摘要
国债规模既是一个关系到财政甚至国家健康运行的现实难题,又是一个倍受学界关注和争议的重大理论课题。其核心难题在于,为什么有的国家债台高筑却安然无恙,而有的国家负债不多却惴惴不安?如何合理而有效的解释上述的现象,学界和政府至今尚不能提供确切的解答。Barro(1979)在JPE上发表的《On the Determination of the Public Debt》一文中就曾指出：“一些与债务发行相关的解释变量看起来似乎是稳定的……但是近一个世纪以来,反周期的债券发行所积累的国债规模,远远超出了理论的指引。这样的趋势要求重新考虑某些附加因素对国债的影响,以保政府政策的稳定。”
可以认为,时至今日,国债规模研究已经远远超出了财政借贷关系的范畴,宏观上成为了国家实施财政和货币政策的主要工具；微观上也成为了家庭财富关系的重要组成部分。特别是在目前经济危机席卷全球,国际范围内经济合作与争端并存的情况下,准确获悉国债规模的测量方法和客观有效的数量标准,是防范债务风险和运用国债工具的紧迫需要,也是世界各国顺利度过此次风浪,维护经济和社会稳定的有力保证。
纵观国内外主要研究文献,学者对国债规模的解释主要存在以下问题尚待探索：(1)一般研究者仅采用了以欧盟标准为原型的“国际警戒线”静态比对分析,而国债规模的本质是动态的,因此应该确立一个具有可操作性的动态分析框架；(2)没有就国债规模标准,给出科学而客观准确的数值解答。如,国债负担率等；(3)需要进一步挖掘微观层面对国债规模的解释,如考虑家庭账户约束与财政预算约束对国债规模的共同作用。(4)没有在微观分析基础上,获得国债规模的自然负债空间和考虑制度变迁的情况。
为此,本研究集中探讨了以微观分析为基础的国债规模动态分析框架,并划分了国债规模的自然负债空间。首先,研究构建了一个无限期家庭账户和跨期动态家庭账户的微观分析基础,联系宏观解释国债规模的财政约束理论,从家庭账户的预期、行为偏好、效用优化、代际赠予和代际反哺,以及宏观的财政赤字、税收、财政支出、经济增长、真实利率等相关因素,解析国债规模所受影响及作用机制；其次,采用系统仿真的方法研究并验证国债规模解释理论的有效性和稳健性；最后,运用面板门槛模型,研究样本国家国债规模的门槛临界值大小
第一章,绪论。说明研究的背景和意义,研究现状及切入点,研究路线及主要内容,研究的创新点,研究的基本假设及范式说明。
第二章,国债规模解释的微观理论基础述评。重点从家庭账户下国债规模的基本阐释,跨期、动态家庭账户约束、债务中性与国债规模两个大的方面,回顾了国债规模解释的微观理论基础,在所能涉猎的资料范围内,把握了现有研究的状况与不足,获得了进一步研究的理论支持与研究空间。
第三章,国债规模解释的微观理论基础研究。本章主要拓展了家庭账户与国债规模一般约束模型的动态关系；丰富了“巴罗-李嘉图等价定理”对国债规模影响的微观理论基础;探讨了家庭有形资本、无形资本与国债规模的关系；分析了家庭账户下,代际溢出和代际反哺等复杂问题对国债规模的影响,为宏观解释国债规模奠定了微观分析理论基础。
第四章,宏观解释国债规模的理论述评。主要介绍了宏观解释国债规模的动态分析框架的既有研究进展,整理了宏观解释国债规模的关键因素,解析了制度变迁、发展差异与国债规模的关系,最终获得了微观分析基础在宏观解释国债规模研究中的理论依据。
第五章,以微观分析为基础的国债规模宏观解释理论研究。本章立足于以微观分析为基础的宏观解释框架,通过解析家庭账户预期、行为和决策对国债规模的影响,理论研究了国债规模自然负债空间和制度变迁中国债规模的模型阐释,运用系统仿真的办法,验证国债规模解释理论的有效性和稳健性。
第六章,以微观分析为基础的国债规模解释实证研究。结合第五章的理论模型、本章采用门槛面板模型,分析了样本国家的国债规模门槛临界值,为制定国债规模的客观数量标准提供了实证依据。
第七章,研究结论。根据上述章节的研究,总结了全文的主要结论,并展望了存在的后续研究空间。
理论与实证研究发现：(1)国债规模解释的微观基础,是进一步探讨国债规模内涵的必然,也是增强宏观解释能力的主要动力。(2)家庭账户的行为偏好与财富、福利状况是国债规模的“基准”。(3)家庭账户下有形资本与无形资本的形成,资本在代际间的赠予与反哺,是国债规模动态演进的微观基础。(4)国债规模的动态分析框架受家庭账户约束和财政账户约束的共同作用,由约束函数、目标函数和状态函数三部分构成,且家庭账户微观变量和财政账户宏观变量之间存在交互关系。(5)以微观分析为基础的国债规模的动态分析框架包括了国债规模的自然负债空间和制度变迁中国债规模的模型阐释。(6)国债规模的自然负债空间模型说明家庭账户、财政收支和经济发展三者之间共同影响了国债规模的大小；制度变迁中的国债规模模型阐释,弥合了“自然负债空间”的解释盲点,证明了国债功能的转换对经济和社会发展的作用。(7)在实证上,国债规模的非线性特征被再一次证实,获得了样本国家国债负担率42.224%的客观门槛值标准。
研究的创新点：
(1)研究梳理并探讨了以微观分析为基础的宏观解释国债规模理论,证实了通过微观家庭账户研究国债规模的可行性和必要性,获得由约束函数、目标函数和状态函数三部分构成,以微观分析为基础的国债规模的动态分析框架,改进了“国际警戒线标准”的静态单一特征。
(2)研究细分了国债规模动态分析框架的内涵,认为国债规模的自然负债空间和制度变迁中国债规模的阐释模型共同解析并形成了“分析框架”的可操作模型。研究运用系统仿真的方法,验证并展示了国债规模自然负债空间的系统状态是有效和稳健的,同时,制度变迁中国债规模的阐释模型也弥补了仿真结果中无效区域的解释。
(3)根据理论探讨获得的国债规模动态均衡特征,研究采用新近发展的门槛面板模型,计量了样本国家的国债规模临界值。实证分析重点关注了国债规模与经济增长、财政收支和财政可承受能力的关系,为相关国家在不同环境下,规划经济发展、制定财政政策提供了可量化的债务规模依据。
The determination of the public debt scale (PDS) is a difficult, contentious problem in the academia and it is closely connected to the health of a country's public finance and its economy. One central problem is:how can some countries'economy operate well with heavy debt burden while other countries become worried burdened with much less debt? The governments and academia have not yet come up with a satisfactory explanation to this dilemma. In "On the Determination of the Public Debt", Barro (JPE,1979) asserted that some explaining variables related to public debt seem to remain constant. However, in the last century the issuing of counter cycle debt has led to debt accumulation which is beyond the prediction of conventional theory. Under such circumstance, we need to reconsider other variables in the determination of debt scale as to ensure the consistency of government policy.
Nowadays, Public debt has gone far beyond government borrowing:macroscopically it has become a major tool for the government to implement its monetary and fiscal policy; microscopically it has become an important part of family wealth. Thus, against the backdrop of current financial crisis and the coexistence of economic cooperation and competition, accurately determination of the public debt and an objective and effective quantity standard in such determination process are imperative for both the use of public debt as a financial tool and for the prevention of public debt related risks.
After a thorough literature review, following problems are identified in terms of Public Debt Scale (PDS):(1) Most of the scholars adopted an EU standard based, static comparison analysis method called "international warning line". However, the nature of public debt is dynamic, which calls for a dynamic analysis operative framework; (2) No objective, scientific standard on public debt scale has been provided, such as the scale of public debt-to-GDP ratio; (3) Microscopic variables need to be included in the determination of public debt scale in China, such as Household Aaccounts Constraint and Government Budget Constraint; (4) No study has taken into consideration the natural public debt solvency and system transition from a micro analysis perspective.
To address these problems, this paper mainly discussed a dynamic analysis model of public debt based on micro-analysis, and divided natural public debt solvency into different levels. Firstly, the author constructed a micro-analysis foundation of eternal family account and over period dynamic family account. Secondly, the author used this foundation and public finance constraint theory (which is used to explain public debt scale macroscopically) to explain the impact of a series of variables on PDS and determination mechanism. These variables include the expectation of family account, behavioral preference, utility maximization, endowment and counter-endowment effect between generations and other macro-ecomomic variables such as financial deficit, tax revenue, public expenditure, economic growth and real interest rate. Thirdly, system simulation was used to check the validity of the above model's validity and robustness. Finally, the author used a Panel Threshold Model (PSM) to find out the threshold values of PDS of several countries.
Chapter One, introduction. This chapter includes research background, current development, research perspective and research method, main innovations in this research, research hypotheses and definition of related concepts.
Chapter Two, a literature review of microscopic theoretical foundations of PDS. The author provides PDS determination mainly from two ways:one is from a family account perspective and the other is from the connection between PDS and over-period, dynamic family account constraint and debt neutrality. After a thorough analysis of extant microscopic theories, the author pointed out theoretical gaps which need to be further bridged.
Chapter Three, a study on microscopic theoretical foundations of PDS. In this part the author extended the general constraint model of family account on PDS into a dynamic model and broadened our understanding of microscopic mechanism of Barro-ricardian invariance theorem; Secondly, the author analyzed the relationship between the tangible family asset, intangible family asset and PDS; Thirdly, the author analyzed the effect on PDS of endowment surplus and counter-endowment between generations, laying the foundation for the macroscopic determination of PDS.
Chapter Four, a literature review of macroscopic theoretical foundations of PDS. The author introduced the recent development of dynamic analytic frameworks in the determination of PDS, sorted out key variables in the determination process, analyzed the relationship between system transition, development difference and the PDS, and then found out theoretical support of microscopic analysis in the macroscopic determination of PDS.
Chapter Five, a macroscopic theoretical study on PDS based on microscopic analysis. In this chapter, the author adopted a microscopic determination framework on the basis of microscopic analysis; undertook a theoretical study on the determination mechanism of the impact of natural debt solvency and system transition on PDS; used system simulation to test the validity and robustness of the theory proposed by the author.
Chapter Six, an empirical study to test the PDS determination theory above. Combined with the theory in Chapter Five, a threshold panel model was used to calculate the threshold value of PDS of sample countries, which can be used as a objective standard in the setting up of PDS.
Chapter Seven, research conclusion. Based on the conclusions of above chapters, the author came up with a general conclusion of the whole research, and provided directions for the future studies.
After theoretical and empirical study, major findings include:(1) the microscopic foundation is necessary in the determination and explanation of PDS. (2) PDS needs to be anchored by behavioral preference, wealth and welfare state reflected in family account, all of which provided a natural set of standard. (3) Tangible assets, its formation, endowment and counter endowment between generations formed the foundation for the advancement of PDS. (4) The dynamic framework of PDS is constrained by both family account and government financial account, and consists of constraint function, objective function and state function. There is also interaction effect between variables related with family account and those related with public financial account. (5) The essence of dynamic analysis framework based on microscopic analysis is the PDS's natural debt solvency and systems transition based explanation. (6) Natural debt solvency explains how family account, fiscal revenue and expenditure and economic development co-determine the PDS; the explanation provided by the system transition model has filled the gap created by "natural debt solvency" and proved the role of functional transition of PDS in economic and social development. (7) Empirically, the nonlinear nature of PDS has been again confirmed, and we've got the threshold value of 42.224% from sample countries.
Main Innovation:
(1) A thorough review of PDS determination literature and a thorough study and discussion of macroscopic PDS determination theory is based on microscopic analysis. The author confirmed the necessity and feasibility of studying PDS from a micro-level family account. The author developed a dynamic analytical framework based on micro-analysis, which consists of constraint function, objective function and state function, so the model improved the current static model featuring "international warning line"
(2) A investigation of the nature of PDS dynamic analytical model, The author holds that the natural debt solvency (NDS) of PDS and the transitional PDS explanation model together formed an operative dynamic model of PDS. By the use of system simulation, the author tested the validity and robustness of NDS of PDS. At the same time, the transitional PDS explanation model has complemented the explanations for the invalid areas of simulation results.
(3) Because of the nonlinearity of PDS, this research used a newly developed panel threshold model to calculate the threshold value of sample countries'PDS. After taking into considerations the relations between economic growth, fiscal revenue and expenditure and the financial capacity, the author provided an accurate standard for the determination of PDS of different countries under different conditions, so that they can make references in their economy planning and fiscal policy formulation.
引文
1 1979年James Buchanan尔巴罗利用代际利他(Overlapping Generation Altruism)和跨期代际转移(Overlapping Generation Transfer)证明的债务中性定理,为‘'Barro-Ricardian Invariance Theorem"也被后人称之为债务中性定理(Neutral),基本要义是：国家对百姓征税和通过国债筹资,效果是等价的,不会影响国家的宏观经济,利率、私人的投资等。
2 不仅后续的学者质疑债务中性的假说,即使在1974年Barro这篇成名作之前,也有诸多大师在经验和实证上证明 了通过市场机制,导致债务的非中性。Barro自己就提及了Metzler(1951),Modigliani(1961),Mundell(1971),Tobin(1971)等的研究质疑。
3 这便是著名的Ponzi Game译作“庞氏骗局”
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11 称之为‘'Public Debt in a Liquidity-Constrained Economy"
12 假定投资、储蓄和消费偏好相同
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