分权对腐败的影响——基于45国2000～2010年的数据分析
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摘要
在关于腐败诱因的研究中,分权与腐败程度之间究竟存在何种关系,一直是学术界争论的热点问题之一。文章认为,一国的分权改革若要有效地遏制腐败,必须依赖于良好的问责机制。文章对45个国家在2000～2010年间的面板数据采用固定效应模型、交互效应模型等方法分析后发现,分权对腐败的影响受到问责的调节,而问责对腐败具有抑制效果;在问责机制相对滞后的条件下,分权与腐败控制之间呈负相关关系,地方政府权力的增大会加剧一国的腐败程度;而在问责机制比较健全的条件下,增大地方政府权力则会减轻腐败程度。文章的政策含义是,中央政府在向地方政府下放权力的过程中,必须同时着手建立有效的问责机制,加强对腐败行为的预防和治理。
In the study of the causes of corruption, the relationship between decentralization and corruption has been a focus in literature. This paper argues that the anti-corruption effect of decentralization in some countries is dependent on a well-functioning accountability mechanism. Based on the panel data from 45 countries between 2000 and 2010, this paper adopts the fixed effect model and the interactional effect in its empirical research. It finds that the effect of decentralization on corruption is moderated by accountability, which plays a role in reducing corruption. In details, when the accountability mechanism is poor, decentralization may exacerbate corruption, and vice versa. These results imply that when the central government delegates some powers to the subnational or local governments, the construction of a more powerful and effective accountability mechanism is necessary, and more intense efforts should be made to prevent and fight corruption.
In the study of the causes of corruption, the relationship between decentralization and corruption has been a focus in literature. This paper argues that the anti-corruption effect of decentralization in some countries is dependent on a well-functioning accountability mechanism. Based on the panel data from 45 countries between 2000 and 2010, this paper adopts the fixed effect model and the interactional effect in its empirical research. It finds that the effect of decentralization on corruption is moderated by accountability, which plays a role in reducing corruption. In details, when the accountability mechanism is poor, decentralization may exacerbate corruption, and vice versa. These results imply that when the central government delegates some powers to the subnational or local governments, the construction of a more powerful and effective accountability mechanism is necessary, and more intense efforts should be made to prevent and fight corruption.
引文
陈刚、李树、余劲松,2009:“援助之手还是攫取之手?——关于中国式分权的一个假说及其验证”,《南方经济》, 2009, 7: 3—15。
郭峰、龙硕、胡军,2015:“财政分权、政绩偏好和地方官员腐败研究”,《世界经济文汇》,2015, 3: 60—76。
黄溶冰、赵谦,2015:“财政分权、审计监督与反腐败成效——来自中国2002～2011年的经验证据”,《中南财经政法大学学报》,2015, 6: 19—25。
李明、刘彬,2015:“中国式分权与地方政府行为:一个综述”,《新疆财经大学学报》,2015, 1: 11—22。
罗也骁、段龙龙、胡春,2015:“财政分权、政府规模扩张与官员腐败——基于中国省际动态面板数据的研究”,《上海经济研究》,2015, 1: 59—68。
倪星、陈珊珊,2013:“经济结构、制度安排与地区腐败——基于副省级城市2000—2010年的数据分析”,《中山大学学报(社会科学版)》,2013, 53(6): 138—150。
潘春阳、何立新、袁从帅,2011:“财政分权与官员腐败——基于1999—2007年中国省级面板数据的实证研究”,《当代财经》,2011, 3: 38—46。
吴勋、王雨晨,2016:“财政分权、经济责任审计功能与官员腐败——基于省级面板数据的实证研究”,《经济问题》,2016, 12: 124—128。
吴一平,2008:“财政分权、腐败与治理”,《经济学(季刊)》, 2008, 7(3): 1045—1060。
解洪涛,2015:“分权与治理:新政治经济学的理论综述”,《公共行政评论》, 2015, 6: 154—176。
Arikan, G.G., 2004. “Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?” International Tax & Public Finance. 11(2):175-195.
Bac, M.,2001. “Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?” Public Choice. 107(1-2):87-96.
Bardhan, P., and D.Mookherjee, 2005. “Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview.” In Rose-Ackerman, S., eds. Handbook of Economic Corruption. Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar.
Blanchard, O., and A.Shleifer, 2001. “Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia.” IMF Staff Papers. 48(1):171-179.
Brennan, H.G., and J.M.Buchanan, 1980. The Power to Tax : Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. London: Cambridge University Press.
Cai, H., and D.Treisman, 2004. “State Corroding Federalism.” Journal of Public Economics. 88(3):819-843.
——2005. “Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization and Corruption.” American Economic Review. 95(3):817-830.
Carbonara, E., 1998. “Bureaucracy, Corruption and Decentralization.” Working Papers. 35:71-78.
Faguet, J.P., 2010. “Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia.” Journal of Public Economics. 88(3-4):867-893.
Fan, C.S., C.Lin, and D.Treisman, 2009. “Political Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from around the World.” Journal of Public Economics. 93(1-2):14-34.
Ferraz, C., and F.Finan, 2011. “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments”. American Economic Review. 101(4):1274-1311.
Fisman, R., and R.Gatti, 2002. “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Program.” Public Choice. 113(1-2):25-35.
Heidenheimer, A.J., and M.Johnston, 2002. Political Corruption: Concepts & Context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Huther, J., and A.Shah, 1998. “Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization.” World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. No.1894.
Ivanyna, M., and A.Shah, 2010. “Decentralization (Localization) and Corruption: New Cross-Country Evidence.” Policy Research Working Paper. 29(2):344-362.
Klitgaard, R., 1998. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kolstad, I., V.Somville, and A.Wiig, 2014. “Devolutionary Delusions? The Effect of Decentralization on Corruption.” CMI Working Papers. WP 2014:10.
Kunicová, J., and S.Rose-Ackerman, 2016. “Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption.” British Journal of Political Science. 35(4):573-606.
Lederman, D., N.V.Loayza, and R.R.Soares, 2010. “Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter.” Economics & Politics. 17(1):1-35.
Lessmann, C., and G.Markwardt, 2010. “One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats.” World Development. 38(4):631-646.
Manor, J., 1999. The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mello, D., R.Luiz, and M.Barenstein, 2001. “Fiscal Decentralization and Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis.” IMF Working Paper. 01/71. Washington DC: IMF.
Nupia, O., 2007. “Decentralization, Corruption and Political Accountability in Developing Countries.” Documentos Cede. 17:1-29.
Prud'Homme R., 1995. “The Dangers of Decentralization.” World Bank. 10(2):201-220.
Rose-Ackerman, S., and T.S?reide, 2006. “International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption.” Books. 63(2):20-21.
Ryvkin, D., and D.Serra, 2012. “How Corruptible Are You? Bribery under Uncertainty.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 81(2):466-477.
Seabright, P., 1996. “Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model.” European Economic Review. 40(1):61-89.
Schakel, A.H., 2009. “A Post Functionalist Theory of Regional Government.” MPRA Paper. No. 21596: 52-74.
Shleifer, A., and R.W.Vishny, 1993. “Corruption.” Social Science Electronic Publishing. 108(3):599-617.
Tanzi, V., 1996. “Fiscal Federalism and Efficiency: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects.” In M.Bruno and B.Pleskovic, eds. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Tiebout, C.M., 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy. 64(5):416-424.
Transparency International, 2009. The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide. Berlin: Transparency International.
Treisman, D., 1999. After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. Ann Arbor. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
——2000. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study.” Journal of Public Economics. 76(3):399-457.
——2007. “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science. 10(10):211-244.
Treisman, D., S.Bannerjee, and S.Bloom, 2000. “Decentralization and the Quality of Government.” Manuscript Ucla.
World Bank, 1997. Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
(1)http://politics. people. com. cn/n1/2016/0329/c1001-28234841. html,2018年12月访问。
(1)http://www1. worldbank. org/publicsector/decentralization/what. htm,2018年12月访问。
(1)(2)http://data. worldbank. org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators,2018年12月访问。https://www. transparency. org,2018年12月访问。
(1)(2)http://data. imf. org/? sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405,2018年12月访问。http://data. worldbank. org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators,2018年12月访问。
(1)http://data. worldbank. org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators,2018年12月访问。
郭峰、龙硕、胡军,2015:“财政分权、政绩偏好和地方官员腐败研究”,《世界经济文汇》,2015, 3: 60—76。
黄溶冰、赵谦,2015:“财政分权、审计监督与反腐败成效——来自中国2002～2011年的经验证据”,《中南财经政法大学学报》,2015, 6: 19—25。
李明、刘彬,2015:“中国式分权与地方政府行为:一个综述”,《新疆财经大学学报》,2015, 1: 11—22。
罗也骁、段龙龙、胡春,2015:“财政分权、政府规模扩张与官员腐败——基于中国省际动态面板数据的研究”,《上海经济研究》,2015, 1: 59—68。
倪星、陈珊珊,2013:“经济结构、制度安排与地区腐败——基于副省级城市2000—2010年的数据分析”,《中山大学学报(社会科学版)》,2013, 53(6): 138—150。
潘春阳、何立新、袁从帅,2011:“财政分权与官员腐败——基于1999—2007年中国省级面板数据的实证研究”,《当代财经》,2011, 3: 38—46。
吴勋、王雨晨,2016:“财政分权、经济责任审计功能与官员腐败——基于省级面板数据的实证研究”,《经济问题》,2016, 12: 124—128。
吴一平,2008:“财政分权、腐败与治理”,《经济学(季刊)》, 2008, 7(3): 1045—1060。
解洪涛,2015:“分权与治理:新政治经济学的理论综述”,《公共行政评论》, 2015, 6: 154—176。
Arikan, G.G., 2004. “Fiscal Decentralization: A Remedy for Corruption?” International Tax & Public Finance. 11(2):175-195.
Bac, M.,2001. “Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?” Public Choice. 107(1-2):87-96.
Bardhan, P., and D.Mookherjee, 2005. “Decentralization, Corruption and Government Accountability: An Overview.” In Rose-Ackerman, S., eds. Handbook of Economic Corruption. Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar.
Blanchard, O., and A.Shleifer, 2001. “Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia.” IMF Staff Papers. 48(1):171-179.
Brennan, H.G., and J.M.Buchanan, 1980. The Power to Tax : Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. London: Cambridge University Press.
Cai, H., and D.Treisman, 2004. “State Corroding Federalism.” Journal of Public Economics. 88(3):819-843.
——2005. “Does Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization and Corruption.” American Economic Review. 95(3):817-830.
Carbonara, E., 1998. “Bureaucracy, Corruption and Decentralization.” Working Papers. 35:71-78.
Faguet, J.P., 2010. “Does Decentralization Increase Government Responsiveness to Local Needs? Evidence from Bolivia.” Journal of Public Economics. 88(3-4):867-893.
Fan, C.S., C.Lin, and D.Treisman, 2009. “Political Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from around the World.” Journal of Public Economics. 93(1-2):14-34.
Ferraz, C., and F.Finan, 2011. “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments”. American Economic Review. 101(4):1274-1311.
Fisman, R., and R.Gatti, 2002. “Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Program.” Public Choice. 113(1-2):25-35.
Heidenheimer, A.J., and M.Johnston, 2002. Political Corruption: Concepts & Context. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Huther, J., and A.Shah, 1998. “Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization.” World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. No.1894.
Ivanyna, M., and A.Shah, 2010. “Decentralization (Localization) and Corruption: New Cross-Country Evidence.” Policy Research Working Paper. 29(2):344-362.
Klitgaard, R., 1998. Controlling Corruption. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kolstad, I., V.Somville, and A.Wiig, 2014. “Devolutionary Delusions? The Effect of Decentralization on Corruption.” CMI Working Papers. WP 2014:10.
Kunicová, J., and S.Rose-Ackerman, 2016. “Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption.” British Journal of Political Science. 35(4):573-606.
Lederman, D., N.V.Loayza, and R.R.Soares, 2010. “Accountability and Corruption: Political Institutions Matter.” Economics & Politics. 17(1):1-35.
Lessmann, C., and G.Markwardt, 2010. “One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats.” World Development. 38(4):631-646.
Manor, J., 1999. The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Mello, D., R.Luiz, and M.Barenstein, 2001. “Fiscal Decentralization and Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis.” IMF Working Paper. 01/71. Washington DC: IMF.
Nupia, O., 2007. “Decentralization, Corruption and Political Accountability in Developing Countries.” Documentos Cede. 17:1-29.
Prud'Homme R., 1995. “The Dangers of Decentralization.” World Bank. 10(2):201-220.
Rose-Ackerman, S., and T.S?reide, 2006. “International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption.” Books. 63(2):20-21.
Ryvkin, D., and D.Serra, 2012. “How Corruptible Are You? Bribery under Uncertainty.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 81(2):466-477.
Seabright, P., 1996. “Accountability and Decentralization in Government: An Incomplete Contracts Model.” European Economic Review. 40(1):61-89.
Schakel, A.H., 2009. “A Post Functionalist Theory of Regional Government.” MPRA Paper. No. 21596: 52-74.
Shleifer, A., and R.W.Vishny, 1993. “Corruption.” Social Science Electronic Publishing. 108(3):599-617.
Tanzi, V., 1996. “Fiscal Federalism and Efficiency: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects.” In M.Bruno and B.Pleskovic, eds. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1995. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Tiebout, C.M., 1956. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy. 64(5):416-424.
Transparency International, 2009. The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide. Berlin: Transparency International.
Treisman, D., 1999. After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia. Ann Arbor. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
——2000. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study.” Journal of Public Economics. 76(3):399-457.
——2007. “What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science. 10(10):211-244.
Treisman, D., S.Bannerjee, and S.Bloom, 2000. “Decentralization and the Quality of Government.” Manuscript Ucla.
World Bank, 1997. Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
(1)http://politics. people. com. cn/n1/2016/0329/c1001-28234841. html,2018年12月访问。
(1)http://www1. worldbank. org/publicsector/decentralization/what. htm,2018年12月访问。
(1)(2)http://data. worldbank. org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators,2018年12月访问。https://www. transparency. org,2018年12月访问。
(1)(2)http://data. imf. org/? sk=A0867067-D23C-4EBC-AD23-D3B015045405,2018年12月访问。http://data. worldbank. org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators,2018年12月访问。
(1)http://data. worldbank. org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators,2018年12月访问。