摘要
交通基础设施作为经济社会发展的重要基础和前提条件，是我国现阶段基础设施投资的重点领域。由于交通基础设施项目具有投资规模大、投资回收期长等特征，传统的以政府公共资金为主导的投融资模式已不能完全满足我国交通基础设施建设发展的需要，社会资本被逐步引入。近年来，利用社会资本进入交通基础设施领域最常用的方式是BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer)模式，该模式不仅可以减轻政府投资的资金压力，还可以提高项目运营效率，因此，BOT模式在交通基础设施项目上得到越来越广泛的运用，但是BOT模式不能直接应用于经济效益不佳的交通基础设施如城市轨道交通项目，此时政府需要对其进行补偿，才能保障项目的有效实施。目前，在项目实践中，政府通常采用资本补偿SBOT(Subsidize inBuilding, Operate and Transfer)模式来运作城市轨道交通项目如北京地铁4号线等。
BOT/SBOT项目的核心是特许权协议，特许期是特许权协议的一个关键决策变量。特许期的长短直接关系到公共部门和私营部门的利益，特许期过短，私营部门则会制定较高的收费机制从而把部分风险转移给项目使用者，进而损害公众利益；特许期过长，在项目经济寿命一定的情况下，则会减少特许期期满后公共部门的项目运营期，进而损害公共部门利益。因此，合理的特许期对BOT/SBOT项目的成功运作至关重要。
交通基础设施项目一般具有投资不可逆、预期收益不确定、投资时机有一定回旋余地等不确定特征，因此，在BOT项目价值评估与投资决策过程中应该考虑项目延迟期权的价值。而现有的BOT项目特许期决策模型主要以DCF (DiscountedCash Flow)方法为基础的，由于DCF方法没有考虑到项目预期现金流量的不确定性和项目执行过程中的灵活性问题，应用传统的DCF方法进行BOT项目投资评估和决策，会忽视项目延迟期权的价值，造成项目价值被低估，进而导致特许期决策失误。而且现有文献对BOT项目特许期的决策模型研究主要集中在财务评价可行的BOT项目，缺乏对政府资本补偿下SBOT项目的研究，而政府资本补偿数量和特许期是SBOT项目特许权协议的两个关键决策变量，政府资本补偿数量的大小直接关系到SBOT项目特许期的长短。鉴于此，本文针对不确定收益下特许期的决策问题，分别以交通BOT/SBOT项目为对象，利用实物期权和博弈论相结合的方法，研究了如何决策合理的特许期和政府资本补偿数量以协调BOT/SBOT项目中公共部门与私营部门之间的利益冲突。具体来说，本文主要开展了以下几方面的研究工作：
首先，针对不确定收益下财务评价可行交通BOT项目特许期的决策问题，以高速公路BOT项目为研究对象，利用实物期权和博弈论相结合的方法，构建了交通BOT项目特许期的决策模型，其决策程序分为两步：步骤一，依据项目预期现金流量，根据不确定条件下不可逆的投资理论，构建了公共部门/私营部门投资交通BOT项目的最优投资时机决策模型，得到特许期的可行域；步骤二，根据双方不同的策略行为，利用博弈论理论，分别构建了特许期的Stackelberg博弈模型和特许期的Nash协商模型，并分别求解出特许期的Stackelberg均衡解和特许期的Nash协商均衡解，最后通过实例对不确定收益下交通BOT项目特许期的决策模型进行了验证和分析。该研究不仅拓宽了实物期权不确定条件下不可逆的投资理论在BOT项目的应用范围，而且丰富了BOT项目特许期的决策方法，同时为公共部门和私营部门决策BOT项目特许期提供了一种新思路。
其次，针对财务评价不可行BOT项目的政府资本补偿数量决策模型，以城市轨道交通SBOT项目为研究对象，在综合考虑轨道交通项目财务经济效益和社会效益的基础上，提出公共部门/私营部门投资轨道交通SBOT项目的基准条件，采用加权平均资金成本作为私营部门的贴现率，构建了轨道交通SBOT项目资本补偿数量决策模型，并求解出政府资本补偿数量的可行域。该研究为政府确定和决策城市轨道交通SBOT项目资本补偿数量提供了系统的理论方法。
最后，在前面研究的基础上，借鉴不确定收益下财务可行交通BOT项目特许期决策模型的分析框架，根据城市轨道交通SBOT项目的特点，在综合考虑轨道交通项目财务经济效益和社会效益的基础上，研究了政府资本补偿一定条件下SBOT项目特许期的决策问题。其决策程序分为两步：步骤一，根据不确定条件下不可逆的投资理论，构建了公共部门/私营部门投资交通SBOT项目的最优投资时机决策模型，得到特许期的可行域；步骤二，根据双方不同的策略行为，利用博弈论理论，分别构建了特许期的合作博弈模型和特许期的Nash协商模型，并对特许期均衡解的性质进行了讨论，最后通过算例对不确定收益下交通SBOT项目特许期的决策模型及其性质进行了验证。该研究探索性地对政府资本补偿下SBOT项目特许期的决策模型进行研究，力图为公共部门和私营部门决策SBOT项目特许期提供理论依据。
As an important foundation and prerequisite for economic and social development,transportation infrastructure has been key investment in infrastructure areas designatedby the State. Due to large investment scale, the traditional investment and finance modewhich mainly relied on public funds cannot fully meet the needs for the developmentand construction of transportation infrastructure in China. In recent years, the mostcommonly way of attracting social capital to participate in transportation infrastructureis BOT procurement model. The BOT contract arrangement helps the governmentconcerned alleviate its financial burden while at the same time improve the efficiency ofthe project. Therefore, BOT procurement model has been widely applied to theinvestment and finance field of transportation infrastructure especially on highwayprojects. However, BOT procurement model cannot be directly used for financiallynon-viable transportation infrastructure projects such as urban rail transit projects. Forurban rail transit projects with economic feasible that are financially non-viable,government should provide them with subsidies which are adopted by BOTprocurement model for taking into account they have significant social benefits in noisepollution, accidents, air pollution, and other aspects compared with non-railtransportation projects. At present, in practice, SBOT (Subsidize in Building, Operateand Transfer) model has been adopted, such subway line4in Beijing etc.
The core of BOT/SBOT projects is concession contract. Concession period is thekey decision parameter in BOT-type. As the length of the concession period directlyaffects both the interests of the investor and the interests of the government concerned.Projects with a shorter concession period could result in not only the investmentperformance of the investor but also a higher toll/tariff regime transferred to the groupof people who use the infrastructure facility. On the other hand, granting an excessivelylong concession period means a shorter operation period after the concession periodexpiration when the project has a certain economic life which may result ingovernment’s loss. Therefore, the reasonable concession period is crucial to the successof BOT/SBOT project.
Because the investment on transportation projects is partially or completelyirreversible and the expected revenue from the investment is uncertain, project valuesshould include the value of option to defer in the project evaluation process. Without considering the uncertainty of the expected cash flow and management flexibility of theproject, the traditional investment decision method─DCF (Discount Cash Flow),ignores the potential value of the option to defer, causes the value of the project isunderestimated, and results in the longer of concession period. On the other hand, theexisting literature on the decision model of concession period is mainly focused onfinancial feasible BOT project but lack of research on SBOT. Therefore, this paper takestransportation BOT/SBOT project as research subject respectively, concentrates on howto decide a reasonable concession period to coordinate the interest conflict betweenpublic sector and private sector by using the method of combination of real options andgame theory. Specifically, this paper carried out the following research work:
Firstly, to provide a decision-making model on concession period of transportationBOT project with finically viable, this paper takes highway BOT projects as researchsubject. An alternative model for defining concession period is presented in this paperby using the combination of real options and game theory. The optimal concessionperiod can be identified through two procedures: First, real options theory is employedto construct models of investment threshold of public sector and private sectorrespectively, and an effective interval for concession period is determined; Furthermore,by considering the strategic behavior of the sectors, the paper establishes models ofconcession period by using Stackelberg game, cooperative game, and Nash negotiation,derives three equilibrium solutions. Finally, an actual highway BOT project is referredto demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed model. This research not onlyexpands the application range of real options theory to flexible BOT-type contractdesign but also enriches concession period decision theory, at the same time provides anew perspective for the public sector and private sector to determine a reasonableconcession period for transportation BOT projects with financially viable.
Secondly, to provide a decision-making model on the level of subsidies of BOTwith financially non-viable, this paper takes urban rail transit SBOT projects as researchsubject. This paper establishes the investment benchmark of SBOT project from privatesector’s and public sector’s viewpoints respectively, puts forward to quantitativedecision-making model for government subsidies, and further derives an effectiveinterval for government subsidies in urban rail transit SBOT project. Finally, anexample of urban rail transit SBOT project is applied to demonstrate thedecision-making model.
Finally, based on the previous research, this paper takes urban rail transit SBOT projects as research subject, studies the decision-making model on concession period ofSBOT projects given government subsidy by considering the combination of economicbenefits and social benefits. The optimal concession period can be identified throughtwo procedures: First, real options theory is employed to construct models of investmentthreshold of public sector and private sector respectively, and an effective interval forconcession period is determined; Furthermore, by considering the strategic behavior ofthe sectors, the paper establishes models of concession period by using cooperativegame, and Nash negotiation, derives two equilibrium solutions, and discuss thecharacteristics of the equilibrium solutions. Finally, an example of urban rail transitSBOT project is applied to demonstrate the decision-making model of concessionperiod under uncertainty. The exploratory research aims to provide theoretical analyticalframework for determining a reasonable concession period of SBOT projects withinitial subsidy.
引文
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