公司存在最优所有权结构吗?——来自面板门槛模型的经验证据
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摘要
基于委托代理理论,利用2008—2015年中国上市公司数据建立面板门槛模型,研究上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效的关系,检验公司是否存在最优的股权结构。研究发现:上市公司第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效之间存在倒"U"型的关系;第一大股东持股比例在(0,27.815%)时,监督效应占主导地位;而第一大股东持股比例在[27.815%,100%)时,侵占效应占主导地位;我国上市公司第一大股东最优的持股比例为27.815%。第一大股东持股比例的区间效应及其最优水平会随着公司内外部环境的变化而动态调整,公司就需要采取措施对其股权结构进行优化。
Based on the principal-agent theory,the panel threshold model was established by using the data of Chinese listedcompanies from 2008 to 2015 to study the relationship between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of a listedcompany and the company's performance,and to test whether the company has the optimal shareholding structure. The resultsshow that there is an inverted u-shaped relationship between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and theperformance of the listed company;when the largest shareholding ratio is in(0,27.815%) interval,the supervision effectplays the leading role;but it is in[27.815%,100%)interval,the entrenchment effect plays the leading role;the best largestshareholding ratio is 27.815%. The interval effect of the largest shareholding ratio and its optimal level is also dynamicadjustment with the change of the company's internal and external environment,the companies will need to take measures tooptimize its ownership structure accordingly.
Based on the principal-agent theory,the panel threshold model was established by using the data of Chinese listedcompanies from 2008 to 2015 to study the relationship between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of a listedcompany and the company's performance,and to test whether the company has the optimal shareholding structure. The resultsshow that there is an inverted u-shaped relationship between the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder and theperformance of the listed company;when the largest shareholding ratio is in(0,27.815%) interval,the supervision effectplays the leading role;but it is in[27.815%,100%)interval,the entrenchment effect plays the leading role;the best largestshareholding ratio is 27.815%. The interval effect of the largest shareholding ratio and its optimal level is also dynamicadjustment with the change of the company's internal and external environment,the companies will need to take measures tooptimize its ownership structure accordingly.
引文
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[16]LEECH D,LEAHY J.Ownership structure,control type classifications and the performance of large British com-panies[J].The economic journal,1991,101(409):1418-1437.
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[18]HANSEN B E.Threshold effects in non-dynamic pan-els:estimation,testing,and inference[J].Journal of econo-metrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
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[20]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].经济研究,2005(10):48-58.
[21]DIETL H M.Capital markets and corporate governance in Japan,Germany and the United States:organization-al response to market inefficiencies[M].London:Routledge,2002.
[2]SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.Large shareholders and cor-porate control[J].Journal of political economy,1986,94(3):461-488.
[3]CLAESSENS S,DJANKOV S,FAN J P H.Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large share-holdings[J].Journal of finance,2002,57(6):2741-2771.
[4]BURKART M,GROMB D,PANUNZI F.Large sharehold-ers,monitoring,and the value of the firm[J].The quarter-ly journal of economics,1997,112(3):693-728.
[5]MORCK R,SHLEIFER A,VISHNY R W.Management ownership and market valuation:an empirical analysis[J].Journal of financial economics,1988,20:293-315.
[6]MCCONNELL J J,SERVAES H.Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value[J].Journal of fi-nancial economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[7]SHORT H,KEASEY K.Managerial ownership and the performance of firms:evidence from the UK[J].Journal of corporate finance,1999,5(1):79-101.
[8]DEMSETZ H,VILLALONGA B.Ownership structure and corporate performance[J].Journal of corporate finance,2001,7(3):209-233.
[9]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12):23-30.
[10]徐晓东,陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003(2):64-74.
[11]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,等.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005(5):81-91.
[12]刘汉民,齐宇,解晓晴.股权和控制权配置:从对等到非对等的逻辑[J].经济研究,2018(5):175-189.
[13]曹廷求,杨秀丽,孙宇光.股权结构与公司绩效:度量方法和内生性[J].经济研究,2007(10):126-137.
[14]陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8):28-35.
[15]田利辉,范乙凡.家族控股股东的侵占路径和上市公司利益的保护机制[J].证券市场导报,2018(5):4-12.
[16]LEECH D,LEAHY J.Ownership structure,control type classifications and the performance of large British com-panies[J].The economic journal,1991,101(409):1418-1437.
[17]GROSSMAN S J,HART O D.Takeover bids,the freerider problem,and the theory of the corporation[J].The bell journal of economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[18]HANSEN B E.Threshold effects in non-dynamic pan-els:estimation,testing,and inference[J].Journal of econo-metrics,1999,93(2):345-368.
[19]SEIFERT B,GONENC H,WRIGHT J.The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by in-siders,blockholders,and institutions[J].Journal of multi-national financial management,2005,15(2):171-191.
[20]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].经济研究,2005(10):48-58.
[21]DIETL H M.Capital markets and corporate governance in Japan,Germany and the United States:organization-al response to market inefficiencies[M].London:Routledge,2002.