企业内部薪酬差距与人力资本结构调整
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摘要
本文考察薪酬差距如何影响企业内部的人力资本结构变动。基于员工不同教育程度划分人力资本层次,本文研究发现:(1)薪酬差距的增加显著降低了大学学历员工的比例,同时提升了高中及以下学历员工的比例;(2)通过构造工具变量和基于全球性经济危机的场景设定,我们发现薪酬差距和人力资本结构之间存在显著的因果关系;(3)在薪酬差距水平较高的情况下,薪酬差距的增加显著吸引了更有可能进入企业中高层的高学历员工。在薪酬差距水平较低的情况下,扩大薪酬差距显著提升(降低)了高中及以下学历(大学学历)员工比例,一个可能原因在于不同学历员工的议价能力存在差异。(4)薪酬差距与人力资本结构变化之间的相关性主要体现在规模较大、管理者平均年龄较低的企业。(5)人力资本结构在薪酬差距影响创新的过程中发挥了显著的中介效应,薪酬差距提升了研究生和本科学历员工比例,促进了企业创新。
Although human capital theory was a revolutionary and controversial concept when it was first proposed in the 1960 s,it has evolved into one of the most universally accepted research objects in economics and other social sciences. The research on human capital and economic consumption has mainly been conducted at the theoretical or macro levelusingfactors such as economic growth,the wage contract,and life cycle. In contrast,studies from a micro perspective focus on the returns from investments in private education and health.As a result,little firm level research is available. Moreover,in recent years,the pay gap between executives and employees has attracted significant attention from the media,the public,and the government. For example,in January 1,2015,the Chinese government implemented a salary reform scheme for central enterprise principals,targeting around 200 executives from 72 SOEs. This reform reducedthe executive-worker pay ratio to about eight times. However,further research is needed on the economic consequences of the intra-firm pay gap between executives and employees.In this paper,we examine the impact of the pay gap between executives and employees on the human capital structure of firms. Research has shown that the intra-firm pay gap has a significant influence on firm performance and productivity,and that this influence originates from the incentive effect of the pay gap on different levels of employees. We argue that the firm pay gap can affect the human capital structure of a firm by altering the incentives of both managers and employees. We use two competing theories to describe the economic incentives of pay gaps: tournament theory and comparison theory. In addition,we usethe economic theories of matching and managerial talent to explain some of our results. Practically,firms match the various abilities of managers by designing different pay policies. Moreover,different compensation contracts provide different choices for employees with different levels of education. Therefore,it is important to investigate how the pay gap affects the human capital structure of firms.We manually collect education data on the employees of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2015.Specifically,we classify human capital into three types: high education employees, medium education employees,and low education employees. We use the ratio of the average managers' compensation to the average employees' salary to measure the intra-firm pay gap. We obtain financial data and corporate governance information about the listed firms from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research( CSMAR)database and the WIND database. We also exclude firms from the financial industry. Our analyses generate the following findings. First,a firm's pay gap reduces the ratio of bachelor degree employees,and increases the ratio of employees with low education. Second,using an instrumental variable approach and a scenario analysis of the global economic crisis,we find that the pay gap has a causal impact on the human capital structure of firms. Third,for firms with a small pay gap,enlarging a firm's pay gap significantly increases the ratio of employees with a low education,whereas it reduces the ratio of employees with a mid-level education. A possible explanation for this is that employees with different levels of education have different degrees of bargaining power. However,for the firms with a high pay gap,increasing the pay gap has a positive effect in attracting employees with a high level of education who maybe future managers. Fourth,the relation between a firm's pay gap and the changes in the human capital structure are more salient in firms that are large or employ young executives. Finally,human capital has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between a firm's pay gap and innovation,which suggests thata high pay gap increases the ratio of highly educated employees and thus leads to more innovation.This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First,we measure firms' human capital using their employees' educational data,and thus are able to provide direct evidence of firms' human capital. Second,we examine the effects of the intra-firm pay dispersion on the structure of human capitalat the firm level,which provides a relatively new angle for uncovering the economic consequences of the intra-firm pay gap. Third,our findings provide clear policy implications by showing the relationship between the pay gap and a firm's human capital structure. To match the human capital structure to the development of firms,policy makers need to designan effective compensation system.
Although human capital theory was a revolutionary and controversial concept when it was first proposed in the 1960 s,it has evolved into one of the most universally accepted research objects in economics and other social sciences. The research on human capital and economic consumption has mainly been conducted at the theoretical or macro levelusingfactors such as economic growth,the wage contract,and life cycle. In contrast,studies from a micro perspective focus on the returns from investments in private education and health.As a result,little firm level research is available. Moreover,in recent years,the pay gap between executives and employees has attracted significant attention from the media,the public,and the government. For example,in January 1,2015,the Chinese government implemented a salary reform scheme for central enterprise principals,targeting around 200 executives from 72 SOEs. This reform reducedthe executive-worker pay ratio to about eight times. However,further research is needed on the economic consequences of the intra-firm pay gap between executives and employees.In this paper,we examine the impact of the pay gap between executives and employees on the human capital structure of firms. Research has shown that the intra-firm pay gap has a significant influence on firm performance and productivity,and that this influence originates from the incentive effect of the pay gap on different levels of employees. We argue that the firm pay gap can affect the human capital structure of a firm by altering the incentives of both managers and employees. We use two competing theories to describe the economic incentives of pay gaps: tournament theory and comparison theory. In addition,we usethe economic theories of matching and managerial talent to explain some of our results. Practically,firms match the various abilities of managers by designing different pay policies. Moreover,different compensation contracts provide different choices for employees with different levels of education. Therefore,it is important to investigate how the pay gap affects the human capital structure of firms.We manually collect education data on the employees of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2015.Specifically,we classify human capital into three types: high education employees, medium education employees,and low education employees. We use the ratio of the average managers' compensation to the average employees' salary to measure the intra-firm pay gap. We obtain financial data and corporate governance information about the listed firms from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research( CSMAR)database and the WIND database. We also exclude firms from the financial industry. Our analyses generate the following findings. First,a firm's pay gap reduces the ratio of bachelor degree employees,and increases the ratio of employees with low education. Second,using an instrumental variable approach and a scenario analysis of the global economic crisis,we find that the pay gap has a causal impact on the human capital structure of firms. Third,for firms with a small pay gap,enlarging a firm's pay gap significantly increases the ratio of employees with a low education,whereas it reduces the ratio of employees with a mid-level education. A possible explanation for this is that employees with different levels of education have different degrees of bargaining power. However,for the firms with a high pay gap,increasing the pay gap has a positive effect in attracting employees with a high level of education who maybe future managers. Fourth,the relation between a firm's pay gap and the changes in the human capital structure are more salient in firms that are large or employ young executives. Finally,human capital has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between a firm's pay gap and innovation,which suggests thata high pay gap increases the ratio of highly educated employees and thus leads to more innovation.This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First,we measure firms' human capital using their employees' educational data,and thus are able to provide direct evidence of firms' human capital. Second,we examine the effects of the intra-firm pay dispersion on the structure of human capitalat the firm level,which provides a relatively new angle for uncovering the economic consequences of the intra-firm pay gap. Third,our findings provide clear policy implications by showing the relationship between the pay gap and a firm's human capital structure. To match the human capital structure to the development of firms,policy makers need to designan effective compensation system.
引文
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[6]黎文靖和胡玉明,2012,《国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?》,《经济研究》第12期,第125～136页。
[7]黎文靖和郑曼妮,2016,《实质性创新还是策略性创新?》,《经济研究》第4期,第60～73页。
[8]梁上坤和陈冬华,2014,《业绩波动性与高管薪酬契约选择》,《金融研究》第1期,第167～179页。
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1本文的研究中:高层人力资本比例+中层人力资本比例+高中及以下人力资本比例=1,由于总体上薪酬差距对高层人力资本比例没有显著的影响,那么可能存在这样的关系:对中层人力资本比例产生负向影响的原因可能也是对高中及以下人力资本比例产生正向影响的原因,对高中及以下人力资本比例产生正向影响的原因也即是对中层人力资本比例产生负影响影响的原因。文章暂时无法识别哪个学历层次的员工为主要驱因素,这也成为作者未来需要进一步探索的问题。
2我们从CSMAR数据库中下载上市企业每年“董监高”人员的学历披露情况数据,分别计算了企业-年的每种学历层次的“董监高”人数在各学历层次中的占比。描述性统计发现:平均而言“董监高”人数在高学历员工中的比重最大(14. 3%),其次是中等学历员工以及高中及以下学历员工(分别是1. 67%和0. 11%)。在高学历员工中,普通员工的比例仍占大部分。一方面,这类高学历员工已经(很小部分)或可能成为未来的管理者,薪酬差距的提升对高层人力资本没有发挥出显著的作用;另一方面,由于作为普通员工中的一员(80%以上的高学历员工仍为普通员工),他们会被较高的员工工资所激励,因此员工工资与高层人力资本之间体现出显著的正相关关系。
1在这里,我们对路径探究得出的结论并不是非此即彼。薪酬差距在影响人力资本结构的过程中,“主动”与“被动”调整的情形都有可能存在,而这部分的实证检验旨在证明“主动”路径的存在性。
1一般而言,在劳动力市场中,能够获得较高工资水平的员工,其议价能力相对较强,反之较弱。基于这个前提,我们对高/低薪酬差距组别的员工学历和薪酬水平的比例进行了统计,结果发现:企业薪酬差距较低的组别中,员工议价能力高的观测值占多数(33. 9%),与之相反,在企业薪酬差距较高的组别中,员工议价能力低的观测值占多数(33%)。这说明薪酬差距低(PayG ap Low)的组别,员工因为有较强的议价能力,可以自主选择进入或退出某个企业,因此薪酬差距对中等和较低人力资本的比例变化有显著影响;薪酬差距高(PayG ap High)的组别,由于员工的议价能力较弱,因此薪酬差距的变化对中等和高中及以及学历人力资本比例没有显著影响,而只是对高层人力资本员工的偏好发挥了显著的作用(正相关)。
1关于管理者平均年龄和人力资本结构的探究,通过实证检验我们发现,管理者的平均年龄与薪酬差距存在显著的正相关关系(未在正文中报告),说明管理者的平均年龄越大,管理者和员工之间的薪酬差距越大。直觉上,随着工作年限的增加,员工工资会有向下的刚性和向上的弹性,并且由于担任管理者年限较长的员工,可能随着职位的提升,对公平性的偏好也会改变,因此当管理者的平均年龄较大,对公平性的偏好降低,从而体现出更高的薪酬差距。
1人力资本结构的变动对企业的影响存在一个长期效应,正如Waldinger(2016)通过研究人力资本和物质资本在影响一个国家产出的差异时,发现人力资本不仅较物质资本而言对产出有更大的影响,并且人力资本的影响存在长期性,而物质资本并不存在。因此我们主要报告了因变量(LnPatent和LnPatent1)先导三期的结果,事实上我们也对先导一期的因变量进行了相同的检验,结果一致。
[2]陈冬华、范从来和沈永建,2015,《高管与员工:激励有效性之比较与互动》,《管理世界》第5期,第160～171页。
[3]程新生、刘建梅和陈靖涵,2015,《才能信号抑或薪酬辩护:超额薪酬与战略信息披露》,《金融研究》第12期,第146～161页。
[4]孔东民、徐茗丽和孔高文,2017,《企业内部薪酬差距与创新》,《经济研究》第10期,第144～156页。
[5]李海峥、梁赟玲、刘智强和王小军,2010,《中国人力资本测度与指数构建》,《经济研究》第10期,第42～54页。
[6]黎文靖和胡玉明,2012,《国企内部薪酬差距激励了谁?》,《经济研究》第12期,第125～136页。
[7]黎文靖和郑曼妮,2016,《实质性创新还是策略性创新?》,《经济研究》第4期,第60～73页。
[8]梁上坤和陈冬华,2014,《业绩波动性与高管薪酬契约选择》,《金融研究》第1期,第167～179页。
[9]刘春和孙亮,2010,《薪酬差距与企业绩效:来自国企上市公司的经验证据》,《南开管理评论》第2期,第30～39页。
[10]缪毅和胡奕明,2016,《内部收入差距,辩护动机与高管薪酬辩护》,《南开管理评论》第2期,第32～41页。
[11]谢德仁、林乐和陈运森,2012,《薪酬委员会独立性与更高的经理人报酬-业绩敏感度---基于薪酬辩护假说的分析和检验》,《管理世界》第1期,第121～140页。
[12]杨志强和王华,2014,《公司内部薪酬差距,股权集中度与盈余管理行为》,《会计研究》第6期,第57～65页。
[13]温忠麟、张雷、侯杰泰和刘红云,2004,《中介效应检验程序及其应用》,《心理学报》第5期,第614～620页。
[14]Abdel-Khalik,A.R.2003.“Self-sorting,Incentive Compensation and Human-capital Assets”European Accounting Review,12(4):661～697.
[15]Abowd,J.M.1990.“Does Performance-based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance”ILR Review,43(3):52～73.
[16]Alesina,A.,R.Di Tella,and R.Mac Culloch.2004.“Inequality and Happiness:are Europeans and Americans Different?”Journal of Public Economics,88(9):2009～2042.
[17]Banker,R.D.,D.Bu,and M.N.Mehta.2016.“Pay Gap and Performance in China”Abacus,52(3),501～531.
[18]Bebchuk L.,and Y.Grinstein.2005.“Firm Expansion and CEO Pay”National Bureau of Economic Research.
[19]Becker,G.S.1962.“Investment in Human Capital:A Theoretical Analysis”Journal of Political Economy,70(5,Part2),9～49.
[20]Becker,G.S.,and Chiswick B.R.1966.“Education and the Distribution of Earnings”The American Economic Review,56(1/2):358～369.
[21]Belloc,F.2012.“Corporate Governance and Innovation:A Survey”Journal of Economic Surveys,26(5):835～864.
[22]Cauchie,G.,and N.G.Vaillant.2016.“New Firm Survival:Isolating the Role of Founders'Human Capital in Accounting for Firm Longevity”Journal of Human Capital,10(2):186～211.
[23]Chen C X.,and T.Sandino.2012.“Can Wages Buy Honesty?The Relationship between Relative Wages and Employee Theft”Journal of Accounting Research,50(4):967～1000.
[24]Dai,Y.,D.Kong,and J.Xu.2017.“Does Fairness Breed Efficiency?Pay Gap and Firm Productivity in China”International Review of Economics&Finance,48:406～422.
[25]Denison,E.F.1962.“The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States”Committee for Economic Development,New York.
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1本文的研究中:高层人力资本比例+中层人力资本比例+高中及以下人力资本比例=1,由于总体上薪酬差距对高层人力资本比例没有显著的影响,那么可能存在这样的关系:对中层人力资本比例产生负向影响的原因可能也是对高中及以下人力资本比例产生正向影响的原因,对高中及以下人力资本比例产生正向影响的原因也即是对中层人力资本比例产生负影响影响的原因。文章暂时无法识别哪个学历层次的员工为主要驱因素,这也成为作者未来需要进一步探索的问题。
2我们从CSMAR数据库中下载上市企业每年“董监高”人员的学历披露情况数据,分别计算了企业-年的每种学历层次的“董监高”人数在各学历层次中的占比。描述性统计发现:平均而言“董监高”人数在高学历员工中的比重最大(14. 3%),其次是中等学历员工以及高中及以下学历员工(分别是1. 67%和0. 11%)。在高学历员工中,普通员工的比例仍占大部分。一方面,这类高学历员工已经(很小部分)或可能成为未来的管理者,薪酬差距的提升对高层人力资本没有发挥出显著的作用;另一方面,由于作为普通员工中的一员(80%以上的高学历员工仍为普通员工),他们会被较高的员工工资所激励,因此员工工资与高层人力资本之间体现出显著的正相关关系。
1在这里,我们对路径探究得出的结论并不是非此即彼。薪酬差距在影响人力资本结构的过程中,“主动”与“被动”调整的情形都有可能存在,而这部分的实证检验旨在证明“主动”路径的存在性。
1一般而言,在劳动力市场中,能够获得较高工资水平的员工,其议价能力相对较强,反之较弱。基于这个前提,我们对高/低薪酬差距组别的员工学历和薪酬水平的比例进行了统计,结果发现:企业薪酬差距较低的组别中,员工议价能力高的观测值占多数(33. 9%),与之相反,在企业薪酬差距较高的组别中,员工议价能力低的观测值占多数(33%)。这说明薪酬差距低(PayG ap Low)的组别,员工因为有较强的议价能力,可以自主选择进入或退出某个企业,因此薪酬差距对中等和较低人力资本的比例变化有显著影响;薪酬差距高(PayG ap High)的组别,由于员工的议价能力较弱,因此薪酬差距的变化对中等和高中及以及学历人力资本比例没有显著影响,而只是对高层人力资本员工的偏好发挥了显著的作用(正相关)。
1关于管理者平均年龄和人力资本结构的探究,通过实证检验我们发现,管理者的平均年龄与薪酬差距存在显著的正相关关系(未在正文中报告),说明管理者的平均年龄越大,管理者和员工之间的薪酬差距越大。直觉上,随着工作年限的增加,员工工资会有向下的刚性和向上的弹性,并且由于担任管理者年限较长的员工,可能随着职位的提升,对公平性的偏好也会改变,因此当管理者的平均年龄较大,对公平性的偏好降低,从而体现出更高的薪酬差距。
1人力资本结构的变动对企业的影响存在一个长期效应,正如Waldinger(2016)通过研究人力资本和物质资本在影响一个国家产出的差异时,发现人力资本不仅较物质资本而言对产出有更大的影响,并且人力资本的影响存在长期性,而物质资本并不存在。因此我们主要报告了因变量(LnPatent和LnPatent1)先导三期的结果,事实上我们也对先导一期的因变量进行了相同的检验,结果一致。