跨区域环境治理中纵向府际关系协调探析
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摘要
纵向府际关系协调是顺应治理发展趋势的必然要求,其运行逻辑应遵循交易成本最小化原则。纵向府际关系协调机制选择受跨区域合作性质、跨区域合作风险、区域间差异化程度、政治权力分散程度等多重因素的影响,而具体治理工具则包含战略规划方式、项目评估审核方式、法律法规规章方式、制度介入刺激方式、联席会议方式、政治动员方式等。在上述因素基础上,应当根据跨区域环境治理合作的不同类型有针对性地探讨纵向权力介入的时机、程度、方式,以实现与横向府际关系协调的有机结合,从而提高跨区域环境治理合作绩效,打造绿色共同体。
The coordination of vertical intergovernmental relations is an inevitable requirement of complying with the development trend of governance,and its operation should follow the principle of minimizing transaction costs. The choice of coordination mechanism for vertical intergovernmental relations is influenced by multiple factors such as the nature of cross-regional cooperation,the risk of cross-regional cooperation,interregional differentiation,and the degree of political power dispersion. The specific governance tools include strategic planning,project evaluation and review,laws and regulations,institutional interventions,joint meetings,and political mobilization. Therefore,it is necessary to discuss the timing,extent and mode of vertical power intervention according to different types of cross-regional environmental governance cooperation,so as to achieve an organic combination with horizontal intergovernmental relations,thereby improving the performance of cross-regional environmental governance cooperation and creating a green community.
The coordination of vertical intergovernmental relations is an inevitable requirement of complying with the development trend of governance,and its operation should follow the principle of minimizing transaction costs. The choice of coordination mechanism for vertical intergovernmental relations is influenced by multiple factors such as the nature of cross-regional cooperation,the risk of cross-regional cooperation,interregional differentiation,and the degree of political power dispersion. The specific governance tools include strategic planning,project evaluation and review,laws and regulations,institutional interventions,joint meetings,and political mobilization. Therefore,it is necessary to discuss the timing,extent and mode of vertical power intervention according to different types of cross-regional environmental governance cooperation,so as to achieve an organic combination with horizontal intergovernmental relations,thereby improving the performance of cross-regional environmental governance cooperation and creating a green community.
引文
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(1)生态项目主要包括环境污染问题治理、环境隐患问题治理、生态退化问题治理以及绿色贫困问题治理,其中前三者是恢复人与自然的和谐常态,不产生经济增益,而第四者则实现生态、经济的双重增益。考虑到增益情况差异以及所引起的合作风险差异,将其划分为两种跨区域治理合作类型——共治共享型、共建共享型,以“治”“建”表述区分。
[2]邢华.我国区域合作治理困境与纵向嵌入式治理机制选择[J].政治学研究,2014,(5).
[3]张五常.经济解释[M].北京:商务印书馆,2001.
[4]宋宪伟.马克思企业理论与交易成本理论之间的互补性[J].云南社会科学,2010,(4).
[5]詹姆斯·M.布坎南.自由、市场和国家[M].北京:北京经济学院出版社,1989.
[6]杨龙.中国区域战略发展的新趋势[J].天津社会科学,2016,(4).
[7]杜旻蕾,宋国君.论环境规划中公众参与的一般模式[J].中国地质大学学报(社会科学版),2007,(3).
[8]叶必丰,等.行政协议:区域政府间合作机制研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2010.
[9]臧雷振,徐湘林.理解“专项治理”:中国特色公共政策实践工具[J].清华大学学报(社会科学版),2014,(6).
(1)生态项目主要包括环境污染问题治理、环境隐患问题治理、生态退化问题治理以及绿色贫困问题治理,其中前三者是恢复人与自然的和谐常态,不产生经济增益,而第四者则实现生态、经济的双重增益。考虑到增益情况差异以及所引起的合作风险差异,将其划分为两种跨区域治理合作类型——共治共享型、共建共享型,以“治”“建”表述区分。