信息共享、债权人保护与银行贷款:来自中国境外贷款的实证研究
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摘要
在法律权利和执行能力对设立企业银行贷款合同的影响方面,传统研究主要关注债权人权利和财产权保护程度对企业银行贷款利差的影响,然而信贷信息共享可以直接减少信息不对称,从而降低投资人的违约风险,所以笔者创新性地加入了信息共享变量来研究不同国家之间信贷信息共享程度、债权人权利和财产权保护的差别是否会影响所在国借款人的贷款利差。笔者选取2014至2016年间中国借给来自22个国家的借款公司的银团贷款数据,通过实证检验,结果表明,国家的信贷信息共享程度越高,贷款利差越低。其次,不考虑信贷信息共享程度时,所在国债权人权利和财产权保护水平对贷款利差都有显著影响,法律对投资者的保护越好,企业承担的贷款利差越低。然而由于减少了信息不对称问题,信息共享这一变量的存在削弱了债权和财产权保护程度与贷款利差之间的负向关系。政策方面,笔者建议以建立信息机构增强信息共享为主,这对"一带一路"经济体有效获得资金支持具有显著意义。
In terms of the effect of legal rights and enforcement on the establishment of bank loan contracts,traditional studies mainly focus on how the creditor rights protection and property rights protection influence bank loan spreads.However,credit information sharing can reduce information asymmetry directly which can help decrease the default risk for investors.Therefore,our research adds the variable about information sharing and then examines whether difference in information sharing,creditor rights and property rights will affect the loan spread to borrowers.We focus on loans with Chinese lenders and borrowers in 22 countries during year 2014 to year 2016.The empirical results show that better and higher credit information sharing are associated with lower loan spreads.Besides,without considering information sharing,the extent of creditor rights and property rights protection has significant negative impact on loan spreads.However,information sharing undermines the negative influence of creditor rights and property rights on loan spreads due to reducing the information asymmetry problem.As for policy advice,we suggest to pay attention to constructing information sharing agencies which plays an important role in obtaining capital efficiently for the Belt and Road economies.
In terms of the effect of legal rights and enforcement on the establishment of bank loan contracts,traditional studies mainly focus on how the creditor rights protection and property rights protection influence bank loan spreads.However,credit information sharing can reduce information asymmetry directly which can help decrease the default risk for investors.Therefore,our research adds the variable about information sharing and then examines whether difference in information sharing,creditor rights and property rights will affect the loan spread to borrowers.We focus on loans with Chinese lenders and borrowers in 22 countries during year 2014 to year 2016.The empirical results show that better and higher credit information sharing are associated with lower loan spreads.Besides,without considering information sharing,the extent of creditor rights and property rights protection has significant negative impact on loan spreads.However,information sharing undermines the negative influence of creditor rights and property rights on loan spreads due to reducing the information asymmetry problem.As for policy advice,we suggest to pay attention to constructing information sharing agencies which plays an important role in obtaining capital efficiently for the Belt and Road economies.
引文
[1]郑雪峰,刘立峰.“一带一路”的投融资问题及对策建议[J].中国经贸导刊,2018,898(15):36-38.
[2]Bae K H,Goyal V K.Creditor Rights,Enforcement,and Bank Loans[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2009,64(2):823-860.
[3]Houston J F,Lin C,Lin P.Creditor Rights,Information Sharing,and Bank Risk Taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):485-512.
[4]郑联盛.“一带一路”项目金融需求的供给匹配[J].开放导报,2019(1):35-39.
[5]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanesn F,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Law and Finance[Z].NBER Working Paper,1996,106(6):1113-1115.
[6]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanesn F,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Legal Determinants of External Finance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):1131-1155.
[7]Bhattacharya U,Daouk H.The World Price of Insider Trading[J].The Journal of Finance,2002,57(1):75-108.
[8]Bhattacharya U,Daouk H.When No Law Is Better than a Good Law[J].Review of Finance,2009,13(4):577-627.
[9]Qian J,Strahan P E.How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts:The Case of Bank Loans[J].The Journal of Finance,2007,62(6):2803-2834.
[10]Laeven L.Does Judicial Efficiency Lower the Cost of Credit?[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2016,29(7):1791-1812.
[11]Jappelli T,Bianco P M.Courts and Banks:Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2005,37(2):223-244.
[12]Pinneiro A C,Cabral C.Credit Markets in Brazil:The Role of Judicial Enforcement and Other Institutions[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,1999.
[13]Claessens S.Bankruptcy around the World:Explanations of Its Relative Use[J].American Law and Economics Review,2005,7(1):253-283.
[14]Gatti S,Kleimeier S,Megginson W L,et al.Arranger Certification in Project Finance[J].Financial Management,2013,42(1):1-40.
[15]邵明波.法治、金融发展与银行贷款长期化[J].世界经济文汇,2010,(2):56-68.
[16]郑志刚,邓贺斐.法律环境差异和区域金融发展——金融发展决定因素基于我国省级面板数据的考察[J].管理世界,2010(6):14-27.
[17]魏锋,沈坤荣.所有制、债权人保护与企业信用贷款[J].金融研究,2009(9):26-39.
[18]Stiglitz J E,Weiss A.Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information[J].American Economic Review,1981,71(3):393-410.
[19]Djankov S,McLiesh C,Shleifer A.Private Credit in 129 Countries[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:299-329.
[20]Beck T,Levine R,Loayza N.Finance and the Sources of Growth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:261-300.
[21]Brown M,Jappelli T,Pagano M.Information Sharing and Credit:Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):151-172.
[22]Kroszner R S,Laeven L,Klingebiel D.Banking Crises,Financial Dependence,and Growth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:187-228.
[23]Barth J R,Lin C,Lin P,et al.Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms:Cross Country Micro Evidence on the Beneficial Role of Competition and Information Sharing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,91(3):361-388.
[24]袁海博.对我国中小企业融资难问题的研究与思考[J].经济视角,2010(2):13-16.
[25]周宏,杨萌萌,李远远.企业债券信用风险影响因素研究评述[J].经济学动态,2010(12):137-140.
[26]周宏,林晚发,李国平,等.信息不对称与企业债券信用风险估价——基于2008—2011年中国企业债券数据[J].会计研究,2012(12):36-42.
[27]Alberto B,Marco P,Salvatore P.Multiple Bank Lending,Creditor Rights,and Information Sharing[J].Review of Finance,2015,19:519-570.
[28]Morck R,Yu W,Yeung B Y.The Information Content of Stock Markets:Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:215-260.
[29]Miller,M.Credit Reporting around the Globe:The State of the Art in Public Credit Registries and Private Credit Reporting Firms[M]//Miller M.Credit Reporting Systems and International Economy.MIT Press,Cambridge,MA,2005:25-80.
[30]Esty B C,Megginson W L.Creditor Rights,Enforcement,and Debt Ownership Structure:Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):37-60.
[31]Myers S.Determinants of Corporate Borrowing[J].Financial Economics,1977,5(2):147-175.
[32]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanesn F,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
(1)仅在此处描述变量中位数的统计特征,回归中并未使用中位数。
(1)银团贷款(辛迪加贷款):两家或两家以上银行基于相同贷款条件,依据同一贷款协议,按约定时间和比例,通过代理行向借款人提供的本外币贷款。它与普通的贷款相比,主要优点有:(1)摆脱资金限制,能够提供足够规模的大额贷款;(2)实现风险共担,减小风险冲击造成单个银行的巨大损失;(3)实现资源多元化整合,提高贷款效率(郑联盛,2019[4])。
(2)第三个衡量财产权保护的变量——私人财产征用风险,由于没有找到合适的数据所以没有采用。
(3)为了节省空间,具体解释见附录一。
(4)如果信贷社或信贷登记处不营业或者覆盖少于5%的成人人口,那么信贷信息深度指数的得分为0。其余八个方面的得分见附录二。
(5)Dealscan数据库来源于汤森路透Loan Pricing Corporation(LPC)数据库,它是关于银团贷款的全球实时与历史数据库,内容包括贷款与债券的合同条款、利率等核心信息。我们用从Dealscan数据库中得到的贷款数据,基于相同的公司名字和手动筛选,来与Worldscope中的借款人公司数据相匹配,同时与使用LIBOR作为利差的贷款数据相匹配,最终得出实证所需的相关数据。
(6)因我们无法找到中国和俄罗斯之间的匹配数据,因此总观察量减少到327。
[2]Bae K H,Goyal V K.Creditor Rights,Enforcement,and Bank Loans[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,2009,64(2):823-860.
[3]Houston J F,Lin C,Lin P.Creditor Rights,Information Sharing,and Bank Risk Taking[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2010,96(3):485-512.
[4]郑联盛.“一带一路”项目金融需求的供给匹配[J].开放导报,2019(1):35-39.
[5]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanesn F,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Law and Finance[Z].NBER Working Paper,1996,106(6):1113-1115.
[6]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanesn F,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Legal Determinants of External Finance[J].Journal of Finance,1997(52):1131-1155.
[7]Bhattacharya U,Daouk H.The World Price of Insider Trading[J].The Journal of Finance,2002,57(1):75-108.
[8]Bhattacharya U,Daouk H.When No Law Is Better than a Good Law[J].Review of Finance,2009,13(4):577-627.
[9]Qian J,Strahan P E.How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts:The Case of Bank Loans[J].The Journal of Finance,2007,62(6):2803-2834.
[10]Laeven L.Does Judicial Efficiency Lower the Cost of Credit?[J].Journal of Banking & Finance,2016,29(7):1791-1812.
[11]Jappelli T,Bianco P M.Courts and Banks:Effects of Judicial Enforcement on Credit Markets[J].Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2005,37(2):223-244.
[12]Pinneiro A C,Cabral C.Credit Markets in Brazil:The Role of Judicial Enforcement and Other Institutions[J].SSRN Electronic Journal,1999.
[13]Claessens S.Bankruptcy around the World:Explanations of Its Relative Use[J].American Law and Economics Review,2005,7(1):253-283.
[14]Gatti S,Kleimeier S,Megginson W L,et al.Arranger Certification in Project Finance[J].Financial Management,2013,42(1):1-40.
[15]邵明波.法治、金融发展与银行贷款长期化[J].世界经济文汇,2010,(2):56-68.
[16]郑志刚,邓贺斐.法律环境差异和区域金融发展——金融发展决定因素基于我国省级面板数据的考察[J].管理世界,2010(6):14-27.
[17]魏锋,沈坤荣.所有制、债权人保护与企业信用贷款[J].金融研究,2009(9):26-39.
[18]Stiglitz J E,Weiss A.Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information[J].American Economic Review,1981,71(3):393-410.
[19]Djankov S,McLiesh C,Shleifer A.Private Credit in 129 Countries[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:299-329.
[20]Beck T,Levine R,Loayza N.Finance and the Sources of Growth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:261-300.
[21]Brown M,Jappelli T,Pagano M.Information Sharing and Credit:Firm-Level Evidence from Transition Countries[J].Journal of Financial Intermediation,2009,18(2):151-172.
[22]Kroszner R S,Laeven L,Klingebiel D.Banking Crises,Financial Dependence,and Growth[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:187-228.
[23]Barth J R,Lin C,Lin P,et al.Corruption in Bank Lending to Firms:Cross Country Micro Evidence on the Beneficial Role of Competition and Information Sharing[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2009,91(3):361-388.
[24]袁海博.对我国中小企业融资难问题的研究与思考[J].经济视角,2010(2):13-16.
[25]周宏,杨萌萌,李远远.企业债券信用风险影响因素研究评述[J].经济学动态,2010(12):137-140.
[26]周宏,林晚发,李国平,等.信息不对称与企业债券信用风险估价——基于2008—2011年中国企业债券数据[J].会计研究,2012(12):36-42.
[27]Alberto B,Marco P,Salvatore P.Multiple Bank Lending,Creditor Rights,and Information Sharing[J].Review of Finance,2015,19:519-570.
[28]Morck R,Yu W,Yeung B Y.The Information Content of Stock Markets:Why do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:215-260.
[29]Miller,M.Credit Reporting around the Globe:The State of the Art in Public Credit Registries and Private Credit Reporting Firms[M]//Miller M.Credit Reporting Systems and International Economy.MIT Press,Cambridge,MA,2005:25-80.
[30]Esty B C,Megginson W L.Creditor Rights,Enforcement,and Debt Ownership Structure:Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003,38(1):37-60.
[31]Myers S.Determinants of Corporate Borrowing[J].Financial Economics,1977,5(2):147-175.
[32]La Porta R,Lopez-De-Silanesn F,Shleifer A,Vishny R W.Law and Finance[J].Journal of Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
(1)仅在此处描述变量中位数的统计特征,回归中并未使用中位数。
(1)银团贷款(辛迪加贷款):两家或两家以上银行基于相同贷款条件,依据同一贷款协议,按约定时间和比例,通过代理行向借款人提供的本外币贷款。它与普通的贷款相比,主要优点有:(1)摆脱资金限制,能够提供足够规模的大额贷款;(2)实现风险共担,减小风险冲击造成单个银行的巨大损失;(3)实现资源多元化整合,提高贷款效率(郑联盛,2019[4])。
(2)第三个衡量财产权保护的变量——私人财产征用风险,由于没有找到合适的数据所以没有采用。
(3)为了节省空间,具体解释见附录一。
(4)如果信贷社或信贷登记处不营业或者覆盖少于5%的成人人口,那么信贷信息深度指数的得分为0。其余八个方面的得分见附录二。
(5)Dealscan数据库来源于汤森路透Loan Pricing Corporation(LPC)数据库,它是关于银团贷款的全球实时与历史数据库,内容包括贷款与债券的合同条款、利率等核心信息。我们用从Dealscan数据库中得到的贷款数据,基于相同的公司名字和手动筛选,来与Worldscope中的借款人公司数据相匹配,同时与使用LIBOR作为利差的贷款数据相匹配,最终得出实证所需的相关数据。
(6)因我们无法找到中国和俄罗斯之间的匹配数据,因此总观察量减少到327。