异质性视角下促进绿色产品消费的补贴与征税政策比较
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摘要
引导消费者增加绿色产品消费的经济政策研究较少关注不同政策工具的实施条件和效果比较。通过限定政策实施对象为消费者群体,引入消费者偏好和收入维度的异质性,考察补贴和征税两类经济政策工具是否有助于实现政府政策目标;进而在更吻合现实的过半数规则场景下,讨论这两类政策工具的实施条件与效果。研究结论表明:补贴和征税两类政策工具都可以推动绿色产品消费达到最优水平,从而最大化总的社会福利;但高收入群体倾向于政府对绿色产品提供补贴,低收入群体倾向于政府对高耗能产品征收税费。在高耗能产品消费者占多数比例的状况下,政府对绿色产品的补贴和高耗能产品的税收取决于消费者的偏好、收入异质性以及绿色产品社会收益的相对大小。当消费者收入差异较大时,针对低收入群体的补贴和税收要比社会福利最优时高;当消费者收入差异较小时,针对高耗能产品的补贴和税收要比社会福利最优时低。与社会福利最优时的政策选择不同,过半数规则下,消费者普遍表现出更为宽松或更为严格的政策工具倾向。由于消费者收入异质性在政策工具倾向中发挥着重要作用,经济政策设计应当充分考虑补贴融资的资金来源、税收收入的分配方式,以及绿色产品本身的吸引力和相对价格等因素。继而,针对消费者不同政策倾向的具体条件差异,从完善经济政策,发挥政策调控有力导向作用、考虑产品特征,增强社会公众福利与获得感、改变消费观念,建立健全绿色消费长效机制等方面提出促进绿色产品可持续性消费的政策建议。
Economic policy research on guiding consumers to increase consumption of green products pays less attention to the implementation conditions and comparison of effects of different policy instruments. By defining the target of policy implementation as consumer group and introducing the heterogeneity of consumer preference and income dimensions,the paper examines whether subsidy and taxation are helpful to achieve government policy objectives,and then discusses the implementation conditions and effects of these two types of policy instruments under the more realistic scenario of the majority rule. The results show that both subsidy and taxation can promote the consumption of green products to reach the optimal level,thus maximizing the overall social welfare; but the highincome group tends to subsidize green products,while the low-income group tends to levy taxes and fees on high-energy-consuming products. In the case of a high proportion of consumers of energy-consuming products,government subsidies on green products and taxes on high-energy-consuming products depend on consumers' preference heterogeneity,income heterogeneity and the relative size of social benefits of green products. When the difference of consumers' income is large,the subsidy and tax for low-income groups are higher than those for social welfare. When the difference of consumers' income is small,the subsidy and tax for high-energy-consuming products are lower than those for social welfare. Different from the optimal policy choice of social welfare,consumers generally show a more relaxed or stringent policy tool tendency under the majority rule. Because the heterogeneity of consumer's income plays an important role in the trend of policy tools,economic policy design should fully consider the sources of subsidized finance,the distribution of tax revenue,and the attractiveness and relative price of green products. Then,in view of the different conditions of consumers' different policy tendencies,the paper puts forward some policy suggestions to promote sustainable consumption of green products from the aspects of perfecting economic policies,giving full play to the powerful guiding role of policy regulation and control,considering product characteristics,enhancing public welfare and sense of access,changing consumption concepts,establishing and improving the long-term mechanism of green consumption.
Economic policy research on guiding consumers to increase consumption of green products pays less attention to the implementation conditions and comparison of effects of different policy instruments. By defining the target of policy implementation as consumer group and introducing the heterogeneity of consumer preference and income dimensions,the paper examines whether subsidy and taxation are helpful to achieve government policy objectives,and then discusses the implementation conditions and effects of these two types of policy instruments under the more realistic scenario of the majority rule. The results show that both subsidy and taxation can promote the consumption of green products to reach the optimal level,thus maximizing the overall social welfare; but the highincome group tends to subsidize green products,while the low-income group tends to levy taxes and fees on high-energy-consuming products. In the case of a high proportion of consumers of energy-consuming products,government subsidies on green products and taxes on high-energy-consuming products depend on consumers' preference heterogeneity,income heterogeneity and the relative size of social benefits of green products. When the difference of consumers' income is large,the subsidy and tax for low-income groups are higher than those for social welfare. When the difference of consumers' income is small,the subsidy and tax for high-energy-consuming products are lower than those for social welfare. Different from the optimal policy choice of social welfare,consumers generally show a more relaxed or stringent policy tool tendency under the majority rule. Because the heterogeneity of consumer's income plays an important role in the trend of policy tools,economic policy design should fully consider the sources of subsidized finance,the distribution of tax revenue,and the attractiveness and relative price of green products. Then,in view of the different conditions of consumers' different policy tendencies,the paper puts forward some policy suggestions to promote sustainable consumption of green products from the aspects of perfecting economic policies,giving full play to the powerful guiding role of policy regulation and control,considering product characteristics,enhancing public welfare and sense of access,changing consumption concepts,establishing and improving the long-term mechanism of green consumption.
引文
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[13]赵雪梅，肖玲玲，王邹．交通补贴对城市居民效用的影响分析[J]．系统工程理论与实践，2018,38(8):2088-2097.
[14]BERTHE A, ELIE L. Mechanisms explaining the impact of economic inequality on environmental deterioration[J]. Ecological economics,2015,116:191-200.
[15]缪勒．公共选择[M]．第3版.韩旭，杨春学，等，译．北京:中国社会科学出版社，2010.
[16]FREDRIKSSON P G,MATSCHKE X,MINIER J. Environmental policy in majoritarian systems[J]. Journal of environmental economics and management,2010,59(2):177-191.
[17]PECORINO P. Supermajority rule,the law of 1/n,and government spending:a synthesis[J]. Public choice,2018,175(1):19-36.
[18]朱迪．我国可持续消费的政策机制:历史和社会学的分析维度[J]．广东社会科学，2016(3):213-222.
[19]郁建兴，王茵.光伏产业财政补贴政策的作用机制——基于两家光伏企业的案例研究[J]．经济社会体制比较，2017(4):127-138.
[20]托尔．气候经济学:气候、气候变化与气候政策经济分析[M]．齐建国，王颖婕，齐海英，译．大连:东北财经大学出版社，2016.
[2]范如国，冯晓丹．“后补贴”时代地方政府新能源汽车补贴策略研究[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2017,27(3):30-38.
[3]马亮，仲伟俊，梅姝娥．“供给侧改革”背景下的新能源汽车产业补贴政策创新研究[J]．系统工程理论与实践，2017,37(9):2279-2288.
[4]廖家勤，孙小爽．新能源汽车财税政策效应研究[J]．税务与经济，2017(1):86-93.
[5]高秀平，彭月兰．我国新能源汽车财税政策效应与时变研究——基于A股新能源汽车上市公司的实证分析[J]．经济问题，2018(1):49-56.
[6]吴波．绿色消费研究述评[J]．经济管理，2014,36(11):178-189.
[7]胡鞍钢，周绍杰，绿色发展:功能界定、机制分析与发展战略[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2014,24(1):14-20.
[8]柳光强，税收优惠、财政补贴政策的激励效应分析——基于信息不对称理论视角的实证研究[J]．管理世界，2016(10):62-71.
[9]RAUSCH S,SCHWARZ G A,Household heterogeneity,aggregation,and the distributional impacts of environmental taxes[J]. JournaI of public economics,2016,138:43-57.
[10]高新伟，闫昊本．新能源产业补贴政策差异比较R&D补贴，生产补贴还是消费补贴[J]．中国人口·资源与环境，2018,28(6):30-40.
[11]EBERT U,MOYES P. Talents,preferences and income inequality[J]. Social choice and welfare,2018,51(1):13-50.
[12]EEROLA E,HUHTALA A. Voting for environmental policy under income and preference heterogeneity[J]. American journal of agricultural economics,2008,90(1):256-266.
[13]赵雪梅，肖玲玲，王邹．交通补贴对城市居民效用的影响分析[J]．系统工程理论与实践，2018,38(8):2088-2097.
[14]BERTHE A, ELIE L. Mechanisms explaining the impact of economic inequality on environmental deterioration[J]. Ecological economics,2015,116:191-200.
[15]缪勒．公共选择[M]．第3版.韩旭，杨春学，等，译．北京:中国社会科学出版社，2010.
[16]FREDRIKSSON P G,MATSCHKE X,MINIER J. Environmental policy in majoritarian systems[J]. Journal of environmental economics and management,2010,59(2):177-191.
[17]PECORINO P. Supermajority rule,the law of 1/n,and government spending:a synthesis[J]. Public choice,2018,175(1):19-36.
[18]朱迪．我国可持续消费的政策机制:历史和社会学的分析维度[J]．广东社会科学，2016(3):213-222.
[19]郁建兴，王茵.光伏产业财政补贴政策的作用机制——基于两家光伏企业的案例研究[J]．经济社会体制比较，2017(4):127-138.
[20]托尔．气候经济学:气候、气候变化与气候政策经济分析[M]．齐建国，王颖婕，齐海英，译．大连:东北财经大学出版社，2016.