基于博弈视角的邻避效应利益冲突分析
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摘要
针对我国频繁发生邻避冲突事件的现状,从博弈论视角分析邻避效应的演化机理与成因根源,并提出相应规避机制。针对不同决策主体构建了三类邻避效应演化博弈模型,通过引入邻避因子_m~n、信息传播函数λ(x)等参数,建立地方政府与邻避居民的一般化复制动态方程,深入分析了地方政府封闭决策期、协商谈判期以及设施兴建运营期时的邻避效应演化机理。分析得出:邻避居民由于信息匮乏,导致风险损失预期值K增高,从而增强冲突演化进度与强度;规避邻避效应的关键节点在于避免邻避效应的利益冲突,其根源在于不同主体对邻避设施风险成本感知的巨大差异,以及由差异导致的应对策略和行为;邻避因子_m~n值大大降低,驱使邻避居民风险偏好抗争收益大于风险抗议成本,形成冲突演化。最后基于合作博弈理论分析提出规避机制,只有博弈双方共同签订具有特定约束力行为的协议,才能充分避免邻避居民的利益受损,邻避效应才能得以最终规避。
Based on the current status of frequently occurred NIMBY incidents in China, the evolution mechanism and causes were analyzed by the game theory and the solving mechanism was recommended.Three kinds of evolutionary game model for different decision-makers were developed. The replicated dynamic equation between the local government and NIMBY residents were established using NIMBY factor _m~n, information dissemination functions λ(x) and other parameters to analyze the evolutionary mechanism of NIMBY effect for three stages: closed decision period, negotiation period, and facilities' construction and operation period. The conclusions were:(1) Due to limited information for the NIMBY residents, the expected value of risk loss K was increased, resulting in increased intensity and rate of progress of the conflict;(2) The key node to avoid NIMBY effect was its benefit conflict, which originated from the significant different risk perception on NIMBY facilities by various subjects, and the strategies and behaviors caused by these differences;(3) Because the NIMBY factor _m~n was largely reduced, the residents' benefits in risk preference of struggling were higher than risk protesting cost, and conflict was eventually formed;(4) The solving mechanisms were proposed based on the cooperative game theory.Only if specific agreement was signed between the local government and NIMBY residents, the benefits of NIMBY residents could be fully protected, and the NIMBY effect could be ultimately avoided.
Based on the current status of frequently occurred NIMBY incidents in China, the evolution mechanism and causes were analyzed by the game theory and the solving mechanism was recommended.Three kinds of evolutionary game model for different decision-makers were developed. The replicated dynamic equation between the local government and NIMBY residents were established using NIMBY factor _m~n, information dissemination functions λ(x) and other parameters to analyze the evolutionary mechanism of NIMBY effect for three stages: closed decision period, negotiation period, and facilities' construction and operation period. The conclusions were:(1) Due to limited information for the NIMBY residents, the expected value of risk loss K was increased, resulting in increased intensity and rate of progress of the conflict;(2) The key node to avoid NIMBY effect was its benefit conflict, which originated from the significant different risk perception on NIMBY facilities by various subjects, and the strategies and behaviors caused by these differences;(3) Because the NIMBY factor _m~n was largely reduced, the residents' benefits in risk preference of struggling were higher than risk protesting cost, and conflict was eventually formed;(4) The solving mechanisms were proposed based on the cooperative game theory.Only if specific agreement was signed between the local government and NIMBY residents, the benefits of NIMBY residents could be fully protected, and the NIMBY effect could be ultimately avoided.
引文
[1]乔艳洁,邱小明.周清华.生态城市建设中的邻避效应探析[J].城市发展研究,2014,21(2):8-10.
[2]Lake R K.Rethinking NIMBY[J].Journal of the American Planning Association,1993,59(1):87-93.
[3]O'Hare M."Not on my block you don't":Facility siting and the strategic importance of compensation[J].Public Policy,1977,25(4):407-458.
[4]Peelle E,Ellis R.Beyond the'not-inmy-backyard'impasse[C].Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy,1987:68-77.
[5]叶祖盼.城市邻避设施的规划研究[D].上海:同济大学.2009.
[6]何艳玲.“中国式”邻避冲突:基于事件的分析[J].开放时代,2009(12):102-114.
[7]Greenberg C.Liberal NIMBY:American Jews and civil rights[J].Journal of Urban History,2012,38(3):452-466.
[8]Siegrist M,Visschers V.Acceptance of nuclear power:The Fukushima effect[J].Energy Policy,2013(59):112-119.
[9]乔艳洁.曹婷,唐华.从公共政策角度探析邻避效应[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2007,26(1):93-97.
[10]Chiu Chingpin.Lai Shikung.An experimental comparison of negotiation strategies for siting NIMBY facilities[J].Environment and Planning,2009(36):956-967.
[11]Kesten C.Green.Forecasting decisions in conflict situations:A comparison of game theory,role-playing,and unaided judgement[J].International Journal of Forecasting.2002.18(3):321-344.
[12]刘德海.群体性突发事件中政府机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(1):175-183.
[13]王循庆,李勇建,孙华丽.基于情景推演的群体性突发事件演化博弈分析[J].管理科学,2015,28(6):133-143.
[14]Kerachian R,Fallahnia M,Bazargan-Lari M R,et al.A fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resources management:Application of rubinstein bargaining theory[J].Resources,Conservation and Recycling,2010,54(10):673-682.
[15]徐寅峰,刘德海.群体性突发事件产生根源的主观博弈分析[J].预测,2004,23(6):43-45.
[16]Sueyoshi T.An agent-based approach equipped with game theory:Strategic collaboration among learning agents during a dynamic market change in the California electricity crisis[J].Energy Economics,2010,32(5):1009-1024.
[17]张向和.垃圾处理场的邻避效应及其社会冲突解决机制的研究[D].重庆:重庆大学,2010.
[18]郑谦.“邻避冲突”的动态博弈分析:不完美信息条件下的均衡与信念:兼析PX项目建设的困境与对策[J].兰州学刊,2014(12):133-144.
[19]Tversky A,Kahneman D.Judgement under uncertainty:Heuristics and biases[J].Science,New Series,1974:1124-1131.
[20]Young H P.Individual learning and social rationality[J].European Economic Review,1998(52):651-663.
[21]Smith J M,Price G R.The logic of animal conflict[J].Nature,1973,246(5427):15-18.
[22]Taylor P D,Jonker L B.Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics[J].Mathematical Biosciences,1978.40(78):145-156.
[23]Weibull J W.Evolutionary game theory[M].Boston:MIT Press,1995.
[24]Liu D,Xiao X Li H,et al.Historicalevolution and benefit-cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision:An evolutionary game analysis framework[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,243(3):974-984.
[25]Sethi R.Strategy-specific barriers to learning and non-monotonic selection dynamics[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1998,23(2):284-304.
[26]郑君君,闫龙,张好雨,等.基于演化博弈和优化理论的环境污染群体性事件处置机制[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):168-176.
[27]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J].上海财经大学学报.2001,3(5):3-9.
[28]熊国强,张婷,王海涛.情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(9):162-170.
[29]张飞,张翔,徐建刚.基于多主体包容性的邻避效应全过程风险规避研究[J].现代城市研究,2013(2):17-22.
[30]Eisenhardt K M.Building theories from case study research[J].The Academy of Management Review,1989,14(4):532-550.
[31]刘德海.信息交流在群体性突发事件处理中作用的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(3):95-102.
[32]汤汇浩.邻避效应:公益性项目的补偿机制与公民参与[J].中国行政管理,2011(7):111-114.
[33]黄汇娟.邻避情结与邻避治理:番禺垃级焚烧厂设置的个案分析[J].广东广播电视大学学报,2012,21(92):99-104.
[34]夏志强.罗书川.分歧与演化:邻避冲突的博弈分析[J].新视野,2015(5):67-73.
[35]刘德海.环境污染群体性突发事件的协同演化机制:基于信息传播和权利博弈的视角[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(4):102-113.
[36]朱紫民.垃级处理环境补偿机制研究[D].广州:中山大学,2010.
[37]朱德米,虞铭明.社会心理、演化博弈与城市环境群体性事件:以昆明PX事件为例[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2015,26(2):57-64.
[38]Tan J H W,Zizzo D J.Groups,cooperation and conflict in games[J].The Journal of Social-Economics,2008,37(1):1-17.
[39]朱阳光.垃圾焚烧场的公众可接受环境风险水平研究[D].苏州:苏州科技学院,2014.
[40]刘德海,陈静锋.环境群体性事件''信息-权利”协同演化的仿真分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(12):3157-3166.
[41]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002.
[42]黄杰,朱正威,赵巍.风险感知、应对策略与冲突升级:一个群体性事件发生机理的解释框架及运用[J].复旦学报(社会科学版),2015(1):134-143.
[43]朱阳光,杨洁,邹丽萍,等.邻避效应研究述评与展望[J].现代城市研究.2015(10):100-107.
[44]Suzuki Y,Iwasa Y.Conflict between groups of players in coupled socioeconomic and ecological dynamics[J].Ecological Economics,2009,68(4):1106-1115.
[45]施锡铨.合作博弈引论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2012.
[46]赵成.论我国环境管理体制中存在的主要问题及其完善[J].中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版),2012(2):38-43.
(1)邻避居民在有限理性下做出策略选择是不可信威胁或承诺,这对地方政府刚开始对设施兴建是否批准具有很大不确定性,很难做出最佳选择;同时邻避居民在非理性下行为选择通过贝叶斯概率等高度理性知识判断本身存在不合理性,或是应用情感等本能意识更为符合实际。
(2)邻避冲突事件中,这三大类型可能会同时按次序发生,亦可能只发生其中一种或两种类型。
(3)为便于博弈分析,假设_A~3=_A~2+w_1=_A~1+w_2,w_1与w_2常数值差很小,表明在n=1,2,3时,当邻避居民接受设施选址时其邻避因子值相接近。
[2]Lake R K.Rethinking NIMBY[J].Journal of the American Planning Association,1993,59(1):87-93.
[3]O'Hare M."Not on my block you don't":Facility siting and the strategic importance of compensation[J].Public Policy,1977,25(4):407-458.
[4]Peelle E,Ellis R.Beyond the'not-inmy-backyard'impasse[C].Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy,1987:68-77.
[5]叶祖盼.城市邻避设施的规划研究[D].上海:同济大学.2009.
[6]何艳玲.“中国式”邻避冲突:基于事件的分析[J].开放时代,2009(12):102-114.
[7]Greenberg C.Liberal NIMBY:American Jews and civil rights[J].Journal of Urban History,2012,38(3):452-466.
[8]Siegrist M,Visschers V.Acceptance of nuclear power:The Fukushima effect[J].Energy Policy,2013(59):112-119.
[9]乔艳洁.曹婷,唐华.从公共政策角度探析邻避效应[J].郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2007,26(1):93-97.
[10]Chiu Chingpin.Lai Shikung.An experimental comparison of negotiation strategies for siting NIMBY facilities[J].Environment and Planning,2009(36):956-967.
[11]Kesten C.Green.Forecasting decisions in conflict situations:A comparison of game theory,role-playing,and unaided judgement[J].International Journal of Forecasting.2002.18(3):321-344.
[12]刘德海.群体性突发事件中政府机会主义行为的演化博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(1):175-183.
[13]王循庆,李勇建,孙华丽.基于情景推演的群体性突发事件演化博弈分析[J].管理科学,2015,28(6):133-143.
[14]Kerachian R,Fallahnia M,Bazargan-Lari M R,et al.A fuzzy game theoretic approach for groundwater resources management:Application of rubinstein bargaining theory[J].Resources,Conservation and Recycling,2010,54(10):673-682.
[15]徐寅峰,刘德海.群体性突发事件产生根源的主观博弈分析[J].预测,2004,23(6):43-45.
[16]Sueyoshi T.An agent-based approach equipped with game theory:Strategic collaboration among learning agents during a dynamic market change in the California electricity crisis[J].Energy Economics,2010,32(5):1009-1024.
[17]张向和.垃圾处理场的邻避效应及其社会冲突解决机制的研究[D].重庆:重庆大学,2010.
[18]郑谦.“邻避冲突”的动态博弈分析:不完美信息条件下的均衡与信念:兼析PX项目建设的困境与对策[J].兰州学刊,2014(12):133-144.
[19]Tversky A,Kahneman D.Judgement under uncertainty:Heuristics and biases[J].Science,New Series,1974:1124-1131.
[20]Young H P.Individual learning and social rationality[J].European Economic Review,1998(52):651-663.
[21]Smith J M,Price G R.The logic of animal conflict[J].Nature,1973,246(5427):15-18.
[22]Taylor P D,Jonker L B.Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics[J].Mathematical Biosciences,1978.40(78):145-156.
[23]Weibull J W.Evolutionary game theory[M].Boston:MIT Press,1995.
[24]Liu D,Xiao X Li H,et al.Historicalevolution and benefit-cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision:An evolutionary game analysis framework[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2015,243(3):974-984.
[25]Sethi R.Strategy-specific barriers to learning and non-monotonic selection dynamics[J].Games and Economic Behavior,1998,23(2):284-304.
[26]郑君君,闫龙,张好雨,等.基于演化博弈和优化理论的环境污染群体性事件处置机制[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(8):168-176.
[27]谢识予.有限理性条件下的进化博弈理论[J].上海财经大学学报.2001,3(5):3-9.
[28]熊国强,张婷,王海涛.情绪影响下群体性冲突的RDEU博弈模型分析[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(9):162-170.
[29]张飞,张翔,徐建刚.基于多主体包容性的邻避效应全过程风险规避研究[J].现代城市研究,2013(2):17-22.
[30]Eisenhardt K M.Building theories from case study research[J].The Academy of Management Review,1989,14(4):532-550.
[31]刘德海.信息交流在群体性突发事件处理中作用的博弈分析[J].中国管理科学,2005,13(3):95-102.
[32]汤汇浩.邻避效应:公益性项目的补偿机制与公民参与[J].中国行政管理,2011(7):111-114.
[33]黄汇娟.邻避情结与邻避治理:番禺垃级焚烧厂设置的个案分析[J].广东广播电视大学学报,2012,21(92):99-104.
[34]夏志强.罗书川.分歧与演化:邻避冲突的博弈分析[J].新视野,2015(5):67-73.
[35]刘德海.环境污染群体性突发事件的协同演化机制:基于信息传播和权利博弈的视角[J].公共管理学报,2013,10(4):102-113.
[36]朱紫民.垃级处理环境补偿机制研究[D].广州:中山大学,2010.
[37]朱德米,虞铭明.社会心理、演化博弈与城市环境群体性事件:以昆明PX事件为例[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2015,26(2):57-64.
[38]Tan J H W,Zizzo D J.Groups,cooperation and conflict in games[J].The Journal of Social-Economics,2008,37(1):1-17.
[39]朱阳光.垃圾焚烧场的公众可接受环境风险水平研究[D].苏州:苏州科技学院,2014.
[40]刘德海,陈静锋.环境群体性事件''信息-权利”协同演化的仿真分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(12):3157-3166.
[41]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002.
[42]黄杰,朱正威,赵巍.风险感知、应对策略与冲突升级:一个群体性事件发生机理的解释框架及运用[J].复旦学报(社会科学版),2015(1):134-143.
[43]朱阳光,杨洁,邹丽萍,等.邻避效应研究述评与展望[J].现代城市研究.2015(10):100-107.
[44]Suzuki Y,Iwasa Y.Conflict between groups of players in coupled socioeconomic and ecological dynamics[J].Ecological Economics,2009,68(4):1106-1115.
[45]施锡铨.合作博弈引论[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2012.
[46]赵成.论我国环境管理体制中存在的主要问题及其完善[J].中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版),2012(2):38-43.
(1)邻避居民在有限理性下做出策略选择是不可信威胁或承诺,这对地方政府刚开始对设施兴建是否批准具有很大不确定性,很难做出最佳选择;同时邻避居民在非理性下行为选择通过贝叶斯概率等高度理性知识判断本身存在不合理性,或是应用情感等本能意识更为符合实际。
(2)邻避冲突事件中,这三大类型可能会同时按次序发生,亦可能只发生其中一种或两种类型。
(3)为便于博弈分析,假设_A~3=_A~2+w_1=_A~1+w_2,w_1与w_2常数值差很小,表明在n=1,2,3时,当邻避居民接受设施选址时其邻避因子值相接近。