法律权利的性质:它与道德权利必然相关吗?
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摘要
从字面意义上看,"法律权利"这个词最初的意思,就是指法律体系中规定的权利。于是,在概念上,法律权利就等于从法律规定的义务中获益;进而,法律权利的根据,就来自于法体系本身的正当性,而跟道德权利这个概念没有直接关系。然而,一旦注意到指向性义务与非指向性义务的区别且权利只跟指向性义务关联,以及指向性义务意味着将某种控制的能力交由权利人来掌握,那么这就必然预设道德权利的概念,因为法体系及其正当性并不能将这些内容囊括其中。所以,法律权利必然以道德权利为基础,法体系必须以开放性的态度保持对道德权利的尊重。
According to its literal meaning, the word "legal rights" means the rights in legal system. And then, legal rights are equal with taking goods from the duties in legal system, and the justification of legal rights is the utility principles of law, instead of moral rights. However, once theorists find that rights only related with directed duties which means rights-holder has capacity to control his choice in some domains,the moral rights would be the justification of legal right, because legal system and its principle could not explain the capacity to control.
According to its literal meaning, the word "legal rights" means the rights in legal system. And then, legal rights are equal with taking goods from the duties in legal system, and the justification of legal rights is the utility principles of law, instead of moral rights. However, once theorists find that rights only related with directed duties which means rights-holder has capacity to control his choice in some domains,the moral rights would be the justification of legal right, because legal system and its principle could not explain the capacity to control.
引文
(1)所谓“识别”,指的是如何在实在法体系所蕴含的法律陈述中“发现”一项法律权利的存在,这显然是一项形式化的作业;所谓“证成”,指的是如何获得一项有正当根据的法律权利的问题,这显然是一项实质化的工作。
(2)更为完整的说明,参见L.W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 54~91.
(3)Alon Harel,“Theories of Rights”, in Martin P. Golding&William A. Edmundson ed., The Blackwell Guide tothe Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Oxford:Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 193~197.
(4)“在概念上”这个表述是说,即使权利在规范上存在利益说与选择说的对立,但是它们都肯定权利是义务人负担义务的根据,虽然这并不是规范性上的根据。
(5)Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, New Haven:Yale University Press, 1919.
(6)一般讨论参见William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, 2nd edition, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 44~50.
(7)这就说明了,为什么边沁在权利的规范理论上会持有一种利益论的主张。
(8)Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, H. L. A. Hart eds., London:Athlone Press, 1970, pp. 293~294.
(9)具体操作过程的讨论可以参见于柏华:《权利认定的利益判准》,《法学家》2017年第6期。
(10)一旦采取“规范存有论”这种将规范视为某种独特实体的看法,那么其实权利陈述和义务陈述都同属于“当为陈述”(assertion of ought),因此某些关于权利的形式分析的理论,将会把权利一概化约为当为陈述,并认为它和义务之间并不存在关键的区别。下一节的讨论其实正好反对这个形式的化约论,因为“它是一个权利”与“它设定了一个义务”还是存在重要的区别。
(11)David Lyons,“Utility and Rights”, in Jeremy Waldron eds., Theories of Rights, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1984, pp. 110~111.
(12)其实还包括所有类型的制度,无论是各种俱乐部,还是某种政治制度或者经济制度的特殊安排。
(13)David Lyons,“Utility and Rights”, pp. 113~117.
(14)具体讨论参见,John Grey,“John Stuart Mill on Liberty, Utility, and Rights”, in J. Roland Pennock&John J.Chapman, Human Rights, New York:New York University Press, 1981, pp. 80~116.
(15)有兴趣者可参见如下文集:R.G. Frey, Utility and Rights, Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
(16)我的完整看法,参见陈景辉:《权利和义务是对应的吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期。
(17)不假思索地将法律中的义务陈述一概转化为权利陈述,必须要克服这项笨拙性论证的挑战,即只将它视为一项义务或者对一项义务的违反,是否会导致遗失重要的内容。
(18)由于这篇文章并不关心错误的性质,因此只提供这个形式性的判断标准。
(19)例如Joseph Raz,“A Right to Dissent? I. Civil Disobedience”, in his The Authority of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 266~269.
(20)Joel Feinberg,“In Defense of Moral Rights”, in hisFreedom and Fulfillment, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994, p.204.
(21)这当然只是其中的一个理由,不过,认识到这一点,将会非常有助于理解“犯罪”和“侵权”之间的区别:前者犯了两项错误,而后者只犯了一项错误。
(22)这个“程度”显然由这两个错误哪个更重要的判断来决定。
(23)Judith Jarvis Thomsom, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1990, p.77.
(24)H.L.A. Hart,“Legal Right”, in his Essays on Bentham, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1982, pp.183~184.
(25)Neil MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”, in P.M.S.Hacker&Joseph Raz eds., Law, Morality, and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1977, pp.197~199.
(26)这样的例子还有很多,比如说夫妻之间同意的性虐待与家暴就存在区别,虽然尊严权、身体权也被视为不可放弃的权利,但是侵害这些权利的夫妻之间的性虐待,至少不能完全等同于家庭暴力。这同样说明,权利人对于不可放弃的权利的放弃,仍然是有意义的。
(27)Joseph Raz,“Legal Rights”, in his Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994, p.259.
(28)Joseph Raz,“Legal Rights”, pp. 261,266.
(29)Joseph Raz,“Legal Rights”, pp. 269,273.
(30)H.L.A. Hart,“Between Utility and Rights”, in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 199,201.
(31)H.L.A. Hart,“Between Utility and Rights”, p.200.
(32)这个例子是范伯格“没有权利之世界”思想实验的简化版本,完整的讨论参见,Joel Feinberg,“The Nature and Value of Rights”, 4(1970)The Journal of Value Inquiry, pp.245,246.
(33)Leif Wenar,“Rights”, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights(2018/1/22访问), pp. 17, 21.
(34)更为详细的讨论参见陈景辉:《存在做错事的权利吗?》,《法律科学》2018年第2期。
(35)Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopian, New York:Basic Books, 1974, p.29.
(36)Ronald Dworkin,“Rights as Trumps”, in Jeremy Waldron ed., Theories of Rights, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1984, p.153.
(37)当然,诺齐克和德沃金的看法还是存在明显的区别:诺齐克的论证以自由这个概念为核心,而德沃金则将平等放在中心的位置。
(38)陈景辉:《比例原则普遍化与基本权利的性质》,《中国法学》2017年第5期。
(2)更为完整的说明,参见L.W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 54~91.
(3)Alon Harel,“Theories of Rights”, in Martin P. Golding&William A. Edmundson ed., The Blackwell Guide tothe Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Oxford:Blackwell Publishing, 2005, pp. 193~197.
(4)“在概念上”这个表述是说,即使权利在规范上存在利益说与选择说的对立,但是它们都肯定权利是义务人负担义务的根据,虽然这并不是规范性上的根据。
(5)Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, New Haven:Yale University Press, 1919.
(6)一般讨论参见William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, 2nd edition, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 44~50.
(7)这就说明了,为什么边沁在权利的规范理论上会持有一种利益论的主张。
(8)Jeremy Bentham, Of Laws in General, H. L. A. Hart eds., London:Athlone Press, 1970, pp. 293~294.
(9)具体操作过程的讨论可以参见于柏华:《权利认定的利益判准》,《法学家》2017年第6期。
(10)一旦采取“规范存有论”这种将规范视为某种独特实体的看法,那么其实权利陈述和义务陈述都同属于“当为陈述”(assertion of ought),因此某些关于权利的形式分析的理论,将会把权利一概化约为当为陈述,并认为它和义务之间并不存在关键的区别。下一节的讨论其实正好反对这个形式的化约论,因为“它是一个权利”与“它设定了一个义务”还是存在重要的区别。
(11)David Lyons,“Utility and Rights”, in Jeremy Waldron eds., Theories of Rights, Oxford:Oxford University Press,1984, pp. 110~111.
(12)其实还包括所有类型的制度,无论是各种俱乐部,还是某种政治制度或者经济制度的特殊安排。
(13)David Lyons,“Utility and Rights”, pp. 113~117.
(14)具体讨论参见,John Grey,“John Stuart Mill on Liberty, Utility, and Rights”, in J. Roland Pennock&John J.Chapman, Human Rights, New York:New York University Press, 1981, pp. 80~116.
(15)有兴趣者可参见如下文集:R.G. Frey, Utility and Rights, Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
(16)我的完整看法,参见陈景辉:《权利和义务是对应的吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期。
(17)不假思索地将法律中的义务陈述一概转化为权利陈述,必须要克服这项笨拙性论证的挑战,即只将它视为一项义务或者对一项义务的违反,是否会导致遗失重要的内容。
(18)由于这篇文章并不关心错误的性质,因此只提供这个形式性的判断标准。
(19)例如Joseph Raz,“A Right to Dissent? I. Civil Disobedience”, in his The Authority of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 266~269.
(20)Joel Feinberg,“In Defense of Moral Rights”, in hisFreedom and Fulfillment, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994, p.204.
(21)这当然只是其中的一个理由,不过,认识到这一点,将会非常有助于理解“犯罪”和“侵权”之间的区别:前者犯了两项错误,而后者只犯了一项错误。
(22)这个“程度”显然由这两个错误哪个更重要的判断来决定。
(23)Judith Jarvis Thomsom, The Realm of Rights, Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard University Press, 1990, p.77.
(24)H.L.A. Hart,“Legal Right”, in his Essays on Bentham, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1982, pp.183~184.
(25)Neil MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”, in P.M.S.Hacker&Joseph Raz eds., Law, Morality, and Society:Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1977, pp.197~199.
(26)这样的例子还有很多,比如说夫妻之间同意的性虐待与家暴就存在区别,虽然尊严权、身体权也被视为不可放弃的权利,但是侵害这些权利的夫妻之间的性虐待,至少不能完全等同于家庭暴力。这同样说明,权利人对于不可放弃的权利的放弃,仍然是有意义的。
(27)Joseph Raz,“Legal Rights”, in his Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1994, p.259.
(28)Joseph Raz,“Legal Rights”, pp. 261,266.
(29)Joseph Raz,“Legal Rights”, pp. 269,273.
(30)H.L.A. Hart,“Between Utility and Rights”, in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 199,201.
(31)H.L.A. Hart,“Between Utility and Rights”, p.200.
(32)这个例子是范伯格“没有权利之世界”思想实验的简化版本,完整的讨论参见,Joel Feinberg,“The Nature and Value of Rights”, 4(1970)The Journal of Value Inquiry, pp.245,246.
(33)Leif Wenar,“Rights”, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights(2018/1/22访问), pp. 17, 21.
(34)更为详细的讨论参见陈景辉:《存在做错事的权利吗?》,《法律科学》2018年第2期。
(35)Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopian, New York:Basic Books, 1974, p.29.
(36)Ronald Dworkin,“Rights as Trumps”, in Jeremy Waldron ed., Theories of Rights, Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1984, p.153.
(37)当然,诺齐克和德沃金的看法还是存在明显的区别:诺齐克的论证以自由这个概念为核心,而德沃金则将平等放在中心的位置。
(38)陈景辉:《比例原则普遍化与基本权利的性质》,《中国法学》2017年第5期。