法律权利的双层规范结构——对霍菲尔德法律关系学说适用范围的反思
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摘要
法律权利在立法层面与司法层面具有不同的规范结构。在立法层面,即法律规范的意义形成层面,法律权利表达了以义务型规范为核心的不同类型规范之间的逻辑关系。在司法层面,即司法裁判中适用法律层面,法律权利在规范结构上表现为当事人之间的多种诉讼关系,这些诉讼关系以获得司法救济为其核心内容。司法层面的法律权利预设了立法层面的权利,并因为"可主张性"与"个案相关性"这两个特征,是立法层面法律权利的限定版本。霍菲尔德的法律关系学说并非法律权利的结构分析的一般理论,它仅适合解释司法层面的法律权利的规范结构。
Legal rights have different normative structures at the legislative level and the judicial level. At the legislative level,that is,at the meaning formation level of legal norms,legal rights express the logical relationship between different types of norms centering on obligatory norms. At the judicial level,that is,at the level of applying the law in judicial adjudication,legal rights are manifested in various litigation relationships between parties in the normative structure,and the core content of these litigation relationships is to obtain judicial relief. Legal rights at the judicial level presupposes rights at the legislative level,and because of the two characteristics of "claimability"and "relevance of individual cases",they are limited versions of legal rights at the legislative level. Hoffield's theory of legal relations is not a general theory for analyzing and interpreting the structure of legal rights,but merely suitable for interpreting the normative structure of legal rights at the judicial level.
Legal rights have different normative structures at the legislative level and the judicial level. At the legislative level,that is,at the meaning formation level of legal norms,legal rights express the logical relationship between different types of norms centering on obligatory norms. At the judicial level,that is,at the level of applying the law in judicial adjudication,legal rights are manifested in various litigation relationships between parties in the normative structure,and the core content of these litigation relationships is to obtain judicial relief. Legal rights at the judicial level presupposes rights at the legislative level,and because of the two characteristics of "claimability"and "relevance of individual cases",they are limited versions of legal rights at the legislative level. Hoffield's theory of legal relations is not a general theory for analyzing and interpreting the structure of legal rights,but merely suitable for interpreting the normative structure of legal rights at the judicial level.
引文
[1] MATTHEW H. Kramer and Hillel Steiner. Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way[J]. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,2007(2):282.
[2]霍菲尔德.基本法律概念[M],张书友,译.北京:中国法制出版社,2009.
[3] DAVID CAMPBELL,PHILIP THOMAS. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning[M]. Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Company,2001.
[4] CARL WELLMAN. A Theory of Rights:Persons Under Laws,Institutions,and Morals[M]. Totowa:Rowman&Allanheld Pubishers,1985:7.
[5] WILLIAM AEDMUNDSON. An Introduction to Rights[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004:94-102.
[6]王涌.寻找法律的最小公分母——霍菲尔德法律概念分析思想研究[J].比较法研究,1998(2):151-161.
[7] JONATHAN GORMAN. Rights and Reason:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights[M]. Chesham:Acumen Publishing,2003:113-114.
[8] ANDREW HALPIN. Rights and Law:Analysis and Theory[M]. London:Hart Publishing,1997.
[9] H L A HART. The Concept of Law[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994.
[10] H L A HART. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1983:92.
[11] JOSEPH RAZ. The Concept of a Legal system:An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1980.
[12] MATTHEW H KRAMER,N SIMMONDS,AND H STEINER. A Debate Over Rights[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1998:238.
[13] JOSEPH RAZ. Ethics in the Public Domain:Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1995:268.
(1)参见沈宗灵:《对霍菲尔德法律概念学说的比较研究》,《中国社会科学》1990年第1期,第67-77页;王涌:《寻找法律的“最小公分母”---霍菲尔德法律概念分析思想研究》,《比较法研究》1998年第2期,第151-161页;陈锐:《对霍菲尔德法律概念论的逻辑分析》,《西南政法大学学报》2003年第5期,第15-21页;翟小波:《对Hohfeld权利及其类似概念的初步理解》,《北大法律评论》2003年第5卷第2辑,第363-382页;陈运生:《一个二元性权利分析体系---对霍菲尔德权利理论的一种解读》,见胡建淼编:《公法研究》,杭州:浙江大学出版社,2008年版,第335-368页。
(2)参见雷磊:《法律权利的逻辑分析:结构与类型》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期,第54-75页;陈景辉:《权利与义务是对应的吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期,第33-53页。
(3)文中的“立法”代指的不是审议、辩论、投票等立法过程,而是立法的产物,即通过立法活动表达的法律规范。与此类似,文中的“司法”代指的也不是调查、辩论、宣判等司法过程,而是司法的产物,即通过司法活动针对个案得出的法律结论。
(4)前四个“一阶”概念指涉自然意义上的行动或状态,后四个“二阶”概念指涉规范意义上的行动或状态。参见L.W.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of Rights,Oxford University Press,1987,P.27-31.
(1)除此之外,另一种主要的规范类型是许可型规范,该类规范授予主体以排他性许可,允许其依自由选择决定是否排除特定义务。参见Joseph Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,Princeton University Press,1990,pp.89-91,95-97.为了简化分析,以下以义务型规范和权力型规范来例示法律的规范结构,没有单独讨论该类规范。
(2)Joseph Raz,The Concept of a Legal system:An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System,Oxford University Press,1980,pp.162-164.立法型权力与规整性权力的主体虽然以国家机关为其典型代表,但不限于此,普通主体也同样在法律上享有这两类权力。
(1)Joseph Raz,The Concept of a Legal system:An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System,pp.176-177.这三种规定之间存在着重叠的情形,有些法律规定同时具有其中的两种性质,但为了表述上的清晰,以下不考虑这种重叠的情形。
(1)这个概念参考了麦考密克的“立法中的权利”。Neil MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”,in P.M.S.Hacker and Raz(ed.),Law,Morality and Society:essays in honour of H.L.A.Hart,Oxford University Press,1977,p.189.
[2]霍菲尔德.基本法律概念[M],张书友,译.北京:中国法制出版社,2009.
[3] DAVID CAMPBELL,PHILIP THOMAS. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning[M]. Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Company,2001.
[4] CARL WELLMAN. A Theory of Rights:Persons Under Laws,Institutions,and Morals[M]. Totowa:Rowman&Allanheld Pubishers,1985:7.
[5] WILLIAM AEDMUNDSON. An Introduction to Rights[M]. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2004:94-102.
[6]王涌.寻找法律的最小公分母——霍菲尔德法律概念分析思想研究[J].比较法研究,1998(2):151-161.
[7] JONATHAN GORMAN. Rights and Reason:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights[M]. Chesham:Acumen Publishing,2003:113-114.
[8] ANDREW HALPIN. Rights and Law:Analysis and Theory[M]. London:Hart Publishing,1997.
[9] H L A HART. The Concept of Law[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1994.
[10] H L A HART. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1983:92.
[11] JOSEPH RAZ. The Concept of a Legal system:An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1980.
[12] MATTHEW H KRAMER,N SIMMONDS,AND H STEINER. A Debate Over Rights[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1998:238.
[13] JOSEPH RAZ. Ethics in the Public Domain:Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press,1995:268.
(1)参见沈宗灵:《对霍菲尔德法律概念学说的比较研究》,《中国社会科学》1990年第1期,第67-77页;王涌:《寻找法律的“最小公分母”---霍菲尔德法律概念分析思想研究》,《比较法研究》1998年第2期,第151-161页;陈锐:《对霍菲尔德法律概念论的逻辑分析》,《西南政法大学学报》2003年第5期,第15-21页;翟小波:《对Hohfeld权利及其类似概念的初步理解》,《北大法律评论》2003年第5卷第2辑,第363-382页;陈运生:《一个二元性权利分析体系---对霍菲尔德权利理论的一种解读》,见胡建淼编:《公法研究》,杭州:浙江大学出版社,2008年版,第335-368页。
(2)参见雷磊:《法律权利的逻辑分析:结构与类型》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期,第54-75页;陈景辉:《权利与义务是对应的吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期,第33-53页。
(3)文中的“立法”代指的不是审议、辩论、投票等立法过程,而是立法的产物,即通过立法活动表达的法律规范。与此类似,文中的“司法”代指的也不是调查、辩论、宣判等司法过程,而是司法的产物,即通过司法活动针对个案得出的法律结论。
(4)前四个“一阶”概念指涉自然意义上的行动或状态,后四个“二阶”概念指涉规范意义上的行动或状态。参见L.W.Sumner,The Moral Foundation of Rights,Oxford University Press,1987,P.27-31.
(1)除此之外,另一种主要的规范类型是许可型规范,该类规范授予主体以排他性许可,允许其依自由选择决定是否排除特定义务。参见Joseph Raz,Practical Reason and Norms,Princeton University Press,1990,pp.89-91,95-97.为了简化分析,以下以义务型规范和权力型规范来例示法律的规范结构,没有单独讨论该类规范。
(2)Joseph Raz,The Concept of a Legal system:An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System,Oxford University Press,1980,pp.162-164.立法型权力与规整性权力的主体虽然以国家机关为其典型代表,但不限于此,普通主体也同样在法律上享有这两类权力。
(1)Joseph Raz,The Concept of a Legal system:An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System,pp.176-177.这三种规定之间存在着重叠的情形,有些法律规定同时具有其中的两种性质,但为了表述上的清晰,以下不考虑这种重叠的情形。
(1)这个概念参考了麦考密克的“立法中的权利”。Neil MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”,in P.M.S.Hacker and Raz(ed.),Law,Morality and Society:essays in honour of H.L.A.Hart,Oxford University Press,1977,p.189.