政府间竞争影响城市土地市场化水平的双边效应研究:基于财政竞争和引资竞争的不同作用
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摘要
研究目的:本文将政府间竞争划分为财政竞争和引资竞争,比较两者对城市土地市场化水平影响的大小,分析政府间竞争与城市土地市场化水平之间的关系。研究方法:基于2003—2016年全国284个地级市的面板数据,利用双边随机前沿模型测算财政竞争和引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平的影响。研究结果:财政竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有正向效应,提高了城市土地市场化水平1.61%;引资竞争对城市土地市场化水平具有负向效应,降低了城市土地市场化水平12.51%;政府间竞争总体上降低了城市土地市场化水平10.90%。时间趋势表明,政府间竞争对城市土地市场化水平的抑制作用呈现波动下降的状态。研究结论:政府间竞争降低了城市土地市场化水平。
The purpose of this paper is to decompose the intergovernmental competition into fiscal competition and investment attraction competition, to compare the bilateral effects, and to analyze the relationship between the intergovernmental competition and the level of urban land marketization. The method is to use the two-tier stochastic frontier model to measure the impact of fiscal competition and investment attraction competition on the level of urban land marketization based on the panel data of 284 prefecture-level cities in China from 2003 to 2016. The results show that: fiscal competition has a positive effect on the level of urban land marketization, increases the level of urban land marketization by 1.61%; investment attraction competition has a negative effect on the level of urban land marketization, reducing the level of urban land marketization by 12.51%; Therefore, the intergovernmental competition generally reduces the level of urban land marketization by 10.90%. Time trend indicates that the inhibition of the level of urban land marketization by intergovernmental competition is in a state of fluctuating decline. In conclusion, intergovernmental competition has reduced the level of urban land marketization.
The purpose of this paper is to decompose the intergovernmental competition into fiscal competition and investment attraction competition, to compare the bilateral effects, and to analyze the relationship between the intergovernmental competition and the level of urban land marketization. The method is to use the two-tier stochastic frontier model to measure the impact of fiscal competition and investment attraction competition on the level of urban land marketization based on the panel data of 284 prefecture-level cities in China from 2003 to 2016. The results show that: fiscal competition has a positive effect on the level of urban land marketization, increases the level of urban land marketization by 1.61%; investment attraction competition has a negative effect on the level of urban land marketization, reducing the level of urban land marketization by 12.51%; Therefore, the intergovernmental competition generally reduces the level of urban land marketization by 10.90%. Time trend indicates that the inhibition of the level of urban land marketization by intergovernmental competition is in a state of fluctuating decline. In conclusion, intergovernmental competition has reduced the level of urban land marketization.
引文
[1]张莉,王贤彬,徐现祥.财政激励、晋升激励与地方官员的土地出让行为[J].中国工业经济,2011(4):35-43.
[2] LIU Y. Government extraction and firm size:local officials’responses to fiscal distress in China[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, 46(4):1310-1331.
[3]王青,陈志刚,叶依广,等.土地市场发展的经济驱动机制:理论与实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2007,17(3):75-80.
[4]牟燕,钱忠好.地方政府土地财政依赖一定会推高城市一级土地市场化水平吗?——基于2003—2015年中国省级面板数据的检验[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(10):8-13,35.
[5]赵文哲,杨继东.地方政府财政缺口与土地出让方式——基于地方政府与国有企业互利行为的解释[J].管理世界,2015,31(4):11-24.
[6]陶然,袁飞,曹广忠.区域竞争、土地出让与地方财政效应:基于1999~2003年中国地级城市面板数据的分析[J].世界经济,2007,30(10):15-27.
[7]杨继东,杨其静.保增长压力、刺激计划与工业用地出让[J].经济研究,2016,51(1):99-113.
[8]颜燕,刘涛,满燕云.基于土地出让行为的地方政府竞争与经济增长[J].城市发展研究,2013,20(3):73-79.
[9]雷潇雨,龚六堂.基于土地出让的工业化与城镇化[J].管理世界,2014,30(9):29-41.
[10]李永乐,胡晓波,魏后凯.“三维”政府竞争——以地方政府土地出让为例[J].政治学研究,2018(1):47-58,127.
[11] CHEN Z, TANG J, WAN J, et al. Promotion incentives for local officials and the expansion of urban construction land in China:using the Yangtze River Delta as a case study[J].Land Use Policy, 2017, 63:214-225.
[12] DING C, NIU Y, LICHTENBERG E. Spending preferences of local officials with off-budget land revenues of Chinese cities[J]. China Economic Review, 2014, 31:265-276.
[13] ZHANG T. Land market forces and government’s role in sprawl:the case of China[J]. Cities, 2000, 17(2):123-135.
[14]陈建军,周维正.空间视角下的地方政府土地经营策略、竞争机制和中国的城市层级体系——来自中国186个地级市的经验证据[J].中国土地科学,2016,30(3):4-11.
[15] HAN S S. Urban expansion in contemporary China:what can we learn from a small town?[J]. Land Use Policy, 2010, 27(3):780-787.
[16]范建双,任逸蓉.违法用地对土地可持续集约利用的影响机制及效应研究[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(3):52-58.
[17] KUMBHAKAR S C, PARMETER C F. The effects of match uncertainty and bargaining on labor market outcomes:evidence from firm and worker specific estimates[J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2009, 31(1):1-14.
[18]王家庭,蔡思远.人口规模和财政压力对城市蔓延的影响——以中国69个大中城市为例[J].城市问题,2018(3):4-11.
[19]张军,高远,傅勇,等.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?[J].经济研究,2007,42(3):4-19.
[20]郑磊.财政分权、政府竞争与公共支出结构——政府教育支出比重的影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2008(1):28-40.
[21]钱忠好,牟燕.中国土地市场化水平:测度及分析[J].管理世界,2012,28(7):67-75,95.
[22]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007,42(11):91-103.
[23]谭丹,黄贤金,陈志刚,等.中国土地市场化程度及其影响因素分析[J].城市问题,2008(1):14-18.
[24]徐现祥,王贤彬.晋升激励与经济增长:来自中国省级官员的证据[J].世界经济,2010,33(2):15-36.
(1)该数据由笔者测算得出,土地收入数据来源于2017年《中国国土资源统计年鉴》,地方政府财政总收入数据来源于2017年《中国统计年鉴》。
[2] LIU Y. Government extraction and firm size:local officials’responses to fiscal distress in China[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2018, 46(4):1310-1331.
[3]王青,陈志刚,叶依广,等.土地市场发展的经济驱动机制:理论与实证分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2007,17(3):75-80.
[4]牟燕,钱忠好.地方政府土地财政依赖一定会推高城市一级土地市场化水平吗?——基于2003—2015年中国省级面板数据的检验[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(10):8-13,35.
[5]赵文哲,杨继东.地方政府财政缺口与土地出让方式——基于地方政府与国有企业互利行为的解释[J].管理世界,2015,31(4):11-24.
[6]陶然,袁飞,曹广忠.区域竞争、土地出让与地方财政效应:基于1999~2003年中国地级城市面板数据的分析[J].世界经济,2007,30(10):15-27.
[7]杨继东,杨其静.保增长压力、刺激计划与工业用地出让[J].经济研究,2016,51(1):99-113.
[8]颜燕,刘涛,满燕云.基于土地出让行为的地方政府竞争与经济增长[J].城市发展研究,2013,20(3):73-79.
[9]雷潇雨,龚六堂.基于土地出让的工业化与城镇化[J].管理世界,2014,30(9):29-41.
[10]李永乐,胡晓波,魏后凯.“三维”政府竞争——以地方政府土地出让为例[J].政治学研究,2018(1):47-58,127.
[11] CHEN Z, TANG J, WAN J, et al. Promotion incentives for local officials and the expansion of urban construction land in China:using the Yangtze River Delta as a case study[J].Land Use Policy, 2017, 63:214-225.
[12] DING C, NIU Y, LICHTENBERG E. Spending preferences of local officials with off-budget land revenues of Chinese cities[J]. China Economic Review, 2014, 31:265-276.
[13] ZHANG T. Land market forces and government’s role in sprawl:the case of China[J]. Cities, 2000, 17(2):123-135.
[14]陈建军,周维正.空间视角下的地方政府土地经营策略、竞争机制和中国的城市层级体系——来自中国186个地级市的经验证据[J].中国土地科学,2016,30(3):4-11.
[15] HAN S S. Urban expansion in contemporary China:what can we learn from a small town?[J]. Land Use Policy, 2010, 27(3):780-787.
[16]范建双,任逸蓉.违法用地对土地可持续集约利用的影响机制及效应研究[J].中国土地科学,2018,32(3):52-58.
[17] KUMBHAKAR S C, PARMETER C F. The effects of match uncertainty and bargaining on labor market outcomes:evidence from firm and worker specific estimates[J]. Journal of Productivity Analysis, 2009, 31(1):1-14.
[18]王家庭,蔡思远.人口规模和财政压力对城市蔓延的影响——以中国69个大中城市为例[J].城市问题,2018(3):4-11.
[19]张军,高远,傅勇,等.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?[J].经济研究,2007,42(3):4-19.
[20]郑磊.财政分权、政府竞争与公共支出结构——政府教育支出比重的影响因素分析[J].经济科学,2008(1):28-40.
[21]钱忠好,牟燕.中国土地市场化水平:测度及分析[J].管理世界,2012,28(7):67-75,95.
[22]张军,高远.官员任期、异地交流与经济增长——来自省级经验的证据[J].经济研究,2007,42(11):91-103.
[23]谭丹,黄贤金,陈志刚,等.中国土地市场化程度及其影响因素分析[J].城市问题,2008(1):14-18.
[24]徐现祥,王贤彬.晋升激励与经济增长:来自中国省级官员的证据[J].世界经济,2010,33(2):15-36.
(1)该数据由笔者测算得出,土地收入数据来源于2017年《中国国土资源统计年鉴》,地方政府财政总收入数据来源于2017年《中国统计年鉴》。