摘要
开放经济条件下,一国货币政策面临的宏观背景必然发生改变。经济全球化下的资本流动使得货币政策的传导机制面临扭曲。同时,各国的货币政策存在溢出效应,进一步制约了对央行货币政策独立性的追求。这些因素的存在改变了中央银行实施货币政策的宏观环境、传导机制和反馈效应,使其在试图达到充分就业、价格稳定和外部均衡等多重目标时面临困难。在目前的情况下,即使浮动汇率也很难为中央银行带来独立的货币政策操作空间。
为了有效探讨开放经济条件下的货币政策效用机制问题,本文对蒙代尔国际宏观经济模型中固定及浮动汇率下国际调节的货币机制进行了扩展,对有资本市场冲击和收益率预期下的货币政策对国际、国内平衡的调节机制进行了规范分析,得出了在开放经济条件下,资本冲击可能造成货币政策无法调节内外部经济均衡的结论。在此基础上,对传统的IS-LM-BP模型进行了扩展,加入了资本市场和汇率预期机制,并放松了利率平价的约束,对开放经济条件下一国货币政策的效果和国际传导机制进行了分析,结论是在存在资本市场收益率预期不同的开放式经济条件下,一国货币政策的传统蒙带尔效应是随着时间动态变化的。一国利率最初的下降会导致经济扩张和贸易顺差。但是,资本市场收益率预期的改变会使以上过程逐渐逆转。
在建立扩展模型的基础上,本文从世界经济的视角出发,对比了前布雷顿森林体系时期日本、德国走向开放经济时期的货币政策效率问题和后布雷顿森林体系时期越南、印度两国的货币政策效率问题。开放经济不同时期的日、德和越南、印度经验对比表明,即使在走向开放经济后,一国货币政策仍然应该以通货膨胀为基本目标。世上没有免费的午餐,货币政策被用于多方面目标的同时必然付出相应的代价。
在向开放经济条件转型的过程中,人民银行的货币政策同样受到开放经济条件下资本流动冲击和货币政策环境外生性增强对货币政策效率的减弱和扭曲。其具体表现为:货币政策目标相机抉择的难度增大、货币政策中介目标操作性的困境、货币政策工具效率的削弱和货币传导机制的扭曲。本文通过人民币浮动以来汇率和货币政策以及资产价格的互动关系研究,得出以下结论:1、利率平价在资本冲击下,由于资本市场收益预期和汇率单向波动预期的存在,难以对资本流动发挥实质作用。2、通货膨胀和汇率升值并不具有简单的替代关系。既不应该用推动通货膨胀来减轻汇率升值的压力,也不应该用汇率升值来抵御通货膨胀。否则必然带来内部经济的失衡。3、在开放经济条件,既然外部均衡难以通过货币政策手段实现,中国货币政策应该盯住内部均衡,实行通货膨胀目标制,才能实现货币政策的有限作用。基于以上,本文继续展开中国货币政策应用的实证研究。实证研究的结果进一步证明了本文的主要观点。
另一方面,在当今存在大国效应和潜在的布雷顿II体系的背景下,美国采取以邻为壑的货币政策,必然带来世界范围内阶段性的流动性泛滥和资产价格泡沫。而当资产泡沫无法维持持续的收益率预期而破灭时时,为了避免资产价格破灭和金融危机对本国经济增长的影响,在囚徒困境的博弈下,各国央行又再度转向更为宽松的货币政策,希望在开放经济条件下的货币政策博弈中,把通涨传给别人,把增长留给自己。美国利用其在国际货币体系中的非对称地位实行放任的货币政策,使各国央行特别是新兴经济体面临货币政策的两难处境:在本国经济上行时期,本国央行为了应对美元储备的增加不得不加大发行货币,从而增加了经济过热和资产泡沫的风险;在全球经济陷入衰退期,本国需要增加流动性时,本国又面临美元资产流出的通缩风险。因此,摆脱美元本位制的束缚同样是提高开放经济条件下货币政策效率的前提之一。
The macro environment of monetary policy is changed under open economy. The capital flow from economic globalization also distorts the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The overflow effect of each country’s individual monetary policy further restricts the complete independence of central banks. All these factors, adding together, change the feedback and transmission mechanism of monetary policy implementation. Therefore, it is impossible for central banks to achieve multiple targets at the same time. A floating exchange system could not bring the operation space for independent monetary policy either.
To further research the monetary policy efficiency under open economy, this article extends the monetary mechanism under floating and fixed exchange rate in M-F model. By establishing an extended M-F model containing yield expectation and capital speculation, the author holds that under open economy, capital speculation can result in failure of monetary policy in adjusting both inner and outside imbalance. Thorough further releasing the restrict of IS-LM-BP model, this article also analyzes the monetary policy transmission mechanism under open economy and draws the conclusion that with the expectation of capital market yields, the traditional Mundell effects of monetary policy is dynamic. The rate cut firstly results in economy expansion and trade surplus, the process shall then be reversed with the change of capital market yields expectation.
From the perspective of world economy, this article first compares the monetary policy efficiency problem of Japan and Germany during Bretton Woods Agreements system, then compares the similar problem happens in Vietnam and India during Post- Bretton system period. The experience comparison shows that even in an open economy, the central bank’s monetary policy shall remain at inflation targeting. There is no free lunch. A multi-targeting monetary policy has to pay a higher cost at last. During the transitional process to open economy, the PBC also faces the monetary policy effect abate and distortion problems from growing capital shock and exogenous background. The detailed forms are: the difficulty of choosing monetary policy target, the predicament in monetary policy intermediate targets, the abating of monetary policy effect, and the distortion of monetary policy transmission. Thorough a research over the mutual relationship between exchange and monetary policy since RMB floated, this article draws the conclusion that:
1. Interest rate parity can not exploit its power over capital flow when there is capital market and exchange rate fluctuation expectation.
2. There is not a simple substitution relationship between inflation and exchange appreciation. It is either proper to push inflation to lessen pressure from exchange appreciation, nor to push appreciation to ease inflation. The above action will all lead to inner imbalance of economy.
3. Under open economy, since it is impossible to realize outside balance thorough monetary policy, PBC shall carry on an inflation targeting monetary policy to exploit its restricted power.
Based on those points of view, this author carries on a series of empirical research. The empirical results from VAR, Granger test and regression test further prove these views.
On the other side, as long as there is a Bretton II system, the“beggar-the-neighbor-effect”of United States shall definitely lead to world wide liquidity overflow and asset bubbles. When the bubble bursts, to avoid the financial crisis, the central banks of world then have to turn to more tolerant monetary policy. In an open economy, the“prisoner game effect”makes the central banks wish pass the inflation to others while keep the growth within their own countries. While the FED carries on an indulgent monetary policy, its asymmetric position in the international monetary system then makes dilemma for all other countries: when economy is going up, the central bank has to increase its currency issue to digest the dollar reserve. This adds the risks of economy over hot and asset bubbles. During the regression period, the central bank has to consider the deflation risk due to dollar outflow when it tries a looser monetary policy. From a longer perspective, to break off the fetters of dollar standard is a premise of improving monetary policy effect under open economy.
引文
1 Kamin, Steven B., Marazzi, Mario and Schindler, John W., "The Impact of Chinese Exports on Global Import Prices" . Review of International Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 179-201.
2 Michae Mandel. Can Anyone Steer This Economy. Business Week. NOVEMBER 20, 2006
3焦巍:“经济全球化下的货币政策效率问题”,郑州大学学报社哲版,2009年1季刊。
6麦金农,邹至庄:“国际著名学者关于人民币升值是非评说”,国际经济评论2005年11-12期
7许小年:“准备金率:麦田里的稻草人”,《财经》许小年专栏,2008-04-15.
9肯尼斯·罗高夫:“全球化对货币政策的影响”,《比较》27期,中信出版社,2006.
10蒙代尔:“固定及浮动汇率下国际调节的货币动态机制”,蒙代尔文集,第三卷P13-23.中国金融出版社2003
11 Frenkel,Jeffery:“Global Transmission of Interest Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime”, NBER Working paper 8828.2002
13姜波克:“国际金融理论的发展趋势及理论前沿”,《金融研究》,2002第9期
14 Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff,“Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux”, Journal of Political Economy, 1995, June 103.
15蒙代尔:“资本流动和国家大小”,蒙代尔文集:第三卷P98-105.中国金融出版社,2003.
16钟伟:“开放经济条件下的国际货币合作”,中国经济体制改革研究会公共政策研究中心网站:http://www.crcpp.org/cpipphtml/zw_finance/2006-4/19/200604191532.htm
17 Money Market Operations in China: Monetary Policy or FX Policy?”, Bank of Japan Working Paper: No.07-E-13, May 2007.
18孙华妤:“汇率制度制约货币政策?中国货币政策独立性和有效性探查:1994-2004”,清华大学国际研究中心工作论文。http://ccfr.org.cn/cicf2006/cicf2006paper/20060127190742.pdf
19刘元春,黄族胜:“中国货币政策独立性研究”,《人民币汇率与中国货币政策研究》,P114-135,中国经济出版社,2006.
20 Geiger,Michael:“Monetary Policy in China:Targets, Instruments, and their Effectiveness”, Wurzburg Economic paper No68, April 2006.
21 Alice Y. Ouyang and Ramkishen S. Rajan:“Monetary Sterilization in China since 1990: How much and How Effective?”, univ. of Adelaide Internatioal Finance Program, discussion paper No.0507, June 2005.
25杜军:“日本泡沫经济形成机理研究”,《首都经贸大学学报》,2007年6期
26范幸丽:“广场协议、日本长期萧条与人民币升值”,《世界经济研究》2003年12期。
31罗忠洲,李宁:“日元实际汇率与长期实际利率的实证分析:1971-2002”,《金融研究》2002年1期。
32陈作章:《日本货币政策问题研究》,复旦大学出版社,2005.
33盛松成,周鹏:“经济增长过程中的汇率升值问题—德国、日本与中国的比较研究”,《上海金融》,2006年5期。
34 Kanh,George and Kristina Jacobson:“Lessons from West German Monetary Policy”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, April 1989.
35 Deutsche Bundesbank,“The Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank”. http://www.bundesbank.de/download/presse/publikationen/geldpolitik_bundesbank_199610_en.pdf
37 Richard Clarda, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler:“Monetary Policy Rules in Practice:Some International Evidence”,European Economic Review,June 1998.
38 Clarida, Richard and Mark Gertler:“How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy”,NBER Working Paper 5581,May 1996.
41 Bernanke,B. and Fredeic Mishkin:“Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy:Observations from Six Industrialized Countries: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1992.
42 Mori,N.S.Shiratsuka and H. Taguchi:“Policy Responses to the Post Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A tentative Review”, BOJ Monetary Economic Studies 2001.
49张曙光,张斌:“外汇储备持续积累的后果”,《经济研究》,2007年4期
51余永定:“当前中国宏观经济的新挑战”,《国际经济评论》,2007,9-10.
54伯南克:“货币政策和资产价格波动”,《伯南克的货币理论和政策哲学》,北京大学出版社,2008.
55史蒂芬·罗奇:“中国与核心通胀”,华尔街日报亚洲版,2008年4月1日。
56克鲁格曼,奥博斯特菲尔德:《国际经济学》第四版,P340,中国人民大学出版社,2001.
1、蒙代尔:“固定及浮动汇率下国际调节的货币动态机制”,蒙代尔文集:第三卷。P13-23。北京,中国金融出版社,2003
2、蒙代尔:“国际非均衡体系”,蒙代尔文集:第三卷。P39-52。北京,中国金融出版社,2003
3、蒙代尔:“资本流动和国家相对大小”,蒙代尔文集:第三卷。P98-105。北京,中国金融出版社,2003
4、弗里得曼:《弗里得曼文萃》,P450-P625,北京,首都经贸大学出版社,1999。
5、麦金农:“浮动汇率为什么失败:重新思考流动性陷阱”,麦金农文集:第四卷(下)。P284-P299。北京,中国金融出版社,2006
6、麦金农:“两种类型的国际货币替代”,麦金农文集:第四卷(下)。P269-P283。北京,中国金融出版社,2006
7、麦金农,邹至庄:“国际著名学者关于人民币升值是非评说”,国际经济评论2005年11-12期。中国社科院世经所网站。http://old.iwep.org.cn/pdf/2005/gjzmxzgyrmbszsfps_maijinnong.pdf
8、肯尼思·罗高夫:“全球化对货币政策的影响”,《比较》27期,北京,中信出版社,2006
9、多恩布什:《宏观经济学》,中国人民大学出版社,北京,2000
10、克鲁格曼,奥伯斯菲尔德:《国际经济学[M]》(第四版),北京,中国人民大学出版社,2001
11、杰夫里·萨克斯,费利普·拉雷恩:《全球视角的宏观经济学》,上海,上海人民出版社,2004
12、伯南克:“货币政策和资产价格波动”,《伯南克的货币理论和政策哲学》,北京大学出版社,北京2008
13、瓦拉德拉扬·查里,帕特里克·基欧:“现代宏观经济学的理论与政策实践”,《比较》27期,中信出版社,北京2006
14、刘红忠、张卫东:“新开放经济宏观经济学模型”,《国际金融研究》2001年第1期
15、黄余送:“开放经济条件下大国财政与货币政策组合分析”,《比较》2007(1)期,北京,中信出版社,2007
16、钟伟:“开放经济条件下的国际货币合作”,中国经济体制改革研究会公共政策研究中心网站:http://www.crcpp.org/cpipphtml/zw_finance/2006-4/19/200604191532.htm,2006-4-19
17、刘仁伍:《全球化背景下的货币政策调控》,北京,社会科学文献出版社,2007
18、刘元春、黄族胜:“中国货币政策独立性研究”,《人民币汇率与中国货币政策研究》,北京,中国经济出版社,2006
19、刘元春:“突破蒙带尔不可能三角与四面体假说的不成立”,《人民币汇率与中国货币政策研究》,P114-P135。北京,中国经济出版社,2006
20、范志勇:“中国货币政策与汇率政策的协调与替代”,《世界经济》,2005年第7期
21、孙华妤:“汇率制度制约货币政策?中国货币政策独立性和有效性探查: 1994到2004”,清华大学国际金融研究中心网站,http://ccfr.org.cn/cicf2006/cicf2006paper/20060127190742.pdf
22、夏斌、廖强:“货币供应量已不宜作为当前我国货币政策的中介目标”,《经济研究》,2001
23、沈国兵:“汇率制度的选择-兼论对人民币汇率制度的启示”,北京,经济科学出版社,2003
24、余永定:“当前中国宏观经济的新挑战”,《国际经济评论》2007年9-10
25、姜波克:“国际金融理论的发展趋势及理论前沿”,《金融研究》2002第9期
26、张斌,何帆:“如何应对经济崛起时期的汇率升值压力—日本、德国的经验与启示”,《国际经济评论》2004年5-6
27、罗忠洲,李宁:“日元实际汇率与长期实际利率的实证分析:1971-2002”,《金融研究》2006年第1期
28、范幸丽:“广场协议、日本长期经济萧条与人民币升值”,《世界经济研究》2003年第12期
29、杜军:“日本泡沫经济形成机理研究”,《首都经贸大学学报》2007年第6期
30、瞿强:“日本泡沫经济时期的货币与财政政策及其教训”,《金融论坛》2001年第9期
31、盛松成,周鹏:“经济增长过程中的汇率升值问题—德国、日本与中国的比较研究”,《上海金融》2006年第5期
32、陈作章:《日本货币政策问题研究》,复旦大学出版社,上海,2005
33、戴根有:“关于我国货币政策的理论与实践问题”,《金融研究》2000年第9期
34、戴根有:《中国货币政策传导机制研究》,经济科学出版社,北京,2001
35、刘斌:“货币政策冲击的识别及我国货币政策有效性的实证分析”,《金融研究》,2001年第7期
36、陆前进:“论央行货币管理和短期公共债务管理、央行票据管理之间的协调”,《世界经济文汇》2005年第4期
37、肇越:“金融资产膨胀、金融体系稳定与货币政策调整”,《金融资产膨胀与货币政策困境》,社会科学文献出版社,北京2006
38、易纲、王召:“货币政策与金融资产价格”,《经济研究》,2002年第3期
39、徐明棋:“美国国际收支经常账户逆差不断扩大对国际经济的影响”,《国际金融研究》,2006年第4期
40. Alice Y. Ouyang and Ramkishen S. Rajan,“Monetary Sterilization in China Since the 1990s: How Much and How Effective?”, Discussion Paper No. 0507 for International Macroeconomics and Finance Program, June, 2005
41. Ben S Bernanke, Globalization and monetary policy. Remarks At the Fourth Economic Summit, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford, California.. http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2007/20070302/
42. Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler,“Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995,9-4, 27-48.
43. Bernanke, Ben, and Michael Woodford, eds.,“The Inflation Targeting Debate”,(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) 2005
44. Bernanke, B., Thomas Laubach, Frederic S., and Adam Posen,“Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience, Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1999
45. Bernank,Ben and Ilian Mihov,“Measuring Monetary Policy”,mimeo, Princeton University, Feb.1995
46. Bernanke,Ben and Ilian Mihov,“What does the Bundesbank target”, European Economic Revies, 1997
47. Bernanke,Ben and Frederic Mishkin,“Central Bank Behavior and the Strategy of Monetary Policy: Observations from Six Industrialized Countries: NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1992
48. Bernanke, B.,M. Gertler,and S. Gilchris,“The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework”, Handbook of Macroeconomics, Amesterdam: Forthcoming
49. Bank of Japan,“The Role of the Money Stock in Conducting Monetary Policy”,Bank of Japan Research Papers,2003, Policy Planning Office.
50. Blanchard, Olivier J. and Francesco Giavazzi.“Rebalancing Growth in China: A Three-Handed Approach.”MIT Department of Economics Working Paper 05-32. 2005.
51. Blanchard, Oliver and Mark Watson,“Bubbles,Rational Expectations, and Financial Markets”, Crisis in the Economic and Financial Structure, Lexington Books, 1982
52. Clarida, Richard and Mark Gertler,“How the Bundesbank Conducts Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper 5581, May 1996
53. Clarida, Richard, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler,”Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some Interational Evidence”, European Economic Review, June 1998
54. C.H.Kwan,“Comments on Inflation, Appriciation or Reform”, Nomura Institute of Capital Market Research, Nov.2007
55. Dornbusch, Rudiger,“Devaluation, Money and Nontraded Goods,”American Economic Review December, 871-880. 1973.
56. Deutsche Bundes Bank,“The Monetary Policy of the Bundesbank”,Oct. 1995 http://www.bundesbank.de/download/presse/publikationen/geldpolitik_bundesbank_199610_en.pdf
57. Eichengreen, Barry, and Mariko Hatase,“Can a Rapidly-Growing Export-Oriented Economy Smoothly Exit an Exchange Rate Peg? Lessons from China from Japan’s High-Growth Era,”NBER working Paper 11625, September,2005
58. Fleming J.Marcus,“Domestic Financial Policies Under Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates”, IMF staff papers, No.9(3),1962.
59. Frankel, Jeffery,“Global Transmission of Interest Rates: Monetary Independence and Currency Regime.”, NBER Working Paper 8828. 2002.
60. Frenkel, Jacob A. 1981.“The Collapse of Purchasing Power Parity During the 1970s.”European Economic Review, 16, pp. 145–65.
61. Franke Jeffery,“No single currency rigime is right for all countries or at all times”, NBER working paper No.7338, 1999.
62. Fujiki, H., C. Hsioo, and Y. Shen:“Is There a Stable Money Demand Function under the Low Interest Policy ? A Panel Data Analysis,”2002, BOJ Monetary and Economic Studies.
63. Goldstein, Morris,“Adjusting China’s Exchange Rate Policies,”High-Level Seminar, Dalian, China, May 26-27, 2004.
64. Goldstein, Morris, and Nicholas Lardy,“Two-Stage Currency Reform for China,”Wall Street Journal, September 12, 2003.
65. Goodfriend, Marvin:“Monetary Policy in the New Neoclassical Synthesis: A Primer,”International Finance, Summer,2002.
66. Goodfriend,M,“Understanding the transmission of monetary policy”, manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, May. Presented at Joint China-IMF High Level Seminar on“China’s monetary policy transmission mechanism”,2004
67. Gerlach, Stefan and Frank Smets,“The Monetary Transmission Mechanism: Evidence fromthe G-7 Countries”, in Financial Structure and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism, Basle: Bank for International Settlements, 1995
68. Hutchison, Michael,“Monetary Contral with an Exchange Rate Objective: Then Bank of Japan, 1973-86,“Journal of International Money and Finance”, 1988:7
69. International Monetary World Economic Outlook, April 2008, Washington DC
70. John B Taylor:“Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999a
71. Kasa, Kenneth and Helen Popper,“Monetary Policy in Japan: A Structural VAR Anyalysis”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Pacific Basin Working Paper PB.95-12, 1995
72. Kasman,Bruce,“A Comparison of Monetary Policy Operation Procedures in Six Industrialised Countries”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mimeo, 1992
73. Kanh, George and Kristina Jacobson,“Lessons from West German Monetary Policy”, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review, April 1989
74. Laxton, Douglas and Paolo Pesenti,“Monetary Rules for Small ,Open,Emerging Economies”, Journal of Monetary Economics 50, July, 2003
75. Lane ,Philip R,.“The New Open Economy Macroeconomics :A Survey.”Working Paper No. 2115 ,Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper ,March 2001 ,Journal of International Economics.
76. McKinnon, Ronald,“China’s Exchange Rate Trap: Japan Redux?”American Economic Association Meetings, Boston, 7 January 2006.
77. Meltzer,Allan H.,“Monetary, Credit Transmission Processes: A Monetarist Perspective”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995
78. McKinnon, Ronald, and Gunther Schnabl,“The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin,”Stanford University, September,2003.
79. McKinnon, Ronald:“China’s Exchange Rate Trap: Japan Redux?”, Stanford University, American Economic Association Meetings, Boston, 7 January 2006
80. Menzie D.Chinn and M.Dooley,“Monetary Policy in Japan, Germany and The U.S.: Does One Size Fit All?”, NBER Working Paper 6092, July 1997
81. Michael B.Devereus, Kang Shi and Juanyi Xu,“Global monetary policy under a dollar standard”, Journal of International Economics, 2005.
82. Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher , Roberto Rigobon.“Stocks, bonds, money markets and exchange rates– measuring international financial transmission”. Working Paper Series 452, European Central Bank. 2005.
83. Michael Bruno,Jeffrey Sachs:“The Economics of Worldwide Stagflation”, Chapter 6, Harvard Press, 1985
84. Mori, N. S. Shiratsuka. And H. Taguchi,“Policy Responses to the Post-Bubble Adjustments in Japan: A Tentative Review,”BOJ Monetary Economic studies (Special Edition) 2001
85. Obstfeld,Maurice,“International macroeconomics: Beyond the Mundel-Fleming Model”, NBER Working Paper, No.8369, 2001.
86. Obstfeld,Maurice, and Rogoff, Kenneth,“Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux”, Journal of Political Economy, June 103(3),1995
87. Obstfeld,Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff,“Golbal Implications of Self-Oriented National Monetary Rules”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, May 2002.
88. Peter J. Quirk:“Exchange Rate Regimes as Inflation Anchors”, Finance & Development, March 1996
89. Ralph Bryant:“Domestic and Cross-border Consequences of U.S Macroeconomic Policies”, Macroeconomic Policies in an Independent World, IMF, 1989.
90. Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali, and Mark Gertler(2000) ,“Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic stability: Evidence and some theory”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb. 2000
91. Rofoff, Kenneth,“Can International Monetary Cooperation be Counterproductive?”, Journal of International Economics 18 (May), 1985.
92. Rudiger.Dornbusch, and Paul Krugman. 1976.“Flexible Exchange Rates in the Short Run”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3, pp. 537–75.
93. Rudiger.Dornbusch:”Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics”, Journal of Political Economy, 1976.12.
94. Shigeto Nagai and Hong Wang,“Money Market Operations in China: Monetary Policy or FX Policy?”, Bank of Japan Working Paper, No.07-E-13, May, 2007.
95. YinWong-Cheung, Dickson Tam and Matthew S. Yiu,“Does the Chinese Interest Rate Follow the U.S Interest Rate?”, CESIFO Working Paper NO. 1943, March,2007.
96. Svensson,L,E,“Why exchange rate bands? Monetary independence in spite of fixed exchange rates”, NBER working paper No. 4209, 1992.
97. Shigeyoshi Miyagawa,Yoji Morita :“LESSONS FROM JAPAN’S PROLONGED RECESSION”,Sep.2005, Working Paper 44 of UNIVERSITY OF TAMPERE. http://tampub.uta.fi/econet/wp44-2005.pdf
98. Taylor,John,“The Role of the Exchange Rate in Monetary Targetting Rules,”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 2000.
99. Tsatsaronis, Konstantinos,“Bank Lending and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism : The Case of Germany”, mimeo, 1993
100. Trehan, Bharat,“The Practice of Monetary Targeting: A Case Study of the West German Experience”, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Economic Review, Spring 1988, 30-34.
101. Vega,M and D.Winkelried,“How Does Global Disinflation Drag Inflation in a Small Open Economy”, Central Bank of Peru Working Paper, 2005.
102. Von Hagen,Jurgen,“Inflation and Monetary Targeting in Germany”, in Leonardo Leiderman an: Lars E.O. Svensson, Inflation Targets, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1995.
103. Von Hagen,Jurgen,“Monetary Targeting with Exchange Rate Constraints: The Bundesbank in the 1980s”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Review, Vol . 71 no 5, Sep/Oct 1989, 53-69.