摘要
运用合同订立理论、合同相对性理论、以及经济学的相关理论,采用理论分析与实际相结合、定性与定量分析相结合的方法,对招标投标中存在的理论和实际问题进行了深入研究,取得了如下成果:
(1)对招标投标的概念进行了界定。全面分析了招标投标的概念,在此基础上论述了招标与拍卖的不同,分析了造成目前混用的原因。对于概念错误而导致我国目前几部法律误用的情况,分别提出了相关的立法建议。
(2)深入研究了招标投标制度与政府采购制度的关系,提出应当将《招标投标法》并入《政府采购法》,或者作为《政府采购法》的子法。
(3)基于合同订立理论对招标中若干问题进行了研究。对通过招标订立的合同的成立进行了研究。招标投标各个阶段的性质是:招标是要约邀请,投标是要约,发出中标通知书是承诺。中标通知书导致合同的成立。在此基础上,又研究了以下两个问题:一是招标过程中各个阶段的相关法律责任的性质和承担问题,二是关于招标人的废标权问题。还对投标保证金的性质进行了研究,研究结论投标保证金属于物权的范畴,是一种质押担保方式。
(4)基于合同相对性理论,对招标中若干问题进行了研究。对于招标代理费问题,目前部分项目由中标人向招标代理机构交中标服务费,违反了合同相对性原理,缺乏突破合同相对性的依据。对中标人放弃工程款优先权问题进行了研究,认为中标人不能无条件放弃工程款优先权。对通过招标订立合同的撤销权问题进行了研究,通过招标订立的合同不应当完全适用《合同法》,应当由行政监督部门行使撤销权。
(5)从多个角度分析了拍卖和投标的区别,并以参加投标/拍卖人数的问题为例,分别应用Friedman模型和Hassman-Rivett模型定量研究了投标/拍卖问题的本质区别。通过理论分析可以得出拍卖问题和招标问题的描述模型完全不同。对作为招标基础的投标决策经济学理论模型的理论特点和适用范围进行了广泛的研究,指出了模型应用过程中容易引起误用的问题。研究了博弈理论在招标问题中的应用,针对二人暗标投标问题中的静态贝叶斯博弈模型进行了深入的研究,得出了该模型中投标人的最优策略。对投标人最优策略的研究有助于最优招标策略的制定。
This dissertation, based on the theories of the contractual conclusion and the contractual relativity, and by employing the economic theories, has achieved, in combination with lots of practical and theoretical problems existing in the field of the bid invitation and offer, and also integrating the theoretical study with the qualitative analysis, the following objectives:
1. Doing researches on the fundamental problems in the field of bid-invitation-and-offer. First, a clear conception on bid-invitation-and-offer is provided. Then, this dissertation points out, based on the elaboration of this conception, that there are differences between the bid-invitation and auction, and in the meanwhile, gives the reasons why the bid-invitation and auction are often confused by us. Just because we have misunderstanding on the conception of bid-invitation-and-offer, it is natural for us to find several laws in China are misapplied. To solve this situation, some legislative suggestions have been put forward. Second, this dissertation put highlights on the relationship between the bid-invitation-and-offer mechanism and the governmental procurement system. An idea is clearly coming out that The Law of PRC on Bid Invitation and Bid Offer should be incorporated into
The Law of PRC on Governmental Procurement, or the former should function at the sub-level to the latter.
2. Doing researches, based on the contractual conclusion theory, on the certain problems in the field of bid-invitation; doing researches on those contracts which are made by open bids. The different stages of the bid-invitation-and-offer process should be characterized as follows: the bid-invitation is an invitation to offer, the bid-offer is an effective offer and the issuance of the bid-winning notification is an effective promise. The bid-winning notification leads to the contract establishment. Starting from this base, another two problems have also been studied: (a) how to characterize the legal responsibilities of different stages of the whole process of bid-invitation-and-offer and who should be held for responsible once legal problems arise. (b) whether the bid-inviter should enjoy the right to denounce the bid. Therefore, a study on the nature of the tender bond is subsequently carried out. And we find the tender bond should be relegated to jus ad rem, say, a kind of the hypothecation guarantee.
3. Doing researches, based on the contractual relativity theory, on the certain problems in the field of the bid-invitation. Put into the consideration the fact that the bid-winner should pay the service fee to the public bidding agent, we find this practice is going against the contractual relativity theory and there is lack of any sound basis, upon which the contractual relativity theory can be broken up. Doing researches on the priority enjoyed by the bid-winner to give up the project fund. We conclude that the bid-winner cannot, without any qualifications or conditions, give up the project fund priority. Doing researches on the right to rescind the contract made by open bid, we realize it improper to subject the contract made by open bid only to PRC Contractual Law. The administrative organs should perform the right to rescind those contracts made by open bids.
4. An analysis, form the multi-angles, is made on differences between the auction and bid-offer. By employing the Friedman model and Hassman-Rivett model, and by taking example the number of participants into bid-offer and auction respectively, we have qualitatively studied the distinction between auction and bid-invitation. After the theoretical analysis has been made, we can find the descriptive models applied to the auction and bid-offer are utterly different. By thorough study on the theoretical characteristics of the bid-offer decision economic model as the bid-invitation basis, we find it easy for us to misplace some models when using them. Doing researches on applying the Game Theory into the bid-invitation, especially on the Static Basil Game Model in the bilateral non-open bidding, we find the most optimum strategy for those offering bid in this model. The study on the optimum strategy for bid-providers is beneficial to the work-out of the best bid-invitation plan.
引文
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