集体土地作价人股农业特色小镇路径演化分析
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摘要
"乡村振兴战略"背景下农业特色小镇是辐射带动新农村发展的重要载体而土地是农业特色小镇建设需要解决的核心问题.针对农村集体经济组织在集体土地作价入股农业特色小镇策略选择问题,基于演化博弈思想,构建农村集体经济组织与企业的演化博弈模型,探究集体土地作价入股农业特色小镇路径演化问题,最后,利用Matlab工具对双方选择合作策略的影响因素进行数值仿真分析.研究发现:集体土地作价入股农业特色小镇,企业与农村集体经济组织的合作策略选择与集体土地的未来收益、奖惩机制、投入成本、运营风险有关.针对研究结果提出了相关政策建议,有利于促进双方合作,对激活农村存量土地、加强农村建设、发展特色农业、拉动农村经济、实现乡村振兴战略目标具有重要意义.
Under the background of "the strategy of rural revitalization",small towns with agricultural characteristics are the important carriers of radiation driving the development of new countryside,and land is the core problem to be solved in the construction of small towns with agricultural characteristics.Based on evolutionary game theory,the evolutionary game m odel of rural collective economic organizations and enterprises is constructed to solve the problem of strategy selection of rural collective economic organizations to invest in small towns with agricultural characteristics through collective land pricing.The evolutionary path of rural collective economic organizations to invest in small towns with agricultural characteristics is explored.Finally,the influencing factors of cooperative strategies are simulated and analyzed by using MATLAB tool.This is the case.It is found that the cooperative strategy choice between enterprises and rural collective economic organizations is related to the future income of collective land,reward and punishment mechanism,input cost and operational risk.In view of the results of this study,the paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations,which are conducive to promoting cooperation between the two sides.It is of great significance for activating rural land stock,strengthening rural construction,developing characteristic agriculture,stimulating rural economy and realizing the strategic goal of rural revitalization.
Under the background of "the strategy of rural revitalization",small towns with agricultural characteristics are the important carriers of radiation driving the development of new countryside,and land is the core problem to be solved in the construction of small towns with agricultural characteristics.Based on evolutionary game theory,the evolutionary game m odel of rural collective economic organizations and enterprises is constructed to solve the problem of strategy selection of rural collective economic organizations to invest in small towns with agricultural characteristics through collective land pricing.The evolutionary path of rural collective economic organizations to invest in small towns with agricultural characteristics is explored.Finally,the influencing factors of cooperative strategies are simulated and analyzed by using MATLAB tool.This is the case.It is found that the cooperative strategy choice between enterprises and rural collective economic organizations is related to the future income of collective land,reward and punishment mechanism,input cost and operational risk.In view of the results of this study,the paper puts forward relevant policy recommendations,which are conducive to promoting cooperation between the two sides.It is of great significance for activating rural land stock,strengthening rural construction,developing characteristic agriculture,stimulating rural economy and realizing the strategic goal of rural revitalization.
引文
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[10]王薇,张守健,孙智.基于演化博弈的工程建设标准采纳行为研究[J].科技管理研究,2018,38(20):243-248.
[11]魏莉,陈伟达,杨烨.环保第三方监督下钢铁企业碳减排行为及其演化动态[J].工业工程与管理,2019(1):72-79.
[12]吕永卫,霍丽娜.基于演化博弈的煤炭企业低碳减排路径分析[J/OL].系统科学学报,2019(02):132-136.
[13]林彤,宋戈.基于规模经营的农地流转策略演化博弈分析—以黑龙江省克山县为例[J].干旱区资源与环境,2018,32(07):15-22.
[14]傅沂,欧阳熹薇.不完全契约视角下养老地产发展模式转型的演化博弈分析[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2018,24(05):94-106.
[15]姚洪兴,狄红星,丁娟.两类零售企业竞争策略选择的演化博弈分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2007(20):7-13.
[2]张振勇.利益博弈、同意一致性与农村宅基地制度演化[J].西北农林科技大学学报(社会科学版),2014,14(2):18-24.
[3]杨梅,郝华勇.特色小镇引领乡村振兴机理研究[J].开放导报,2018(02):72-77.
[4]郝华勇.以特色小镇引领农村一二三产业融合发展研究[J].农业经济,2018(02):3-5.
[5]李凌岚,安诣彬,郭戍.“上”“下”结合的特色小镇可持续发展路径[J].规划师,2018,34(01):5-11.
[6]王玮,黄春晓.江苏省农业特色小镇建设现状与路径研究[J].江苏农业科学,2018,46(12):315-319.
[7]鲁钰雯,翟国方,施益军,周姝天.中外特色小镇发展模式比较研究[J].世界农业,2018(10):187-193+267.
[8]余茜,李冬梅.农业特色小镇发展模式比较研究—以浙江省余杭市春风长乐小镇和陕西省杨凌区五泉.镇为例[J].世界农业,2018(02):53-59.
[9]李冬梅,郑林凤,林赛男,余茜,张社梅,王芳.农业特色小镇形成机理与路径优化—基于成都模式的案例分析[J].中国软科学,2018(05):79-90.
[10]王薇,张守健,孙智.基于演化博弈的工程建设标准采纳行为研究[J].科技管理研究,2018,38(20):243-248.
[11]魏莉,陈伟达,杨烨.环保第三方监督下钢铁企业碳减排行为及其演化动态[J].工业工程与管理,2019(1):72-79.
[12]吕永卫,霍丽娜.基于演化博弈的煤炭企业低碳减排路径分析[J/OL].系统科学学报,2019(02):132-136.
[13]林彤,宋戈.基于规模经营的农地流转策略演化博弈分析—以黑龙江省克山县为例[J].干旱区资源与环境,2018,32(07):15-22.
[14]傅沂,欧阳熹薇.不完全契约视角下养老地产发展模式转型的演化博弈分析[J].中南大学学报(社会科学版),2018,24(05):94-106.
[15]姚洪兴,狄红星,丁娟.两类零售企业竞争策略选择的演化博弈分析[J].数学的实践与认识,2007(20):7-13.