摘要
预算管理是企业围绕预算而展开的预算编制、预算执行、预算分析、预算调控和预算考评等一系列管理活动,其目的是为了落实企业战略目标,完善企业管理机制,明确和协调各部门的工作,控制各部门的活动以及考评各部门的业绩。西方市场经济发达国家对企业预算运用得比较熟练,对企业预算管理的理论研究也比较多。我国对企业预算管理的研究和运用时间不长,到目前为止,国有企业预算管理研究虽然有一定进展,但仍然不够深入,也未形成完整的体系。代理理论不仅客观地指出了企业中预算管理职能的必要性和重要性,其理论框架和数学模型也为预算管理的发展提供了新的思路。
本文在研究企业预算管理理论和代理理论基本内容、模型的基础上,讨论了代理理论在国有企业预算管理中的应用。考虑中国特殊国情的情况下,分析了代理理论视角下国有企业委托代理关系的特殊性,以及国有企业预算管理中存在的预算松弛严重、预算考评体系不完善等问题及其产生原因,并提出了解决国有企业预算管理特殊问题的一些对策,如用代理理论的激励模型、建立委托人激励机制、建立国有企业经营管理者“剩余索取权”激励机制、建立职业经理人市场竞争约束机制等措施减少预算松弛;提出了国有企业预算考评体系的构建设想以及构建以价值链分析为基础的预算管理系统,解决国有企业预算目标的战略导向问题以及预算考评体系不完善的问题。
Budget Management means that enterprises start a series of activities around budgeting, such as budget lay-out, budget execution, budgetary analysis, budgetary control and budget appraisal. Its purpose are to implement the corporate strategic objectives, improve enterprise management mechanisms, clear and coordinate the work of various departments, control the activities of various departments and evaluate the performance of various departments. Western developed countries, with the use of a more skilled enterprise budget, also have more theoretical studies on enterprise budget management. The research into China's enterprise budget management and using time are not very long, so far, state-owned enterprises, although have made much progress in budget management research, still have not gone far enough and not yet a complete system. Agency theory not only objectively point out the necessity and importance of the enterprise budget management functions, but also its theoretical framework and mathematical models cast new light on the progress of budgetary management.
On the study of the theory of enterprise budget management and the basic components of agency theory, this thesis discusses the application of agency theory in the budget management of state-owned enterprises. Take China's special national conditions into account, this thesis analyses the particularity of entrusted agency relationships of state-owned enterprises , the existence of a serious relaxation of the budget of budget management, the faultiness and causes of the budget evaluation system, and also put forward some Countermeasures on how to solve special problems that are exist in budget management of state-owned enterprises, such as incentive model of agency theory, the establishment of principal incentive mechanism, the establishment of managers " residual claim" incentive mechanism, the establishment of market competition mechanism of professional managers, and other measures to reduce the budgetary slack. The article also bring forward a idea for state-owned enterprises appraisal system as well as a value chain analysis of the budget management system, in order to tackle with strategic directions problems of budget target and faultiness of budget appraisal system.
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