摘要
农村家庭承包经营制的确立为微观经济主体提供了有效的激励机制,成为改革之初中国农业经济高速增长的重要保障,与此同时,随着农产品流通市场化改革的推进,小农户应对大市场困难重重,需要独立应对各类风险。在此背景下,作为小农户集体行动的制度安排,农业合作社应运而生,被视为是农业组织化和农业现代化的必然要求。
中国的农业合作社具有“强者牵头”和“弱者参与”的特征,形成了独具特色的“核心-外围”式的圈层结构,农户参与合作社除了身份的隶属关系,更多地是形成合约交易关系。由此引出的问题是：农户参与合作社的行为决策受哪些因素影响?合作社内部交易合约安排如何对生产决策权进行配置?合作社内部交易合约安排能否降低农户价格风险?农户参与合作社能否实现交易成本节约和生产收益增加?合约安排对农户生产行为具有怎样的影响?利用山东省苹果种植户的调查数据,本文基于农户视角就这些问题进行了深入探讨。研究内容和分析结论如下：
第1章为“导论”。提出拟分析的问题,阐明研究目的和意义,对相关概念进行界定,给出研究方法和技术路线,最后给出论文结构安排。第2章为“理论回顾与文献综述”,首先是相关理论基础,包括交易成本理论、不完全合约理论和委托-代理理论,在理论分析的基础上,并对国内外相关文献进行梳理,包括农户参与合作社行为决策、资产决策权的合约配置、价格风险的合约分配、合约交易的收入效应、农户施肥和施药行为决策,最后进行总结性的评述。第3章为“调研设计”,介绍山东省农业合作社运行概况和苹果产业发展情况,介绍本文的调研设计,描述样本的基本情况,为开展后续章节的计量分析奠定基础。
第4章为“农户参与合作社的行为决策”。构建以户主特征、农户经营特征和市场环境特征为主要解释变量的计量模型,分析结果显示：户主年龄越大、户主文化程度越高或市场价格波动越频繁,农户参与合作社的积极性就会越低,而苹果种植越大、苹果收入比重越高、苹果质量越好或者市场价格水平偏低,农户参与合作社的积极性就会越高。
第5章为“合作社内部交易合约安排：生产决策权配置”。从调查情况来看,农户参与合作社后,生产决策权均不同程度地向合作社转移,其中肥料和农药采购决策权、施用决策权以及采收时间决策权向合作社转移的概率更高；分析结果显示：生产决策权的配置主要受合作社的专用性资产投资、是否聘任农技员、产品销售渠道、领办主体身份和合约定价制度等因素的影响。
第6章为“合作社内部交易合约安排：价格风险规避”。调查发现,合作社向农户提供的初始合约和最终执行的合约在产品定价制度上存在不一致,说明合作社具有机会主义的倾向；分析结果显示：农户参与合作社后面临的价格风险能否降低主要取决于苹果质量、苹果种植规模、距果品市场的距离、合作社领办主体身份、二次返利政策和技术指导等因素。
第7章为“合作社内部交易合约安排：成本与收益效应”。分析结果显示：在其它条件不变的情况下,合作社内部交易合约安排可以使农户的交易成本降低约48元/亩,纯收益增加约321元/亩。交易成本降低的原因主要是合作社分担了农资采购环节和产品销售环节的部分信息费、运输费和时间成本,纯收益增加的原因主要是合作社集体采购的农业生产资料价格相对较低。
第8章为“合作社内部交易合约安排对农户生产行为的影响”。与非社员相比,社员的化肥施用水平要低344.6元/亩,有机肥施用水平要高269.4元/亩,农药施用强度要低189.7元/亩。分析结果显示：测土配方施肥技术指导、产品质量检测和产品定价方式能够诱导农户合理施用肥料；农药残留检测、农药施用行为控制、产品定价方式和施药过程监督能够诱导农户合理施用农药。
第9章为“典型案例分析”。案例研究发现：合作社与不同社员交易的合约安排存在明显差异。精品示范园和标准化基地的生产决策权主要由合作社控制,交易价格主要采取“市场价+附加价”,普通果园的生产决策权以农户控制为主,交易价格主要采取“随行就市”。与参与合作社前相比,农户参与合作社后的苹果生产成本和收益均有所增加,且施肥和施药行为也趋向合理,从而进一步验证了上面的分析结论。
第10章为“研究结论与政策启示”,对本文进行概括性的总结,从研究结论中提炼出一些政策启示,并展望今后可进一步研究的问题。
The rural household responsibility system has provided effective economic incentive to micro-economic agents, which in turn ensured the booming of Chinese agricultural economy at the very beginning of reform. Nevertheless, with the deepening of market-oriented reform launched in the circulation of agricultural products, small farmers start to encounter with great difficulties in getting adapted to the big market and dealing with various types of risk. In this setting, agricultural cooperatives emerged as an institutional arrangement for collective action of small farmers, which are deemed to be essential for agricultural systematization and modernization.
Agricultural cooperatives in China are generally characterized by "strong leaders" and "weak participators", showing a unique "core-peripheral" circle structure. After gaining membership in the cooperative, apart from building an identity affiliation with the cooperative, the farmers also establish to a large extent a contractual transaction relationship with the cooperative. In this context, several questions could be posed here such as:what factors determine the farmers'decision of participation in the cooperative? How is the production decision rights allocated according to the contractual arrangement of internal transaction in the cooperative? Does the contractual arrangement reduce price risk for farmers? Does it save transaction cost and increase production revenue by maintaining a cooperative membership? What effects does the contractual arrangement have on the farmers' production behavior? Based on the survey data of apple growers in Shandong Province, this paper will examines the above question. The outline of the paper and conclusions drawn are as follow:
The paper begin in ChapterⅠwith a brief introduction, in which research questions and objectives are presented, several key conceptions are defined, the methodology and technical route are sketched, and then the structure arrangement of the dissertation is introduced. ChapterⅡcontinues with a literature view on its theoretical bases (transaction cost theory and principal-agent theory) and several strands of the literature such as farmers' decisions on participation in the cooperatives, the contractual allocation of decision rights, the contractual allocation of price risk, the income effect of contractual transaction, the behavioral decision on fertilizer and chemical use. ChapterⅢoffers some background information on the operation of cooperatives and development of the apple industry in Shandong Province, and then gives a description of the survey design and the samples.
In Chapter IV, the paper examines the determinants of farmers'decision on participation in the cooperative. The empirical analysis based on the econometric model with farmer characteristics, operation characteristics and market characteristics as main dependent variables reveals that the older farmer is, the higher the education the farmer has gained, or the more volatile the market price is, the lower the farmers' motivation to join in the cooperative would be. Whereas the lager the apple planting size is, the higher proportion the apple farming income accounts for, the higher the apple quality is, or the lower the market price is. the stronger the farmers'motivation to join in the cooperative would be.
In Chapter V, the paper discusses how the production decision rights is allocated via the contractual arrangement. The survey demonstrates that the decision rights shift from farmers to the cooperative after farmers' joining in the cooperative in various degrees. A higher probability of decision rights shifting towards the cooperative is observed for fertilizer/chemical purchasing and applying. The allocation of the production decision rights are mainly influenced by investment in specific assets by the cooperative, employment of agricultural technician, marketing channels, social identity of the cooperative leaders and contractual pricing system.
Chapter VI examines whether the contractual arrangement reduces price risk for farmers. As the survey demonstrates, the cooperative tends to be opportunistic, given that there is a disparity between the initial contract and the implemented contract in terms of pricing system. The results show the decrease of price risk that farmers face with after their participation in the cooperative is mainly determined by factors such as quality of apples, planting size, distance to markets, the social identity of the cooperative leaders, profit rebate and technical guidance.
ChapterⅦevaluates whether contractual arrangement saves transaction cost and increase production revenue by maintaining a cooperative membership. The results illustrate that, ceteris paribus, the contractual arrangement reduces farmers' transaction cost for about 48 Yuan/Mu and increase net revenue for about 321 Yuan/Mu. The decrease of transaction cost is largely because the cooperative share part of the information cost, transport fee as well as time cost in the process of agricultural inputs purchasing and apples marketing. The rise in net revenue is mainly due to lower price of agricultural inputs via group purchasing.
ChapterⅧdiscusses the impact of the contractual arrangement on farmers' production behavior. Compared with non-members, the cooperative members reduce inorganic fertilizer use and chemical use amounted to 344.6 Yuan/Mu and 189.7 Yuan/Mu respectively, while increase organic fertilizer use amounted to 269.4 Yuan/Mu. The results show that soil test-based fertilization guidance, quality control of apples and pricing system can facilitate farmers' effective use of fertilizers; pesticide residuals detecting, control and supervision of chemical use and pricing system promote farmers' effective use of chemicals.
Chapter IX presents a case study, which reveals that the contractual arrangement with different members varies widely. The production decision rights of demonstration districts and standardized production base are mainly controlled by the cooperative, with transation according to "market price plus markup"; whereas the production decision rights of ordinary orchards are controlled by farmers, with transation at market price. There is an increase in revenue of farmers, and chemical and fertilizer use also tend to be more moderate after their participation in the cooperative, which further validate the aforementioned conclusion.
Chapter X summarizes the whole dissertation and presents a set of policy recommendations, and then concludes with further discussion.
引文
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