“互联网+”手机回收模式缘何绩效不彰?——基于mABM的演化博弈仿真分析
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摘要
为探讨"互联网+"手机回收模式运营绩效不彰的缘由,在厘清该回收模式绩效影响因素基础上,建立了消费者和回收(平台)商的回收策略选择演化博弈模型,通过分析其演化稳定策略及稳定条件,揭示回收绩效不彰的因果机理,并利用Netlogo仿真平台构建mABM仿真模型模拟博弈双方策略演化过程,验证结论的有效性。研究表明:1)消费者环保认知度水平是影响回收模式绩效的重要因素;2)消费者对信息泄露损失和交易成本的高度敏感性抑制消费者采取"积极回收"策略,但安全便捷的回收服务将使得回收商成本投入增加和收益减少,导致回收绩效不彰;3)价格透明度和政府补贴份额分配是夹在消费者和回收商间的矛盾体。据此,提出了"互联网+"手机回收模式绩效提升的基本策略与具体措施。
In order to explore the reason why the performance of"Internet+"mobile phones recycling mode is poor,on the basis of clarifying the factors affecting the performance of this recycling mode,an evolutionary game model is established to research strategy selection between consumers and recyclers(platforms).By analyzing its evolutionary stability strategy and stability conditions,the causes of the poor performance of this recycling mode is revealed.The mABM simulation model is used to simulate the evolution process,so as to verify the validity of the conclusions.The research shows that:1)consumers' recognition of environmental benefits is the significant factor that restricts the recycling effectiveness;2)High sensitivity to information leakage losses and transaction convenience costs prevents consumers from adopting"active recycling"strategies,but providing safe and convenient recycling services will reduce the profits of recyclers,resulting in poor recycling performance;3)The transparency of price and government subsidy distribution are the contradictions between consumers and recyclers.According to the interpretation,some relevant suggestions and strategies are proposed to improve the performance.
In order to explore the reason why the performance of"Internet+"mobile phones recycling mode is poor,on the basis of clarifying the factors affecting the performance of this recycling mode,an evolutionary game model is established to research strategy selection between consumers and recyclers(platforms).By analyzing its evolutionary stability strategy and stability conditions,the causes of the poor performance of this recycling mode is revealed.The mABM simulation model is used to simulate the evolution process,so as to verify the validity of the conclusions.The research shows that:1)consumers' recognition of environmental benefits is the significant factor that restricts the recycling effectiveness;2)High sensitivity to information leakage losses and transaction convenience costs prevents consumers from adopting"active recycling"strategies,but providing safe and convenient recycling services will reduce the profits of recyclers,resulting in poor recycling performance;3)The transparency of price and government subsidy distribution are the contradictions between consumers and recyclers.According to the interpretation,some relevant suggestions and strategies are proposed to improve the performance.
引文
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[22]李杰,张睿,徐勇.虚假口碑信息控制演化博弈研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2019,15(3):39-46.LiJie,Zhang Rui,Xu Yong.The evolutionary game theoretic study on the control of false word-of-mouth information[J].Complex Systems and Complexity Science,2019,15(3):39-46.
[23]柴瑞瑞,刘德海,陈静锋.考虑防御拓扑特征的暴恐事件演化博弈模型和仿真分析[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(5):28-36.Chai Ruirui,Liu Dehai,Chen Jingfeng.Evolutonary game model and simulation analysis of terrorist incidents considering defense topological characteristics[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2017,26(5):28-36.
[24]Liu J,Bai H,Zhang Q,et al.Why are obsolete mobile phones difficult to recycle in China?[J].Resources,Conservation and Recycling,2018,141:200-210.
[25]Friedman D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1991:637-666.
[2]杨德明,刘泳文.“互联网+”为什么加出了业绩[J].中国工业经济,2018,362(5):80-98.Yang Deming,Liu Yongwen.Why can internet plus increase performance[J].China Industrial Economics,2018,362(5):80-98.
[3]芮萌.爱回收的40亿大买卖[J].经理人,2018(5):52-55.Rui Meng.Aihuishu the 4billion dollars recycling business[J].Handlers,2018(5):52-55.
[4]顾一帆,王怀栋,吴玉锋.再生资源供应链的结构,行为和绩效分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(7):46-52.Gu Yifan,Wang Huaidong,Wu Yufeng.Structure,behavior and performance of secondary resource supply chain[J].China population,resources and environment,2017,27(7):46-52.
[5]赛诺中国.沉默的巨矿---2017年手机回收市场研究[DB/OL].[2018-05-03].http://cn.sino-mr.com/index.
[6]Wang Bo,Chunyu Ren,Xiaoyang Dong,et al.“Determinants shaping willingness towards on-line recycling behaviour:An empirical study of household e-waste recycling in China”[J].Resources,conservation and recycling,2019,143:218-225.
[7]Yao L,Liu T,Chen X,et al.An integrated method of life-cycle assessment and system dynamics for waste mobile phone management and recycling in China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2018,187(20):852-862.
[8]Tan Q,Duan H,Liu L,et al.Rethinking residential consumers’behavior in discarding obsolete mobile phones in China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2018,195(10):1228-1236.
[9]Zhou S Y,Yang X J.Research on the influencing factors of beijing residents’used mobile phones network recycling willingness[J].American Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering,2016,1:68-72.
[10]Chi X,Wang M Y L,Reuter M A.E-waste collection channels and household recycling behaviors in Taizhou of China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,80(7):87-95.
[11]Veenstra A,Wang C,Fan W,et al.An analysis of E-waste flows in China[J].International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology,2010,47(5):449-459.
[12]Wang Z,Zhang B,Yin J,et al.Willingness and behavior towards e-waste recycling for residents in Beijing city,China[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2011,19(9):977-984.
[13]Yin Jianfeng,Gao Yingnan,He.Survey and analysis of consumers’behaviour of waste mobile phone recycling in China.[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2014,35(15):517-525.
[14]高颖楠,徐鹤.中国废弃手机回收经济责任分配[J].环境污染与防治,2011,33(9):104-107.Gao Yingnan,XuHe.Distribution of economic responsibility for the recycling of discarded mobile phones in China[J],Environmental Pollution and Control,2011,33(9):104-107.
[15]刘慧慧,黄涛,雷明.废旧电器电子产品双渠道回收模型及政府补贴作用研究[J].中国管理科学,2013,21(2):123-131.Liu Huihui,Huang Tao,Lei Ming.Dual-channel recycling model of waste electrical and electronic equipment and research on effects of government subsidy[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2013,21(2):123-131.
[16]王玉燕,李璟.公平关切下基于网络平台销售、回收的E-闭环供应链的主导模式研究[J].中国管理科学,2018(1):139-151.Wang Yuyan,Lijing.Research on dominant models of E-CLSC based on network sale and recycle considering fairness concern[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018(1):139-151.
[17]冯章伟,肖条军,柴彩春.第三方回收商领导型两级闭环供应链的回收与定价策略[J].中国管理科学,2018(1):118-127.Feng Zhuangwei,Xiao Tiaojun,Chai Caichun.Recycling and pricing strategies of closed-loop supply chain by the leader of third-party recycler[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018(1):118-127.
[18]朱晓东,吴冰冰,王哲.双渠道回收成本差异下的闭环供应链定价策略与协调机制[J].中国管理科学,2017(12):188-196.Zhu Xiaodong,Wu Bingbing,Wang Zhe.Closed-loop supply chain pricing strategy and coordination mechanism under the difference of dual-channel recycling cost[J].Chinese Journal of Management Science,2017(12):188-196.
[19]Wang H G,Wu Y F,Gu Y F,et al.An evaluation of potential yield of indium recycled from waste mobile phone in China[J].Materials Science Forum,2016,847:335-343.
[20]Smith J M,Price G R.The logic of animal conflict[J]Nature.1973:15-18.
[21]许利民,李圣兰,郑杰.“互联网+回收”情境下基于演化博弈的电子废弃物回收合作机理研究[J].运筹与管理,2018,27(9):87-99.Xu Limin,Li Shenglan,Zheng Jie.Cooperation mechanism of e-waste recycling in“internet+recycling”environment based on evolutionary game[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2018,27(9):87-99.
[22]李杰,张睿,徐勇.虚假口碑信息控制演化博弈研究[J].复杂系统与复杂性科学,2019,15(3):39-46.LiJie,Zhang Rui,Xu Yong.The evolutionary game theoretic study on the control of false word-of-mouth information[J].Complex Systems and Complexity Science,2019,15(3):39-46.
[23]柴瑞瑞,刘德海,陈静锋.考虑防御拓扑特征的暴恐事件演化博弈模型和仿真分析[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(5):28-36.Chai Ruirui,Liu Dehai,Chen Jingfeng.Evolutonary game model and simulation analysis of terrorist incidents considering defense topological characteristics[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2017,26(5):28-36.
[24]Liu J,Bai H,Zhang Q,et al.Why are obsolete mobile phones difficult to recycle in China?[J].Resources,Conservation and Recycling,2018,141:200-210.
[25]Friedman D.Evolutionary games in economics[J].Econometrica:Journal of the Econometric Society,1991:637-666.