摘要
银行信贷融资一直以来都是企业的重要资金来源。但为了控制风险,目前中国的商业银行主要发放担保贷款(包括抵押、质押和保证贷款),这就使无法取得充足担保(物)的企业较难获得银行信贷,特别是实力薄弱的中小企业。本文试图研究会计信息能否对信用贷款决策发挥作用。
银行贷款按照贷款性质不同通常划分为四种：抵押贷款、质押贷款、保证贷款和信用贷款,“抵押、质押”直接表现为银行对企业部分财产的控制,“保证”表现为对保证人的追索权,这三种贷款同为“担保贷款”,而“信用”凭借的是企业自身的信用。
事实上对于不同性质的贷款,由于风险最终承担对象不同,会计信息发挥作用的程度是不一致的。担保贷款由于其有保证人或担保物,银行可以在贷款无法收回的时候向第三方保证人追索或强制拍卖担保物,从而保证了贷款的相对安全,相对于保证人或担保物的信息,银行对于企业会计信息的需求相对较低。但是在银行发放信用贷款的时候,由于银行没有获得相应的保证以及担保物,就势必需要对借款企业的会计信息进行全面分析,尽可能降低信贷风险。这说明,贷款的性质结构与会计信息的信贷决策作用之间的关系可能是紧密而复杂的。
本文以我国特殊的制度环境为研究背景,以会计信息质量特征与银行信用借款比重为研究对象,基于债务契约理论和会计信息的契约观,对我国沪深股市2001—2007年间上市公司的数据进行了实证研究。研究发现：
1.在控制银行信贷决策的其他影响因素后,我们发现,会计信息质量会影响银行信用借款的发放——会计信息质量较高的公司更容易得到银行的青睐,在同等条件下,将会得到更高比例的银行信用借款。
2.国有企业的股权性质对企业的隐性担保作用削弱了会计信息质量与信用借款比重之间的正相关关系,而在非国有企业中,会计信息质量与银行信用借款比重之间的正相关关系显著成立。这说明,对于非国有企业来说,要想获得信用借款,好的会计信息质量更重要。
3.企业的代理层级会影响会计信息质量与信用借款比重之间的关系,代理链条长的企业提供的隐性担保以及相关信息削弱了会计信息质量与信用借款比重之间的正相关关系,而在代理链条短的企业中,会计信息质量与银行信用借款比重之间的正相关关系显著成立。
4.我国各地区存在“金融业市场化”差异,较低的金融业市场化削弱了会计信息质量与信用借款比重之间的正相关关系,但在金融业市场化高的地区,银行的信贷决策相对比较独立,对风险的控制更为严格,会计信息质量与银行信用借款比重之间的正相关关系显著成立。
本文结合中国独特的制度背景,从贷款的性质结构出发,区分会计信息与担保物信息的差别,研究会计信息信贷决策支持作用机理,从而丰富了会计信息的契约观,以及会计信息与不同信贷契约的关系在不同制度环境下的差异。从实务的角度,本文的结论将为改善中国商业银行的信贷决策行为提供理论依据与政策建议。对长期无法得到信用贷款的中小企业,本文提供了一个缓解企业与银行之间信息不对称的思路：企业在会计信息系统建设上的投入也许是值得的。
Bank financing has always been an important source of external funding for corporations. However, commercial banks of China mainly grant secured loans (including collateral, pledge and suretyship) to control risk at present, which made corporations short of collaterals hard to get bank loans, especially small firms. This paper attempts to study the effect of accounting quality on lending decisions of credit loans.
Bank loans are commonly classified into four kinds according to its nature: collateral, pledge, suretyship and credit loans. "Collateral and pledge" means that banks can control part of the firm's properties, "suretyship" means that banks have recourse to guarantors, and these three kinds of loans are secured loans, while "credit" means that banks can only depend on the firm's credibility.
As a matter of fact, as the body undertaking risk is different to loans of different nature, the role of accounting information acting in the lending decision making process is different. There are guarantors or collaterals for secured loans, and in case that the borrower fails to repay the loan, banks can ask the guarantors to repay it or enforce the collaterals sold by auction, which ensures the safety of the loan, therefore, compared to the information of the guarantors and collaterals, the demand for firms' accounting information is lower. However, as there is no guarantor or collateral while offering a credit loan, bank officers need to analyze the borrower's accounting information comprehensively to reduce the risk to the bottom. This indicates that the nature structure of loans is closely correlated with the role of accounting information in making credit decisions, and their relation can be indeed complicated.
Under the specific institution background of China, taking the quality of accounting information and the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans as our subject of study, and based on the theory of debt covenant and contract perspective of accounting information, this paper does an empirical research by using statistics of listed companies on the Chinese stock market during the year 2001 and year 2007.Our conclusions indicate that:
1. After controlling for the other determinants of credit decisions, we find that accounting quality has a significant impact on the lending decision making of credit loans——corporations with better quality of accounting information are favored by banks, ceteris paribus, they can get higher ratio of bank credit loans.
2. Ownership property serves as an invisible guarantee of state-owned enterprises, which weakens the relation between accounting quality and the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans, and in non-state-owned enterprises, the quality of accounting information is still positively correlated with the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans. This indicates that a high quality of accounting information is important to non-state-owned enterprises in their process of acquiring credit loans.
3. The intermediate layer of corporations affects the lending decision making of credit loans. Corporations with more intermediate layers provide an invisible guarantee and more relative information, which weakens the relation between accounting quality and the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans and in corporations with less intermediate layers, the quality of accounting information is still positively correlated with the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans.
4. Regions'financial market development is unbalanced in our country, and a lower degree of financial market development weakens the relation between accounting quality and the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans. In the well developed financial market, credit decisions of banks are independent from other interventions, and banks'control of risk is relatively stricter, consequently, the quality of accounting information is still positively correlated with the ratio of credit loans to total bank loans.
This paper investigates the support mechanism of accounting information in credit decisions by considering the specific institution background of China and distinguishing between accounting information and collateral information, which enriches the contract perspective of accounting information, and our results shed light on how institution background play an important role in the manner in which banks respond to the quality of accounting information of borrowers. Our conclusions also provide a theoretical support and a policy suggestion for improving credit decision process of commercial banks of China. As for the small firms to which credit loans are unavailable, this paper brings forward a proposal to attenuate the asymmetric information problems:it is worthwhile to invest in the accounting information systems.
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