取消农业税、财政压力与雾霾污染
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摘要
空气质量改善是经济高质量发展的重要体现,然而,在财政预算软约束的背景下,地方绿色发展任重道远。基于2005年全国取消农业税改革作为地方财政收入降低的政策冲击,利用连续型DID方法研究了地方财政压力上升对城市雾霾污染的影响。研究发现,取消农业税之后,地方财政压力显著上升,进而恶化了城市空气质量。而且财政收入受冲击越大的地区,雾霾污染越严重。这一效应在经过共同趋势、度量方式、敏感性和其他政策冲击等检验后,依然稳健。机制分析表明,为降低农业税收入减少的影响,地方政府有动机扩大工业投资规模,同时降低环境规制,以保证税源稳定,但是以牺牲空气质量为代价。因此,迫切需要改善地方财政困境,管控地方政府投资行为,加强绿色发展的制度设计。
Air quality improvement is an important indication of high-quality economic development. However,with the soft budget constraints of local government,green development still has a long way to go. Based on the abolition of agricultural tax reform nationwide in 2005,with the local revenue decline,this paper reveals the impact of local financial pressure on urban smog pollution by continuous DID method. We find that local fiscal pressures significantly rose after canceling the agricultural taxes,which in turn worsened urban air quality. Where fiscal revenues are more affected by the reform,the smog pollution is more serious. The effect of local financial pressure on air pollution remains robustness by testing common trends,measurements,sensitivities and other policy shocks. This paper also shows that local governments are motivated to expand the scale of industrial investment and reduce the environmental regulation to reduce the impact of declined agricultural tax revenue. Therefore,there is an urgent need to mitigate the local financial difficulty,restrain the investment behavior of local government,and strengthen the system design of green development.
Air quality improvement is an important indication of high-quality economic development. However,with the soft budget constraints of local government,green development still has a long way to go. Based on the abolition of agricultural tax reform nationwide in 2005,with the local revenue decline,this paper reveals the impact of local financial pressure on urban smog pollution by continuous DID method. We find that local fiscal pressures significantly rose after canceling the agricultural taxes,which in turn worsened urban air quality. Where fiscal revenues are more affected by the reform,the smog pollution is more serious. The effect of local financial pressure on air pollution remains robustness by testing common trends,measurements,sensitivities and other policy shocks. This paper also shows that local governments are motivated to expand the scale of industrial investment and reduce the environmental regulation to reduce the impact of declined agricultural tax revenue. Therefore,there is an urgent need to mitigate the local financial difficulty,restrain the investment behavior of local government,and strengthen the system design of green development.
引文
[1]冷艳丽,冼国明,杜思正.外商直接投资与雾霾污染——基于中国省际面板数据的实证分析[J].国际贸易问题,2015(12):74-84.
[2]张可.经济集聚的减排效应:基于空间经济学视角的解释[J].产业经济研究,2018(3):64-76.
[3]PANDOLFI M,GONZALEZ-CASTANEDO Y,ALASTUEY A,et al. Source apportionment of PM10 and PM2. 5 at multiple sites in the strait of Gibraltar by PMF:impact of shipping emissions[J]. Environmental science and pollution research,2011,18(2):260-269.
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[6]谭志雄,张阳阳.财政分权与环境污染关系实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(4):110-117.
[7]SINHA A,RASTOGI S K. Collaboration between central and state government and environmental quality:evidences from Indian cities[J]. Atmospheric pollution research,2017,8(2):285-296.
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[10]张鑫,陈志刚.经济增长激励、官员异质性与城市工业污染:以长三角地区为例[J].长江流域资源与环境,2018(7):1413-1422.
[11]DUZGOREN-AYDIN N S. Sources and characteristics of lead pollution in the urban environment of Guangzhou[J].Science of the total environment,2007,385(1):182-195.
[12]WHEELER D. Racing to the bottom? Foreign investment and air quality in developing countries[R]. Policy research working paper,2001,NO. WPS 2524.
[13]BLANCHARD O,SHLEIFER A. Federalism with and without political centralization:China versus Russia[J]. IMF staff papers,2001,48(1):171-179.
[14]LI H,ZHOU L. Political turnover and economic performance:the incentive role of personnel control in China[J]. Journal of public economics,2005,89(9):1743-1762.
[15]陈抗,ARYE LH,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化——从援助之手到攫取之手[J].经济学(季刊),2002(4):111-130.
[16]高彦彦,郑江淮.分税制改革、城市偏向与中国农业增长[J].南方经济,2012(7):18-29.
[17]张双长,李稻葵.“二次房改”的财政基础分析——基于土地财政与房地产价格关系的视角[J].财政研究,2010(7):5-11.
[18]洪源,袁莙健,陈丽.财政分权、环境财政政策与地方环境污染——基于收支双重维度的门槛效应及空间外溢效应分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(7):1-15.
[19]谢贞发,严瑾,李培.中国式“压力型”财政激励的财源增长效应——基于取消农业税改革的实证研究[J].管理世界,2017(12):46-60+187-188.
[20]HAN L,KUNG K S. Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments:evidence from China[J]. Journal of development economics,2015,116:89-104.
[21]DEAN J M,LOVELY M E,WANG H. Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China[J]. Journal of development economics,2009,90(1):1-13.
[22]梁平汉,高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界,2014(6):65-78.
[23]袁凯华,李后建.政企合谋下的策略减排困境——来自工业废气层面的度量考察[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(1):134-141.
[24]谢罗奇,龚玲,赵纯凯.官员晋升、金融发展与环境污染——来自市长变更的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(8):15-26.
[25]张尔升,胡国柳.地方官员的个人特征与区域产业结构高级化——基于中国省委书记、省长的分析视角[J].中国软科学,2013(6):71-83+61.
[26]EBENSTEIN A. The consequences of industrialization:evidence from water pollution and digestive cancers in China[J].Review of economics and statistics,2012,94(1):186-201.
[27]WIERZBOWSKI M,FILIPIAK I,LYZWA W. Polish energy policy 2050–an instrument to develop a diversified and sustainable electricity generation mix in coal-based energy system[J]. Renewable&sustainable energy reviews,2017,74:51-70.
[28]席鹏辉.财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理——纳税大户议价能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2017(11):100-117.
[29]陈晓光.财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等[J].中国社会科学,2016(4):53-70+206.
[30]余靖雯,陈晓光,龚六堂.财政压力如何影响了县级政府公共服务供给?[J].金融研究,2018(1):18-35.
[31]陈思霞,许文立,张领祎.财政压力与地方经济增长——来自中国所得税分享改革的政策实验[J].财贸经济,2017(4):37-53.
[32]ANGRIST J D,PISCHKE J S. Mastering‘metrics’:the path from cause to effect[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015.
[33]范子英,彭飞.“营改增”的减税效应和分工效应:基于产业互联的视角[J].经济研究,2017(2):82-95.
[34]MOSER P,VOENA A. Compulsory licensing:evidence from the trading with the enemy act[J]. American economic review,2012,102(1):396-427.
[35]CHEN S X. The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement:evidence from a natural experiment in China[J]. Journal of public economics,2017,147:62-76.
[36]VAN DONKELAAR A,MARTIN R V,BRAUER M,et al. Global estimates of ambient fine particulate matter concentrations from satellite-based aerosol optical depth:development and application[J]. Environ health perspect,2010,118(6):847-855.
[37]程仲鸣,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,2008(9):37-47.
[38]罗必良.分税制、财政压力与政府“土地财政”偏好[J].学术研究,2010(10):27-35.
[39]王家庭,蔡思远.人口规模和财政压力对城市蔓延的影响——以中国69个大中城市为例[J].城市问题,2018(3):4-11.
[40]李宝礼,胡雪萍.经济增长、财政压力与地方政府土地城镇化偏好——基于turnbull模型的理论分析与实证研究[J].贵州财经大学学报,2015(3):1-8.
[41]冷艳丽,杜思正.产业结构、城市化与雾霾污染[J].中国科技论坛,2015(9):49-55.
[42]KONISKY D M. Regulatory competition and environmental enforcement:is there a race to the bottom?[J]. American journal of political science,2010,51(4):853-872.
[43]WOODS N D. Interstate competition and environmental regulation:a test of the race to the bottom thesis[J]. Social science quarterly,2006,87(1):174-189.
[44]王勇,刘厚莲.中国工业绿色转型的减排效应及污染治理投入的影响[J].经济评论,2015(4):17-30+44.
[2]张可.经济集聚的减排效应:基于空间经济学视角的解释[J].产业经济研究,2018(3):64-76.
[3]PANDOLFI M,GONZALEZ-CASTANEDO Y,ALASTUEY A,et al. Source apportionment of PM10 and PM2. 5 at multiple sites in the strait of Gibraltar by PMF:impact of shipping emissions[J]. Environmental science and pollution research,2011,18(2):260-269.
[4]KUNCE M,SHOGREN J F. Destructive interjurisdictional competition:firm,capital and labor mobility in a model of direct emission control[J]. Ecological economics,2007,60(3):543-549.
[5]张志强.环境规制提高了中国城市环境质量吗?——基于“拟自然实验”的证据[J].产业经济研究,2017(3):69-80.
[6]谭志雄,张阳阳.财政分权与环境污染关系实证研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(4):110-117.
[7]SINHA A,RASTOGI S K. Collaboration between central and state government and environmental quality:evidences from Indian cities[J]. Atmospheric pollution research,2017,8(2):285-296.
[8]GORDON R H,LI W. Provincial and local governments in China:fiscal institutions and government behavior[R]. NBER working paper,2011,No. 16694.
[9]BAI J,LU J,LI S. Fiscal pressure,tax competition and environmental pollution[J]. Environmental and resource economics,2018(1):1-17.
[10]张鑫,陈志刚.经济增长激励、官员异质性与城市工业污染:以长三角地区为例[J].长江流域资源与环境,2018(7):1413-1422.
[11]DUZGOREN-AYDIN N S. Sources and characteristics of lead pollution in the urban environment of Guangzhou[J].Science of the total environment,2007,385(1):182-195.
[12]WHEELER D. Racing to the bottom? Foreign investment and air quality in developing countries[R]. Policy research working paper,2001,NO. WPS 2524.
[13]BLANCHARD O,SHLEIFER A. Federalism with and without political centralization:China versus Russia[J]. IMF staff papers,2001,48(1):171-179.
[14]LI H,ZHOU L. Political turnover and economic performance:the incentive role of personnel control in China[J]. Journal of public economics,2005,89(9):1743-1762.
[15]陈抗,ARYE LH,顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化——从援助之手到攫取之手[J].经济学(季刊),2002(4):111-130.
[16]高彦彦,郑江淮.分税制改革、城市偏向与中国农业增长[J].南方经济,2012(7):18-29.
[17]张双长,李稻葵.“二次房改”的财政基础分析——基于土地财政与房地产价格关系的视角[J].财政研究,2010(7):5-11.
[18]洪源,袁莙健,陈丽.财政分权、环境财政政策与地方环境污染——基于收支双重维度的门槛效应及空间外溢效应分析[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(7):1-15.
[19]谢贞发,严瑾,李培.中国式“压力型”财政激励的财源增长效应——基于取消农业税改革的实证研究[J].管理世界,2017(12):46-60+187-188.
[20]HAN L,KUNG K S. Fiscal incentives and policy choices of local governments:evidence from China[J]. Journal of development economics,2015,116:89-104.
[21]DEAN J M,LOVELY M E,WANG H. Are foreign investors attracted to weak environmental regulations? Evaluating the evidence from China[J]. Journal of development economics,2009,90(1):1-13.
[22]梁平汉,高楠.人事变更、法制环境和地方环境污染[J].管理世界,2014(6):65-78.
[23]袁凯华,李后建.政企合谋下的策略减排困境——来自工业废气层面的度量考察[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2015(1):134-141.
[24]谢罗奇,龚玲,赵纯凯.官员晋升、金融发展与环境污染——来自市长变更的证据[J].山西财经大学学报,2018(8):15-26.
[25]张尔升,胡国柳.地方官员的个人特征与区域产业结构高级化——基于中国省委书记、省长的分析视角[J].中国软科学,2013(6):71-83+61.
[26]EBENSTEIN A. The consequences of industrialization:evidence from water pollution and digestive cancers in China[J].Review of economics and statistics,2012,94(1):186-201.
[27]WIERZBOWSKI M,FILIPIAK I,LYZWA W. Polish energy policy 2050–an instrument to develop a diversified and sustainable electricity generation mix in coal-based energy system[J]. Renewable&sustainable energy reviews,2017,74:51-70.
[28]席鹏辉.财政激励、环境偏好与垂直式环境管理——纳税大户议价能力的视角[J].中国工业经济,2017(11):100-117.
[29]陈晓光.财政压力、税收征管与地区不平等[J].中国社会科学,2016(4):53-70+206.
[30]余靖雯,陈晓光,龚六堂.财政压力如何影响了县级政府公共服务供给?[J].金融研究,2018(1):18-35.
[31]陈思霞,许文立,张领祎.财政压力与地方经济增长——来自中国所得税分享改革的政策实验[J].财贸经济,2017(4):37-53.
[32]ANGRIST J D,PISCHKE J S. Mastering‘metrics’:the path from cause to effect[M]. Princeton:Princeton University Press,2015.
[33]范子英,彭飞.“营改增”的减税效应和分工效应:基于产业互联的视角[J].经济研究,2017(2):82-95.
[34]MOSER P,VOENA A. Compulsory licensing:evidence from the trading with the enemy act[J]. American economic review,2012,102(1):396-427.
[35]CHEN S X. The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement:evidence from a natural experiment in China[J]. Journal of public economics,2017,147:62-76.
[36]VAN DONKELAAR A,MARTIN R V,BRAUER M,et al. Global estimates of ambient fine particulate matter concentrations from satellite-based aerosol optical depth:development and application[J]. Environ health perspect,2010,118(6):847-855.
[37]程仲鸣,夏新平,余明桂.政府干预、金字塔结构与地方国有上市公司投资[J].管理世界,2008(9):37-47.
[38]罗必良.分税制、财政压力与政府“土地财政”偏好[J].学术研究,2010(10):27-35.
[39]王家庭,蔡思远.人口规模和财政压力对城市蔓延的影响——以中国69个大中城市为例[J].城市问题,2018(3):4-11.
[40]李宝礼,胡雪萍.经济增长、财政压力与地方政府土地城镇化偏好——基于turnbull模型的理论分析与实证研究[J].贵州财经大学学报,2015(3):1-8.
[41]冷艳丽,杜思正.产业结构、城市化与雾霾污染[J].中国科技论坛,2015(9):49-55.
[42]KONISKY D M. Regulatory competition and environmental enforcement:is there a race to the bottom?[J]. American journal of political science,2010,51(4):853-872.
[43]WOODS N D. Interstate competition and environmental regulation:a test of the race to the bottom thesis[J]. Social science quarterly,2006,87(1):174-189.
[44]王勇,刘厚莲.中国工业绿色转型的减排效应及污染治理投入的影响[J].经济评论,2015(4):17-30+44.