自主品牌汽车产业的财税激励政策研究:基于CGE模型的分析
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摘要
现有关于发展自主品牌汽车产业的政策与研究结论相互掣肘,摇摆不定.通过在可计算一般均衡模型中引入以往研究所忽视的技术要素和财政补贴变量,利用中国2012年实际经济运行数据,分析了自主品牌汽车技术进步的影响和财税激励政策的作用差异.研究发现,基于社会福利最大化角度,最优财政补贴比例在5%左右,且随着自主品牌汽车技术的提升而下降,与购置税优惠政策以牺牲其它产业和劳动者利益为代价发展汽车产业不同,技术进步和财政补贴政策既能促进经济增长,又能缩小贫富差距.因此,对自主品牌汽车部门实施研发补贴,是一项兼顾长期技术进步与短期补贴效用的更为有利的政策选择.
The government and scholars have not reached agreement on the developing of self-owned brand vehicle industry. This paper constructed a CGE model by adding technical input element and financial subsidy variable which are ignored by other scholars and analyzed the impacts of technical progress and finance and taxation policy on self-owned brand vehicle industry by using the Chinese statistical data in 2012. The results show that the optimal financial subsidy rate is.about 5%, which decreases with the increase of technical level of selfowned brand vehicle. Differing from the purchase taxation policy which does harm to other industries and labors, the technical progress and financial subsidy policy not only promote the economic growth rate, but also reduce the inequality. Therefore, the R&D subsidy policy for self-.owned brand vehicle industry is the efficient policy choice taking both the long-term technical progress and short-term subsidy utility into account.
The government and scholars have not reached agreement on the developing of self-owned brand vehicle industry. This paper constructed a CGE model by adding technical input element and financial subsidy variable which are ignored by other scholars and analyzed the impacts of technical progress and finance and taxation policy on self-owned brand vehicle industry by using the Chinese statistical data in 2012. The results show that the optimal financial subsidy rate is.about 5%, which decreases with the increase of technical level of selfowned brand vehicle. Differing from the purchase taxation policy which does harm to other industries and labors, the technical progress and financial subsidy policy not only promote the economic growth rate, but also reduce the inequality. Therefore, the R&D subsidy policy for self-.owned brand vehicle industry is the efficient policy choice taking both the long-term technical progress and short-term subsidy utility into account.
引文
[1]Schafer A,Jacoby H D.Technology detail in a multisector CGE model:transport under climate policy[J].Energy Economics,2005,27(1):1-24.
[2]Yan F,Winijkul E,Jung S,et al.Global emission projections of particulate matter(PM):I.Exhaust emissions from on-road vehicles[J].Atmospheric Environment,2011,45(28):4830-4844.
[3]Lin,Jiang Z.Estimates of energy subsidies in China and impact of energy subsidy reform[J].Energy Economics,2011,33(2):273-283.
[4]孙林.基于混合CGE棋型的乘用车节能减排政策分析[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2012,22(7):40-48.
[5]柳青,刘宇,徐晋涛.汽车尾气排放标准提高的经济影响与减排效果——基于可计算一般均衡(CGE)棋型的分析[J].北京大学学报:自然科学版,2016,52(3):515-527.
[6]郭玉清.资本积累、技术变迁与总量生产函数——基于中国1980-2005年经验数据的分析[J].南开经济研究,2006(3):79-89.
[7]张顺明,余军.内部货币与我国最优关税政策研究[J].经济研究,2009,44(2):18-31.
[8]Shoven J B,Whalley J.Applying general equilibrium[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1992.
[9]Harberger A C.The incidence of the corporation income tax revisited[J].National Tax Journal,2008,61(2):303-12.
[10]Ji J,Ye Z,Zhang S.Welfare analysis on optimal enterprise tax rate in China[J].Economic Modelling,2013,33(2):149-158.
1.参见网页http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/201301/t20130122_729462.html.
2.参见网页http://www.chinaacc.com/new/184_187/2009_12_16_ma9593245816121900210166.shtml.
3.参见网页http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2012qhczjs/201307/t20130715_966216.html.
4.数据来源于网页http://www.12gang.com/article_6631.html.
[2]Yan F,Winijkul E,Jung S,et al.Global emission projections of particulate matter(PM):I.Exhaust emissions from on-road vehicles[J].Atmospheric Environment,2011,45(28):4830-4844.
[3]Lin,Jiang Z.Estimates of energy subsidies in China and impact of energy subsidy reform[J].Energy Economics,2011,33(2):273-283.
[4]孙林.基于混合CGE棋型的乘用车节能减排政策分析[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2012,22(7):40-48.
[5]柳青,刘宇,徐晋涛.汽车尾气排放标准提高的经济影响与减排效果——基于可计算一般均衡(CGE)棋型的分析[J].北京大学学报:自然科学版,2016,52(3):515-527.
[6]郭玉清.资本积累、技术变迁与总量生产函数——基于中国1980-2005年经验数据的分析[J].南开经济研究,2006(3):79-89.
[7]张顺明,余军.内部货币与我国最优关税政策研究[J].经济研究,2009,44(2):18-31.
[8]Shoven J B,Whalley J.Applying general equilibrium[M].Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1992.
[9]Harberger A C.The incidence of the corporation income tax revisited[J].National Tax Journal,2008,61(2):303-12.
[10]Ji J,Ye Z,Zhang S.Welfare analysis on optimal enterprise tax rate in China[J].Economic Modelling,2013,33(2):149-158.
1.参见网页http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/201301/t20130122_729462.html.
2.参见网页http://www.chinaacc.com/new/184_187/2009_12_16_ma9593245816121900210166.shtml.
3.参见网页http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2012qhczjs/201307/t20130715_966216.html.
4.数据来源于网页http://www.12gang.com/article_6631.html.