国际秩序转型期的中美制度竞争——基于制度制衡理论的分析
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摘要
在全球化和经济相互依存不断加深的时代背景下,除了传统的军事制衡战略,在国际政治中,大国也以包容性制度制衡和排他性制度制衡战略的形式进行战略互动与竞争。国际秩序转型更增强了主导国与崛起国之间的制度制衡。本文关注的研究问题是,为什么中国这样的崛起国会选择维护现有国际秩序的"包容性制度制衡"战略,而作为主导国或守成国的美国却实行旨在破坏现有国际秩序的"排他性制度制衡"战略。本文认为,制度红利的变化影响着国家对不同制度制衡战略的选择偏好,这是制度竞争过程中国家基于成本—收益的理性选择。随着美国在现有国际制度中享受的"制度红利"不断下降,它更有可能选择挑战现有国际秩序的"排他性制度制衡"战略,包括退出现有多边机制以及建立对其有利的新的国际机制。相反,随着中国在现有国际机制中"制度红利"的增加,中国更有可能选择维护现有国际秩序的"包容性制度制衡"战略。通过两个案例,即美国奥巴马政府在建立TPP期间所实行的"排他性制度制衡"以及中国成立亚投行期间的"包容性制度制衡",本文进一步检验了"制度红利—制度制衡"的理论模型。制度制衡将成为21世纪国际秩序转型期间中美之间战略互动的一种新形式。
As globalization and economic interdependence deepens,states have adopted both inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing strategies in international interaction and competition.In a transitional international order,institutional balancing between a dominant state and a rising power tends to intensify.This paper asks why the rising power China has chosen an inclusive institutional balancing strategy to maintain the existing international order,while the dominant state,the United States,has adopted an exclusive institutional balancing strategy to challenge the existing order.The paper argues that states' preferences for institutional balancing strategies are mainly shaped by"institutional dividend".In other words,they make rational choices based on cost-benefit calculations in the process of institutional competition.The United States is more likely to adopt an exclusive institutional balancing strategy,including exiting the current institutions and establishing new institutions,when its institutional dividend decreases.Instead,China is more likely to choose an inclusive institutional balancing strategy as its institutional dividend continues to increase.To test this "institutional dividend—institutional balancing"hypothesis,the paper examines two cases.One is the TPP and the U.S.exclusive balancing,and the other is the AIIB and China's inclusive balancing.The paper concludes that institutional balancing is becoming a new form of strategic interaction between the United States and China in the transition of international order in the 21 st century.
As globalization and economic interdependence deepens,states have adopted both inclusive and exclusive institutional balancing strategies in international interaction and competition.In a transitional international order,institutional balancing between a dominant state and a rising power tends to intensify.This paper asks why the rising power China has chosen an inclusive institutional balancing strategy to maintain the existing international order,while the dominant state,the United States,has adopted an exclusive institutional balancing strategy to challenge the existing order.The paper argues that states' preferences for institutional balancing strategies are mainly shaped by"institutional dividend".In other words,they make rational choices based on cost-benefit calculations in the process of institutional competition.The United States is more likely to adopt an exclusive institutional balancing strategy,including exiting the current institutions and establishing new institutions,when its institutional dividend decreases.Instead,China is more likely to choose an inclusive institutional balancing strategy as its institutional dividend continues to increase.To test this "institutional dividend—institutional balancing"hypothesis,the paper examines two cases.One is the TPP and the U.S.exclusive balancing,and the other is the AIIB and China's inclusive balancing.The paper concludes that institutional balancing is becoming a new form of strategic interaction between the United States and China in the transition of international order in the 21 st century.
引文
(1)James Politi,“Donald Trump Moves to Pull US Out of Postal Treaty”,Financial Times,October 17,2018,https://www.ft.com/content/a1233f3e-d21a-11e8-a9f2-7574db66bcd5.
(2)“Trump Says May Pull Out of WTO,If It Doesn't ‘Shape Up’”,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-if-they-don-t-shape-up.相关评论还可参见Chad P.Bown and Douglas A.Irwin,“What Might a Trump Withdrawal from the World Trade Organization Mean for US Tariffs?” Peterson Institute for International Economics,Policy Brief 18-23,November 2018,https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/what-might-trump-withdrawal-world-trade-organization-mean-us-tariffs。
(3)柯特妮·韦弗:《特朗普:美国退出〈武器贸易条约〉》,《金融时报》,2019年4月28日,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001082532 full=y&archive。
(4)G.John Ikenberry,“The Rise of China and the Future of the West:Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs,Vol.8,No.1,2008,p.24.
(5)“President Xi's Speech to Davos in Full”,World Econonic Forum,January 17,2017,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum;《习近平在二十国集团领导人第十三次峰会第一阶段会议上的讲话》,外交部网站,2018年12月1日,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1618008.shtml。
(6)Steve Chan,Weixing Hu and Kai He,“Discerning States' Revisionist and Status-Quo Orientations:Comparing China and the US”,European Journal of International Relations,Vol.25,No.2,2019,p.2,https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118804622.
(7)Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,Routledge,2004,p.xv.江忆恩和陆柏彬主编的文集较为全面地阐述了美国对华的接触战略。
(8)David Shambaugh,“Containment or Engagement of China?Calculating Beijing's Responses”,International Security,Vo1.21,No.2,1996,p.181.
(9)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in US China Policy”,New Paradigms Forum,November 20,2014,http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1896.
(10)James Mann,“America's Dangerous China Fantasy”,The New York Times,October 27,2016,http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/opinion/americas-dangerous-china-fantasy.html?_r=0.
(11)David M.Lampton,“A Tipping Point in US-China Relations Is upon Us”,US-China Perception Monitor,May 11,2015,http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations -is-upon-us-part-i/#_ftnref5.相关研究还可参见Zhao Suisheng,“Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise:How the Obama Administration Brought Back Hedge in Its Engagement with China”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.21,No.75,2012,pp.369-389。
(12)李巍:《国际秩序转型与现实制度主义理论的生成》,《外交评论》,2016年第1期,第31—59页。
(13)Randall Schweller,“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms:A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.11,Issue 1,2018,pp.32-46.
(14)赵洋:《中美制度竞争分析——以“一带一路”为例》,《当代亚太》,2016年第2期,第28—57页。
(15)Khong Yuen Foong,“The Reality of US-China Competition”,Global-Is-Asian,National University of Singapore,July 9,2016,https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/the-reality-of-us-china-competition.
(16)有关中美战略竞争的研究可以参见:Russell Ong,China's Strategic Competition with the United States,Routledge,2011;John J.Mearsheimer,“The Gathering Storm:China's Challenge to US Power in Asia”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.3,Issue 4,2010,pp.381-396;Dustin Tingley,et al.,“The Political Economy of Inward FDI:Opposition to Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.8,Issue 1,2015,pp.27-57;Xuetong Yan and Haixia Qi,“Football Game Rather than Boxing Match:China-US Intensifying Rivalry Does Not Amount to Cold War”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.5,Issue 2,2012,pp.105-127;Randall Schweller,“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms:A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations”,pp.23-48;李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,社会科学文献出版社,2017年;赵明昊:《“竞争”与中美关系的当前态势》,《战略决策研究》,2018年第2期,第47—55页;左希迎:《战略竞争时代的中美关系图景》,《战略决策研究》,2018年第2期,第79—88页。
(17)Kai He,“Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia”,European Journal of International Relations,Vol.14,No.3,2008,pp.489-518;Kai He,Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific:Economic Interdependence and China's Rise,Routledge,2009.
(18)Kai He,“Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia”,pp.489-518;Kai He,Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific:Economic Interdependence and China's Rise.
(19)需要指出的是,本文作者之一贺凯在近期研究中还提出了制度制衡的第三种类型——制度间制衡。制度间制衡是制度制衡的扩展形式,这种制衡策略可以是包容性的,也可以是排他性质的,其独特性并不在于制衡的目标,而在于制衡的方式。鉴于制度间制衡并不妨碍前两种制度制衡的互斥性,而且作为既有制度制衡类型的扩展形式并不影响研究的分析结果,笔者因此没有将这一类型纳入考虑范围。Kai He,“Role Conceptions,Order Transition and Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific:A New Theoretical Framework”,Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.72,No.2,March 2018,pp.95-96;Kai He,“Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific”,International Politics,Vol.52,No.2,2015,p.217.
(20)Seungjoo Lee,“Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega-FTAs in East Asia”,Asian Survey,Vol.56,No.6,2016,pp.1055-1076.
(21)边际收益递减(diminishing return)是经济学的一个基本规律,是指企业在生产过程中,通过增加某种生产要素的投入提高产出,在其他条件不变的前提下,当该生产要素投入数量增加到一定程度以后,继续增加该要素所带来的效益增加量是递减的。
(22)关于制度红利为什么存在边际收益递减现象以及影响这种收益变化的因素,需要另外的研究进行专门分析,鉴于篇幅限制,本文不对这一问题进行更深入的论述。
(23)李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,第106页。
(24)Kai He and Stephen Walker,“Role Bargaining Strategies for China's Peaceful Rise”,Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.8,No.4,2015,pp.371-388.
(25)关于“大国无战争”时代的大国行为逻辑可以参见杨原的相关研究。杨原:《大国无战争、功能分异与两极体系下的大国共治》,《世界经济与政治》,2015年第8期,第29—65页;杨原:《大国无战争时代霸权国与崛起国权力竞争的主要机制》,《当代亚太》,2011年第6期,第5—32页;杨原:《武力胁迫还是利益交换?——大国无战争时代大国提高国际影响力的核心路径》,《外交评论》,2011年第4期,第96—116页。
(26)李巍:《国际秩序转型与现实制度主义理论的生成》,第32页。
(27)Shawn Donnan and Demetri Sevastopulo,“Trump Opens Door to US Rejoining TPP”,Financial Times,January 28,2018;Matthew P.Goodman,“From TPP to CPTPP”,Center for Strategic & International Studies,March 8,2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp.
(28)李巍:《东亚经济地区主义的终结?——制度过剩与经济整合的困境》,《当代亚太》,2011年第4期,第17页。
(29)数据来源于东盟官方网站:ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2018,ASEAN Secretariat,December 2018,p.78,https://www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/asyb-2018.pdf。
(30)“Overview of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”,ASEAN Secretariat Information Paper,August 2018,pp.1-6,https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Overview-of-ASEAN-China-Relations-Au gust-2018_For-Website.pdf.
(31)李巍:《当国际峰会变成清谈馆》,《中国经济周刊》,2010 年 11 月 22 日,第 17页。
(32)李巍:《东亚经济地区主义的终结?——制度过剩与经济整合的困境》,第13—14页。
(33)刘丰:《安全预期、经济收益与东亚安全秩序》,《当代亚太》,2011年第3期,第146页。
(34)戴维·皮林:《禁止中国入内的俱乐部?》,FT中文网,2013年5月24日,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001050577 archive。
(35)王金强:《TPP背景下国际经贸规则的变革与亚太价值链的构建》,《东北亚论坛》,2016年第3期,第84—85页。
(36)Flynn Sean,Aidan Hollis and Mike Palmedo,“An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries”,Journal of Law,Medicine and Ethics,Vol.37,No.2,2009,pp.184-208.
(37)“Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures”,Trans-Pacific Partnership Text,Article 3,pp.3-1-3-31,http://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text;宋国友:《TPP:地缘影响、中美博弈及中国选择》,《东北亚论坛》,2016年第2期,第71页。
(38)Peter A.Petri and Ali Abdul-Raheem,“Can RCEP and the TPP Be Pathways to FTAAP?” “Chapter 2”,in Pacific Economic Cooperation Council,State of the Region,October 2014,pp.1-21,https://ssrn.com/abstract=2513893.
(39)“State-Owned Enterprises and Designated Monopolies”,Trans-Pacific Partnership Text,Article 17,pp.17-1-17-34,http://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
(40)沈铭辉:《美国的区域合作战略:区域还是全球?——美国推动TPP的行为逻辑》,《当代亚太》,2013年第6期,第90—91页。
(41)Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“Leadership Transition and Global Governance:Role Conception,Institutional Balancing,and the AIIB”,Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.12,No.2,2019,pp.153-178,https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz003.
(42)“Members of the Bank-AIIB”,Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html.
(43)《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》,第二十二条,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_chinese_bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf.
(44)《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》,第二十八条,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_chinese_bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf.
(45)李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,第104—105页。
(46)罗杭、杨黎泽:《国际组织中的投票权与投票权力——以亚洲基础设施投资银行为例》,《世界经济与政治》,2018年第2期,第138页。
(47)Hong Yu,“Motivation Behind China's ‘One Belt,One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.26,Issue 105,2017,pp.353-368.
(48)Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“Game of Institutional Balancing:China,the AIIB,and the Future of Global Governance”,RSIS Working Paper Series No.314,S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Singapore,2018,p.12,https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WP314.pdf.
(49)Injoo Sohn,“AIIB:A Plank in China's Hedging Strategy”,Brookings East Asia Commentary Series,May 11,2015,https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/aiib-a-plank-in-chinas-hedging-strategy/.
(50)Joseph S.Nye,Jr.,Is the American Century Over?John Wiley & Sons,2015.
(51)Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“Game of Institutional Balancing:China,the AIIB,and the Future of Global Governance”,pp.18-20.
(52)《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》,第二十八条,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_chinese_bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf.
(53)周方银:《国际领导权之争的误区与中美关系的前景》,《战略决策研究》,2018年第2期,第4—13页。
(54)阎学通:《世界权力的转移:政治领导与战略竞争》,北京大学出版社,2015年,第63—86页。
(55)依据制度制衡理论解释美国的“退出战略”,参见任琳:《“退出外交”与全球治理秩序——一种制度现实主义的分析》,《国际政治科学》,2019年第1期,第84—115页。
(56)Edward Luce,“The New Era of US-China Decoupling”,Financial Times,December 20,2018.
(2)“Trump Says May Pull Out of WTO,If It Doesn't ‘Shape Up’”,https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-30/trump-says-he-will-pull-u-s-out-of-wto-if-they-don-t-shape-up.相关评论还可参见Chad P.Bown and Douglas A.Irwin,“What Might a Trump Withdrawal from the World Trade Organization Mean for US Tariffs?” Peterson Institute for International Economics,Policy Brief 18-23,November 2018,https://piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/what-might-trump-withdrawal-world-trade-organization-mean-us-tariffs。
(3)柯特妮·韦弗:《特朗普:美国退出〈武器贸易条约〉》,《金融时报》,2019年4月28日,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001082532 full=y&archive。
(4)G.John Ikenberry,“The Rise of China and the Future of the West:Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs,Vol.8,No.1,2008,p.24.
(5)“President Xi's Speech to Davos in Full”,World Econonic Forum,January 17,2017,https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/01/full-text-of-xi-jinping-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum;《习近平在二十国集团领导人第十三次峰会第一阶段会议上的讲话》,外交部网站,2018年12月1日,https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1618008.shtml。
(6)Steve Chan,Weixing Hu and Kai He,“Discerning States' Revisionist and Status-Quo Orientations:Comparing China and the US”,European Journal of International Relations,Vol.25,No.2,2019,p.2,https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066118804622.
(7)Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S.Ross,Engaging China:The Management of an Emerging Power,Routledge,2004,p.xv.江忆恩和陆柏彬主编的文集较为全面地阐述了美国对华的接触战略。
(8)David Shambaugh,“Containment or Engagement of China?Calculating Beijing's Responses”,International Security,Vo1.21,No.2,1996,p.181.
(9)Christopher Ford,“The Death of the ‘Liberal Myth’ in US China Policy”,New Paradigms Forum,November 20,2014,http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1896.
(10)James Mann,“America's Dangerous China Fantasy”,The New York Times,October 27,2016,http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/opinion/americas-dangerous-china-fantasy.html?_r=0.
(11)David M.Lampton,“A Tipping Point in US-China Relations Is upon Us”,US-China Perception Monitor,May 11,2015,http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations -is-upon-us-part-i/#_ftnref5.相关研究还可参见Zhao Suisheng,“Shaping the Regional Context of China's Rise:How the Obama Administration Brought Back Hedge in Its Engagement with China”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.21,No.75,2012,pp.369-389。
(12)李巍:《国际秩序转型与现实制度主义理论的生成》,《外交评论》,2016年第1期,第31—59页。
(13)Randall Schweller,“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms:A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.11,Issue 1,2018,pp.32-46.
(14)赵洋:《中美制度竞争分析——以“一带一路”为例》,《当代亚太》,2016年第2期,第28—57页。
(15)Khong Yuen Foong,“The Reality of US-China Competition”,Global-Is-Asian,National University of Singapore,July 9,2016,https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/gia/article/the-reality-of-us-china-competition.
(16)有关中美战略竞争的研究可以参见:Russell Ong,China's Strategic Competition with the United States,Routledge,2011;John J.Mearsheimer,“The Gathering Storm:China's Challenge to US Power in Asia”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.3,Issue 4,2010,pp.381-396;Dustin Tingley,et al.,“The Political Economy of Inward FDI:Opposition to Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.8,Issue 1,2015,pp.27-57;Xuetong Yan and Haixia Qi,“Football Game Rather than Boxing Match:China-US Intensifying Rivalry Does Not Amount to Cold War”,The Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.5,Issue 2,2012,pp.105-127;Randall Schweller,“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms:A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US-China Relations”,pp.23-48;李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,社会科学文献出版社,2017年;赵明昊:《“竞争”与中美关系的当前态势》,《战略决策研究》,2018年第2期,第47—55页;左希迎:《战略竞争时代的中美关系图景》,《战略决策研究》,2018年第2期,第79—88页。
(17)Kai He,“Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia”,European Journal of International Relations,Vol.14,No.3,2008,pp.489-518;Kai He,Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific:Economic Interdependence and China's Rise,Routledge,2009.
(18)Kai He,“Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory:Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia”,pp.489-518;Kai He,Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific:Economic Interdependence and China's Rise.
(19)需要指出的是,本文作者之一贺凯在近期研究中还提出了制度制衡的第三种类型——制度间制衡。制度间制衡是制度制衡的扩展形式,这种制衡策略可以是包容性的,也可以是排他性质的,其独特性并不在于制衡的目标,而在于制衡的方式。鉴于制度间制衡并不妨碍前两种制度制衡的互斥性,而且作为既有制度制衡类型的扩展形式并不影响研究的分析结果,笔者因此没有将这一类型纳入考虑范围。Kai He,“Role Conceptions,Order Transition and Institutional Balancing in the Asia-Pacific:A New Theoretical Framework”,Australian Journal of International Affairs,Vol.72,No.2,March 2018,pp.95-96;Kai He,“Contested Regional Orders and Institutional Balancing in the Asia Pacific”,International Politics,Vol.52,No.2,2015,p.217.
(20)Seungjoo Lee,“Institutional Balancing and the Politics of Mega-FTAs in East Asia”,Asian Survey,Vol.56,No.6,2016,pp.1055-1076.
(21)边际收益递减(diminishing return)是经济学的一个基本规律,是指企业在生产过程中,通过增加某种生产要素的投入提高产出,在其他条件不变的前提下,当该生产要素投入数量增加到一定程度以后,继续增加该要素所带来的效益增加量是递减的。
(22)关于制度红利为什么存在边际收益递减现象以及影响这种收益变化的因素,需要另外的研究进行专门分析,鉴于篇幅限制,本文不对这一问题进行更深入的论述。
(23)李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,第106页。
(24)Kai He and Stephen Walker,“Role Bargaining Strategies for China's Peaceful Rise”,Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.8,No.4,2015,pp.371-388.
(25)关于“大国无战争”时代的大国行为逻辑可以参见杨原的相关研究。杨原:《大国无战争、功能分异与两极体系下的大国共治》,《世界经济与政治》,2015年第8期,第29—65页;杨原:《大国无战争时代霸权国与崛起国权力竞争的主要机制》,《当代亚太》,2011年第6期,第5—32页;杨原:《武力胁迫还是利益交换?——大国无战争时代大国提高国际影响力的核心路径》,《外交评论》,2011年第4期,第96—116页。
(26)李巍:《国际秩序转型与现实制度主义理论的生成》,第32页。
(27)Shawn Donnan and Demetri Sevastopulo,“Trump Opens Door to US Rejoining TPP”,Financial Times,January 28,2018;Matthew P.Goodman,“From TPP to CPTPP”,Center for Strategic & International Studies,March 8,2018,https://www.csis.org/analysis/tpp-cptpp.
(28)李巍:《东亚经济地区主义的终结?——制度过剩与经济整合的困境》,《当代亚太》,2011年第4期,第17页。
(29)数据来源于东盟官方网站:ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2018,ASEAN Secretariat,December 2018,p.78,https://www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/asyb-2018.pdf。
(30)“Overview of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”,ASEAN Secretariat Information Paper,August 2018,pp.1-6,https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Overview-of-ASEAN-China-Relations-Au gust-2018_For-Website.pdf.
(31)李巍:《当国际峰会变成清谈馆》,《中国经济周刊》,2010 年 11 月 22 日,第 17页。
(32)李巍:《东亚经济地区主义的终结?——制度过剩与经济整合的困境》,第13—14页。
(33)刘丰:《安全预期、经济收益与东亚安全秩序》,《当代亚太》,2011年第3期,第146页。
(34)戴维·皮林:《禁止中国入内的俱乐部?》,FT中文网,2013年5月24日,http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001050577 archive。
(35)王金强:《TPP背景下国际经贸规则的变革与亚太价值链的构建》,《东北亚论坛》,2016年第3期,第84—85页。
(36)Flynn Sean,Aidan Hollis and Mike Palmedo,“An Economic Justification for Open Access to Essential Medicine Patents in Developing Countries”,Journal of Law,Medicine and Ethics,Vol.37,No.2,2009,pp.184-208.
(37)“Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures”,Trans-Pacific Partnership Text,Article 3,pp.3-1-3-31,http://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text;宋国友:《TPP:地缘影响、中美博弈及中国选择》,《东北亚论坛》,2016年第2期,第71页。
(38)Peter A.Petri and Ali Abdul-Raheem,“Can RCEP and the TPP Be Pathways to FTAAP?” “Chapter 2”,in Pacific Economic Cooperation Council,State of the Region,October 2014,pp.1-21,https://ssrn.com/abstract=2513893.
(39)“State-Owned Enterprises and Designated Monopolies”,Trans-Pacific Partnership Text,Article 17,pp.17-1-17-34,http://www.tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text.
(40)沈铭辉:《美国的区域合作战略:区域还是全球?——美国推动TPP的行为逻辑》,《当代亚太》,2013年第6期,第90—91页。
(41)Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“Leadership Transition and Global Governance:Role Conception,Institutional Balancing,and the AIIB”,Chinese Journal of International Politics,Vol.12,No.2,2019,pp.153-178,https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz003.
(42)“Members of the Bank-AIIB”,Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html.
(43)《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》,第二十二条,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_chinese_bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf.
(44)《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》,第二十八条,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_chinese_bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf.
(45)李巍:《制度之战:战略竞争时代的中美关系》,第104—105页。
(46)罗杭、杨黎泽:《国际组织中的投票权与投票权力——以亚洲基础设施投资银行为例》,《世界经济与政治》,2018年第2期,第138页。
(47)Hong Yu,“Motivation Behind China's ‘One Belt,One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”,Journal of Contemporary China,Vol.26,Issue 105,2017,pp.353-368.
(48)Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“Game of Institutional Balancing:China,the AIIB,and the Future of Global Governance”,RSIS Working Paper Series No.314,S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies,Singapore,2018,p.12,https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/WP314.pdf.
(49)Injoo Sohn,“AIIB:A Plank in China's Hedging Strategy”,Brookings East Asia Commentary Series,May 11,2015,https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/aiib-a-plank-in-chinas-hedging-strategy/.
(50)Joseph S.Nye,Jr.,Is the American Century Over?John Wiley & Sons,2015.
(51)Kai He and Huiyun Feng,“Game of Institutional Balancing:China,the AIIB,and the Future of Global Governance”,pp.18-20.
(52)《亚洲基础设施投资银行协定》,第二十八条,https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/basic-documents/_download/articles-of-agreement/basic_document_chinese_bank_articles_of_agreement.pdf.
(53)周方银:《国际领导权之争的误区与中美关系的前景》,《战略决策研究》,2018年第2期,第4—13页。
(54)阎学通:《世界权力的转移:政治领导与战略竞争》,北京大学出版社,2015年,第63—86页。
(55)依据制度制衡理论解释美国的“退出战略”,参见任琳:《“退出外交”与全球治理秩序——一种制度现实主义的分析》,《国际政治科学》,2019年第1期,第84—115页。
(56)Edward Luce,“The New Era of US-China Decoupling”,Financial Times,December 20,2018.