摘要
在经济区域化浪潮兴起的今天,对任何一个国家或地区而言,首当其冲的问题不是争论经济全球化或区域化的经济体系,哪个对全球经济的长远发展更有利,而是研究如何在这一浪潮中做出对本国经济的长期可持续发展最有利的决策。因为不论哪种体系是世界经济发展的最优选择,现实已经选择了区域经济一体化的发展模式,即使这可能是一种次优选择,但也是任何一个国家或地区都无力去改变的现实。在区域经济一体化的过程中,不同的贸易政策安排对国内和国际层面不同利益主体的影响都是“非中性”的,由于这种政策安排通常都是通过谈判达成的,因此,如何在谈判中确定本国的策略、预期对方的策略并估计可能的收益就成为了各国或地区在谈判中的核心工作。
由于在不同形式的区域经济一体化组织中的谈判原则相近,谈判所采取的策略和评估原则相似,因此本文以目前最盛行的区域经济一体化形式——双边FTA的谈判为研究对象,对其谈判过程进行具体分析。目前,国内对于双边FTA谈判的研究在对象和方法上都存在有一定的局限性。一方面,国内大部分关于双边FTA的研究都集中于不同的贸易政策将会怎样影响各国的经济发展、贸易增长乃至国民福利等,却很少有文献去研究现实中的贸易政策和国际贸易规则是如何制定的。但实际上,贸易政策和规则一经制定,在其他条件不变的情况下,其对经济的潜在影响范围和程度也就已经大致界定了。因此,本文的研究重点是探寻在双边FTA谈判过程中,贸易政策是如何形成的这一根本问题。对于这一问题的阐述、分析和理解将有利于对贸易政策进行更深入的分析。
另一方面,国内关于贸易谈判的文献大多局限于对谈判技巧和案例的分析上,从理论和方法角度的研究还不多见。根据本文的研究,目前尚没有单一某项理论可以彻底阐释双边FTA谈判的整个过程,因此,本文的主要目标是建立双边FTA谈判系统模型,其中需要创建和应用联合指数分析、双层博弈理论框架、局部和一般均衡以及逆向分析等理论和方法,并在此基础上建立可计算模型对双边FTA谈判进行量化分析。从技术角度看,双层博弈理论、局部和一般均衡理论都无法直接应用于本文的定量研究。到目前为止,双层博弈理论仍然没有严格的数理模型框架,而且博弈论得到均衡解的基础仍然是局部均衡理论。同时,GTAP模型的应用仍然停留在从外生政策冲击到潜在经济影响的单方向。因此,通过深化以上理论和模型的应用,本文将从建立双层博弈理论的数理框架、深化应用GTAP模型、应用GTAP模拟结果进行逆向分析来完善博弈均衡解等技术方面着手开展研究。
基于理论和现实的需要,本文沿着理论和技术相结合的思路,分五章对双边FTA谈判进行分析。
第一章论述了FTA在全世界范围内迅速发展的背景下,为解决我国积极实行自由贸易区战略过程中遇到的问题和不足,并为我国FTA谈判提供重要的定量决策参考方法和依据,本文尝试通过利用数理分析和计算机软件等工具建立一个双边FTA谈判模型,使我国可以更有效的选择、影响和参与FTA谈判及相关贸易规则的制定。这一尝试不仅可以缩短谈判周期,还可以提高谈判分析和决策的能力,提高谈判效率。因此,本文的研究不仅具有重要的理论意义,更具有实际应用的价值。
第二章评述了双边FTA谈判的相关理论,即区域经济一体化理论、双层博弈理论、CGE理论和GTAP模型。通过对相关理论的评述,本章确定了进一步深入研究的空间:(1)联合应用指数分析谈判标的,建立谈判标的综合分类标准并归纳出其适用谈判策略;(2)根据双层博弈理论的定性分析框架建立相应的数理分析框架;(3)根据双边FTA谈判特点,将国内博弈分析转化为局部均衡分析并建立数理模型框架;(4)根据双边FTA谈判特点,分析、调整和简化应用国际层面博弈的动态模型;(5)沿区域经济一体化理论的发展路径和可计算一般均衡理论以及GTAP模型,深入研究贸易政策变化后对不同国家或地区和不同部门的经济影响;(6)应用GTAP模拟结果建立逆向分析方法,完善博弈和局部均衡分析的不足,以便得到最优谈判策略。
第三章在分析和建立多个阶段的独立模型的基础上,合成建立了双边FTA谈判模型:(1)谈判准备阶段。研究双边FTA谈判的主要要素及其逻辑联系,通过对谈判标的进行联合指数分析,本章建立了谈判标的综合分类标准并确定其适用策略范围的框架标准;(2)正式谈判阶段。根据双边FTA谈判特点,在分别建立国内局部均衡模型和国际动态博弈模型的基础上,本章构建了双边FTA谈判的双层博弈数理框架。虽然本章借用双层博弈理论框架,但是本章的国内和国际两层博弈顺序和最终策略决定方式都与原理论有所不同;(3)谈判终局阶段。通过深化GTAP模型的应用并建立逆向分析方法,本章建立了谈判策略的逆向选择模型。
第四章通过对中韩FTA谈判的实证分析,应用和检验本文建立的谈判模型:(1)谈判准备阶段。以产业为标准对谈判标的进行分类,通过应用多项指数综合分析标的,本章确定了不同产业的谈判重要性分类及其适用的策略;(2)国内谈判阶段。以阿明顿假设为基础建立局部均衡模型,结合对韩国谈判策略坐标设定,本章分析出韩国关税每1%的变化所对应中国关税变化百分比;(3)国际谈判阶段。应用双边动态博弈模型,结合设定的谈判进程速度和国内局部均衡结果,本章分析出可能的国际谈判均衡解;(4)在更新GTAP宏观和关税数据并对比应用长期和短期闭合的基础上,结合国内和国际谈判可能达成的策略组合,分别模拟出双方不同部门受到的潜在影响;(5)应用GTAP模拟结果逆向分析国内策略和国际策略,本章界定出第三章建立模型的有效性范围,并进一步完善了谈判模型的策略选择。
第五章将谈判模型与政治因素相结合,分析在政治因素影响下,谈判模型的相关假设和参数的变化对谈判结果的影响,并定性地分析得到谈判策略选择的变化及其有效性:当本文模型中的政府对双边FTA的建立存在政治意愿时,最终的策略选择及其有效性将同时受到政治和经济因素的双重影响。
最后,总结全文,在结合理论与实证分析的基础上归纳出本文启示:(1)综合多项理论联合建立双边FTA谈判系统模型是有效并可以进行实际操作的,同时可以弥补单一理论的不足,找到最优的谈判策略组合;(2)加强沟通和交流,建立合作意愿便于双边FTA的达成;(3)按照谈判意愿原则正确寻找谈判伙伴、发挥比较优势有助于双边FTA发挥积极作用。同时,还评述了本文的潜在不足和可以改进并继续未来研究之处。
通过以上理论和实证两方面研究,本文针对双边FTA货物贸易谈判创立了多个独立的分析方法和定量模型,并依据理论将这些独立模型之间的输入条件和输出结果互相联结,从而综合建立了一个双边FTA谈判系统研究模型。同时,通过实证研究,本文证实了这一系统模型具有理论创新和现实操作的积极意义。当然,本文由于受到部分产业数据不可获得,以及作者对动态局部和一般均衡理论与建模技术掌握不够全面的限制,对多目标局部均衡的研究还不够,未能找到对谈判涉及的主观因素进行精确客观描述的变量,未能将整体趋势分析模型的结果和量化分析模型的结果进行有效融合等。希望在今后的研究中还可以在更加细分谈判标的基础上,建立考察更多变量的动态局部均衡模型,深化应用动态一般均衡模型,对定量和定性数据进行有效融合等改进,从而可以更精确地对最优策略和潜在经济影响进行研究。
In the current trend of regional economic integration, the most important task for all countries and areas is not to debate whether the world economy will benefit more from the globalization or from regional economic integration in the long run, but to work out how to make the most favorable decision to the sustainable development of domestic economy. In respect that whichever is the best option, it is reality that the global economy has taken the economic regionalization as its current development model and no country or region could change this, even if it may be a second best choice. In the process of regional economic integration, different trade policy arrangements have non-neutral influences on different interest group, both in domestic and international economy. Since this kind of arrangements are usually reached through negotiations, thus, how to define domestic strategies, anticipate strategies of negotiating partners and estimate the potential effects have become the core issue for all negotiating sides.
Considering that regional economic integration organizations have different forms but share similar principles, strategies and estimation rules in negotiations, this paper take bilateral FTA negotiation, which is the most prevalent form of regional economic integration, as the analysis subject to study its process in details. Presently, domestic bilateral FTA negotiations studies have some limitations on subjects and methods. On the one hand, most researches on the bilateral FTA focus on how different trade policies affect the economic development, trade growth and the national welfare, but few of them explores how trade policies and international trade rules are defined. But in fact, once the trade policies and rules have been established, given the situations that other conditions remain unchanged, their potential scope and extent of impacts on the economy are also roughly defined. Therefore, this paper focuses on exploring how trade policies are established in the process of bilateral FTA negotiations. Expatiating, analyzing and understanding of this issue would be helpful for deepening analysis of trade policies.
On the other hand, a lot of domestic studies of trade negotiations are limited in negotiating skills and case studies while few of them are conducted from the perspective of theories and methodologies. The paper found that there has not a single theory that could fully explain the whole process of bilateral FTA negotiations. Technically, up to the present, two-level game theory still does not have a rigorous mathematical framework, and an equilibrium solution of a game is still on the base of partial equilibrium theory. In additional, the application of GTAP model still remains in the one-way, from the exogenous policy shocks to the potential economic impacts. Therefore, by further applications of the above theories and models, the paper researches the mathematical framework for two-level game, deepens the application of GTAP model, and establishes the reverse analysis of equilibrium of games by using GTAP simulation results.
On the basis of theories and practices, the paper analyzes the bilateral FTA negotiations with the combination of theory and technique, consisting of five chapters as follows:
The first chapter reviews the rapid growth of FTAs and presents the problems and shortcomings during the process of China’s active implementation of Free Trade Area Strategy. In order to provide quantitative methodology, the goal of this paper is to establish a bilateral FTA negotiation model by means of mathematical analysis methods and softwares, so that our country could choose, influence and participate in FTA negotiations and other trade rules formulations in a more efficient way. Thus, it could not only shorten the period of negotiations, but also improve the capacity of negotiating analysis and decision-making, also the efficiency, which is both of great theoretical significance and high application value in practices.
The second chapter discusses the related theories of bilateral FTA negotiations, such as regional economic integration theories, two-level game theory, CGE theory and GTAP model. Along with these discussions, this paper will further studying the following parts: (1) Analyze the negotiating subjects with different indices and set a comprehensive classification for the subjects and conclude those corresponding strategies; (2) Extend two-level game theory from qualitative analysis to the establishment of its mathematical framework; (3) Transfer domestic game to partial equilibrium analysis and build a mathematical model framework according to the features of bilateral FTA negotiations. (4) Set up a dynamic game model in the international level based on bilateral FTA negotiations; (5) Further analysis on how trade policies affect different interest groups and sectors by following the development path of regional economic integration theories and combined with the Computable General Equilibrium Theory and application of GTAP model; (6) Establish and apply the reverse analysis of GTAP model solutions to perfect the game theory and partial equilibrium and conclude the optimal strategies.
The third chapter establishes a bilateral FTA negotiation model based on the linkages and establishment of several independent models for different negotiation stages. (1) For the preparatory stage, this chapter sets a comprehensive classification of the subjects and concludes their corresponding strategies by means of studying main elements of bilateral FTA negotiations and their logical links, combined indices. (2) For the formal negotiation stages, with the establishment of domestic partial equilibrium model and international dynamic game model, this part builds a mathematical framework of two-level game theory. However, although the chapter applies the two-level game theory, neither the order of domestic and international levels’games, nor the means of concluding final strategies is the same as the original theories. (3) For the final stage of the negotiation, this chapter sets up a reverse strategy analysis model by further application of GTAP model’s outputs.
The fourth chapter, by empirically analyzing China-Korea FTA negotiation, applies and tests the model established in the previous chapter. (1) For the preparatory stage, the chapter classifies the negotiation subjects by industries and applies comprehensive analysis of indices. Thus, it concludes the negotiating significance and corresponding strategies of different industries. (2) For the domestic-level negotiation stage, the chapter establishes the partial equilibrium model on the basis of Armington assumption, and with the combination of coordinate strategies settings of South Korean, this part analyzes the corresponding percentage changes of China's tariff with every 1% change of the Korean side. (3) For the international-level negotiation stage, the chapter applies the bilateral dynamic game model, combines with the given pace of negotiating process and the domestic equilibrium results, this part finds a possible equilibrium solution of the international negotiation. (4) The chapter, by updating macro-economic and tariff data in GTAP model and applying both long-term and short-term closure, simulates the potential impacts on different sectors of both sides respectively with regard to the possible agreement. (5) By using GTAP solutions, the chapter applies reverse strategies analysis method in both domestic and international strategies and finds out the validity range of the model established in chapter 3 and perfects the strategy selection of the negotiation model.
The fifth chapter combines the negotiation model with political factors and analyzes the impacts of related assumptions and parameters’changes on the outcome of the negotiation. It also obtains the qualitative changes and the validity of the strategy selection—when the government in the model has a political will of reaching agreement in bilateral FTA negotiation, its final strategy selection and the validity will be dually affected by both political and economic factor.
Finally, the paper reviews the above parts and concludes the results on the basis of theoretical and empirical analysis. (1) It is effective and operable to establish a bilateral FTA negotiation system model by integration of theories. In addition, it can also make up for the deficiency of single theory and obtain the optimum negotiation strategy. (2) It is in favor of establishing the will of cooperation and reaching agreement in bilateral FTA negotiation by close communication. (3) It is helpful to make bilateral FTA negotiation more effective if the government seeks negotiation partner in accordance with the principal of its negotiation strategic wills or take its own comparative advantages. At the same time, this paper also reviews its own potential deficiency and discusses how to make the improvements and where to make further studies.
By the above theoretical and empirical researches, this paper establishes a number of independent analytical methods and quantitative models regarding trade in goods bilateral FTA negotiations. Moreover, this paper builds a comprehensive and systematic model of bilateral FTA negotiations according to the input and output linkages between these independent models. At the same time, the empirical research confirms that this systematic model is significant in theoretical innovation and practical operation. However, due to the reason that some industry data are not available and the author does not know well in dynamic partial and general equilibrium theories and modeling techniques, this paper still left multi-subject partial equilibrium model untouched and doesn’t find the variables to describe the subject factors accurately and objectively in the dynamic international negotiation. This paper yet can not effectively integrate the results of two models, overall trend analysis model and quantitative analysis model. In the future studies, researches can further the classification of negotiation subjects and build multi-subject dynamic partial equilibrium model also deepen applying the dynamic CGE analysis in the potential economic effects. It is also necessary to improve the effective integration of quantitative and qualitative data so as to study the optimum strategy and potential impacts on the economy more precisely.
引文
1本文对于“双边”的定义是两个国家或地区,此后若有“两国”、“双方”、“两方”等叙述皆指“两个国家或地区”的概念。
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2同上页脚注7。
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4同上。
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2 Bazerman, Max H., Magliozzi, Thomas, Neale, Margaret A. Integrative Bargaining in a Competitive Market [J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1985, 35: 294- 313.
3 Mannix, Elizabeth A., Loewenstein, George F. Managerial Time Horizons and Interfirm Mobility: An Experimental Investigation [J]. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Process, 1993, 56(2): 266-284.
4 Barry Blecherman. Adopting automated negotiation [J]. Technology in Society, 1999, (21): 167-174.
1苟文均.博弈论与社会经济行为分析[J].世界经济,1995,(4):19-25.
2同上。
1谢识予.经济博弈论(第三版)[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2007:1-55.
2 Howard Raiffa. The Art and Science of Negotiation [M]. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
3何帆.国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架[J].公共管理学报,2004,(1):36-42.
4同上。
5 Cédric Dupont, Cosimo Beverelli and Stéphanie Pézard. Learning in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Some Results from Simulation for Developing Countries [A], In: John Odell (ed.). Developing Countries and Trade Negotiations [M], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
6 Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two–Level Games [A]. In: Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam. Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics [M]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993: 431-468.
1 Cédric Dupont, Cosimo Beverelli and Stéphanie Pézard. Learning in Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Some Results from Simulation for Developing Countries [A], In: John Odell (ed.). Developing Countries and Trade Negotiations [M], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
2 Robert S. Strauss. Foreword [A]. In: Joan E. Twiggs. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: A Case Study in Building Domestic Support for Diplomacy [M]. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1987: vii.
3刘光溪,邹彦.试析多边贸易谈判中的博弈战略问题[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究:上海对外贸易学院学报,2003,(10):1-7.
1 Robert D.Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games [J]. International Organization, 1988, 42: 427-460.
2 Michael ZüRN. Bringing the Second Image (Back) In: About the Domestic Sources of Regime Formation [A]. In: Peter Mayer, Volker Rittberger (eds.). Regime Theory and International Relations [M]. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1993.
3 Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two–Level Games [A]. In: Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam. Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics [M]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993: 431-468.
4这里所说的“一般均衡”不同于本文以后将谈到的“可计算一般均衡”,前者是指国内和国际因素发挥作用的有机结合,后者是指一指一种经济模拟方法。
5王传兴,“双层次博弈”理论的兴起和发展[J].世界经济与政治,2001,(5):36-39.
6刘光溪,查贵勇.双层博弈与入世谈判[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究:上海对外贸易学院学报,2003,(8):1-7.
7同上。
8 Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two–Level Games [A]. In: Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam. Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics [M]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993: 431-468.
1 Glenn H. Snyder, Paul Diesing. Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises [M]. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
2薄燕.双层次博弈理论:内在逻辑及其评价[J].现代国际关系,2003,(6):54-60.
3娄伶俐.“双层次博弈”理论框架下的环境合作实质——以多边气候变化谈判为例[J].世界经济与政治论坛,2008,(2):117-121.
4 Robert D. Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two–Level Games [A]. In: Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, Robert D. Putnam. Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics [M]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993: 431-468.
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3 James E. Alt, Michael Gilligan. The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions [J]. Journal of Political Philosophy, 1994, 2(2): 165-192.
4 Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman. Protection for Sale [J]. American Economic Review, 1994, 84(4): 833 - 850.
5 Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman. Trade Wars and Trade Talks [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1995, 103(4): 675-708.
6何帆.国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架[J].公共管理学报,2004,(1):36-42.
7黄静波,曾瑜阳.贸易政策理论的微观基础[J].广州大学学报(社会科学版),2006,(11):40-46.
1 Bhagwati, Jagdish N. Protectionism [M]. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988.
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3施锡铨.由WTO谈判所衍生的博弈研究[J].上海财经大学学报,2001,(3):12-15,31.
1刘光溪.碰撞、融合、发展:亲历13年复关入世谈判的思索[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2002.
2刘光溪,邹彦.试析多边贸易谈判中的博弈战略问题[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究:上海对外贸易学院学报,2003,(10):1-7.
3徐磊.中美纺织品贸易谈判的博弈模型分析[J].北方经济:学术版,2006,(1):31-32.
4赵丽红.美洲自由贸易协定谈判中主要谈判方的博弈[J].拉丁美洲研究,2006,28(1):21-27.
5娄伶俐.“双层次博弈”理论框架下的环境合作实质——以多边气候变化谈判为例[J].世界经济与政治论坛,2008,(2):117-121.
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2詹姆斯?M?亨德森,理查德?E?匡特.中级微观经济理论数学方法[M].北京:北京大学出版社,1988.
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5赵永,王劲峰.经济分析——CGE模型与应用[M].北京:中国经济出版社,2008:2-20.
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1 (1)周曙东,胡冰川,吴强,崔奇峰.中国——东盟自由贸易区的建立对区域农产品贸易的动态影响分析[J].管理世界,2006,(10):14-21.(2) [116] Thomas W. Hertel. Global Trade Analysis Modeling and Applications [M]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997:13-74.
2北京大学中国经济研究中心.首届“北京农业贸易政策对话”纪要[EB/OL].http://www.ccer.edu.cn/CN/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=7883,2007-04-27.
3黄季焜,杨军.全球贸易自由化对中国和世界经济的影响[J].地理科学进展,2005,24(1):1-10.
4杨军,黄季焜,仇焕广.建立中国和澳大利亚自由贸易区的经济影响分析及政策建议[J].国际贸易问题,2005,(11):65-70.
1周曙东,胡冰川,吴强,崔奇峰.中国——东盟自由贸易区的建立对区域农产品贸易的动态影响分析[J].管理世界,2006,(10):14-21.
2吴凌燕,李众敏.美国参与东亚区域合作对中国的影响研究[J].财贸研究,2007,(6):67-72.
3李丽,邵兵家,陈迅.中印自由贸易区的建立对中国及世界经济影响研究[J].世界经济研究,2008,(2):22-28.
1赵丽红.美洲自由贸易协定谈判中主要谈判方的博弈[J].拉丁美洲研究,2006,28(1):21-27.
1 Robert D.Putnam. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games [J]. International Organization, 1988, 42: 427-460.
1何帆.国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架[J].公共管理学报,2004,(1):36-42.
2 Gene M. Grossman, Elhanan Helpman. Protection for Sale [J]. American Economic Review, 1994, 84(4): 833 - 850.
1刘光溪,邹彦.试析多边贸易谈判中的博弈战略问题[J].世界贸易组织动态与研究:上海对外贸易学院学报,2003,(10):1-7.
2张越扶.经济结构、经济增长与环境问题——一个CGE模型的分析[D].北京:中国农业大学,2001.
1赖明勇,祝树金.区域贸易自由化:可计算一般均衡模型及应用[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2008:1-8.
2李洪心.可计算的一般均衡模型——建模与仿真[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2008:10.
1李洪心.可计算的一般均衡模型——建模与仿真[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2008:7-17.
2同上。
1黄益平,宋立刚.应用数量经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2001:169.
1董桂才.我国农产品出口市场结构及依赖性研究[J].国际贸易问题,2008,(7):16-21.
1姜爱林.出口评价法:评价国际竞争力的重要手段[J].西安财经学院学报,2003,16(5):5-11.
1吴国蔚,薛花.比较优势理论在中国出口贸易中的体现[J].国际经贸探索,2007,23(5):9-13,53.
1吕玲丽.中国与东盟农产品出口相似性分析[J].世界经济研究,2006,(1):36-40.
2黄益平,宋立刚.应用数量经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2001:166-167.
1李坤望.我国关税结构调整及关税减让方式探讨.南开学报:哲学社会科学版[J].2002:(4):6-9
1何帆.国际贸易谈判的政治经济分析:一个初步的框架[J].公共管理学报,2004,(1):36-42.
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