摘要
传统的代理理论主要是基于伯利和米恩斯(Berle and Means,1932)关于现代企业所有权和控制权高度分离的观点,研究的是股东与经理之间的冲突。但是,近年来各国学者研究发现(La Porta et al,1999;Becht and Mayer,2001),股东与经理之间的冲突已不是现代公司的主要冲突,而另外一种因股权结构差异而导致的公司大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突逐渐凸显。在这种利益冲突下,理性的大股东选择“隧道挖掘”行为,利用投票权获得控制权私人收益,掠夺上市公司资源,侵害中小股东的利益,这已成为现代公司的普遍现象。
中国上市公司也存在许多大股东大量进行“隧道挖掘”、侵占上市公司资源的案例。从ST猴王,到顾雏军的科龙,许多曾经辉煌却最终破灭的股市“神话”背后,都有着上市公司被控股大股东“隧道挖掘”、掏空资源的悲剧。随着“股权分置”改革的初步完成和资本市场的逐步完善,控股股东“隧道挖掘”的侵占行为模式和手段等将发生重大变化,由原来的直接占用上市公司、虚构上市公司利润等形式,逐渐变为以散布信息配合二级市场股价操纵、内幕交易等为主,其违法获利更为快速、手段更具隐蔽性。控股大股东的“隧道挖掘”行为已经严重损害了中小股东的利益,危害了上市公司的可持续发展。
本文正是基于大股东——中小股东代理理论,对大股东隧道挖掘行为的特点、方式、动机以及收益风险等方面进行了分析,并通过中国上市公司的典型案例如ST猴王崩溃的过程,说明上市公司大股东“隧道挖掘”的制度根源、侵占手段以及严重危害,最后提出上市公司应构建制衡型内部监管机制,并从大股东监管、中小股东权益保护、上市公司信息披露以及加强资本市场监管等四方面提出外部监管的具体措施。
论文首先从代理理论出发,梳理了代理理论发展的新特点和现阶段国内外学者在大股东“隧道挖掘”领域的研究成果,并进行了评价。同时,针对国内大股东“隧道挖掘”现象日益严重的现象,进行了制度层面的剖析,指出:国有股“一股独大”、公司治理结构不健全、股票市场上“股权分置”的“二元”股权结构、缺乏对中小投资者保护的措施以及资本市场监督力量薄弱等缺陷是导致大股东“隧道挖掘”在我国这一新兴资本市场更加严重的原因。
接着对大股东“隧道挖掘”行为进行了深入分析,发现大股东之所以进行“隧道挖掘”行为,是因为大股东能够获得超过其股权比例的控制权私有收益。这部分收益分为两个方面:一是直接占用或转移上市公司资源,包括非公平关联交易、资金占用、利润操纵、现金股利。二是利用二级市场股价波动和股票份额变动来获取资本利得,如通过股价操纵实现高抛低收,侵占小股东利益;再如通过股票发行稀释其他股东权益、冻结少数股权、内部交易,渐进的收购行为,以及其他不利于中小股东的各种财务交易行为。大股东具有的资金、信息和控制权等天然优势,使得“隧道挖掘者天然是大股东”的命题成立。通过构建大股东“隧道挖掘”的风险收益函数,得出了减少大股东侵害的对策:减持国有股,加快国有股、法人股流通,从而降低其国有资本的锁定风险,增大侵害的机会成本;加强对大股东的监督,加大对大股东侵害的惩罚程度;降低大股东“隧道挖掘”侵害行为的额外收益;稳定经营公司,降低未来的不确定性,提高未来收益的贴现率,可以有效的减少大股东“隧道挖掘”侵害行为的发生。同时也要注意到大股东从上市公司直接获得的收益与二级市场上获得的收益之间并不是互相独立的,拥有上市公司控制权的大股东一般不会单纯利用二级市场上的交易来获取收益,也不会单纯将上市公司的资源一直转移殆尽以“杀鸡取卵”,而是在不同的“隧道挖掘”方式之间进行权衡和配合,以求控制权收益的最大化。
ST猴王的案例显示了上市公司大量优质资源被控股大股东“隧道挖掘”收入囊中,最后导致上市公司资源枯竭,原本绩优的上市公司陷入退市的深渊。ST猴王之所以落到如此下场,从根本上来讲,源于其控股股东猴王集团对上市公司的超额控制(这种超额控制是由政府的决策和畸形的股权结构导致的),上市公司与集团公司不独立,集团公司将上市公司作为自己的银行或提款机,上市公司没有建立有效的公司治理结构,外部没有高效的监管措施,这些都为大股东占用上市公司资金、不公平关联交易、操纵虚假的利润信息等“隧道挖掘”行为提供了便利。ST猴王的案例为我们揭示了加强上市公司治理,有效抑制大股东“隧道挖掘”行为,不仅需要完善股权结构和内部治理机制,还要构建有效的外部监管制度。
论文借鉴多个大股东股权制衡的理论模型,构建出多个大股东分享控制权的最优股权结构模型。并从我国上市公司的实际情况,提出调整目前国有股高度集中型的股权结构为多个大股东分享控制权的股权结构,构建制衡型公司治理内部机制。随着“股权分置”改革的推进和资本市场的完善,我国畸形的股权结构将会得到改善,逐步建立起全流通条件下的股票市场,股票的全流通和多样化的持股主体将有利于制衡型的内部治理机制的形成,多个大股东分享控制权的内部治理机制能够在一定程度上抑制大股东“隧道挖掘”行为。但是,只有制衡型内部治理机制并不能够完全制止大股东侵占行为,同时,还需要设计相关的外部监管机制。
在“后股权分置”时期,大股东“隧道挖掘”行为、中小股东权益保护、信息披露制度所出现的新问题和上市公司监管面临的新挑战,论文对上述问题进行了详细研究,并根据实际情况和相关法律法规提出了相应的对策建议。
总之,上市公司大股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突越来越明显,大股东基于自身的利益函数常常利用手中的控制权进行“隧道挖掘”行为,侵占中小股东的利益,影响资本市场和股票市场的发展。随着“股权分置”改革的逐步完成和资本市场的日益完善,大股东“隧道挖掘”将变得更加隐蔽、更加快捷。针对股票全流通条件下大股东“隧道挖掘”的具体表现形式及其监管措施的设计,以及在股票全流通条件下如何设计有效的控制权市场机制来抑制大股东“隧道挖掘”行为等,将成为未来研究的焦点。
Recently some scholars have found the stock rights of most countries' firm are not disperse but quite convergence except of some few countries such as America and England. The disperse of controlling shareholders' stock rights results in another agency problem which minority shareholders are aggrieved by controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders may use various means that is treasure occupied and dividend distribution in order to plunder the minority shareholders. The central conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders more crutial. Since 1990s, the benefit of having multiple shareholders has seen as limiting their tunnelling.
Because of the special ownership structure, the tunnelling is more popular in China. From ST HOUWANG to Gu Chujun's KELONG, the largest shareholder uses lots of tunnelling ways to take up much resource from the listed company which does harm to the listed companies and investors, and result in bad performance of listed' companies. For this reason, it is very important to study the article about how to deal with the tunnelling of controlling shareholders.
The article analyzes the agency problem of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders to post the degree of tunnelling by the treasure occupied and dividends distribution in China's listed companies. The research improves the comprehension of this problem and contributes to enhancing the corporate governance.
The thesis surveys the academic researches on the agency problem of controlling shareholders which is based on internal and external actuality summarization. It also expounds the reason of the agency problem of controlling shareholder. The researchers all around the world have explored the research on controlling shareholders' tunneling deeply on many aspects, such as the reasons, ways, influences and resistant powers.
This paper focus on the adverse effects of shareholders' tunneling on listed companies and the effect of those resistant powers, such as shareholding structure, corporate governance and so on. As to the adverse effects of shareholders' tunnelling on listed companies' financial status, the researches have explored those bad effects of the tunneling ways, such as transactions between related parties, except the way of expropriation of listed company's fund by controlling shareholder, and so on. Additionaly, in order to find out the tunnelling mechanism, the author divided the behavior into two main types, and concreted the problem by combining the behaviors and the essential cause of each type.
In this thesis, by using empirical method the author studied the big shareholders' tunnelling. By analyzing the cases, the author outlined the problem's actuality, impact degree, and the relations between behaviors and controlling shareholders. From the author's point of view, to settle the tunnelling of controlling shareholders, we must validate listing companies' governance mechanism, straighten out supervision of controlling shareholders and protection of minority shareholders. At the same time, we need to consolidate external environment and institutions.
The academic circle advances a new governance mechanism------the ownership structure of check and balance type with multiple large shareholders sharing the right of control and its governance mechanism------to counteract the large shareholders' infringement on minority shareholders. This is a check and balance mechanism among multiple shareholders sharing the right of control to prevent large shareholders from snatching corporate value and infringing on minority shareholder. It is both of a special ownership structure and of a check and balance governance mechanism. There are mainly three theoretical models explaining this governance mechanism. (1) Modelbased on improving the supervision efficiency. (2) Model based on reducing the infringement on the minority shareholders. (3) Mixed model. infringement on the minority shareholders. (3) Mixed model. A further analysis of governance mechanism with multiple large shareholders sharing the right of control shows there are two effects. On one hand it will decrease the cost incurred by the infringement on minority shareholders, on the other hand it will lead to the cost incurred by inefficient decision-making. Generally speaking other things being equal the probability of infringement on minority shareholders under the multiple large shareholder structure is less than that under the sole controlling-shareholder structure, especially when the enterprise is confronted with highly uncertain investment decision and rather risky operating environment. This paper suggests that multiple shareholders that monitor each other can efficiently limit the private benefits extraction in China. So Chinese listed companies should first remold the qualified agents for state-owned shares, and then change the ownership structure from one single shareholder to multiple shareholders.
In the last of this thesis, the author used the theories of institutional economics, in order to search the institutional background and limitations of present institutions. At the end, the author provided the clues to settle the tunnelling problem from the point of re-designing and re-arranging the institutions.
There are still many imperfections and irregularities in the corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. The outstanding problem is that controlling shareholder embezzles the listed companies' finance through improper related transactions and related means, expropriates the minority shareholders' interest and exhausts the profit of the listed company. These behaviors greatly undermine the corporate value and the interest of minority shareholders. So in order to improve the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies and check the controlling shareholder's behavior of tunnelling the minority shareholders' interest, there are much more need to do.
引文
[1]屠光绍:《市场监管:架构与前景》,上海人民出版社,2000年5月,23-24页。
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