-36.
[235]姚栋强.我国的招标投标制度及中外比较[EB/OL].http://www.tjztb.gov.cn/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=199,2005-06-02.
[236]金永彬.我国招投标的发展现状及分析[J].山西建筑,2008,34(24)：251-252.
[237]贺攀明.建设工程项目招标投标制度比较研究[J].高等函授学报(自然科学版),2009,22(2)：5-7.
[238]侯龙.完善招投标制度是规范建筑市场治理工程腐败的关键[J].党风与廉政,2003(8)：10-12.
[239]姜帆.完善工程招标投标管理防止“围标”、”串标“行为[J].北方交通,2007(2)：81-83.
[240]陆先行,赵宁.招投标监管的”湖北模式”[N].中国纪检监察报,2008-06-03.
[241]涂小冬.浅谈如何完善招投标监管体系[J].中国招标,2008(36)：15-16.
[242]李小勇.如何加强对招投标全过程的监督管理[J].中国招标,2009(29)：9-11.
[243]刘鸣.对招投标综合监管工作的有益探索[J].中国招标,2009(38)：22-23.
[244]张栩杨.对加强招投标执法活动有效性监督的思考[J].消费导刊,2009(6)：146.
[245]吴俐萍,贺丽娜,蒋先虎.浅析如何完善招投标制度[J].广西城镇建 设,2010(4)：70-72.
[246]张道江,李玉国.浅议物资采购监督发现的问题及对策[J].北京石油管理干部学院学报,2010(3)：72-74.
[247]长丰构建阳光平台源头防治腐败——招投标实现零投诉[J].中国监察,2009(20).
[248]李少宏.浅谈招投标中的公平追求与业主权利[J].山西建筑,2010,36(1)：271-272.
[249]石民.浅议招投标领域腐败犯罪的成因与对策[J].法制与社会,2011(1)：73.
[250]芦苇.政府招投标中的廉政创新举措分析[J].九江学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2011(1)：48-50.
[251]杜晓,杨卉.抑制招投标领域腐败重在法律制度落实[N].法制日报,2011-12-07.
[252]张宝军.试论加强对招投标工作的监督[J].山西政报,2011(8)：42-43.
[253]李飞跃.如何防范建设工程项目恶意低价中标[J].山西建筑,2012,38(24)：256-257.
[254]Steinar Vagstad. Promoting fair competition in public procurement. Journal of Public Economics,1995,58 (2):283-307.
[255]Klaus Abbink. Staff rotation as an anti-corruption policy:an experimental study. European Journal of Political Economy,2004,20 (4):887-906.